Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A. No. 770 of 2025 Upendra Prasad, aged about 42 years, son of Late Ramjee Yadav, Ex- Handling Labour, Food Corporation of India, Dhanbad Depot, P.O. & P.S.- Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad, resident of Village- Barmasia, Near Football Ground, Dhanbad, P.O. & P.S.-Dhanbad, District-Dhanbad … … ... Petitioner/Appellant Versus 1. Food Corporation of India through its Managing Director, Barakhamba Road, P.O. & P.S. & District-New Delhi, PIN-110001 2. District Manager (now Divisional Manager), FCI Divisional Office, Kutchery Road, Ranchi, P.O. - G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District- Ranchi-834001. 3. Assistant Manager, Depot, FCI, Food Storage Depot, Chutia, P.O. & P.S.- Chutia, District-Ranchi 4. Area Manager, Food Corporation of India, P.O. & P.S.- Hazaribagh, District- Hazaribagh, PIN-825301 ... Respondents/Respondents --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD --------- For the Appellant : Mrs. M.M. Pal, Sr. Advocate Mrs. M. Patra, Advocate Miss Shipra Shalini, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr.Nipun Bakshi, Advocate Mr. Shubham Sinha, Advocate --------- 02/Dated: 13.01.2026 M. S. Sonak, C.J.(Oral) 1. Heard Mrs. M.M. Pal assisted by Mrs. M. Patra, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr. Nipun Bakshi assisted by Mr. Shubham Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal challenges the learned Single Judge’s order dated 01.09.2025 dismissing the appellant’s petition seeking a direction on the respondents to appoint him on compassionate grounds. Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB 3. The Appellant’s father opted for voluntary retirement. It is pleaded that at that stage, the father stated that he would opt for voluntary retirement, provided his son was appointed on compassionate grounds. The respondents rejected the petitioner’s application for a compassionate appointment on 08.11.2010. 4. After that, the petitioner, until the institution of Writ Petition No. 4619 of 2025 in which the impugned order has been made, did not challenge the rejection order dated 08.11.2010. In the petition, the petitioner applied for a direction upon the respondents “not to give effect to their order of rejection dated 08.11.2010”. 5. Mrs. Pal, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, submitted that the petitioner’s case was entirely covered by the decision of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India and another Vs. Ram Kesh Yadav and Another1, where, in similar circumstances, the benefit of compassionate appointment was granted to the respondent therein. She further submitted that in almost identical circumstances, relief was granted by this Court to Ramawater Chandravanshi. Post this decision, it was a duty of the respondents to have considered or reconsidered the petitioner’s case for reappointment on compassionate grounds. 6. Mrs. Pal relied upon State of Karnataka and others Vs. C. Lalitha2 to submit that Articles 14 and 16 mandate parity, and all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, irrespective of the fact that only one person may have approached the Court. She 1 (2007) 9 SCC 531 2 (2006) 2 SCC 747 Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB also relied upon Maharaj Krishan Bhatt and Another v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others3 to submit that there ought to be parity in the State’s dealings with its citizens without even requiring the citizens to approach the Court. Mrs. Pal also submitted that the petitioner was informed on 15.10.2024 that his case is under consideration by the respondents. 7. Finally, Mrs. Pal submitted that the petitioner is still unemployed and continues to face hardships. She submitted that the benefit of a compassionate appointment was wrongfully denied, and, if the Court considers appropriate, such an appointment may now be directed with prospective effect without any claim for back wages, etc. Mrs. Pal submitted that since the above aspects have not been adequately considered in the learned single judge’s impugned order, this appeal be allowed and the reliefs claimed for in the appellant’s writ petition be granted. 8. Mr. Nipun Bakashi and Mr. Shubham Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents, defended the impugned order based upon the reasoning reflected therein. They submitted that this is a case in which the petitioner approached the Court after a gross delay and laches. They submitted that the petitioner had sat on the fence and merely taken a chance after relief was granted to Ramavatar Chandravanshi, who had been agitating the issue of the denial of a compassionate appointment to him since the year 2008. In any event, they submitted that there was no absolute parity between the petitioner’s case and the said Ramavatar’s case. 3 (2008) 9 SCC 24 Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB 9. The rival contentions now fall for our determination. 10. In this case, we are concerned with the petitioner’s claim for a compassionate appointment based on his father's voluntary retirement before 2010. It is well settled that such an appointment, in a sense, is an exception to the normal rules of appointment, which have to be consistent with the constitutional provisions in Articles 14 and 16. The object of such compassionate appointment is to provide for some immediate relief to the family members of the deceased-employee who has passed away in harness. 11. In Ram Kesh Yadav’s case (supra), relied upon by Mrs. Pal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that an employer cannot be directed to act contrary to the terms of its policy governing compassionate appointments. Nor can compassionate appointment be directed dehors the policy. The scheme clearly bars compassionate appointment to the dependant of an employee who seeks voluntary retirement on medical grounds, after attaining the age of 55 years. This is a logical and valid object in providing that the benefit of compassionate appointment for a dependant of an employee voluntarily retiring on medical grounds, will be available only where the employee seeks such retirement before completing 55 years. The Court noted that but for such a condition, there will be a tendency on the part of employees nearing the age of superannuation to take advantage of the scheme and seek voluntary retirement at the fag end of their service on medical grounds and thereby virtually creating employment by “ succession”. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the Courts cannot relax such conditions. However, on facts, relief was granted to the respondent in Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB the said matter. There was no question of delay or laches involved in the said case. 12. The main issue in this petition is whether the appellant is entitled to any relief after his application for appointment on compassionate grounds was rejected by the respondents on 08.11.2010 based on a petition instituted only in 2025. 13. Admittedly, from 08.11.2010 until 2025, i.e., for almost 15 years, the petitioner did not question the rejection dated 08.11.2010. Only after another employee, i.e., Ramavatar Chandravanshi, who had been agitating the issue of his denial of a compassionate appointment from 2008 onwards, ultimately succeeded in obtaining some relief from this Court, did the appellant institute Writ Petition No. 4619 of 2025. 14. The delay in this case is inordinate, and the explanation offered for such inordinate delay is not acceptable. The petitioner, it appears, has sat on the fence, without challenging the rejection letter dated 08.11.2010, for almost 15 years. The petition, which is now dismissed by the impugned order, was only to take a chance and see whether any relief could be obtained now. Any grant of relief at this stage, and after such inordinate delay, would virtually defeat the objective of a compassionate appointment. 15. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tinku vs. State of Haryana4 has reiterated that compassionate appointment can neither be claimed as a vested right nor could it be regarded as a condition of service of an employee, who dies in harness. In the event, the Government has any scheme for compassionate appointment, 4 2024 INSC 867 Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB then such an appointment can be given on a proper and strict scrutiny of the various parameters as laid down with an intention to help a family out of sudden pecuniary financial destitution to help it get out of the emerging urgent situation where the sole bread earner has expired, leaving them helpless and may be penniless. Compassionate appointment is, therefore, provided to bail out a family of the deceased employee facing extreme financial difficulty and but for the employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis. The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that whether there is no policy, instruction, or rule providing for an appointment on compassionate grounds, such an appointment cannot be granted. Further, such appointment is an exception culled out to the general rule in favour of the family of the deceased-employee. The purpose of such schemes is to provide immediate succor to the family. 16. In the present case, as noted earlier, it is not as if the petitioner’s father had expired. His father had only opted for voluntary retirement, therefore, must have secured the financial benefits that go with such retirement. In any event, even if this is not the ground on which the petitioner could have been denied relief, the delay on the petitioner’s part in approaching the Court after almost 15 years by trying to take advantage of the reliefs obtained by Ramawater, is a good ground to infer acquiescence and denial relief to the petitioner. 17. C. Lalitha (supra) was a case where relief in rem was granted, and it is in that context that the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, irrespective of the fact that only one of the persons had approached the Court. There Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB was no question of delay and laches involved in the case of C. Lalitha (supra). Similarly, in the case of Maharaj Krishan Bhatt (supra), there was no question of delay or laches. It was not a case in which the petitioner approached the Court almost 15 years after the cause of action accrued. Accordingly, neither decision assists the petitioner’s case, given the inordinate and unexplained delay in approaching the Court for a compassionate appointment. 18. In the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana5, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if a person chooses to sit over the matter and then wakes up after the decision of the Court in another matter, then such a person cannot stand to benefit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the petitioners kept sleeping over their rights for a long time and woke up only after they had some impetus from the latter decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the petitioner’s desperate attempt to redo the seniority would not be amenable to judicial review at this belated stage. 19. To the same effect are the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Government of West Bengal Vs. Tarun K. Roy7, where a belated petition was filed on ly after another person, who had been diligently agitating his cause, succeeded in obtaining relief from the Court. 5 (1997) 6 SCC 538 6 (1995) 6 SCC 684 7 (2004) 1 SCC 347 Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB 20. In State of U.P. Vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava8, Hon’ble Supreme Court, after analysing several decisions on the subject, culled out the following legal principles:- “22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, 8 (2015) 1 SCC 347 Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons must be treated alike by extending that benefit, even if they have not approached the Court. However, this principle is subject to the well-recognised exceptions of laches, delay, and acquiescence. If those persons do not challenge the wrongful action in their cases, acquiesce in it, and wake up only after a long delay because their counterparts who had approached the Court Neutral Citation No. 2026:JHHC:843-DB earlier succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot insist that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters, and laches, delay, and/or acquiescence would be valid grounds for dismissing their claim. In this case, the relief granted to Ramavtar was not some relief in rem. Therefore, the principle in paragraph 22.3 above would not apply either. 22. On perusal of the RTI information furnished to the petitioner, which is at page 72 of the paper-book, we think that such responses do not entitle the petitioner to any relief, having approached the Court with such enormous delay and laches. 23. Accordingly, based on the material on record and the law on the subject, we find no infirmity whatsoever in the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. In fact, the impugned order is very much aligned with the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to above. 24. This Letters Patent Appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed, without any order as to costs. 25. Interim applications, if any, will not survive and are disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) January 13, 2026 N.A.F.R. Manoj/Sharda/Cp.2 Uploaded on 15.01.2026