1 2026:CGHC:6367 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 99 of 2016 Ganesh Ram S/o Late Rajaram, Aged About 40 Years Caste- Kolta, R/o Village Gosaideeh, Tahsil Gharghoda, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh .....Defendant No.1 ... Appellant versus 1 - Safedram Pradhan S/o Late Rajaram, Aged About 55 Years Caste Kolta, R/o Village Gosaideeh, Tahsil Gharghoda, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.....Plaintiff 2 - The State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh....Defendant No.2 …. Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Aniruddha Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No.1 : Mr. S.A. Ansari, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 04/02/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 16.12.2015 passed by the learned 4th SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.02.06 17:08:43 +0530 2 Additional District Judge, Raigarh (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 242- A/2014 (Ganesh Ram vs. Safedram Pradhan & Anr.), affirming the judgment and decree dated 06.11.2013 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class-I, Gharghoda, District Raigarh (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 6-A/2010, whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/ defendant No.1 was dismissed. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellant/ defendant No.1. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The plaintiff filed the suit seeking declaration of title, possession, and permanent injunction, pleading inter alia that the suit property, being Khasra No. 6, area 2.696 hectares, was purchased by his father, late Rajaram, from Usha and Radha for a valuable consideration, which was fully paid and registration of the sale deed was to be done jointly in the names of plaintiff and defendant No.1. It is further pleaded that the defendant No.1, by deceit, had the property registered solely in his name and unlawfully claimed additional portions of the land. The plaintiff further pleads that after his father’s death on 06.07.2007, the defendant No.1 obstructed the plaintiff from cultivating the land, despite prior division of the property under a settlement deed dated 19.01.2007 and decisions taken in a Panchayat meeting, including transfer of proceeds and partition of the house. Hence, the plaintiff sought declaration of title, confirmation of possession and permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from 3 interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the suit property. 3. Per contra, Defendant No.1, in his written statement, while denying the entire claim of the plaintiff, contended that the plaintiff had falsely represented himself as belonging to a tribal community to secure employment in the Police Department and voluntarily resigned upon discovery by higher authorities. It was further pleaded that due to proceedings under Section 170(ख) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, approximately 10.5 acres of land in villages Beldagi and Amdala were reverted to tribal persons, and that the financial obligations of Rajaram, the father of the parties, including the marriages of the plaintiff and four sisters of Defendant No.1, weakened his financial position, necessitating sale of lands. Defendant No.1 denied that the lands described in Schedule “B” were sold by Rajaram and stated that he executed the sale deed in his own name with financial assistance from his father-in-law. He also denied that the lands in Schedule “A” were partitioned between him and the plaintiff and submitted that the plaintiff had failed to implead his four sisters as necessary parties. Accordingly, Defendant No.1 prayed that the suit be dismissed on the grounds of non-joinder of necessary parties and limitation. 4. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the 4 plaintiff has established his title and possession over the suit land. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 06/11/2013, the defendant No.1 preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the learned Courts have erred in decreeing the suit by treating the Schedule ‘B’ property as ancestral without any cogent evidence and without the plaintiff discharging the burden of proof under Section 101 of the Evidence Act. It is further contended that the provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act were ignored while determining the shares, the issue of non-joinder of necessary parties was wrongly rejected, and the findings recorded are perverse, giving rise to substantial questions of law warranting interference. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 7. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the 5 pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently held that the suit land bearing Khasra No. 6, admeasuring 2.696 hectares, was purchased out of the consideration paid by late Rajaram and that the plaintiff has successfully established his title and possession over the suit property. Both the Courts have recorded a categorical finding that Defendant No.1 had, by deceit, got the sale deed executed solely in his name, despite the intention of joint ownership, and the plea raised by defendant No.1 regarding exclusive self-acquisition and non-joinder of necessary parties is not supported by any cogent evidence and failed to demonstrate how the suit for declaration of title was suffered from mis-joinder of parties. The findings regarding prior settlement dated 19.01.2007, obstruction caused by defendant No.1, and entitlement of the plaintiff to declaratory relief have been affirmed concurrently. No perversity, misreading of evidence, or substantial legal infirmity is demonstrated so as to warrant interference with the concurrent findings of fact in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to 6 settled principles of law. 9. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ defendant No.1 failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 10. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 12. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could 7 reasonably have reached. 13. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 15. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the 8 trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. 16. Consequently, the interim relief granted earlier shall stand vacated. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge $. Bhilwar