2026:HHC:15063 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CrMMO No. 395 of 2026 Date of Decision: 6.5.2026 _____________________________________________________________________ Ajay Chauhan ……...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. …....Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the Petitioner: Mr. Naresh Sharma, Mr. Anuj Bali and Mr. Ajay Sharma, Advocates. For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General. ASI Jasbeer Singh, IO. PS West Shimla present with record. ___________________________________________________________________________ Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral) By way of instant petition filed under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short “BNSS”), prayer has been made by the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 234 of 2018, dated 25.8.2018, registered with Police Station (West) Boileauganj, Shimla-6, Himachal Pradesh under Sections 341, 143, 188,147, 148, 149, 353 & 332 of the IPC along with consequential proceedings pending in the competent court of law. 2026:HHC:15063 2 2. Precisely, facts of the cases as emerge from the pleadings as well as other material adduced on record by the respective parties are that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings came to be lodged against present petitioner as well as other 15 other persons at the instance of one Dinesh Kumar, In-charge, Police Station West, Shimla, alleging therein that on 24.08.2018, while he along with HC Manoj, HC Rajender, Constable Sonu, Constable Manoj Rana was present on duty near Keneddy Chowk for maintenance of law and order in view of the ongoing session of the HP Vidhan Sabha, workers of Himachal Pradesh State Youth Congress, who wanted to stage Dharna near Vidhan Sabha, started gathering at Chaura Maidan and at about 02:30 PM, about 700-800 workers holding Dandas in their hands and flags of the Youth Congress led by Yadupati Thakur, Amit Kohli, Manish Thakur, Dalip Khurana, Vikas Kalta, Vinod Zinta, Baldev, Vijay Chauhan, Kailash Mehta, Veenu Mehta, Pradeep Surya, Naresh Dasta, Vivek Kumar, Ajay, Ankur, Arjun Singh Negi, Vikram Kumar, Akash Saini, Sukrant Bhatia and Ripna came at the Keneddy Chowk shouting slogans in the form of a rally. In order to maintain law and order and to prevent the entry of mob into Vidhan Sabha, police had barricaded the road towards Boileauganj, however on reaching the barricades, some Youth Congress Workers started removing the barricades 2026:HHC:15063 3 by pushing them and started shouting slogans against the policies of the State Government. Though ADM, SDM (Urban), Additional SP Headquarters and Additional SP (Urban), who at the relevant time were present at the spot tried to pacify the mob, but yet, mob tried to enter the Vidhan Sabha Complex by forcibly removing the barricades. It also came to be alleged in the FIR that persons from amongst the mob starting pelting stones on the police force causing them injuries, as such, on the orders of the SDM (Urban) present on the spot, the violent mob was warned on the megaphone not to indulge in stone pelting and stop the rally. However, despite warning, the mob became violent and tried to enter the Vidhan Sabha Complex by breaking and removing the barricades. When the mob became violent, the SDM (Urban) present on the spot directed to use water cannons to disperse the mob, but yet the mob did not disperse and some members of the mob crossed the barricades and came towards the side of the police, however they were removed to the other side by use of force by the police. The mob dispersed from the Keneddy Chowk and came towards the main road from the stairs adjoining Labour Bureau where they started shouting slogans and stopped traffic for about 25-30 minutes. Police tried to pacify the Youth Congress workers and revived the smooth flow of traffic, but yet some workers started shouting slogans outside the RMS Office and blocked the 2026:HHC:15063 4 traffic. After blocking the traffic for about 5-10 minutes and being persuaded by the police, the Youth Congress Workers left the spot. In the afore incident, Additional SP Manmohan Singh, Constable Raj Kumar, Constable Dheeraj, Constable Bittu, Constable Rakesh, LC Reena, LC Reenu sustained injuries, whose medical examination was got conducted and MLC was also obtained. The Medical Officer advised X-ray qua the injuries sustained by LC Reena, LC Reenu and Constable Bittu. HC Pooja and HC Seema refused for medical examination having suffered minor injuries only. Since persons named in the FIR gathered on the spot armed with stones and dandas notwithstanding the warnings issued by the Administrative Officers present and blocked traffic, caused hindrance in the performance of law and order duties by the police officer, FIR came to be lodged under the afore provisions of law. Though after completion of investigation, police has presented Challan in the Court of Ld. Judicial Magistrate First Class (V), Shimla, but before same could be taken to its logical end, petitioner who is also named in the FIR has approched this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR in question. 3. Despite sufficient opportunity, no reply/status report has been filed. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the 2026:HHC:15063 5 petitioner is that no case much less under Sections 341, 143, 188, 147, 148, 149, 353 & 332 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. He submitted that basic ingredients required for the offences under afore provisions of law are totally missing. He submitted that even if all the allegations recorded in FIR and investigation are hypothetically accepted to be true and correct, still such allegations fail to make out any prima facie case against the petitioner. Hence, FIR as well as subsequent proceedings are liable to be quashed. While making this Court peruse FIR, learned counsel submitted that FIR nowhere mentions the role of the petitioner. He submitted that the petitioner, at the relevant date and time, was not present on the spot, yet on hearsay, his name has been mentioned in the FIR. He submitted that though there is nothing to suggest that petitioner was present on the spot, but even if it is presumed that he was present on the spot, it would still not lead to an automatic inference of his being involved in the same and acting with a common object with those who were in fact involved in the alleged offence. He submitted that police ought to have carried out video recording of the alleged incident, which would have made the things crystal clear, but in the present case, no such video recording was done, therefore, there is no evidence adduced on record to demonstrate presence of the petitioner on the spot as well as illegal act, if 2026:HHC:15063 6 any, done by him. He further submitted that no independent witness ever came to be associated by the Investigating Officer, especially when it is not in dispute that at the time of alleged incident, large number of persons were present on the spot. He submitted that since there is no allegation/evidence against the petitioner for his having participated in the criminal act, no fruitful purpose would be served in case FIR sought to be quashed is permitted to sustain, rather petitioner would be unnecessarily be put to ordeal of protracted trial, which is otherwise bound to fail. He submitted that even if it is accepted that petitioner herein raised slogans and participated in demonstration of Dharna, same would not amount to criminal act, hence, naming and arraying the petitioner as accused is in gross violation of law, as such, prayer of the petitioner for quashing the FIR in question deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that FIR was lodged on facts as narrated in the same and now matter is pending before the learned trial Court, therefore, appropriate course available to the petitioner is to raise all these issues before the learned trial Court itself. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record. 2026:HHC:15063 7 6. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. 7. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that High Court, while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.PC is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing theproceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 8. Subsequently, in case titled State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Apex Court, while elaborately discussing the scope and competence of High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr.PC laid down certain principles governing the jurisdiction of High Court to exercise its power. After passing of aforesaid judgment, issue with regard to exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.PC, again came to be considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.577 of 2017 (arising out of SLP (CrL.) No. 287 2026:HHC:15063 8 of 2017) titled Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., wherein it has been held that saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. court proceedings ought not be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. 9. In Amish Devgan vs Union of India and Ors, (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “(vii) Conclusion and relief 116. At this stage and before recording our final conclusion, we would like to refer to decision of this Court in Pirthi Chand [State of H.P. v. Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 210] wherein it has been held : (SCC pp. 44-45, paras 12-13) “12. It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate into cognizable offence. After the investigation is conducted (sic concluded) and the charge- sheet is laid, the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance with the provisions which are considered mandatory and effect of its non- compliance. It would be done after the trial is concluded. The court has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statements of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court 2026:HHC:15063 9 could take cognizance of the offence on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognizable offence is made out, no further act could be done except to quash the charge-sheet. But only in exceptional cases i.e. in rarest of rare cases of mala fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak private vengeance issue of process under Criminal Procedure Code is availed of. A reading of a [Vide Corrigendum dated 20-3- 1996 issued from Residential Office of Hon'ble Mr Justice K. Ramaswamy.] complaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any cognizable offence — the court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power.” 10. In the case of Kaptan Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (2021) 9 SCC 35, the Supreme Court held as under : “9.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC. It is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the investigating officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. From the impugned judgment and order [Radhey Shyam Gupta v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine All 914] passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded. If the petition under Section 482 CrPC was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. However, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after 2026:HHC:15063 10 conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation. Even at this stage also, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. As held by this Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel [Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] in order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any cognizable offence or not, the High Court cannot act like the investigating agency nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. It is further observed and held that that question is required to be examined keeping in view, the contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, the High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is further observed it is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. It is further observed that in such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 12. Therefore, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the criminal proceedings by entering into the merits of the allegations as if the High Court was exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial. The High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC.” 11. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Abhishek Singh vs Ajay Kumar and Ors., (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1313, reiterated that: “9. The scope of the Court's power to quash and set aside proceedings is well-settled to warrant any restatement. While the arguments advanced have the potential to raise many issues for consideration, we must first 2026:HHC:15063 11 satisfy ourselves as to the propriety of the exercise of such power by the High Court. The task of the High Court, when called upon to adjudicate an application seeking to quash the proceedings, is to see whether, prima facie, an offence is made out or not. It is not to examine whether the charges may hold up in the Court. In doing so, the area of action is circumscribed. In Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, it was held: “8. It is no more res integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an allegation made in the FIR or the charge-sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding.” 15. In that view of the matter, we hold that the High Court had improperly quashed the proceedings initiated by the appellant. It stands clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the matter, and the guilt or innocence of the respondents has to be established in the trial, in accordance with the law. The proceedings out of the subject FIR, mentioned in paragraph 2 are revived and restored to the file of the concerned Court.” 12. Reliance is also placed upon judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court inPrashant Bharti Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, Rajiv Thapar and Others Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 2026:HHC:15063 12 330, Anand Kumar Mohatta and Anr. v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home and Anr, AIR 2019 SC 210 andPramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr, (2019) 9 SCC 608. 13. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case. 14. Since facts which led to lodging of FIR have already been taken note herein above, same are not being repeated for the sake of brevity, however careful perusal of contents of FIR compels this Court to agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that there is no specific allegation with regard to illegal act, if any, committed by the petitioner on the date of alleged incident. It is also not clear from the FIR that at the relevant time, petitioner was present on the spot and he in connivance with other persons on the spot ever attempted to prevent the police officials from discharging their duty, there is no whisper with regard to injury, if any, caused by the petitioner to any of the police officials. Precise allegation as contained in the FIR is that Youth Congress Workers, who wanted to stage Dharna before Vidhan Sabha, not only removed the barricades, but also attempted 2026:HHC:15063 13 to enter Vidhan Sabha, however, names of the persons who had allegedly attempted to commit the afore act has been not specifically mentioned in the FIR, rather very vague allegation has been leveled that 700-800 workers holding dandas in their hands and flags of the Youth Congress led by Yadupati Thakur, raised slogans in the form of rally and thereafter, attempted to remove the barricades by pushing the police officials. Though there is mention with regard to injuries caused to some police officials, but there is no mention that who caused such injuries. Once as per police version, 700-800 workers had gathered near Vidhan Sabha on the date of alleged incident, it is not understood that how and on what basis, only 15 persons have been named in the FIR including the petitioner. 15. Section 195 of Cr.P.C. deals with prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. Sub-section (1) of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. inter-alia provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of IPC etc. except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. 2026:HHC:15063 14 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Muniappan and others Versus State of Tamil Nadu and connected matters, (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 567, has been pleased to hold that Section 195 (a) (i) of Cr.P.C. bars the Court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 of IPC for abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant and the Court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill-will or frivolity or disposition and to save the time of the criminal Courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. Hon’ble Court further held that this provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rules contained under Section 190 of Cr.P.C. that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the Court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. 2026:HHC:15063 15 17. Careful perusal of the FIR in issue suggests that same has been lodged at the behest of ASI Bhagat Ram Verma, who after getting the alleged facts, on the basis of which the FIR was lodged recorded by way of a rukka, called for investigation in the matter. 18. Section 188 of IPC, inter alia, provides that whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession or under his management, disobeys such direction, shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to any persons lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both; and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. 2026:HHC:15063 16 19. Section 195 of Cr.P.C. talks of no Court taking cognizance of offences, inter alia, punishable under Section 188 of IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant “concerned”. 20. It is not in dispute that the FIR was not lodged on the basis of the complaint filed by public servant who had promulgated the order allegedly violated by the petitioner and the other co-accused. In this view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation in holding that lodging of the FIR in fact was in violation of the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. 21. Incidentally, even earlier Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daulat Ram Versus State of Punjab, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1206, while interpreting the provisions of Section 195 of Cr.P.C., has been pleased to hold that this Section contemplates the complaint to be in writing by public servant “concerned”. 22. In State of U.P. Versus Suresh Chandra Shrivastava, AIR 1984 Supreme Court 1108, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold as under:- “The law is now well settled that where an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein unless such offences from an integral part so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of S. 195 of the Code.” 2026:HHC:15063 17 23. This Court is of the considered view that the law is in fact well settled by Hon’ble Apex Court that where an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195 of Cr.P.C., then Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. will affect only the offences mentioned therein unless such offences form an integral part so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. 24. In the present case, the offences which have been alleged to have been committed by the petitioner besides Section 188 of Cr.P.C. which is contained in Section 195 of Cr.P.C. are alleged to have committed in the same transaction and these offences form an integral part of the main transaction and even as per the prosecution, the offences committed were part of the same transaction. 25. That being the case, this Court is of the considered view that as the provision of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. was not followed while charging the petitioner for commission of offence punishable under Section 188 of IPC alongwith other offences, the proceedings so initiated against the petitioner are per se bad and liable to be quashed and set aside in terms of the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court. 2026:HHC:15063 18 26. Moreover, in the case at hand, this Court is persuaded to agree with Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner that there is nothing on record to suggest that petitioner herein was part of unlawful assembly, rather his presence on the spot is doubtful. An assembly of five or more persons is designated an unlawful assembly if their common object is to commit an illegal act, such as using criminal force against the government or public servants in the exercise of lawful power of such public servant. To invoke aforesaid provision of law, prosecution is also under obligation to prove that by means of criminal force or show of criminal force, an attempt was made to compel a police official to do what he is not legally bound to do or to do what he is legally entitled to do. True, it is that an assembly, which was not unlawful, may subsequently become unlawful assembly, but to determine the existence of a common object, a Court is required to see the circumstances, in which the incident had taken place and conduct of members of the unlawful assembly including the weapon of offence carried or used on the spot. 27. Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that while staging Dharna or raising slogans, unlawful assembly, if any, in prosecution of common object, attempted to do act of rioting. If it is so, Section 147 otherwise could not have been invoked. Section 147 does not create separate offence, but 2026:HHC:15063 19 makes a member of an unlawful assembly vicariously liable for offences committed by others in furtherance of a common object. There must be a nexus between common object and the offence committed and if it is found that same was committed to accomplish a common object, every member of the assembly will become liable for the same. However, in the instant case, what to talk of common intention and common object, very presence of the petitioner as well as other accused, named in the FIR, is doubtful on the spot. No specific role, if any, played by them in the alleged incident, has been pointed out in the FIR. 28. Section 353 of IPC provides that whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 29. Since in the instant case, there is nothing to suggest that accused named in the FIR including the petitioner had ever attempted to assault or use criminal force to prevent public servant from doing his/her duty, case under Section 353 is not made out. Since basic ingredient of aforesaid provisions of law are missing, case of the prosecution are likely to 2026:HHC:15063 20 fail in all probabilities and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served in case FIR in question is permitted to sustain rather that would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. 30. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above, present petition is allowed and FIR No. 234 of 2018, dated 25.8.2018, registered with Police Station (West) Boileauganj, Shimla-6, Himachal Pradesh under Sections 341, 143, 188,147, 148, 149, 353 & 332 of the IPC as well as consequent proceedings, are quashed and set-aside qua the petitioner-accused and he is acquitted of the offences alleged in the FIR. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. May 6, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma), (manjit) Judge