Page No.# 1/16 GAHC040005472026 2026:GAU-AP:599 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : CRP/26/2026 Bomli Basar Son of Tobom Basar, permanent resident of Gori III Village, PO and PS Basar, Leparada District, Arunachal Pradesh. VERSUS Minjom Bagra Son of Late Imin Bagra, permanent resident of Village Lipu Bagra, PO and PS Aalo, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh. Advocate for the Petitioner : Rintu Saikia, Sr. Adv, Gopi Bam,Muchi Mele,Mindo Taso,K Bam,Idak Bam,Ligam Nochi Advocate for the Respondent : Kemo Lollen, Maryum Sora,Geli Taye,D Ado BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG 1. Date on which judgment is reserved: 25.05.2026 2. Date of pronouncement of judgment: 16.06.2026 3. Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? NO 4. Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? YES JUDGMENT & ORDER(CAV) Heard Mr. Rintu Saikia, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. Idak Bam, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Kemo Lollen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the sole respondent. 2. The present Civil Revision Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order dated 13.03.2026, passed by the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), West Siang District, Aalo, whereby, the appeal filed by the respondent under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Page No.# 2/16 (Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been admitted. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 13.03.2026 filed by the respondent under order 41 Rule 5 read with section 151 of Civil Procedure code passed in Misc. Case No. 18/2026 in Civil Appeal No. 04/2026, passed without jurisdiction and stayed the operation of the keba decision dated 21.02.2026 passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Council, Basar, has been suspended. 3. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present civil revision petition is that the dispute relates to ownership and decision of a plot of ancestral land situated within the jurisdiction of Basar area. 4. The petitioner lodged a complaint dated 22.05.2025 before the Deputy Commissioner, Basar, alleging that the respondent had illegally sold his ancestral property/land by fraudulently obtaining the Land Possession Certificates(LPCs) and requested for settlement of the dispute through village level keba. 5. Based on the aforesaid compliant, the Deputy Commissioner, Basar, vide order dated 26.05.2025, forwarded the complaint to the Head Gaon Burah/Village Authority under Section 4 of the Assam Frontier(Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, for adjudication. Pursuant thereto, the Head Gaon Burah, Gori- III, Ango village issued Parwana/summons to the parties on 27.05.2025 and 05.06.2025, respectively. 6. On 28.06.2025, the HGB Gori-III, passed Order directing both the parties to maintain status quo over the land. The respondent, thereafter, submitted a representation dated 30.10.2025, asserting that the land, in question, was in possession of her deceased mother by virtue of the Land Possession Certificate issued in her name and had, thereafter, further transferred to his maternal Uncle Shri Minjom Bagra, the present respondent and accordingly, sought for deletion of his name. Subsequently, on having found the status-quo having been violated, the petitioner by his further communication, informed the police regarding alleged Page No.# 3/16 violation of the status-quo order passed by the village authority. Thereupon, the village authority also informed the police on 16.06.2025, regarding alleged breach of its order. The petitioner also lodged a FIR dated 17.06.2025, against the illegal activities by one Shri Santo Chetry and others in violation of the status-quo order. 7. The Deputy Commissioner, Basar, on 19.06.2025, also passed an order directing both the parties to maintain status-quo over the disputed land. Thereafter, summons were issued by the village authority/Customary Court of Gori-III to the parties and upon consideration of the rival claims; passed its decision dated 16.07.2025 holding, inter alia, that the land purchased from Late Nguto Basar by Late Minsa Bagra, mother of Shri Santo Chetry, belongs to Shri Minjom Bagra, while observing that since the entire land had not been sold, a portion thereof, was liable to be restored to the petitioner. 8. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court against the said Keba decision dated 16.07.2025, on 18.07.2025. The respondent also preferred an appeal under Section 3(III)(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, on 24.07.2025, against the Keba decision dated 16.07.2025 of the village authority. 9. During the pendency of the appeal proceedings, the respondent approached this Court by way of filing a Civil Revision Petition being CRP 94/2025 seeking appropriate direction regarding constitution of the appellate forum. By order dated 26.09.2025, passed in CRP NO. 94/2025, this Court directed the appellate authority to include equal representation from both sides and proceed with the appeal. In compliance of the said direction, fresh notices were issued and the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court heard both the parties. By judgment dated 21.02.2026, the appellate Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court held that the entire land was not sold by Late Nguto Basar but only half of an acre of the land had been sold by him to Shri Minjom Bagra and accordingly, declared that half an acre of the land belonged to Page No.# 4/16 late Minsa Bagra and remaining part of the land would belong to Shri Bomli Basar. 10. Thereafter, the respondent initially filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Basar, which was dismissed with liberty. Subsequently, the respondent instituted Civil Appeal No. 04/2026 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aalo, under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Along with the appeal, Misc. Case No. 18/2026 under Order 41 Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was also filed by the respondent, seeking stay of the judgment dated 21.02.2026 passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court, Basar. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aalo, admitted the appeal and granted interim protection. 11. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 12. Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submits that civil dispute within the State of Arunachal Pradesh, are governed by the provisions of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021 (amended from time to time); Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. It is contended that under Section 2(f) of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945, as amended in 2023; the village authority includes the traditional village council or Inter Village Territorial Council, or, the Apex Council, or, by whatever name called including Head Gaon Bura, Head Gaon Buri, Gaon Bura, Gaon Buri and traditional village head. Reference is also made to Section 2(b) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021, which includes the Customary Court and village authority within the definition of Courts exercising civil jurisdiction. According to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, prior to enactment of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021, an appeal from the decision of the village authority were governed by Section 46 of the Assam Frontier(Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. However, by Page No.# 5/16 virtue of Section 27 of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021, the said provision has been deleted and a new appellate structure has been introduced under Section 15 of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 2021. 13. Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, submits that Section 15(4) inserted by the amendment Act i.e. the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, and modified in 2023, creates an appellate forum before the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court against the decisions rendered by the village authority. 14. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court while deciding such appeals, functions as a first appellate authority and not as a Court of original jurisdiction. The learned senior counsel further contends that on that basis, once, the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court has exercised its appellate jurisdiction and rendered its decision on 21.02.2026, any further challenge to that order by the respondent can be made only by way of filing a “Second Appeal” under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before the High Court. The respondent having already availed a first appeal remedy before the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, could not file another appeal before the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Aalo, by invoking Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 15. Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, further submits that proviso to Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, must be construed as applicable only where the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court exercises its original jurisdiction. According to the learned senior counsel, permitting a further appeal before the Civil Judge(Senior Division) against an appeal decision of the Inter Village Page No.# 6/16 Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court, would virtually create a “first appeal” rendering Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, redundant. 16. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including Section 100, stands adopted and applicable within the State of Arunachal Pradesh and that the Legislation of State cannot be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the enactment of the law by the Parliament. 17. In support of his submissions, Mr. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance upon Article 254(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, to contend that Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022, cannot be construed as impliedly repealing or overriding the provisions of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Further reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kulwant Kaur & Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) by LRs. & Ors., reported in (2001) 4 SCC 262, to contend that a State legislation cannot override or create a remedy inconsistent with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and that, in case of repugnancy, Parliament legislation must prevail. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced below: “Paragraph-13, Article 254 thus maintains Parliamentary supremacy in matters under List I and List III (List I Union List and List III Concurrent List). And It is on this score that Mr. Mehta was very eloquent that doctrine of implied repeal will have its true impact on the situation and thus resultantly negatived the effect of Section 41 of the Punjab courts Act. Mr. Mehta contended that Section 100 of the Code and Section 41 of the Punjab Act without any pale of controversy have a common objective viz. authority and jurisdiction to hear Second Appeals and thus both operate on the same field and by reason of the factum of the Punjab Act being non-complimentary to Section 100 of the Code, it cannot but be said to be repugnant and hence the doctrine of repugnancy will have its full play in the matter of declaration of the Punjab Act being void. 14. On the doctrine of implied repeal, Mr. Mehta contended that procedural law must be having a meaningful existence without being in conflict with a parliamentary legislation. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of implied repeal is not to be favoured but where a particular provision cannot co-exist or intended to subsist in the event of there being the repugnancy between central and State Legislature the courts cannot but declare it to be so on the ground of repeal by Page No.# 7/16 implication. Uniformity of law, being the basic characteristics of Indian jurisprudence cannot be termed to be at sufferance by reason of a State Legislation which runs counter to the Central Legislation. It is not necessary that one legislation should be on the positive side whereas the other one in the negative: Such a stringent requirement is not the requirement in order to bring home the issue of repugnancy, but all the same it might result when both the legislations cover the same field. This observation find support from the decision of this Court in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay [1955 (1) SCR 799] wherein this Court observed: It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under Article 254 (1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject-matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together; then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Article 254 (2) whether the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. We must accordingly hold that section 2 of Bombay Act NO.XXXVI of 1947 cannot prevail as against section 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act No.XXIV of 1946 as amended by Act No.LII of 1950. (vide page 809). 15. In Zaverbhai case (supra) this Court in no uncertain terms laid down that the important thing to consider is whether the legislation is in respect of the same matter and it is on this score true effect of Article 254 (2) has been said to the effect that if both the Centre and the State though competent to enact the same, the law of the Centre should prevail over that of the State. There cannot be any divergence of views on this score having regard the language of the Article 254 and this is irrespective of the factum that constitutionality of a statute being always presumed in affirmative rather than in the negative. It is in this context that a Constitution Bench of this Court in the decision in Karunanidhi [M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India & Anr. (1979) 3 SCC 431] stated that before any repugnancy can arise the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) That there is clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act; (b) That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable; (c) That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other. 17. The submission for the Respondent further proceeded to the effect that on a plain reading of this Section it depicts that in the event of there being any inconsistency, the special or local laws will have the precedence over the Code but in the event, there is no inconsistency between the two, the Code will prevail rather an attractive submission but on a closer scrutiny the same pales into insignificance. As aforesaid the special or local law as contained in Section 41 of the Punjab Code was in pari materia with unamended Section 100 so then there was no inconsistency. It is only after the amendment could be said to an inconsistency have developed between the two provisions, which Page No.# 8/16 is submitted to be saved by the aforesaid Section 4. While it is true, on its plain reading at the first glance local law seems to have been saved but we have to examine this in the light of Article 254 of the Constitution of India and the doctrine of repugnancy read with Section 97 of the Amending Act as noticed in the earlier part of this judgment. Incorporation of the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act in the statute book is by virtue of conferment of power under Entry 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Constitution is the parent document and is supreme which has a binding effect on all and by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution, parliamentary supremacy in regard to the adaptation of laws if within the area of operation as provided under List I or List III is recognised. 18. Article 254 makes it unequivocal of the supremacy of the Parliament in the matter of repugnancy of any matter falling under List I or List III. There is one exception carved under Clause (2) to a matter falling under the Concurrent List III. This supremacy is further reinforced by the proviso of this Clause (2), which records; Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. (Noticed again for convenience). 20. It is in this context a decision of this Court (I.T.C. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors :1985 (Suppl) SCC 476) may also be noted, wherein this Court in paragraph 18 of the judgment (see page 496) had the following to state: Thus, in my opinion, the five principles have to be read and construed together and not in isolation where however, the Central and the State legislation cover the same field then the Central legislation would prevail. It is also well settled that where two Acts, one passed by the Parliament and the other by a State Legislature, collide and there is no question of harmonising them, then the Central legislation must prevail. 27. Now we proceed to examine Section 97 (1) of the Amending Act and the amendment of Section 100 CPC by the said 1976 Act. Through this amendment right to Second Appeal further restricted only to lie where, the case involves a substantial question of law. This introduction definitely is in conflict with Section 41 of the Punjab Act which was pari materia with unamended Section 100 CPC. Thus so long there was no specific provision to the contrary in this Code Section 4 CPC saved special or local law. But after it comes in conflict Section 4 CPC would not save, on the contrary its language implied would makes such special or local law applicable. We may examine now the submission for the respondent based on language of Section 100 (1) CPC even after the said amendment. The reliance is on the following words: “100. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by any other law for the time being in force….” These words existed even prior to the amendment and is unaffected by the amendment. Thus so far it could legitimately be submitted that, reading this part of the Section in isolation it saves the local law. But this has to be read with Section 97(1) of the Amending Act, which reads: “97. (1) Any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the Page No.# 9/16 principal Act by a State Legislature before the commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such amendment or provision is consistent with the provision of the principal Act as amended by this Act, stands repealed. (Noticed again for convenience).” 18. The petitioner also relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Secretary to the Government of Kerala, Irrigation Department & Ors. v. James Varghese & Ors., reported in (2022) 9 SCC 593. In paragraphs 63 and 64, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “63. It could thus be seen that this Court has observed that the subject of arbitration finds place in Entry 13 of List III, i.e., the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. It has been held that the legislation pertaining to the said entry could be made either by the Parliament or the State Legislature. It has been held that since the subject of arbitration is in the Concurrent List, the State can also make a law with regard to the same. The only requirement is that to validate such a law, it is necessary to reserve the same for consideration of the President of India and obtain his assent. When such an assent is obtained, the provisions of the State Law or Act so enacted would prevail in the State concerned, notwithstanding its repugnancy with an earlier Parliamentary enactment made on the subject. It is not in dispute that in the present case also, the State Act was reserved for consideration of the President of India and the assent of the President of India has been obtained. As such, the State Act so enacted would prevail in the State of Kerala. 64. It will further be pertinent to note that in the case of MP Rural 2012, the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (State enactment) provided for mandatory statutory arbitration in the State of M.P. irrespective of the arbitration agreement in respect of works contracts in the State of M.P. or its instrumentalities. An argument was sought to be made on behalf of the claimants that the State Act was repugnant to the 1996 Act and that in view of Section 85 of the 1996 Act, the M.P. Act, 1983 stood impliedly repealed. There was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges on the Bench. A.K. Ganguly, J., on the Bench, observed thus: “38. The argument of repugnancy is also not tenable. Entry 13 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution runs as follows: “13. Civil procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration.” In view of the aforesaid entry, the State Government is competent to enact laws in relation to arbitration. 39. The M.P. Act of 1983 was made when the previous Arbitration Act of 1940 was in the field. That Act of 1940 was a Central law. Both the Acts operated in view of Section 46 of the 1940 Act. The M.P. Act, 1983 Page No.# 10/16 was reserved for the assent of the President and admittedly received the same on 17101983 which was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette Extraordinary dated 12 101983. Therefore, the requirement of Article 254(2) of the Constitution was satisfied. Thus, the M.P. Act of 1983 prevails in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, the AC Act, 1996 was enacted by Parliament repealing the earlier laws of arbitration of 1940. It has also been noted that the AC Act, 1996 saves the provisions of the M.P. Act, 1983 under Sections 2(4) and 2(5) thereof. Therefore, there cannot be any repugnancy. (See the judgment of this Court in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe [(1983) 1 SCC 177 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 143 :AIR 1983 SC 150].) 40. In this connection the observations made by the Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India are very pertinent and the following observations are excerpted: (SCC p. 450, para 37) “37… It is, therefore, clear that in view of this clear intention of the legislature there can be no room for any argument that the State Act was in any way repugnant to the Central Acts. We have already pointed out from the decisions of the Federal Court and this Court that one of the important tests to find out as to whether or not there is repugnancy is to ascertain the intention of the legislature regarding the fact that the dominant legislature allowed the subordinate legislature to operate in the same field pari passu the State Act.” 41. It is clear from the aforesaid observations that in the instant case the latter Act made by Parliament i.e. the AC Act, 1996 clearly showed an intention to the effect that the State law of arbitration i.e. the M.P. Act should operate in the State of Madhya Pradesh in respect of certain specified types of arbitrations which are under the M.P. Act, 1983. This is clear from Sections 2(4) and 2(5) of the AC Act, 1996. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument of repugnancy and is accordingly rejected.” 19. Per contra, Mr. Lollen, learned counsel for the respondent, submits that the appellate structure provided under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022, is a special statutory provision governing customary adjudicatory institutions in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the right of appeal under the said provision being a creature of statute, its form and extent are controlled by a statute forming such rights under the Civil Courts Act. He also submits that the amendment of Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022, specifically provides that against the decision of the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court, an appeal shall lie before the Page No.# 11/16 ordinary Civil Courts, namely, Civil Judge(Junior Division), Civil Judge(Senior Division), Additional District Judge, or, District Judge, as the case may be depending upon the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. He further submits that as Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, creates such a special appellate forum and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the Statute, does not call for interference. Hence, Mr. Lollen, learned counsel for the respondent, prays for dismissal of the instant Civil Revision Petition. 20. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Commercial Engineers and Body Building Company Limited, reported in 2022 Supreme (SC) 1053. Paragraph 6 of the said decision reads as under: “Paragraph 6- The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filling of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act.” 21. Upon consideration of the pleadings and the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties; the principal question that arises for determination by this Court is: (i) whether after adjudication by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court while exercising the appellate jurisdiction over the decision of a village authority/Customary Court, a further appeal lies before the Civil Judge(Senior Division) under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, or, whether only a “Second Appeal” under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, lies before the Page No.# 12/16 High Court. 22. For proper consideration and appreciation of the matter at hand, Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, assumes significance and therefore, the same is reproduced hereinbelow, for ready reference: “(iii) After the fourth proviso to sub-section (3) of section 15, the following sub- section shall be inserted, - (4) An appeal from the village Authority, if agreed to by the parties, shall lie before the inter-village territorial Customary Court or Apex Customary Court, by whatever name called, which shall settle the case as per the local Territorial customary laws under the provisions of section 40 of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation, 1945. Provided that, an appeal against the order of the inter-village territorial court or Apex Customary Court shall lie before the Courts of Civil Judge Junior Division, the Courts of Civil Judge Senior Division, the Courts of Additional District Judge or the Courts of District Judge, as the case may be, as per their territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Provided further that, the courts of Civil Judge Junior Division, the Courts of Civil Judge Senior Division, the Courts of Additional District Judge or the Courts of District Judge, as the case may be, shall not set aside an appeal so filed merely on technical ground or procedural lapses but in the interest of justice shall dispose of the same as may be deemed appropriate or proceed with the case de novo.” 23. The above proviso inserted by the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, and further, amended in 2023, specifically provides that: (i). an appeal from the village authority/Customary Court shall lie before the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court; and (ii). an appeal against the order of the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court shall lie before the Civil Courts, namely, Civil Judge(Junior Division), Civil Judge(Senior Division), Additional District Judge, or, District Judge, as the case may be depending upon the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Page No.# 13/16 24. It is seen that the language employed by the Legislature is explicit and unambiguous. 25. The statute itself creates a separate hierarchy concerning decisions rendered by the village authority and the Customary Courts. The contention of the petitioner is that since the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court exercised the appellate jurisdiction in the present case, the subsequent appeal filed by the respondent before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aalo, amounts to a “Second Appeal”, which under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, would lie only before the High Court. In view of the observation made above that the provision under sub-section (4) of the Section 15 of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022 is clear and unambiguous, that the appeal against the order passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Court shall lie before the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Civil Judge (Senior Division), Additional District Judge, or, District Judge, as the case may be depending upon the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction; this contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 26. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, applies to “Second Appeal” arising from the appellate order/decrees passed under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by Courts subordinate to the High Court. However, the appellate authority/ structure created under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, is a special statutory provision governing customary adjudicatory institutions in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. The right of appeal being a creature of statute, its form and extent are controlled by statute forming such rights under the Civil Courts Act. 27. The amended Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, specifically provides that a statutory appeal against the decision of the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court whatever name called, shall lie before the ordinary Civil Courts, namely, Civil Judge (Junior Division), Civil Judge(Senior Division), Additional District Judge, or, Page No.# 14/16 District Judge, depending upon the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. The provisions do not distinguish whether the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court exercised original or appellate jurisdiction. Had the Legislature intended that orders passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court in appellate jurisdiction, would be directly amenable to Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, before the High Court; the statute would have expressly so provided. However, on the contrary, the proviso clearly demonstrates the legislative intent that even orders of the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court are open to challenge before the regular Civil Courts, as the case may be, constituted under the Act. Thus, merely, because the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court/Apex Customary Court possesses both original and appellate jurisdiction does not ipso facto attract Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The nomenclature “Second Appeal” under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot override the special appeal provision expressly provided and enacted under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts(Amendment) Act, 2022. 28. This Court has carefully considered the authorities cited by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner viz. Kulwant Kaur(supra) and James Varghese (supra). However, the said judgments do not support the case of the petitioner. Both the decisions primarily deal with the doctrine of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution of India and the circumstances in which an enactment of the State legislature may be held inconsistent with a Parliamentary law operating in the same field. In the present case, no such irreconcilable inconsistency arises. As observed earlier, Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act, creates a special statutory appellate mechanism governing the decisions of the village authorities and customary Courts. The Act expressly provides the forum of appeal. Therefore, the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions are distinguishable and do not establish any repugnancy between Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts Act and Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Page No.# 15/16 29. It is also a settled law that where the special statute provides for a particular forum and procedure of appeal, the same prevails over the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Aalo, committed no jurisdictional error in entertaining the appeal preferred by the respondent under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022, read with Section 96 and Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 30. In view of the above, the interim order staying the operation of the impugned order dated 21.02.2026, passed by the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court (Keba)/Apex Customary Court, Basar, is also an interlocutory order passed within the jurisdiction and no patent perversity or jurisdictional error is made-out warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 31. Accordingly, this Court holds that: (i). The appeal preferred by the respondent before the learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Aalo, against the order of the Inter Village Territorial Customary Court(Keba), is maintainable under Section 15(4) of the Arunachal Pradesh Civil Courts (Amendment) Act, 2022; (ii). Such appeal cannot be treated as a “Second Appeal” under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, directly maintainable before the High Court; and (iii). The order dated 13.03.2026, admitting the appeal and granting interim stay, does not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 32. Consequently, the instant Civil Revision Petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Page No.# 16/16 33. The learned Civil Judge(Senior Division), Aalo, shall proceed with the appeal preferred by the respondent, in accordance with law. 34. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. JUDGE Comparing Assistant