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2026 DAILYLAW 8198 (BOM)

VISHNU TANAJI KHADE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THR. THE CO-OPERATIVE MINISTRY OF MAHARASHTRA STATE AND ORS.

WP/4533/2026 · 2026-09-11

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Judgment text

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912-4533-2026-WP=.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 4533 OF 2026 Vishnu Tanaji Khade … Petitioner Vs. 1. State of Maharashtra 2. The Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Kolhapur 3. Satara District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. 4. The Managing Committee, Palashi Vividh Karyakari Seva Sahakari Society Ltd. 5. Sunil Tukaram Gambre … Respondents …………. Mr. Kiran Kumar Phukade a/w Arjun Mohite for the Petitioner Mr. Suryajeet Chavan a/w D.L. Hange, Atul Khilari i/b Harsh Arun Khot for Respondent No.5. Mr. Sanjay D. Rayrikar, AGP for Respondent No.1 - State …………. CORAM : SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. DATE : 11th SEPTEMBER, 2026. FINAL ORDER : . Heard both sides. 2. The petitioner is challenging order dated 07.09.2026 passed by respondent no.2 sustaining the objection of the respondent no.5 against the petitioner and excluding petitioner’s name from the voters’ list of the respondent no.3 - Satara District Central Co-operative Bank. Uday S. Jagtap 1 of 5 UDAY SHIVAJI JAGTAP Digitally signed by UDAY SHIVAJI JAGTAP Date: 2026.09.12 16:49:41 +0530 912-4533-2026-WP=.doc 3. The petitioner claims that he is duly nominated representative of the respondent no.4 – Co-operative Society, placing reliance on the Resolution passed on 05.08.2026. The respondent no.5 is the Chairman of the Respondent No.4 – Society who is objecting the nomination of the petitioner. The Resolution of the primary societies were to be submitted from 07.07.2026 to 05.08.2026. Accordingly, petitioner’s nomination was presented but it is rejected on the ground that the Resolution is against the bye law. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced arguments in support of his contention. It is submitted that the respondent no.2 – Returning Officer travelled beyond his jurisdiction and examined the validity of the Resolution. The self same Resolution is challenged in a Co- operative Dispute No. 93 of 2026 and application for temporary injunction at Exh.5 was rejected. It is vehemently submitted that the validity of the Resolution or the Meeting would be the subject matter of proceeding under Section 91. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.5 – objector would submit that the Resolution is nullity. There was no sufficient coaram initially and there was no 05 days clear notice. It is submitted that though he was present in the meeting in question, but he is entitled to Uday S. Jagtap 2 of 5 912-4533-2026-WP=.doc raise the objection. The impugned order is passed within four corners of law. 6. Learned counsel Mr. Pawar appearing for respondent nos. 2 and 3 would submit that the Resolution is against Bye Law No. 9(5)(a), which is rightly appreciated by the Returning Officer. The bye laws are binding. The Returning Officer acted as per Rule 11. The scope for entertaining the petition in election matters is very limited and no interference is called for. 7. The petitioner is nominated to represent the respondent no.4 – Society in a meeting dated 05.08.2026. Initially, the meeting was convened on 03.08.2026 but for want of forum, no Resolution could be passed. It was adjourned to 05.08.2026. The respondent no.5 who is objector is the Chairman of respondent no.4 – Society was present in both the meetings. 8. The bye law of the meeting provides that for want of coram if the meeting is required to be adjourned then, it would be convened after notice of 5 days. The parties have already approached the Co-operative Court under Section 91 challenging the Resolution dated 05.08.2026. Application Exh.5 for temporary injunction has been rejected vide order dated 10.09.2026. It would be within the purview of Section 91 to Uday S. Jagtap 3 of 5 912-4533-2026-WP=.doc examine the validity of the Resolution, the purport of concerned bye law and its interpretation. 9. The scope of the Returning Officer while exercising powers under Section 11 has already been expounded in various judgments including Dhondiba Parshuram Lakade Vs. Shri Someshwar 1979 Mah LJ 311 and Rajan Dinkarrao Pharate and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 1997(1) Mh.L.J. 543. There is no need to dilate it further. The Returning Officer has summary jurisdiction and intricate question cannot be gone into. 10. The impugned order reflects that because of the objection of the respondent no.5, the niceties of alleged violation of bye law No. 9(5)(a) and the 05 days notice have come to the fore. The Resolution dated 05.08.2026 was submitted within stipulated period. The Returning Officer should have accepted it. It was not within his purview to examine the validity of the Resolution that too at the instance of respondent no.5 – objector. I find that the Returning Officer exceeded his jurisdiction in rejecting the nomination of the petitioner. 11. The respondent no.5 is the Chairman of the Society. He was present in the meetings held on 03.08.2026 as well as 05.08.2026. His objection in all probabilities appears to be to settle the personal score. Uday S. Jagtap 4 of 5 912-4533-2026-WP=.doc Such objection should not have been entertained by the Returning Officer. 12. This Court is aware of the scope of interference of the High Court in election process in view of law laid in the case of Dattatray Genba Lole and others Vs. Divisional Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies and Ors. reported in (2021) 2 HCC (Bom) 612. I am of the considered view that interference is required without disturbing or stalling the election process. The valuable right of the respondent no.4 – Society is at stake. The submissions of the petitioner need to be accepted in view of judgment of Division Bench in the case of Kamlabai Vitthal Rohankar Vs. Additional Collector & Ors. 2007 (3) All MR 761. 13. I, therefore, pass following order. O R D E R (i) The Writ Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) and (b). ( SHAILESH P. BRAHME, J. ) Uday S. Jagtap 5 of 5