1 2026:CGHC:12587 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 727 of 2026 The Executive Engineer CSPDCL, Kurud, Dhamtari, Dhamtari, Dist, C.G. State ... Appellant versus 1 - Smt. Sita Bai W/o Bhuvan Aged About 51 Years R/o Goshala Chowk, Village And Post, Avari, Tah. Kurud, Dist. Dhamtari, C.G. State 2 - Bhuvan Sukalu Aged About 47 Years R/o Goshala Chowk, Village And Post, Avari, Tah. Kurud, Dist. Dhamtari, C.G. State 3 - M/s Maa Annapurna Rice Mill Purrena, Prop. Dilip Kumar Sinha S/o Sri Ram Sinha, R/o Sihawa Road, In Front Of Vinayak Industries, Ps And Tahsil Dhamtari, Dist. Dhamtari, C.G. State 4 - The Divisional Manager New India Insurance Co. Ltd, Paphadi Chowk, Raipur, C.G State ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from CIS) SHOAIB ANWAR Digitally signed by SHOAIB ANWAR Date: 2026.03.18 10:32:41 +0530 2 For Appellant : Dr. Veena Nair, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Order on Board 17/03/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No. 01/2026, an application 昀椀led under Section 30 of the Employees’ Compensation Act for condonation of delay in 昀椀ling the present appeal. By the said application, the appellant seeks condonation of delay of 122 days in preferring the appeal. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 07.11.2025 passed in Application No. 68/2025, whereby the modi昀椀cation sought for was rejected, read with order dated 25.08.2025 passed in Application No. 49/2025 by the learned Labour Court, Dhamtari. It is submitted that while preferring the present appeal challenging the aforesaid orders, a delay of 122 days has occurred due to time consumed in collecting necessary and relevant documents and also due to lack of proper knowledge regarding the prescribed limitation period. It is further submitted that the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate, but bona 昀椀de and on account of su昀케cient cause. 3 3. It is further contended that the appellant has a good case on merits and, if the delay is not condoned, the appellant shall su昀昀er irreparable loss and injury. Therefore, it is prayed that, in the interest of justice, equity and fair play, the delay in 昀椀ling the appeal be condoned. 4. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and perused the application for condonation of delay along with the material available on record. 5. Upon due consideration, this Court 昀椀nds that the appellant has sought condonation of delay of 122 days on the grounds of delay in collecting documents and lack of knowledge of the limitation period. This Court is of the considered opinion that the reasons assigned by the appellant are vague and general in nature and do not constitute “su昀케cient cause” within the meaning of law. No cogent or satisfactory explanation, much less a day-to-day explanation, has been furnished to justify the inordinate delay. It is well settled that the law of limitation is to be applied with all its rigour and cannot be relaxed in a routine manner. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, 4 (2012) 3 SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:- “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of 昀椀ling a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona昀椀de, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes 5 cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona昀椀de e昀昀ort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the 昀椀le was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated bene昀椀t for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the bene昀椀t of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation o昀昀ered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons su昀케cient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are 6 liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.” 7. Recently, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:- “5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "su昀케cient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly a昀昀ect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition O昀케cer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of su昀케cient 7 cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the e昀昀ect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “su昀케cient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona 昀椀de on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justi昀椀ed ground to condone the delay. No court could be justi昀椀ed in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no su昀케cient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justi昀椀cation, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the 8 High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'su昀케cient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona 昀椀des is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is pro昀椀tably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that su昀케cient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and 9 inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to 昀椀x their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a 10 period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to 昀椀rst ascertain the bona 昀椀des of the explanation o昀昀ered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the su昀케cient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for inde昀椀nite period of time to be determined at the whims 11 and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satis昀椀ed in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not 12 explained satisfactorily, no su昀케cient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the o昀케cials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the o昀케cials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the o昀케cials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, o昀昀ering legal opinion, 昀椀ling of cases 13 before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., 昀椀x the responsibility on the o昀케cer(s) concerned, and penalize the o昀케cer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to 昀椀le it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of 14 limitation for 昀椀ling an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads su昀케cient cause for not 昀椀ling the appeal earlier, the su昀케cient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to 昀椀le the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such su昀케cient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the 昀椀ling of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being 昀椀led must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).” 8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot 15 be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a select few. 9. Very recently on 12.09.2025, the Supreme Court in the matter of Shivamma (dead) by LRS Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104 categorically held that the High Courts ought not give a legitimizing e昀昀ect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. 10. In the present case, the appellant, being a public authority (Executive Engineer, CSPDCL), was expected to act with due promptitude, diligence, and bona 昀椀des in prosecuting the matter. However, the appellant has failed to demonstrate the same. The conduct re昀氀ects a lack of seriousness and proper attention in pursuing the case. The grounds taken in the appeal appear to be casual, vague, and insu昀케cient, and they do not inspire the con昀椀dence of this Court. 16 11. Accordingly, I.A. No. 01/2026 seeking condonation of delay is hereby rejected. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by limitation, also stands dismissed. 12. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Shoaib