NARENDRA KUMAR MISHRA v. BRANCH MANAGER, AXIS BANK, BHUBANESWAR
WP(C)/737/2026 · 2026-02-12
M S Sahoo
Writ Petition (Civil)body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 817 (ORI) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 817 (ORI) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
p. 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.737 of 2026
An application under Section 226 & 227 of Constitution of India. ---------------
Narendra Kumar Mishra … … Petitioner
-Versus-
Branch Manager, AXIS Bank, Bhubaneswar and another … … Opp. Parties
Advocates appeared in the case:
For Petitioner : Mr. Bishnu Brata Singh, Advocate
For Opp. Party :
------------------
CORAM:
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO
J U D G M E N T ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Decided on 12th February, 2026 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO, J.
1. The petitioner was the applicant before the learned Permanent Lok Adalat (Public Utility Services), Khurda at Bhubaneswar. The P.L.A. Case No.50/2021 was disposed of by award dated 09.09.2025. The matter p. 2 was taken up under the provisions of Section 22 C(1) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.
2. The petitioner challenging the said award seeks for pendentelite interest up to the period of payment. The learned Permanent Lok Adalat has directed for payment of interest @ 6% per annum in case of delay in payment of the awarded sum. As on date, the amount has been paid and the award has been satisfied.
3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
By order dated 15.01.2026, after hearing the
learned counsel for the petitioner at some length, the following observations were made by this Court:
“4. On being asked the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the awards passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat can also be challenged and given some time he shall give citation/precedence on the same. It was also brought to the notice of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the parties agreed before the Permanent Lok Adalat for disposal of the matter and the matter has been taken up under the provisions of Legal Services Authorities Act, therefore the scope of interference in appeal is not there.”
Today, the matter was heard again. The materials available on records are delved into in detail.
4.
Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to section 22D and 22E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 which are reproduced herein: p. 3
“22D. Procedure of Permanent Lok Adalat.—The Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under this Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872). 22E. Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final.—(1) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act made either on merit or in terms of a settlement agreement shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. (2) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court. (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. (4) Every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. (5) The Permanent Lok Adalat may transmit any award made by it to a civil court having local jurisdiction and such civil court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by that court.]” [Underlined part of the provision are emphasized and applied in the present case]
5. Referring to section 22D and 22E, it is submitted that despite the express bar contained in the statute, the petitioner can challenge the award before this Court p. 4 seeking interest for the period the matter was kept pending before the learned Lok Adalat. 6.
The scope of interference by High Court in the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat or Lok Adalat at any level has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the law has been settled in the following decisions: State of Punjab and others v. Jalour Singh:
(2008) 2 SCC 660: AIR 2008 SC 1209; Bhargavi Construction and another v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy: AIR 2017 SC 4428: (2018) 13 SCC 480; Mukund Bhavan Trust and others v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and another: (2024) 15 SCC 675; and Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta and others: 2025 SCC Online SC 2737. The decision in State of Punjab1 has elaborated on the grounds on which the award of a Permanent Lok Adalat/Lok Adalat, especially the Permanent Lok Adalat under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 can be challenged. The relevant paragraph from SCC Online Print is reproduced and applied for adjudication of the present lis. “12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to challenge such p. 5
1 (2008) 2 SCC 660: AIR 2008 SC 1209
an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat.
The question of challenging such an order in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and
disposed of the appeal on merits.” [underlined to supply emphasis]
7. In Bhargavi Construction and another2 (paragraph 33 of SCC Online Print), the following has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:
“33. So far as the second submission of the
learned counsel for the respondents is concerned, it also has no merit. In our view, the decision rendered in State of Punjab [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] is by the larger Bench (three Judge) and is, therefore, binding on us. No efforts were made and rightly to contend that the said decision needs reconsideration on the issue in question. That apart, when this Court has laid down a particular remedy to follow for challenging the award of Lok Adalat then in our view, the same is required to be followed by the litigant in letter and spirit as provided therein for adjudication of his grievance in the first instance. The reason being that it is a law of the land under Article 141 of the Constitution of India (see M. Nagaraj v. Union of India [M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC
2 AIR 2017 SC 4428: (2018) 13 SCC 480 p. 6 212 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 1013] ). It is then for the writ court to decide as to what orders need to be passed on the facts arising in the case.” [underlined to supply emphasis]
8. In Dilip Mehta3, paragraph 14, the following has been laid down:
“14. It is also important to note that the appellant approached the Executing Court only when warrants for delivery of possession were sought to be enforced and dispossession was imminent. The objections filed on 19.09.2022 were, in substance, a defensive step to preserve possession pending a substantive challenge to the Lok Adalat decree. In the context of a decree which merely embodies a Lok Adalat award, such objections can at best invite the Executing Court to examine whether and to what extent the decree is executable against the objector, but cannot furnish a forum for pronouncing upon the validity of the award itself or for setting aside the decree drawn in its terms. The reliance placed by the respondents on the fact that, in the prayer clause of that application, the appellant also used language suggesting that the
judgment and decree be “set aside” does not advance their case. The form of the pleading cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of the Executing Court beyond what the LSA Act and the CPC permit, nor can it convert a limited execution forum into a court of appeal over a Lok Adalat award. Equally, such resort to execution, compelled by the imminent threat of dispossession, cannot be treated as an election of remedy that forecloses recourse to the only effective avenue which the law recognises for challenging a Lok Adalat award, namely a writ petition before the High Court. The judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh (Supra) squarely covers the p. 7
3 2025 SCC Online SC 2737
principles we have discussed above in the following paragraphs:
“12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the
order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and
disposed of the appeal on merits.
13. But the travails continued. In view of the
order dated 11-9-2002 passed by the learned Single Judge holding that a petition under Article 227 has to be filed to challenge the order of the Lok Adalat, the appellants filed a petition under Article 227. But the said petition was dismissed by another Single Judge on the ground that the order of the Lok Adalat passed on 3-8-2001 had attained finality as the objections to it were dismissed on 11-9-2002 and a petition under Article 227 was not maintainable to p. 8 challenge the order of the Lok Adalat. He failed to notice that the order dated 3-8-2001 was neither a decision nor had it attained finality. He also failed to notice that the objections to the order were not rejected by the High Court after consideration on merits. He also overlooked the fact that the learned Judge who decided the appellants' application, had directed that the order of the Lok Adalat should be challenged by filing a petition under Article 227. Be that as it may.” [underlined to supply emphasis]
9. As a residuary submission, it is submitted by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that at this stage this Court can issue notice in the matter to the Opp. Party and later can examine the matter further after notice is sufficient.
In considered opinion of this Court if such a course is adopted it would mean, without prima facie examining the matter on merits notice would be issued. It has to be borne in the mind that litigation comes with cost and certain inconvenience to the other side.
Adopting such course would result in a situation wherein without following and applying the settled propositions of law as laid down in decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court cited above and this Court without being prima facie satisfied will issue notice.
10. In considered opinion of this Court such adjudicatory course if adopted by this Court would be contrary to law apart from adding to the pendency. p. 9
11. Accordingly, it has to be held and is held the writ petition is devoid of merit.
Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.
(Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo) Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 12th February, 2026/Rajesh