2026:HHC:18701 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 204 of 2026 Reserved on: 02.04.2026 Date of Decision: 21.05.2026 Jodh Singh & others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No. For the Petitioner : Mr Daleep Chand, Advocate. For the Respondent No. 1 /State : Mr Lokender Kutlehira, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4 of 2026, titled Jaspreet Kaur vs. Parvinder Singh, etc., pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.1, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the Protection officer filed a domestic incident 2 2026:HHC:18701 report before the learned Trial Court, asserting that the aggrieved person was married to Parvinder as per Sikh customs. One son was born to her. Her parents-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law (the petitioners) started harassing her soon after the marriage for bringing insufficient dowry. She made a complaint at the Police Station, Paonta Sahib, in the year 2019. The matter was also settled by the Panchayat many times before the complaint. However, the petitioners’ behaviour did not improve. The expenses of delivering the child were borne by the aggrieved person’s parents. The petitioners promised to take care of the aggrieved person before the police, but they started harassing her in her matrimonial home. The petitioners turned her out of the matrimonial home after beating her. She reported the matter to the police and the Protection Officer. Her husband filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights, and the aggrieved person joined her husband’s company with her son. She withdrew the cases filed by her. The petitioners again started harassing her. They gave her beatings on 18.09.2025. They pushed her, and she sustained multiple injuries. An effort was made to kill the aggrieved person’s child. The Court awarded her ₹1,00,000/-. The petitioners taunted her for this 3 2026:HHC:18701 award. They asked for the accounts. The aggrieved person’s husband left her. He blocked her and stated that he would not reside with her. Hence, a domestic incident report was filed before the Court. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the allegations made in the complaint are false. The aggrieved person had earlier filed a complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (D.V. Act). She failed to appear before the Court, and the matter was dismissed by the Court for non-prosecution on 20.09.2022. The aggrieved person filed a fresh complaint instead of getting the earlier petition revived. The aggrieved person and her husband are residing separately from the petitioners. The petitioners have no concern with the domestic affairs of the aggrieved person and her husband. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner No. 1 has dispossessed the aggrieved person’s husband of his 4 2026:HHC:18701 property. The petitioners never resided with the aggrieved person in a shared household. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned trial Court be quashed qua the petitioners. 5. I have heard Mr Daleep Chand, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State. 6. Mr Daleep Chand, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the aggrieved person had filed a false complaint. She was residing with her husband away from the petitioners. Petitioner No. 1 dispossessed the aggrieved person’s husband of his property, and an advertisement to this effect was published in the newspaper. The petitioners never shared a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. The ingredients of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, are not fulfilled. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial be quashed qua the petitioners. 7. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the aggrieved person had 5 2026:HHC:18701 made a complaint to the protection officer, who filed a domestic incident report before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158, that the High Court should have a hands-off approach under the DV Act and should interfere only when there is gross illegality or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “35. When it comes to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to an application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005, is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and to prevent acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with 6 2026:HHC:18701 proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.” 10. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false. This submission will not help the respondents. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: - “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 11. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - 7 2026:HHC:18701 “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would 8 2026:HHC:18701 show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not. 12. The domestic incident report specifically mentions that the parents-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the aggrieved person started harassing her for bringing insufficient dowry. She had made various complaints to the police and Panchayat, which were settled, but their behaviour did not improve. She had filed a case under the DV Act, which was withdrawn by her at her husband’s instance. However, her parents-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law instigated her husband to torture her. She stated that she was beaten on 18.09.2025 and had sustained injuries. An attempt was made to kill her child. These allegations, prima facie, show the petitioners’ involvement in the domestic violence. 13. It was submitted that the allegations are vague. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi (supra) that 9 2026:HHC:18701 the proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature. It was observed: “28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.” 14. Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) requires that only facts are required to be pleaded. In the present case, the aggrieved person has pleaded the facts regarding the harassment and the demand of dowry. The evidence by means of which the facts are to be proved is not required to be pleaded. Therefore, the domestic incident report cannot be said to be bad simply because the details of the incident with supporting evidence have not been given. 15. It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the Learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, it should be left to appreciate it. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged 10 2026:HHC:18701 offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 16. No other point was urged. 17. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 18. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the main case. ( Rakesh Kainthla ) 21st May 2025 Judge (ravinder)