2026:HHC:15366 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. : 100 of 2025 Reserved on : 21 st April, 2026 Decided on : 08 th May, 2026 Chander Jot Singh …Petitioner Versus Dharam Singh & Others …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate. For the respondents : Ms. Shrutika Chauhan,Advocate for respondents No.1 to 3. Name of respondent No.4 stands already deleted. Virender Singh, Judge (Oral) Petitioner–Chander Jot Singh has ﬁled the present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for setting aside the order dated 10.01.2025, passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Paonta Sahib (hereinafter referred to as ‘the First Appellate Court’), in Civil Misc. Application No.68 of 2024, ﬁled under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:15366 CPC’), in Civil Appeal No.51 of 2022, titled as Chander Jot Singh versus Dharam Singh. 2. By way of the order dated 10.01.2025, the learned First Appellate Court has dismissed the application ﬁled, under Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC., which was ﬁled by petitioner Chander Jot Singh, in the appeal, which has been ﬁled by him against the judgment and decree dated 10.06.2022, passed by the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’), in Civil Suit No.138/1 of 2011, titled as Chander Jot Singh versus Dharam Singh & Others. 3. By way of judgment and decree dated 10.06.2022, the learned trial Court has dismissed the suit ﬁled by petitioner Chander Jot Singh, for speciﬁc performance against the defendant. 4. Parties to the lis are hereinafter referred to in the same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned trial Court. 5. Brief facts, leading to ﬁling of the present petition, before this Court, as borne out from the record, may be summed up as under:- 3 2026:HHC:15366 5.1. Plaintiﬀ has ﬁled a suit for speciﬁc performance of agreement dated 16.12.2008, which was executed in his favour by Shri Dasheru Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the defendant with regard to the land measuring 755-60 square meters, comprised in Khasra No.57, situated in Up Sampada, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’), for a sale consideration of Rs.6,30,000/-. 5.2. In the said suit, after framing issues, the learned trial Court has directed the parties to adduce evidence. Thereafter, the said suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 10.06.2022. 5.3. Against the said judgment and decree, the plaintiﬀ has ﬁled the appeal before the learned First Appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal, an application under Order 6 rule 17 CPC has been moved by the plaintiﬀ. When, the application was ﬁled, at that time, the appeal was listed for arguments. 5.4. The application was ﬁled on the ground that when, the counsel for the plaintiﬀ (appellant) was preparing the case for arguments, then, it transpired that an important registered document, being Power of Attorney No.602/2008, 4 2026:HHC:15366 dated 16.12.2008, having been registered by late Shri Dasheru Ram, with respect to the suit property in favour of the plaintiﬀ could not be placed on record in evidence and exhibited, in accordance with law. 5.5. It is the further case of the plaintiﬀ that on 16.12.2008, Shri Dasheru Ram, predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, was owner in possession of the suit property and he had executed an agreement of sale regarding the suit property, in favour of the plaintiﬀ. On the day, when, the agreement was executed, Shri Dasheru Ram, predecessor-in- interest of the defendants received the entire sale consideration from the plaintiﬀ and thereafter, he executed the registered Power of Attorney bearing No.602/2008, dated 16.12.2008, in favour of the plaintiﬀ, as such, the sale deed was only left to be executed and registered. 5.6. It is the further case of the plaintiﬀ that when, the case was drafted for being ﬁled before the learned trial Court, necessary facts have been apprised to the learned counsel and the registered Power of Attorney was handed over to him for appending the same with the suit, but, inadvertently, and on account of bona ﬁde mistake, on the part of the learned 5 2026:HHC:15366 counsel for the plaintiﬀ, the said document could not be placed on record. 6. On the basis of the above facts, the plaintiﬀ has sought the following amendment in the suit: “2(A). That on 16.12.2008 Late Shri Dasheru Ram executed the agreement of sale with respect to the suit property in favour of the plaintiﬀ and on receipt of the entire sale consideration Rs.6,30,000/- from the plaintiﬀ, Shri Dasheru Ram also executed and got registered a Power of Attorney No.602/2008 of the even dated 16.12.2008 with Sub Registrar at Paonta Sahib in favour of the plaintiﬀ qua the suit property. The execution of the registered power of attorney in favour of the plaintiﬀ shows and conﬁrms the execution of the agreement of the sale supra and received the entire sale consideration there under from the plaintiﬀ qua the suit land. In view of the submissions made here-in-above, the agreement dated 16.12.2008 is binding on the defendants” 7. The proposed amendment is stated to be important and necessary for the just disposal of the appeal and this amendment, according to the plaintiﬀ, could not be incorporated, in the plaint, when, the lis was pending before the learned trial Court, despite due diligence. 8. This application has been contested by the defendants, on the ground that the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 10.06.2022, has held that the agreement is not enforceable. According to the defendants, the suit was ﬁled in 6 2026:HHC:15366 the year 2011 and the same remained pending for about 11 years. During the pendency of the lis, before the learned trial Court, the document relied upon in the application has neither been relied upon, nor, it has any connection with the suit. 9. According to the defendants, the plaintiﬀ was being represented by a Senior counsel before the learned trial Court and by levelling the allegations against the learned counsel representing the plaintiﬀ, before the learned trial Court, the plaintiﬀ has conveniently shifted the entire blame on his counsel. The proposed amendment is stated to be nothing, but, a feeble attempt to ﬁll up the lacuna. 10. As per the defendants, the pleadings are too short to demonstrate about the necessity of the document sought to be relied upon by way of the proposed amendment. The learned First Appellate Court, vide order dated 10.01.2025, has dismissed the application for amendment. 11. The provisions of Order VI, Rule 17 of the CPC are reproduced, as under:- “Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the 7 2026:HHC:15366 real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” 12. The proviso under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC was inserted on 01.07.2002 and as per the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, the Court may, at any stage, of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms, as may be just, however, by way of proviso, it has been mandated that the amendment shall only be allowed, if the applicant, who is seeking the amendment satisﬁes the judicial conscience of the Court that inspite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. 13. 13. Admittedly, in the present case, the trial has commenced and the judgment against the plaintiﬀ has been passed by the learned trial Court, which has been assailed by the plaintiﬀ before the learned First Appellate Court. Although, the appeal is continuation of suit, but, it cannot be said that the trial has not commenced. 8 2026:HHC:15366 14. Trial, in the present case, has commenced and after commencement of trial, if, any party seeks amendment in the pleadings, then, for such party, it is mandatory to plead the fact that despite due diligence, they could not seek the proposed amendment, before commencement of the trial. 15. The lis remained pending before the learned trial Court for about 11 years and thereafter, the appeal has been ﬁled before the learned First Appellate Court and in that appeal, the plaintiﬀ has sought the indulgence of the learned First Appellate Court to permit the amendment as proposed in the application. 16. The appeal was ﬁled on 18.08.2022 and thereafter, the present application for amendment has been ﬁled, in which, the notice was issued by the learned First Appellate Court, to the defendants, on 07.06.2024. Issues, in this case, were framed by the learned trial Court on 23.04.2013. Meaning thereby, the application has been ﬁled after a gap of about 11 years. 17. The plaintiﬀ has knocked the door of the learned trial Court for the redressal of the grievances, by seeking the relief of speciﬁc performance and it cannot be expected from 9 2026:HHC:15366 the plaintiﬀ to say that during the pendency of the lis before the learned trial Court, which has been decided, the counsel representing the plaintiﬀ, before the learned trial Court, could not lay his hands on the document, upon which, the proposed amendment has been sought. 18. A feeble attempt has also been made, in the application, to shift the burden of negligence, upon the counsel representing the plaintiﬀ, before the learned trial Court, but, without any substance. The said stand cannot be taken into consideration as a gospel truth. Had the amendment been allowed, after commencement of trial, on such grounds, then, there would be no end to the litigation, as, every unsuccessful litigant may move the application, before the higher Court, by alleging the negligence or inaction on the part of the counsel, representing such party, before the learned trial Court or the learned First Appellate Court. 19. Relevant para, of the application, under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, is reproduced, as under:- “That when the suit was being prepared and drafted by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiﬀ in the learned trial Court, the appellant/plaintiﬀ had appraised all the aforesaid facts to his said learned counsel and had also handed over the registered Power of 10 2026:HHC:15366 Attorney No.602/2008 dated 16.12.2008 for appending the same with the plaint and prove it in accordance with law for reason that since Late Shri Dasheru ram had received the entire sale consideration under the agreement of sale dated 16.12.2008 supra, therefore, the registered power of attorney came into being at the hands of Shri Dasheru Ram. But on account of inadvertent and bona ﬁde mistake on the part of his learned counsel in the trial Court the registered power of attorney supra could be placed on recored along with the plaint at the time of ﬁling the suit as it remained buried in his brief nor the factum of execution and registration of the power of attorney supra could be made a part of pleadings in the plaint.” 20. Merely, reasserting the terms, ‘despite due diligence’ is too short to meet out the legislative intent, in inserting the proviso, under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. 21. It is no longer res integra that at the time of deciding the application for proposed amendment, merits of the case should not be discussed. 22. Even otherwise, the scope of interference, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.1388 of 2013, titled as Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Another versus B. Gurappa Naidu & Others, 2026 11 2026:HHC:15366 INSC 434. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 36, are reproduced, as under:- “30. Before adverting to the factual matrix, it would be apposite to examine whether the High Court exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India? 31. The scope and ambit of the power of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been the subject matter of consideration before this Court in several judgments, and the law governing the exercise of such power now stands well settled. In exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, the High Court cannot act as an appellate court, nor can it sit in appeal over the correctness of the orders passed by courts and tribunals over which it exercises the power of superintendence under Article 227. 32. This court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, has held: “35. Nasirullah Beg J. of the Allahabad High Court in a very well-considered judgment rendered in the case of Jodhey vs. State, reported in AIR 1952 All 788, discussed the provisions of Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861, Section 107 of the Government of India Act 1915 and Section 224 of the Government of India Act 1935 and compared them with almost similar provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned judge considered the power of the High Court under Article 227 to be plenary and unfettered but at the same time, in 12 2026:HHC:15366 paragraph 15 at page 792 of the report, the learned judge held that High Court should be cautious in its exercise. It was made clear, and rightly so, that the power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustiﬁable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. The learned judge clariﬁed if only there is a ﬂagrant abuse of the elementary principles of justice or a manifest error of law patent on the face of the record or an outrageous miscarriage of justice, power of superintendence can be exercised. This is a discretionary power to be exercised by Court and cannot be claimed as a matter or right by a party. …….….. 40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through Lrs. & others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others etc. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141, wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse ﬁnding of an inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this `limited extent' the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ﬁndings of fact (see para 18, page 149- 150). In coming to the above ﬁnding, this Court relied on its previous 13 2026:HHC:15366 decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh v. Amanath and Another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 215 and Nagendra Nath Bora & Another vs The Commissioner of Hills Division and others, reported in AIR 1958 SC 398 discussed above.” 33. This court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., has held that the power of the High Court in interfering with the order of the Court or Tribunal, would be restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and ﬂagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. It has been further held: “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and ﬂagrant 14 2026:HHC:15366 violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the ﬁndings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the ﬁnding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to.” 34. This Court in a recent judgment of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, had an occasion to again deal with the exercise of Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and held that, High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction would not act as a Court of First Appeal. It was also held: “15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of ﬁrst appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct 15 2026:HHC:15366 every error of fact or even a legal ﬂaw when the ﬁnal ﬁnding is justiﬁed or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or ﬂagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the ﬁnding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” (emphasis supplied) 35. In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows: a) The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustiﬁable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals. b) It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. 16 2026:HHC:15366 c) The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of ﬁrst appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal ﬂaw when the ﬁnal ﬁnding is justiﬁed or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. 36. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, we are of the considered view that the High Court has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. We say so for the following reasons: 36.1.Firstly, the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution can be exercised where there is an unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction by a court not vested with such jurisdiction, or in cases of gross abuse of jurisdiction. In the present case, it is evident from the record that the Executing Court was duly vested with jurisdiction to deal with the matter, and no case of gross abuse of jurisdiction is made out. On this ground, the High Court could not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227. 36.2.Secondly, the power of superintendence may be invoked where there is an unjustiﬁable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in a court. In the present case, the Executing Court did exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it. Consequently, no occasion arose 17 2026:HHC:15366 for the High Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution on this ground. 36.3.Thirdly, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, could not have acted as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment for that of the subordinate court to correct an error which was not apparent on the face of the record. In the present case, while considering the petition ﬁled by N.I.C.E. under Article 227, the High Court ought to have borne in mind that this Court, in the earlier round of litigation, had speciﬁcally directed the Executing Court to determine the guideline value of the property and accordingly the Executing Court had determined the value of the land. In our considered opinion, the High Court travelled beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 while adjudicating the writ petition ﬁled by N.I.C.E. and we say so for the following reasons: 36.3.1. While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court had a limited scope of interference with the order passed by the Executing Court. What the High Court has done in the present matter is precisely what may be characterised as acting in the capacity of an Appellate Court, which is impermissible in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. Firstly, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court belatedly impleaded the State Government to resolve an issue relating to the interpretation of the manner in which 18 2026:HHC:15366 the guideline value was to be determined. In our considered opinion, such impleadment ought not to have been resorted to, for the reason that the lis throughout was between private parties and arose solely out of a compromise decree. 36.3.2. Secondly, the High Court, in eﬀect, called upon the State Government to ﬁle an aﬃdavit seeking clariﬁcation on the interpretation of the notiﬁcation. Although the High Court ultimately rejected the report submitted by the State, it nonetheless accepted the State’s clariﬁcation with regard to the interpretation of the notiﬁcation and proceeded to act upon the same. In substance, the High Court permitted the State to interpret its own notiﬁcation and thereby inﬂuence a lis exclusively between private parties. The State was thus placed in the position of being a rule-maker, interpreter, and adjudicator of its own notiﬁcation simultaneously, all while the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Such an approach, in our considered view, is impermissible. The executive cannot be allowed to explain away or reinterpret a statutory instrument during the course of litigation to the prejudice of one of the parties. 36.3.3. Thirdly, the High Court accepted the interpretation advanced by the State solely on the ground that an alternative interpretation of the notiﬁcation was possible. By doing so, the High Court substituted its own view for that of the Executing Court, thereby 19 2026:HHC:15366 exhibiting the conduct of an Appellate Court rather than that of a court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 36.3.4. Fourthly, at the very least, the interpretation, adopted by the Executing Court constituted a plausible and reasonable view. In such circumstances, the High Court could not, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, supplant that view with another interpretation, merely because such an alternative view was also possible. By exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 solely to demonstrate that another view was possible, the High Court, in eﬀect, acted as an appellate court, which is impermissible in law. 36.4.Therefore, in our considered opinion, the High Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, travelled beyond the limits of the narrow and circumscribed scrutiny permissible under the said provision, in direct contravention of the principles set out in paragraph 35 of this judgment. 23. If the facts and circumstances of the present case are seen, in the light of the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the learned First Appellate Court, in the present case, has rightly appreciated the peculiar facts and circumstances involved, in the present case, as the proposed 20 2026:HHC:15366 amendment has been sought to be allowed, by levelling allegations against the counsel, who had represented the plaintiﬀ, before the learned trial Court, where, the lis has been decided against him. If such plea is accepted, then there would be no end to the litigation, as every unsuccessful litigant would approach the Court, by levelling allegations, against his counsel, qua alleged negligence/inaction. 24. Considering all these facts, there is no occasion for this Court to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the learned First Appellate Court. As such, the present petition is dismissed. 25. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 26. Parties, through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 21st May, 2026. Record be sent back immediately. ( Virender Singh ) May 08, 2026( ps ) Judge

CHANDER JOT SINGH v. DHARAM SINGH AND OTHERS

Judgment text