1 2026:CGHC:2178 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 585 of 2016 Chamru Alias Charan Sai S/o Late Budhga, Aged About 48 Years Caste Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh Appellant Versus 1 - Smt. Sushila W/o Late Dhanushdhari, Aged About 54 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh 2 - Dhiraj S/o Late Dhanushdhari, Aged About 28 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh 3 - Ajay S/o Late Dhanushdhari, Aged About 24 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Vinod S/o Late Devnath Alias Devari, Aged About 54 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 5 - Chakradhari S/o Late Devnath Alias Devari, Aged About 52 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. 6 - Rammani S/o Late Devnath Alias Devari, Aged About 42 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh. RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.01.14 17:28:27 +0530 2 7 - Nankunwar W/o Late Ganga, Aged About 48 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 8 - Ramsai S/o Late Ganga, Aged About 30 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 9 - Phoolkunwar D/o Late Ganga, Aged About 23 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 10 - Mangli D/o Late Ganga, Aged About 19 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 11 - Sukhmaniya D/o Late Ganga, Aged About 16 Years Minor Through Natural Guardian Nankunwar W/o Late Ganga, Aged About 48 Years, Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 2 - Kaushlya W/o Late Ram Prasad, Aged About 69 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 13 - Vijay Pal S/o Late Ram Prasad, Aged About 54 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 14 - Purushottam S/o Late Ram Prasad, Aged About 42 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 15 - Kundkunwar W/o Late Nandkishore, Aged About 39 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 16 - Jurmaniya W/o Late Nandkishore, Aged About 38 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 3 17 - Arti D/o Late Nandkishore, Aged About 34 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 18 - Radheshyam S/o Late Nandkishore, Aged About 29 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Amalbhitti, P.S. Darima, Tah. Lakhanpur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 19 - Tara D/o Late Ram Prasad, Aged About 49 Years Caste- Bargah, R/o Village Dhanganwa, P.S. And Tah. Ambikapur, District Sarguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 20 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Sarguja, Ambikapur, District- Sarguja, Chhattisgarh Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Swayam Tehanguria, Advocate For Resp. No. 1 to 6 & 14 to 18 : Mr. Vivek Kumar Tripathi, Advocate For State : Mr. Ritesh Giri, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 14/01/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been filed by the defendant No.1 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the judgment and decree dated 20.10.2016 passed in Civil Appeal No. 21-A/2014 (Smt. Sushila v. Chamaru @ Charan Sai) by the learned V Additional District Judge, Ambikapur (C.G.), whereby the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree dated 14.03.2014 passed in Civil Suit No. 160-A/2012 (Smt. Sushila v. Chamaru @ Charan Sai), by which the suit was dismissed by the learned Trial Court mainly on the ground of 4 limitation. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by defendant No.1, who is the appellant herein. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 3. (a) The facts of the case are that a Civil Suit was instituted by the plaintiffs (respondent Nos.1 to 6 herein) seeking a declaration of their title as co-owners to the extent of their one-third share in the suit land described in Schedule ‘B’ of the plaint and for a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendant No.1 from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment of their share in the suit property or from dispossessing them otherwise than in accordance with law. In the plaint, it was averred that the parties are members of the same family and descendants of late Katwari Bargah, who had four sons, namely Hardev, Nanki @ Devsay, Budga, and Dewari @ Devanath. Ancestral agricultural land situated at Village Amalbhitti, comprising Khasra No.19 admeasuring 15.61 acres, stood recorded in the name of Katwari Bargah. During his lifetime, the said land was partitioned among his four sons, and in such partition, Nanki @ Devsay was allotted the land described in Schedule ‘B’ of the plaint, being Khasra No.10 admeasuring 1.811 hectares, which is the suit land. (b) It is further averred that Nanki @ Devsay died issueless, and upon his death, the suit land stood recorded in the name of his wife Hirmen, who remained in possession and cultivation thereof during her lifetime. Since Hirmen had no children, both the plaintiffs and defendants assisted 5 her in agricultural operations, and she lived jointly with the family. According to the plaintiffs, Hirmen, during her lifetime, expressed her intention that after her death the suit land would be partitioned among the family members according to their respective shares. (c) Upon the death of Hirmen, both sides jointly performed her last rites and, according to the plaintiffs, the suit land was thereafter partitioned by mutual consent, under which one-third share fell to the branch of Dewari @ Devanath, father of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claim that their father, and thereafter the plaintiffs themselves, remained in continuous possession and cultivation of the said share. The dispute arose when, upon the death of Dewari @ Devanath, the plaintiffs approached the revenue authorities for mutation and discovered that the entire suit land stood recorded exclusively in the name of defendant No.1. Upon being questioned, defendant No.1 allegedly threatened dispossession, which led to the institution of the present suit. (d) Defendant No.1 contested the suit by asserting that Hirmen had executed a registered Will dated 23.07.1984 in his favour, on the basis of which mutation was effected in his name on 20.11.1990, and that he had remained in continuous possession thereafter. He further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and that the plaintiffs had no right, title, or interest in the suit land. Other defendants did not contest the proceedings and were proceeded ex parte. (e) The Trial Court, while holding that the suit land was ancestral and that the plaintiffs and defendants were co-owners, disbelieved the Will 6 set up by defendant No.1. However, it dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove possession over their alleged one-third share and further held the suit to be barred by limitation. (f) Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal. The First Appellate Court reversed the finding of the Trial Court on limitation by holding that Hirmen, who was the sister-in-law of the plaintiffs and the wife of one of the co-sharers of the ancestral property, died issueless and without leaving any legal representatives. Consequently, the plaintiffs succeeded to the suit property by operation of law under the principles of intestate succession. It was further held that once succession opens, the right of the heirs flows automatically, and in such circumstances, the bar of limitation does not operate so as to defeat a claim founded on inheritance. Accordingly, the suit was held to be within limitation. (g) Since the finding of the Trial Court holding the suit to be barred by limitation was set aside by the First Appellate Court, the present Second Appeal has been preferred by defendant No.1, assailing the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court mainly on the ground that it erred in law in reversing the finding on limitation. 4. Learned counsel for defendant No.1/appellant would submit that Hirmen was the absolute owner of the suit property during her lifetime and that she had validly executed a Will in favour of defendant No.1. It is contended that once absolute ownership of Hirmen is established and the succession is claimed through a testamentary disposition, the plaintiffs 7 cannot invoke the concept of intestate succession to avoid the rigour of the Limitation Act. According to the learned counsel, mere pleading of succession cannot operate as a ground to dispense with or waive the statutory period of limitation, particularly when the plaintiffs had knowledge of the exclusive mutation and long-standing entries in favour of defendant No.1. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 6 and 14 to 18 opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and supported the impugned judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court. It was contended that the Appellate Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and the settled principles of law while reversing the finding of the Trial Court on limitation. Learned counsel submitted that once the alleged Will set up by defendant No.1 was disbelieved and the suit property was held to have devolved by succession, the question of limitation did not arise, and therefore no interference is warranted in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record minutely with utmost circumspection. 7. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined only to examination of substantial questions of law. Interference with reasoned findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court is impermissible unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or 8 contrary to settled principles of law. Mere disagreement with the conclusions arrived at by the First Appellate Court does not clothe this Court with jurisdiction to reappreciate evidence as if sitting in first appeal. 8. In the present case, the core issue revolves around the applicability of limitation to a suit founded on inheritance by succession. The Trial Court itself recorded a categorical finding that the suit land is ancestral in nature and that the parties are co-sharers. It also disbelieved the Will dated 23.07.1984 propounded by defendant No.1, holding that the said Will was not proved in accordance with law. This finding regarding the Will has attained finality. 9. Once the Will set up by defendant No.1 is disbelieved, the natural consequence is that the succession to the property of Hirmen opens as per the principles of intestate succession. The First Appellate Court has recorded a clear finding that Hirmen, being the wife of one of the co- sharers of the ancestral property and sister-in-law of the plaintiffs, died issueless and without leaving any legal representatives. In such circumstances, the property devolved upon the surviving co-sharers by operation of law. This finding is based on pleadings as well as evidence on record and cannot be said to be perverse or legally untenable. 10. The First Appellate Court has further rightly held that when a right accrues by way of inheritance, the cause of action arises from the opening of succession, and the right of the heirs flows automatically. A claim founded on inheritance cannot be defeated merely on the basis of 9 revenue entries or mutation standing in the name of one co-sharer, particularly when such entries do not confer title. It is well settled that mutation entries are fiscal in nature and do not extinguish or create substantive rights in immovable property. 11. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs had knowledge of mutation in favour of defendant No.1 and, therefore, the suit was barred by limitation, does not merit acceptance. Mere knowledge of mutation entries or possession of one co-sharer cannot be treated as hostile or adverse so as to start the clock of limitation against other co-sharers, unless there is clear and unequivocal ouster, which has neither been pleaded nor proved in the present case. 12. The First Appellate Court has thus correctly applied the settled legal principle that limitation does not run against a rightful heir until there is a clear denial of title or an act amounting to ouster. The dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court on the ground of limitation was legally unsustainable. The reversal of that finding by the First Appellate Court, therefore, does not suffer from any error of law, much less a substantial question of law warranting interference by this Court. 13. This Court finds that the Second Appeal essentially seeks reappreciation of evidence and substitution of findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court, which is impermissible within the limited scope of Section 100 CPC. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present Second Appeal. 14. Accordingly, the Second Appeal being devoid of merit and not involving 10 any substantial question of law, is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 20.10.2016 passed by the First Appellate Court are affirmed. The interim order dated 05/12/2016 passed by this Court directing the appellant not to be dispossessed is vacated. 15. A decree be drawn accordingly. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Amardeep/Rahul