1 2026:CGHC:14342 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 1968 of 2017  Ajeet Kumar Katiya S/o Shri Beer Singh Katiya, Aged About 27 Years R/o C/o Shri, Raja Bhaiya Dubey, Behind Rest House, Near M P E B Office, Sihora, Tehsil Sihora, District Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh., Madhya Pradesh --- Petitioner(s) versus 1. Central Reserve Police Force Through Its Director General, Directorate General Office, Block No. 1, C. G. O. Complex Lodhi Road, New Delhi 110003., Delhi 2. Inspector General Of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Range Office, Chandrayan Gutta, Keshogiri, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh 500005., District : Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh 3. Deputy Inspector General Of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Range Office, Chandrayan Gutta, Keshogiri, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh 500005., District : Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh 4. Commandant, 212th Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force, Open Jail Complex, Masgaon, Jagdalpur, Chhattisgarh., District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) WITH WPS No. 3888 of 2017  Naresh Kumar S/o Awadhram, Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Mujgahan, Post Sorar, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. , Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner(s) Versus 2 1. Union Of India (Deleted) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 08-04- 2025 2. The Deputy Inspector General Of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, Jagdalpur, Range, Godhapaiga Police Line, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh. , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3. The Commandant, 194th Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force, Bawana, New Delhi-110039, Delhi --- Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate (in WPS/1968/2017) Mr. Aditya Shrivastava, Advocate on behalf of Mr. BP. Singh,Advocate (in WPS/3888/2017) For Respondents : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy. S.G. Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order On Board 25.3.2026 1) In these petitions, petitioners have challenged the orders passed by disciplinary authorities, appellate authorities and revisional authorities whereby services of petitioners have been terminated. 2) Facts of WPS No. 1968 of 2017 are that petitioner, namely, Ajeet Kumar Katiya was appointed to the post of Constable (GD) in 212 Battalion, CRPF. He remained on leave for period of 30 days from 6.2.2014 to 8.3.2014 with permission and due to medical problems, he could not join the services after said period. On 13.2.2015, petitioner was informed by Police Station Themi, Madhya Pradesh that he has been terminated from services. Petitioner approached the department and came to know that ex- parte departmental inquiry was conducted against him and major penalty of dismissal from services has been inflicted against him by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 13.2.2015. Petitioner 3 preferred departmental appeal which was dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 10.8.2015. Petitioner preferred revision which was also dismissed vide order dated 1.5.2016. 3) Facts of WPS No. 3888 of 2017 are that petitioner, namely, Naresh Kumar who was working on the post of Cook was relieved from 80th Battalion, CRPF on 3.3.2015 and he was supposed to report at 194th Battalion, CRPF on 14.3.2015 but he fell sick and did not join the services for period of 434 days from 14.3.2015 to 19.5.2016. In between, a departmental inquiry was initiated and after its completion, disciplinary authority vide order dated 29.11.2016 removed the petitioner from services. Petitioner preferred departmental appeal which was also dismissed vide order dated 10.7.2017. 4) Mr. Amrito Das, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WPS No. 1968 of 2017 submits that penalty inflicted on the petitioner is wholly excessive and disproportionate looking to the alleged misconduct and Inquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority ought to have considered the medical condition of petitioner and his wife. He further submits that petitioner was not afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing and order of removal was passed without service of notice. He prays to quash the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority. 4 5) Mr. Aditya Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WPS No. 3888 of 2017 submits that petitioner could not join the services on account of medical conditions and sufficient material was placed before the appellate authority but the authority concerned failed consider those documents. He further submits that departmental inquiry was concluded without service of notice, thus removal order was passed in utter violation to the principles of nature justice. He prays to quash the orders passed by disciplinary authority and appellate authority. 6) On the other hand, Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General appearing for the respondents submits that petitioners were members of armed forces and they failed to report at their respective places of posting after completion of leave period. He further submits that notices were sent to petitioners at their addresses mentioned in service book through registered post and they were declared ‘deserter’. He contends that thereafter, article of charges was issued ; Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed in both departmental inquiries ; department examined its witnesses and exhibited relevant documents. He further contends that Inquiry Officer submitted its report before the disciplinary authority, who concurred with the inquiry report and inflicted the penalty of removal from services in both departmental inquiries according to Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. He argues that these petitions deserve to be dismissed. 5 7) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record with utmost circumspection. 8) Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab and Others Versus Ex. C. Satpal Singh1 while dealing with the similar issue involving a member of armed forces, who remained absent from services for considerable period was inflicted with the punishment of removal from services held as under :- 19. This Court, in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra), has held that if the past conduct of an employee is the basis for imposing punishment, the department is obliged to disclose that his past record will also be taken into consideration while inflicting punishment. Now, the question arises for consideration is whether the disciplinary authority had taken into consideration the past conduct of the respondent while passing the dismissal order. From careful reading of the dismissal order reproduced hereinabove, it appears that the disciplinary authority had clearly observed that it had perused the report of enquiry and conclusion thoroughly, whereby the respondent was held guilty for the unauthorized absence and agreed with the conclusion of the enquiry officer. The disciplinary authority had further mentioned regarding the issuance of show cause notice to the respondent and had observed that despite the receipt of the show cause notice, the respondent did not submit his reply, which shows that the respondent accepted the allegation against him. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had noted that 17 years of service of the respondent were forfeited as a result of his absence for 224 days and for which he was punished accordingly. 20. To properly understand the controversy in the light of question framed, it is necessary to examine the relevant judicial precedents, as discussed below. This Court in the case of India Marine Services Private Ltd. (supra), dealt with the case of punishment awarded to an employee in a similar situation, as follows: - "7. It is true that the last sentence suggests that the past record of Bose has also been taken into 1. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1848 6 consideration. But it does not follow from this that that was the effective reason for dismissing him. The Managing Director having arrived at the conclusion that Bose's services must be terminated in the interest of discipline, he added one sentence to give additional weight to the decision already arrived at. Upon this view it would follow that the Tribunal was not competent to go behind the finding of the Managing Director and consider for itself the evidence adduced before him. The order of the Tribunal quashing the dismissal of Bose and directing his re-instatement is, therefore, set aside as being contrary to law." 21. In the case of Director General, RPF & Ors. vs. Ch. Sal Babu, this Court in appeal while setting aside the order of Division Bench of High Court, which had affirmed the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of removal of respondent, observed in para 6 as under: - "6. Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required department/establishment in which the delinquent person the concerned works. 22. Similarly, in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, wherein the respondent employee was dismissed from service on account of misconduct having been found fast asleep on an iron plate during working hours and had also been earlier imposed with minor punishment on three occasions, this Court observed as under: - "32.... In the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the past conduct of the respondent as also his conduct during the domestic enquiry proceedings, we cannot say that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was wholly disproportionate to his act of misconduct or otherwise arbitrary." 23. Likewise, in the case of Govt. of A.P. and Ors. us. 7 Mohd. Taher Ali, where the respondent who was employed as police constable was imposed with a punishment of compulsory retirement on the account of unauthorized absenteeism from election duty, this Court had held that: - "5. ....In our opinion there can be no hard-and-fast rule that merely because the earlier misconduct has not been mentioned in the charge-sheet it cannot be taken into consideration by the punishing authority. Consideration of the earlier misconduct is often (necessary) only to reinforce the opinion of the said authority." 24. This Cout in Bishamber Das Dogra's case (supra), has examined a similar issue and, after taking into consideration the judgment of this Court rendered in K. Manche Gowda's case (supra) held as under: - "24.In State of Mysore u. K. Manche Gowda, this Court held that the disciplinary authority should inform the delinquent employee that it is likely to take into consideration the past conduct of the employee while imposing the punishment unless the proved charge against the delinquent is so grave that it may independently warrant the proposed punishment. Though his previous record may not be the subject matter of the charge at the first instance xx xx xx xx 30.In view of the above, it is evident that it is desirable that the delinquent employee may be informed by the disciplinary authority that his past conduct would be taken into consideration while imposing the punishment. But in case of misconduct of grave nature or indiscipline, even in the absence of statutory rules, the authority may take into consideration the indisputable past conduct/service record of the employee for adding the weight to the decision of imposing the punishment if the facts of the case so require. [Emphasis Supplied] 31. lt is settled legal proposition that habitual absenteeism means gross violation of discipline (vide Burn & Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR p. 530, para 5) and L&T Komatsu Ltd. v. N. Udayakumar (SCC p. 226, para 6).] 8 32. The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. 33.Admittedly, the respondent employee has not completed the service of six years and had been imposed punishment three times for remaining absent from duty. On the fourth occasion when he remained absent for ten days without leave, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The show-cause notice could not be served upon him for the reason that he again deserted the line and returned back after fifty days. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings could not be concluded expeditiously. The respondent submitted the reply to the show-cause notice and the material on record reveal that during the pendency of the enquiry he further deserted the line for ten days. There is nothing on record to show any explanation for such repeated misconduct or absenteeism. The court/tribunal must keep in mind that such indiscipline is intolerable so far as the disciplined force is concerned. 34. The respondent was a guard in CISF. No attempt had ever been made at any stage by the respondent employee to explain as to what prejudice has been caused to him by non-furnishing of the enquiry report. Nor had he ever submitted that such a course has resulted in failure of justice. More so, the respondent employee had never denied at any stage that he had not been punished three times before initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and deserted the line twice even after issuance of the show-cause notice in the instant case. No explanation could be furnished by the respondent employee as under what circumstances he has not even considered it proper to submit the application for leave. Rather, the respondent thought that he had a right to desert the line at his sweet will. It was a case of gross violation of discipline. Appeal filed by the respondent employee was decided by the statutory appellate authority giving cogent reasons. 35. The facts of the present case did not present special features warranting any interference by the Court in limited exercise of its powers of judicial review. In such a fact situation, we are of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the punishment order passed by the disciplinary authority on such technicalities…" 9 30. This Court, in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Ram Singh Ex- Constable while interpreting Rule 16.2(1) of the Rule of 1934 has held as under: - "7.Rule 16.2(1) consists of two parts. The first part is referable to gravest acts of misconduct which entails awarding an order of dismissal. Undoubtedly there is distinction between gravest misconduct and grave misconduct. Before awarding an order of dismissal it shall be mandatory that dismissal order should be made only when there are gravest acts of misconduct, since it impinges upon the pensionary rights of the delinquent after putting long length of service. As stated the first part relates to gravest acts of misconduct. Under General Clauses Act singular includes plural, "act" includes acts. The contention that there must be plurality of acts of misconduct to award dismissal is fastidious. The word "acts" would include singular "act" as well. It is not the repetition of the acts complained of but its quality, insidious effect and gravity of situation that ensues from the offending 'act'. The colour of the gravest act must be gathered from the surrounding or attending circumstances. Take for instance the delinquent who put in 29 years of continuous length of service and had unblemished record; in thirtieth year he commits defalcation of public money or fabricates false records to conceal misappropriation. He only committed once. Does it mean that he should not be inflicted with the punishment of dismissal but be allowed to continue in service for that year to enable him to get his full pension. The answer is obviously no. Therefore, a single act of corruption is sufficient to award an order of dismissal under the rule as gravest act of misconduct. 8. The second part of the rule connotes the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service and that the length of service of the offender and his claim for pension should be taken into account in an appropriate case. The contention that both parts must be read together appears to us to be illogical. Second part is referable to a misconduct minor in character which does not by itself warrant an order of dismissal but due to continued acts of misconduct would have insidious cumulative effect on service morale and may be a ground to take lenient view of giving an opportunity to reform. Despite giving such opportunities if the delinquent 10 officer proved to be incorrigible and found completely unfit to remain in service then to maintain discipline in the service, instead of dismissing the delinquent officer, a lesser punishment of compulsory retirement or demotion to a lower grade or rank or removal from service without affecting his future chances of re-employment, if any, may meet the ends of justice. Take for instance the delinquent officer who is habitually absent from duty when required. Despite giving an opportunity to reform himself he continues to remain absent from duty off and on. He proved himself to be incorrigible and thereby unfit to continue in service. Therefore, taking into account his long length of service and his claim for pension he may be compulsorily retired from service so as to enable him to earn proportionate pension. The second part of the rule operates in that area. It may also be made clear that the very order of dismissal from service for gravest misconduct may entail forfeiture of all pensionary benefits. Therefore, the word 'or' cannot be read as "and". It must be disjunctive and independent. The common link that connects both clauses is "the gravest act/acts of misconduct." 32.We have perused the show cause notice and the order of dismissal passed against the respondent. After going through the same, it is clear that penalty of dismissal is a consequence of proved misconduct. Therefore, the order impugned is within the first part of Rule 16.2 (1) of the Rules. While passing the order dismissing the appeal, the disciplinary authority recorded the finding that the act of absence of the respondent from duty is a grievous act of misconduct. The respondent was appointed as a constable in the Punjab Armed Forces and then transferred to the Commando Force, which is a disciplined force. The authority while passing the order has referred to his previous act of absence from duty besides proving an gravest act of misconduct leading to the order of dismissal. 9) Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus P. Gunasekaran2 while dealing with the scope of interference in service matters held as under :- 2. (2015) 2 SCC 610 11 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings. the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings: (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case: (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; 12 (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be: (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14.In one of the earliest decisions in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7) "7.... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 13 10) Likewise, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others Versus Datta Linga Toshatwad3 held that penalty inflicted in a departmental inquiry can be interfered by the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 of Constitution of India if the order has been passed by an incompetent authority or if procedure to inflict the penalty has not been followed or if the penalty if disproportionate looking to the misconduct. 11) In the present case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that penalty orders were passed by the incompetent authority(s) or the procedure prescribed under the rules have not been followed. With regard to proportionality of penalty, in my opinion, petitioners who were members of the uniformed forces cannot absent themselves on frivolous pleas, having regard to the nature of the duties enjoined on those forces. Such indiscipline, if it goes unpunished, will greatly affect the discipline of the forces. In such forces desertion is a serious matter. Cases of this nature, in whatever manner described, are cases of desertion particularly when there is apprehension on the member of the force being called upon to perform onerous duties in difficult terrains or an order of deputation which he finds inconvenient, is passed. Such matters cannot be taken lightly, particularly when it relates to uniformed forces of this country. In cases of this nature, dismissal from the force is a justified disciplinary action and cannot be 3. (2005) 13 SCC 709 14 described as disproportionate to the misconduct alleged. 12) In consequence, petitions filed by the petitioners stand dismissed. No order as to costs. 13) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE A j i n k y a Digitally signed by AJINKYA PANSARE Date: 2026.04.01 11:17:48 +0530