Page No.# 1/10 GAHC010130612025 2026:GAU-AS:8113-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WA/416/2025 THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SCY. TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM, HIGHER EDUCATION (TECHNICAL) DEPTT., DISPUR, GUWAHATI 06, ASSAM. 2: THE DIRECTOR OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION ASSAM KAHILIPARA DISPUR GUWAHATI 781019 3: THE PRINCIPAL JORHAT ENGINEERING COLLEGE DIST. JORHAT ASSAM 78500 VERSUS DR BISWAJIT SARMA AND ANR S/O LATE DUGDHA NATH, SARMAH, R/O RAJAMAIDAM, P.S. AND P.O. JORHAT, DIST. JORHAT, ASSAM 785001 2:THE ACCOUNTANT GENERAL ASSAM MAIDAMGAON GUWAHATI 78101 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. K GOGOI, MR S DAS Advocate for the Respondent : MR. R K TALUKDAR(R1), MR. I CHOWDHURY SR ADV(R1),MR. R CHAUHAN(R1),MR. D HAZARIKA(R1),MR R DAS(R1),MR T DAS(R1),MS. A CHOWDHURY(R1),SC, AG Page No.# 2/10 BEFORE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR HON’BLE MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY For the Appellant :Mr. K. Gogoi, and Mr. S. Das, Standing Counsels, Higher Education Department. For the Respondents :Mr. I. Choudhury, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. T. Das, Advocate for respondent No. 1. Mr. C. Barua, Standing Counsel, AG (AE), Assam, for respondent No. 2. Date on which Judgment is Reserved : NA Date of the pronouncement of Judgment : 09.06.2026 Whether the pronouncement is the operative part of the Judgment : NA. Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced : Yes. JUDGMENT & ORDER (ORAL) (A.D.Choudhury, J) 1. We have heard Mr K. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel, Higher Education Department, for the appellants/State of Assam; Mr. I. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. T. Das, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. C. Barua, learned Standing Counsel for the AG (AE), Assam, representing the respondent No. 2. 2. The present intra-court appeal is directed against the common Judgment and Order dated 16.05.2025, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No.3864/2017 and WP(C) No. Page No.# 3/10 6604/2022. 3. The facts are largely undisputed. 4. The respondent, Dr. Biswajit Sarma, entered government service as an Associate Professor in Geology at Jorhat Engineering College under the Directorate of Technical Education, Government of Assam. It is undisputed that he held the said post substantively and possessed a lien thereon in terms of fundamental rules. 5. In the year 2015, Gauhati University initiated a process for appointment to the post of Director, College Development Council (for Short CDC). 6. The respondent participated in the selection process and was selected. Pursuant thereto, Gauhati University issued an appointment order appointing him as Director, CDC. 7. Consequent upon such appointment, the Government of Assam issued a Notification dated 25-06-2015, granting lien to the respondent against his parent post for a period of one year. 8. This notification is significant and warrants attention in some detail. While granting the lien, the government expressly stipulated that upon expiry of the admissible lien period, the respondent would either return to the parent department or resign from government service, in the event of permanent absorption in the borrowing institution, failing which the lien would be terminated. 9. The respondent joined the office of the Director, CDC on 27-06-2015. Upon expiry of the period for which the lien had been granted, the respondent did not revert to his parent department. Equally, no order extending the lien was issued by the competent authority. The government thereafter issued a Notification dated 21-04-2017, terminating the lien with effect from 27-06-2016. 10. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent instituted WP(C) No.3864/2017, questioning the validity of the notification dated 21-04-2017. 11. While issuing notice, a learned Single Judge stayed the operation of the notification. The Page No.# 4/10 interim order remained operative during the pendency of the proceeding. 12. An aspect which assumes considerable significance is that, notwithstanding the pendency of the writ petition, and the interim protection granted by the Court, the respondent never sought reversion to the parent department. Instead, he continued to function as Director, CDC, under Gauhati University. 13. The appointment of the respondent as Director, CDC, was itself not perpetual. Upon completion of his tenure in the office, Gauhati University relieved him from the said post. 14. The respondent questioned the University's action in terminating his tenure before this Court in separate proceedings. The challenge ultimately did not result in the restoration of tenure; the writ petition was dismissed, and the respondent ceased to hold the office of Director, CDC. 15. It was only thereafter that the respondent submitted a joining report dated 25-04-2022 before the authorities, under the Directorate of Technical Education, seeking permission to resume duties as Associate Professor in Geology. The authorities declined to permit such joining, leading to the institution of WP(C) No. 6604/2022. 16. Since both the writ petitions arose from the same controversy, namely, the respondent's claim to continue to hold the post of Director of CDC, a lien upon the parent post, and his consequential claim for restoration of government service, they were heard together and disposed of by the impugned judgment dated 16-05-2025. 17. The learned Single Judge accepted the respondent's contention that he had never acquired a lien against the post of Director, CDC, but rather continued to hold a lien over his parent post. 18. Proceeding on that basis, it was held that his lien in the parent department continued uninterrupted. The Notification dated 21-04-2017 was accordingly set aside, and the state authorities were directed to permit the respondent to join as an Associate Professor in Geology. 19. The correctness of that view falls for determination in the present appeal. 20. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the State is that the learned Single Judge Page No.# 5/10 misconstrued the scheme of the Fundamental Rules governing the lien. 21. According to the appellants, the controversy was not merely whether the respondent acquired a lien in Gauhati University. But whether he could continue to assert rights against the parent post after consciously remaining outside the cadre for years beyond the period for which the lien had been sanctioned. 22. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent contended that unless the respondent acquired a lien against the post of Director, CDC, his lien against the post of Associate Professor could not stand extinguished. 23. It was argued that an FR-14 and FR-14A protected the respondent from being rendered lienless, and that the government was therefore not justified in terminating the lien. 24. The rival submissions necessitate an examination of the scheme of fundamental rules governing lien. The controversy, in our considered opinion, cannot be resolved by reading any one provision in isolation. 25. The concept of lien under fundamental rules constitutes a complete code and must be understood through the combined operation of FR-12A, FR-13, FR-14 and FR-14A. 26. FR-9(13) defines a lien as the entitlement of a government servant to hold a substantive permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantially. 27. FR-12A provides that, unless otherwise provided, a government servant on substantive appointment to a permanent post acquires a lien on that post and ceases to hold any lien previously acquired on another post. 28. FR-13 further stipulates that unless his lien is suspended under FR-14 or transferred under FR- 14B, a government servant holding a permanent post substantively retains lien thereof. 29. The significance of FR-14 is that it recognises that lien, though valuable, is not absolute. The rule itself contemplates situations in which the lien may be suspended, regulated or otherwise affected by the operation of the succeeding provisions. The statutory framework, therefore, does Page No.# 6/10 not treat a lien as an indefeasible right detached from the conditions governing service. 30. FR-14 assumes central importance. Clause (a) mandates suspension of the lien where a government servant is appointed in a substantive capacity to a tenure post. Clause (d) authorises substantive filling up of the original post during the period of such suspension, while Clause (e) provides for revival of the suspended lien upon cessation of the circumstances specified in Clause (a). 31. The structure of FR-14 demonstrates a balance between protecting the employee and the legitimate interests of the administration. While the employee is protected through suspension rather than the extinction of the lien, the administration is simultaneously enabled to fill the post substantively and to ensure continuity in public service. 32. The learned single judge principally relied on FR-14(e) to conclude that, even if the post of Director, College Development Council, were treated as a tenure post, the respondent's lien would be revived immediately upon cessation of tenure. With respect, such an approach isolates one clause from the broader statutory scheme. 33. The respondent's argument substantially rests upon FR-14 A (a), which stipulates that a government servant's lien shall not be terminated if the result would be to leave him without lien or suspended lien upon a permanent post. 34. Revival under FR-14(e) cannot be viewed as operating in a vacuum. The provision does not override the conditions attached to the grant of lien, nor does it render irrelevant the conduct of the employee during the subsistence of such arrangement. 35. The purpose of FR- 14 A is plainly protective. It seeks to prevent arbitrary deprivation of security of tenure. The rule embodies a safeguard against administrative action that would leave a government servant without the protection ordinarily associated with substantive service. 36. However, FR-14A cannot be construed as creating a perpetual right of return notwithstanding Page No.# 7/10 expiry of the admissible lien period, failure to revert to the parent department and continued service elsewhere for years together. 37. A provision intended as a shield against arbitrary deprivation cannot be transformed into a source of unrestricted entitlement. Acceptance of the respondent's interpretation would lead to consequences wholly inconsistent with orderly cadre administration. An employee could obtain a lien for a limited period, continue outside the cadre long after expiry of that period and yet insist upon restoration wherever the outside engagement comes to an end, which is not the construction of FR 14 A. Such a construction would render the conditions attached to the grant of lien wholly otiose and would deprive the competent authority of any meaningful control over cadre management. 38. In the present case, the respondent was granted a lien not by operation of law alone, but through a specific Notification dated 25-06-2015. 39. The notification did not merely acknowledge an existing lien; it regulates its exercise. 40. It expressly stipulated that upon completion of the admissible lien period, the respondent was required to return to the parent department or resign if permanently absorbed in the borrowing institution, failing which his lien would stand terminated. The respondent accepted the benefit under the notification and acted upon it. 41. Having accepted the benefit, he remained equally bound by the conditions attached thereto. The legality of those conditions was never questioned. The respondent cannot, therefore, seek enforcement of the beneficial part of the notification while simultaneously disregarding the obligation flowing from it. 42. It is an admitted position that upon expiry of the admissible lien period, the respondent did not return to the parent department. Equally, no order extending the lien was issued by the competent authority. It was in those circumstances that the government issued the Notification Page No.# 8/10 dated 21-04-2017, terminating the lien with effect from 27-06-2016. 43. The Learned Single Judge also proceeded on the footing that since the respondent never acquired a lien against the post of Director, CDC, he necessarily continued to retain a lien against the post of Associate Professor in Geology. 44. In our respectful opinion, the reasoning does not fully address the controversy before the court. 45. The real issue was neither whether the respondent acquired a lien in Gauhati University nor whether he could simultaneously hold two liens. 46. The issue was whether, after accepting an appointment outside the cadre, obtaining a lien for a specified period, and consciously remaining outside the parent department beyond that period, he retained an enforceable legal right to restoration in government service. 47. Service jurisprudence does not recognise an indefinite reservation of a government post in favour of an employee who elects to continue elsewhere after expiry of the period sanctioned by the competent authority. The doctrine of lien exists to protect continuity in service. It is not intended to provide a perpetual option of return irrespective of the conditions under which such protection was granted. 48. An equally significant aspect of the matter is the respondent's conduct. The respondent did not seek reversion upon expiry of the lien period even after obtaining interim protection in WP(C) No.3864/2017. He continued to serve as Director of the CDC. 49. The interim order merely stays the operation of the notification dated 21-04-2017. It did not enlarge the period of lien nor did it create a substantive right, notwithstanding what was available under the fundamental rules. The respondent consciously elected to continue at Gauhati University until his tenure ended; it was only thereafter that he sought restoration to government service. 50. The chronology demonstrates that the respondent retained the parent post as a Page No.# 9/10 contingency to which he could return upon cessation of outside engagement. 51. Neither the text of fundamental rules nor the underlying principle of service supports such an open-ended claim. The learned Single Judge, with respect, construed FR 14-A in isolation and thereby transformed a limited protective provision into a continuing right of re-entry into government service. 52. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the text, structure and purpose of the rules. 53. Considerable reliance was placed by the respondent upon the decision in T.R. Sharma v. Prithvi Singh and another, reported in (1976) 1 SCC 844, State of Haryana v. Shri Des Raj and another, reported in (1976) 2 SCC 844 and State of Rajasthan and another v. S.N. Tiwari and others, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 700. 54. Those decisions undoubtedly recognise that an employee should not suffer merely because the competent authority failed to pass a formal order of suspension of Lien or because another appointment did not ripen into substantive absorption. However, none of those decisions addressed a situation in which an employee consciously continued beyond a period sanctioned by the competent authority, even after the written termination of the lien granted, and thereafter sought restoration several years later. 55. The present controversy must therefore be resolved upon its own factual and legal setting. 56. The doctrine of lien serves an important protective function in public service. Yet, like every legal doctrine, it must operate within the framework of the statute and the conditions governing its exercise. 57. The learned single judge transformed what is essentially a limited protective device into an unrestricted right of entry into government service. Neither the fundamental rules nor the facts of the present case justify such a conclusion. 58. The respondents accepted appointments outside the cadre, obtained liens for a specified period, failed to return upon expiry of that period, continued in the borrowing institution for more than five years, and sought restoration only after cessation of such engagement. Page No.# 10/10 59. In these circumstances, no enforceable legal right to join government service survived. We are therefore unable to sustain the judgment under appeal. 60. The appeal is accordingly allowed. 61. During the pendency of this appeal, the state has brought on record an instruction in deference to our order dated 28.04.2026, indicating that no vacant sanctioned post of assistant professor in geology presently exists under the Directorate of Technical Education, even to accommodate the respondent as an equitable relief. In that background, we cannot direct the appellant to accommodate the respondent on equitable grounds. 62. Accordingly, the common Judgment and Order dated 16.05.2025, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in WP(C) No.3864/2017 and WP(C) No. 6604/2022, is set aside. JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant