2026:HHC:16767 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1180 of 2025 Reserved on: 01.04.2026 Date of Decision: 14.05.2026 Kanta Chauhan ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondent _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr N.K. Tomar, Advocate For the respondents/ State : Msr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 51 of 2025 dated 21.06.2025 registered at Police Station Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 75 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO) 2012. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:16767 to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that Rakesh Tomar, posted as Trained Graduate Teacher, Non-Medical, used to touch his students inappropriately. The girl students were distressed by this behaviour of the teacher. They made a written complaint to the petitioner, who was posted as the principal of the school. The petitioner failed to take any action. The parents of the girls resorted to agitation and shouted slogans against the administration. The police reached the spot. A complaint signed by twenty-five female students was produced before the police, and the Police registered the FIR. The police arrested the teacher and seized the record. It was found that one victim and her father had earlier made a complaint to this effect against the teacher before the petitioner. 25 girl students had also filed a written complaint against the teacher before the petitioner. However, the petitioner had not taken any action. The relatives of the victims organised a protest in the school premises and shouted slogans. The police came to the spot and registered the FIR. The petitioner had not informed the police, which amounted to an offence punishable under Section 21 (2) of the POCSO Act. Hence, 3 2026:HHC:16767 the chargesheet was filed before the Court against the teacher and the petitioner. 3. Being aggrieved by the filing of the chargesheet, the petitioner has approached this Court asserting that there was no delay or laxity on her part. The petitioner is a female and would not shield any person accused of committing an offence punishable under the POCSO Act. The complaint was received on 20.06.2025 and was forwarded to the Station House Officer, Rajgarh. FIR was registered based on the complaint forwarded by the petitioner. The petitioner cooperated with the investigation. No information was given to the petitioner before 20.06.2025. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr N K Tomar, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr N.K. Tomar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had forwarded the complaint to the police, and the police had registered the FIR based on the complaint so forwarded. The petitioner was wrongly arrayed as an accused. 4 2026:HHC:16767 The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending against the petitioner be quashed. 6. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had not forwarded the complaint to the police and no FIR would have been registered in the present case, but for the agitation by the victims’ relatives. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. This Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction at this stage. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised 5 2026:HHC:16767 some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a 6 2026:HHC:16767 police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the 7 2026:HHC:16767 concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The copy of the chargesheet filed by the petitioner specifically mentions that the victim and her father had made a 8 2026:HHC:16767 complaint against the teacher, complaining of sexual harassment. 25 girl students had handed over a written complaint to the petitioner on 20.06.2025. The petitioner admitted in the present petition that she had received a complaint from the girl students on 20.06.2025. The FIR and the chargesheet also show that the petitioner had not forwarded the complaint to the Police. The relatives of the girl students had to resort to protest, and when the police visited the school, the complaint was handed over to the Police. Therefore, prima facie, it is apparent that the petitioner had not forwarded the complaint to the Police immediately after coming to know of the sexual harassment. 12. Section 19(1) of the POCSO Act provides that when any person has apprehension that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed or has knowledge that such an offence has been committed, he shall provide such information to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the Police Official. Section 20 (2) of the POCSO Act provides that any person being in charge of a company or an institution who fails to report the commission of an offence under Sub Section 1 of Section 19 in respect of a subordinate under his control shall be punished for a term which may extend to one year and with a fine. In the present case, the petitioner was in 9 2026:HHC:16767 charge of the school, where the teacher was posted. She was apprised by the victim and her father about the sexual harassment. She failed to report the matter to the police. She was also apprised by 25 girl students of the sexual harassment by a written complaint on 20.06.2025. The petitioner failed to take any action. The incident came to light when the relatives of the victims protested and would not have seen the light of day but for the protest. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner had failed to abide by the duty cast upon her under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, and she has prima facie committed an offence punishable under Section 20 (2) of the POCSO Act. 13. The petitioner submitted that no complaint was made to her before 20.06.2025. It is a matter of Trial and cannot be adjudicated during these proceedings. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed: “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in 10 2026:HHC:16767 a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.” 14. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060: “14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court 11 2026:HHC:16767 while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 15. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, 12 2026:HHC:16767 while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 16. This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: - 22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised. Xxxx 27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…” 17. It was held in C.S. Prasad v. C. Satyakumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 50, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction cannot go into the genuineness of the allegations or the reliability, sufficiency or the acceptability of the evidence. It was observed: “24. On these lines, it is clear that even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are very wide, their 13 2026:HHC:16767 conferment requires the High Courts to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any FIR, the High Court, exercising its power under this provision, cannot embark upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The High Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not, and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.” 18. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not. 19. The police have filed the chargesheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate it. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials 14 2026:HHC:16767 which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.” 20. No other point was urged. 21. In view of the above, the present petition fails and is dismissed 22. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th May, 2026 (Nikita)