2026:HHC:18702 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 322 of 2008 Reserved on: 16.04.2026 Date of Decision: 21.05.2026. Vidya Devi (since deceased) through her LRs. ...Appellants Versus Viasa Devi ...Respondent _____________________________________ Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the appellant : Mr Rahul Gathania, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, Senior Advocate, with Ms Yamini Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 26.03.2008, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 12.09.2006 passed by 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:18702 the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No.1, Una, District Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court seeking a declaration that she is the owner in possession of the suit land described in the head note of the plaint with the consequential relief of a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff’s possession of the suit land. An alternative relief of possession was also sought. It was asserted that the parties had compromised an execution petition No. 42/87 pending before the Court of Learned Sub Judge, First Class, Court No.1, and the defendant delivered the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff as per the compromise. The defendant continued to interfere with the plaintiff’s possession despite requests. Hence, the suit was filed to seek the relief mentioned above. 3. The suit was opposed by filing a written statement admitting that a compromise was effected in the execution petition. It was claimed that the compromise was not read over 3 2026:HHC:18702 and explained to the defendant. The defendant had only exchanged one marla of land with the plaintiff, which was found in the defendant’s possession. The suit was filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. Learned trial Court framed the following issues on 31.08.1996: - 1. Whether the plaintiff has become the owner in possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the compromise dated 29.12.1993 entered in execution No.42/87 has been acted upon, if so, its effect? OPP 3. Whether the compromise between the parties entered into in the execution petition is illegal and void, as alleged? OPD. 4. Relief. 5. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and the plaintiff examined Parkash Chand (PW-1), Nanak Chand (PW-2), and Prem Chand, General Power of Attorney of the plaintiff (PW-3). Defendant examined herself (DW-1) and Amar Singh (DW-2). 6. Learned Trial Court held that there was an overwriting in the compromise (Ext.PW-2/A), which made the plaintiff’s version doubtful that an exchange had taken place. Prem Chand (PW-3) admitted that the plaintiff had obtained 4 2026:HHC:18702 possession of one marla of the land, which corroborated the defendant’s plea that only one marla was exchanged. Hence, the learned trial Court answered issues No.1 to 3 in negative and dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional District Judge Una (learned Appellate Court). The Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that there was overwriting in the compromise. The parties had undertaken to abide by the terms and conditions of the compromise before the Executing Court. There was no evidence that the terms and conditions of the compromise were fulfilled. The plaintiff was required to file a suit for specific performance of the compromise and not a suit for declaration. There was no infirmity in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court were upheld. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed the present 5 2026:HHC:18702 appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: - 1. Whether the suit for correction of the apparent mistake in the compromise and order of the Court was maintainable, more particularly when the application for correction moved by the appellant had been subsequently dismissed as not maintainable? 2. Whether in view of the fact that the appellant was in possession of the property in dispute and was entitled to a decree for declaration and injunction, and the courts below have failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law in not going into the merits of the claim of the plaintiff and holding that the claim was not proved? 9. I have heard Mr Rahul Gathania, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms Yamini Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants. 10. Mr Rahul Gathania, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, submitted that the learned Court below erred in holding that the compromise was doubtful because of the overwriting in it. The compromise was filed before the Court in the judicial proceedings, and its authenticity could not have been doubted. Once the parties had entered into a compromise and the execution petition was withdrawn based on a 6 2026:HHC:18702 compromise, the plaintiff cannot wriggle out of the compromise by denying its existence. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: - ➢ S. Noordeen vs. V.S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar and others (1996) 3 SCC 289; ➢ Karunakar Rout alias Thatei vs. Golak Behari Biswal, AIR 1995 Orissa 110; ➢ Rania vs. Kamla Devi AIR 1976 HP 57; ➢ Thimmanayanim vs Venkatappa Nayanim AIR 1928 Madras 713; ➢ Ayissa vs. Chokru AIR 1920 Madras 242; and ➢ Hemanta Kumari Debi vs. Midnapur Zamindar Co AIR 1919 Privy Council 79 11. Mr Tara Singh Chauhan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms Yamini Sharma, learned counsel for the respondents/defendants, submitted that the overwriting in the compromises makes it doubtful. Prem Chand (PW-3) admitted in his cross-examination that plaintiff had obtained one Marla of the land, which corroborates the defendant’s version. The learned courts below had rightly rejected the compromise. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 7 2026:HHC:18702 12. I have given a considerable thought to the submission made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. Substantial question of law no.1. 13. The plaintiff relied upon a compromise (Ext.PW- 2/A), and consequent order dated 30.12.1993 passed by learned Sub Judge, First Class, Una, District Una, H.P. The compromise (Ext.PW-2/A) reads that the land bearing Khasra No. 3361 measuring 00-16 marlas owned by Vidya Devi was in possession of Viasa Devi, and it was left to her. Khasra No. 3360, measuring 00-18 marlas, which belongs to Viasa Devi, was relinquished to Vidya Devi. There is clear overwriting in the figure 0 (zero) in 3360 and in the figure 1 (one) in 3361. The order of the Court mentions that land bearing Khasra No. 3360 measuring 16 marlas owned by Vidya Devi, in possession of Viasa Devi, was relinquished in favour of the latter. Land comprised in Khasra No. 3361 measuring 0-0-18 owned by Viasa Devi was relinquished in favour of Vidya Devi. The copy of Khatauni Bandobast (Ext.P1) shows that Viasa Devi is the owner of Khara No. 3360, and the recital in the order that Vidya Devi is the owner of Khasra No. 3360 is incorrect. Therefore, the learned 8 2026:HHC:18702 Courts below were right in holding that there was an overwriting in compromise (Ext.PW-2/A) and it was not as per the revenue record and the order of the Court. 14. Prem Chand (PW-3) admitted in his cross- examination that it was agreed that one marla of land, which was in possession of the defendant, would be given to her, and she would exchange one marla of the land with the plaintiff. He admitted that the plaintiff had taken possession of one marla as per the agreement. This admission shows that only one marla of the land was exchanged. The defendant stated in her proof affidavit that a compromise was effected between the parties that only one marla of the land would be exchanged. However, nine marla of land was mentioned in the document, taking advantage of the illiteracy of the defendant, and she had not adhered to the terms of the compromise. This statement is as per the admission made by the plaintiff’s general power of attorney that one marla of land was exchanged. Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the plaintiff’s version that the suit land was exchanged was not acceptable, and the plaintiff was not entitled to a declaration regarding the suit land. Therefore, there is no error in the judgments and decrees passed 9 2026:HHC:18702 by the learned Courts below, and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial question no.2. 15. Perusal of the agreement (Ext.PW-2) and order passed by the Court shows that overwriting was made on the agreement (Ext.PW-2/A) after the order of the Court was passed. Otherwise, the Court would not have recorded Khasra Nos. 3360 and 3361 in the order. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the remedy of the plaintiff was to approach the Court if there was an error in the order passed by it. A civil suit could not have been passed for correcting the error in the order of the Court. Hence, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 16. In Hemanta Kumari (supra), it was held that a party cannot take advantage of a part of the compromise and resist the rest. In the present case, it is highly doubtful that the compromise (Ext.PW-2/A) was executed between the parties; hence, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. 17. It was held in Ayissa (supra), S. Noordeen (supra), Karunakar Rout (supra), and Thimmanayanim (supra) that a 10 2026:HHC:18702 compromise entered into between the parties is exempt from registration. The learned Courts below have not non-suited the plaintiff because the compromise was unregistered and the cited judgments do not apply to the present case. 18. It was held in Rania (supra) that a mistake, which originated in the pleading, can be corrected under Section 152. The order dismissing the amendment is not the subject matter of the present case, and the cited judgment does not apply to the present case. Final Order 19. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. 20. The record of the learned Courts below be returned along with a copy of this judgment. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 21st May, 2026 (ravinder)