2026:HHC:17433 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 248 of 2026 Reserved on: 30.03.2026 Date of Decision: 18.05.2026 Yajush Walia & others ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondent _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioners : Mr Y.P. Sood, Advocate For respondent No.1/ State : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 32 of 2024 dated 04.12.2024 registered in Women Police Station Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Section 85, 115(2), 316(2) and 351 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR pending before 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:17433 learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-III, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant Ragini Rana made a complaint to the Police that she was married to Yajush Walia on 02.03.2024 as per Hindu rites and customs. The family members of Yajush Walia demanded dowry before the marriage and insisted that the marriage should be solemnised at Basi Palace. 20 tolas of gold and silver ornaments and clothes were given to the family members of the Yajush Walia. Parents-in-law and sisters-in- law of the informant used to ask her what she had brought with her. They used to say that many people were offering ₹50 Lacs and a car to Yajush Walia in his marriage. Parents-in-law of the informant used to say that they had given ₹30 lakh to their daughter, and the informant should ask her father to provide her with a big car and a Fixed Deposit Receipt of ₹50 lakh. Yajush Walia also used to tell her that his friend Aman was given a Fixed Deposit receipt of ₹5 lakhs, and she had not brought anything. She explained the economic condition of her father and his inability to provide ₹50 Lacs and a big car to her husband. Her husband and his relatives gave her beatings. Neha Walia called 3 2026:HHC:17433 the informant on 08.06.2024 and told him that Chandigarh Police had raided her house to apprehend Mandeep in October 2023 at the instance of Rajesh Kumar, the informant’s cousin. The informant explained that her family had a civil dispute with the family of Rajesh Kumar since 2020. Saroj Walia said that these kinds of actions were being taken against her son-in-law by the informant’s relative after the marriage was settled with the informant. Earlier, nothing had happened. She asked the informant to settle the case by approaching the local politician. She also asked the informant to spend money on the settlement if required. Nancy Walia showed her slippers to the informant and told her that she keeps the informant on the toe of her slippers, and the informant’s status in her matrimonial home was not more than the shoe of Nancy. She also compelled the informant to get her (Nancy Walia) transferred from the SDM Office, Sarkaghat, to the DC Office, Hamirpur. The informant handed over the key to her almirah to her mother-in-law and went to her parental home. The informant’s husband told her that he would take her to her matrimonial home during Navratri, and she should make arrangements of ₹ 60-70 lakhs. The informant could not make arrangements for the money, and 4 2026:HHC:17433 the informant’s husband refused to take her to her matrimonial home. The informant went to her matrimonial home on 21.11.2024 with her parents, relatives and members of the panchayat, but her husband and her mother-in-law refused to allow her to enter the matrimonial home. Her mother-in-law showed her slippers and threatened to kill her. The informant went to her room and found that the Almirah was open and her clothes and jewellery were missing. She made enquiries from her mother-in-law, who stated that she (informant) had taken her clothes and jewellery with her. Her mother-in-law and sister-in-law, Neha Walia, had removed the articles. The matter was reported to the Police by means of a written application, and the Police registered the FIR. 3. The police investigated the matter and seized various documents. After the completion of the investigation, the police filed a chargesheet before the Court. 4. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the chargesheet, the petitioners/accused have filed the present petition, asserting that the allegations made by the informant are false. Even if the contents of the FIR and 5 2026:HHC:17433 chargesheet are read, no prima facie case is made out against the petitioners. Petitioners/accused never harassed the informant or demanded any dowry from her. The informant left her matrimonial home on 14.08.2024 without any reason. The efforts made by petitioner No. 1 to bring her to her matrimonial home were unsuccessful. He filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act for restitution of conjugal rights in the family court at Hamirpur. The matter was referred to the Mediator, but the informant did not appear before the Mediator. She made false allegations to harass the petitioners. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and is a counterblast to the petition filed by petitioner No.1 under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The allegations made in the complaint are vague. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 5. I have heard Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1/State. 6 2026:HHC:17433 6. Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the allegations made by the informant are false and were made as a counterblast to the petition filed by petitioner No.1 to seek the restitution of the conjugal rights. The allegations are vague, and no action should be taken on their basis. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 7. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the informant had specifically stated that she was being harassed by her husband and his relatives for dowry. She was being compelled to approach the local politician for the settlement of the case and transfer of Nancy Walia. She was abused by showing her slippers. She left her matrimonial home, and the stridhan kept by her in her almirah was misappropriated by the informant’s mother-in-law and sister-in-law. The police have filed the chargesheet before the Court, and the learned Magistrate is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in such a situation. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:17433 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their 8 2026:HHC:17433 entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an 9 2026:HHC:17433 ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of 10 2026:HHC:17433 process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed: “18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping, specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of 11 2026:HHC:17433 the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case. 25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: - “32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation and making every possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. The first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner does the matter reach the Police than even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's faults, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters 12 2026:HHC:17433 and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage were to come to an end, then what would be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband to ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may annoy the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty” 14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Chadha v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094 that the 13 2026:HHC:17433 provisions of Section 498A of IPC are being invoked without mentioning any specific date, time or incident, which casts serious suspicion on the complainant’s version. It was observed: 13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the manner in which the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant-wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant-wife or her family members, and vitiates the very objective of protective legislation. The observations made by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana (2025) 3 SCC 735 appropriately encapsulate this essence as under: “25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement, should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations, unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations, cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant No. 1, have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution, and 14 2026:HHC:17433 the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.” 14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case of the prosecution, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the version of the Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking the criminal machinery of the State. Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality; hence, any further prosecution of the Appellant will only amount to an abuse of the process of law. 15. This position was reiterated in Ghanshyam Soni Vs. State, NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301, wherein it was observed: - 10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing an insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to a few instances of such atrocities; however, the allegations are generic and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, are that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure, beat her up, but there is not even a 15 2026:HHC:17433 cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he, being a friend of the Appellant, instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature and do not elaborate on a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and because the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home(2018) 14 SCC 452, fits perfectly into the present scenario: “6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.” 11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat 2024 INSC 960 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2025 INSC 671. The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dated. 06.12.1999, six days later, on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly 16 2026:HHC:17433 made by the Appellant or his family, and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Janshruti v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 909 that there are hundreds of genuine cases as contrasted to a false case registered under Section 498A, and the Courts should be conscious of the ground reality while adjudicating the cases under Section 498A of IPC. It was observed: - 11. We are cognizant of the growing discourse highlighting instances where the provision may have been misused. However, it must be borne in mind that for every such instance, there are likely hundreds of genuine cases where Section 498A has served as a crucial safeguard for victims of domestic cruelty. We are also aware that certain unconscionable individuals, emboldened by the rising fervour to dismantle such protective provisions, have gone so far as to publicly share videos depicting the exchange of dowry —an act not only unlawful but also indicative of the entrenched nature of the very evil this provision seeks to combat. 12. We also remain acutely attuned to the ground realities. As the Constitutional Court and the apex judicial body of the country, we bear the solemn responsibility of safeguarding justice for our entire population. The harsh truth is that dowry continues to persist as a deeply entrenched social evil, prevalent across vast sections of the country. A significant majority of such cases go unreported, with countless women compelled to endure injustice in silence. This underscores the continuing need for legal provisions such as Section 498A, which serve as 17 2026:HHC:17433 vital instruments of protection and redressal for those most vulnerable. 17. Thus, the Court has to strike a fine balance, and it has to see that the allegations made against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC are not general, vague or omnibus to rope in the husband’s relatives. At the same time, the Court should not scuttle a genuine case filed under Section 498A of the IPC. 18. The FIR specifically mentions that the informant had handed over the key of her almirah to her mother-in-law. She had kept her jewellery and clothes in the almirah, which were missing on her return. She named her mother-in-law and sister-in-law, Neha Walia, as the person who had removed her articles. 19. The FIR also mentions that parents-in-law and sisters-in-law of the informant used to tell her that she had not brought anything with her at the time of her marriage, whereas the offer of ₹ 50 lakh and cars were being made to Yajush Walia. This shows that the informant was being compelled to bring the money and the car. She specifically stated that her husband had left her in her parental home and told her to make arrangements 18 2026:HHC:17433 of ₹50-60 lakhs, otherwise she would not be taken to her matrimonial home. She was unable to arrange the money, and her husband refused to take her to her matrimonial home. She went to her matrimonial home with her relatives and the members of the panchayat, but she was not allowed entry. 20. The FIR also mentions that Neha Walia told the informant that the police had searched for her (Neha Walia’s) husband at the instance of Rajesh Kumar, the informant’s cousin. Earlier, nothing had happened, and this incident happened because of the relationship with the informant. Neha Walia and her mother compelled the informant to settle the matter with the intervention of a local politician or by spending the money. 21. The FIR also mentions that Nancy Walia showed the slippers to the informant and told her that her status was equivalent to her slippers. She had also compelled the informant to get her transferred from the office of SDM Sarkaghat to the office of the DC Hamirpur. The FIR discloses that when the informant was unable to meet the demands of the petitioners, she was beaten and harassed. 19 2026:HHC:17433 22. Therefore, the allegations in the FIR show the specific role of each of the petitioners, and it cannot be said that the allegations in the FIR are vague, upon which no cognizance could have been taken. 23. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed:- “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 24. It was submitted that the parties are not residing together, and a false FIR was filed before the Court. The litigation is pending. This submission will not help the petitioners. The court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine 20 2026:HHC:17433 the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of 21 2026:HHC:17433 Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge- sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 25. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini- trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal 22 2026:HHC:17433 proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 26. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini- trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 27. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 23 2026:HHC:17433 28. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police, and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed due to the delay. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala (supra) that the F.I.R. cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. It was observed: 37. It is settled law that a delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation, and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, “The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents…” (Emphasis supplied) 29. It is undisputed that the Police filed the chargesheet, and the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate it. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the 24 2026:HHC:17433 FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 30. No other point was urged. 31. Consequently, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. 32. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any. 33. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 18th May, 2026 (Nikita)