2026:JHHC:5660-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 486 of 2025 1. Daya Rani, W/o Late Shivji Paswan, R/o Village-Imlitola, P.O. & P.S.-Gulabbagh, District-Purnea (Bihar) 2. Hari Bilas Paswan, S/o Late Ram Sunder Paswan, R/o Village-Sani Mandir, P.O. & P.S.-Gulabbagh, District-Purnea (Bihar) 3. Sumitra Devi, W/o Late Jagdish Rai, R/o Village-Singia Tola, P.O. & P.S.-Gulabbagh, District-Purnea (Bihar) 4. Mahadeo Paswan, S/o Fulchand Paswan, R/o Village-Sani Mandir, P.O. & P.S.-Gulabbagh, District-Purnea (Bihar) 5. Harendra Nath Biswas, S/o Late Harlal Biswas, R/o Village-Ram Krishna Pali, P.O. & P.S.-Akalpur, District-Malda (West Bengal) ….. Appellants Versus 1. Union of India, through the Executive Director (IRS), Food Corporation of India Headquarters, New Delhi 2. The Executive Director (East), Food Corporation of India, Zonal Office (E), Kolkata (West Bengal) 3. The Assistant General Manager (Personnel), Regional Office, Food Corporation of India, Patna 4. The Manager (Karmik), Divisional Office, Food Corporation of India, Purnea (Bihar) ….. Respondents ----- CORAM HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR ----- For the Appellants: Mr. Niranjan Kumar, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Shubham Sinha, Advocate ----- 03/26.02.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This appeal challenges the order dated 21.01.2025 passed by learned Single Judge dismissing the petitioners’ writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 42 of 2025, which, in fact sought modification of the award dated 08.09.2011 disposing of Reference No. 130 of 1996. 3. By the award dated 08.09.2011, the services of the petitioners were in fact regularized. Such regularization was however from the date of the Tribunal’s order. The petitioners accepted the benefits under the said award without raising any grievance whatsoever. 4. However, the respondent-Food Corporation of India (FCI) challenged the Tribunal’s award dated 08.09.2011 before this 2026:JHHC:5660-DB 2 Court, however, this challenge was rejected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also did not entertain the special leave petition filed by the respondent-FCI. The award dated 08.09.2011, therefore, attained finality qua the parties. Significantly, during the entire process, even the appellants/petitioners did not challenge the Tribunal’s award dated 08.09.2011 on the ground that they should have been regularized from some earlier date i.e., the date of reference. 5. Some other set of employees, who were parties to Reference No. 165 of 1997, secured an award dated 27.08.2015, in which they were granted regularization from the date of the reference and not from the date of the Tribunal’s order. The petitioners, who had accepted the earlier award dated 08.09.2011 or in any event, who had chosen to sit on the fence from all this while, petitioned this Court vide W.P. (S) No. 42 of 2025 claiming that even they should be given the same benefits, which were granted to the workmen who were the parties to Reference No. 165 of 1997. Learned Single Judge has rejected this writ petition and we find no error whatsoever in the approach of the learned Single Judge. 6. The petitioners cannot seek benefits under some other award favouring an individual workman. If the petitioners were indeed aggrieved by the award dated 08.09.2011, they should have challenged the same. Instead, they chose to accept the benefits without any protest whatsoever. They even defended this award when the respondent-FCI challenged the same up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 7. At this stage, therefore, at the behest of the appellants/petitioners, there is no question of granting any relief to them, which would amount to modification of the award dated 08.09.2011. 2026:JHHC:5660-DB 3 8. That apart, we are satisfied that the present appeal is also hit by the delay and laches. The petitioners seek modification of the award dated 08.09.2011 by preferring an appeal in the year 2025. Assuming that their claim is based upon the award dated 27.08.2015, still the writ petition was filed after almost 10 years without any explanation for the inordinate delay. This is only an additional ground on which the writ petition could have been rejected, though this is not a ground adopted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 9. For the above reasons, we dismiss this appeal without any order of costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (RAJESH SHANKAR, J.) 26.02.2026 Satish/Vikas/