1 2026:CGHC:8722-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No.275 of 2019 The date when the judgment is reserved The date when the judgment is pronounced The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website Operative Full 11.12.2025 18.02.2026 -- 18.02.2026 1 - Brijmohan Agrawal (Died) Through Lrs. (As Per Hon'ble Order Dated 04-07-2024) 1.1 - Ajay Kumar Agrawal, S/o Late Shri Brijmohan Agrawal, Aged About 48 Years, R/o Danipara, Raigarh, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh 1.2 - Smt. Bulbul Agrawal W/o Shri Badal Prakash Jindal Aged About 44 Years R/o N.H. No.6, Main Road Pushpkunj, Bargarh, Odisha Appellant (s) versus 1 - Madhukar Singhania S/o Shri Shankar Lal Singhaniya Aged About 59 Years R/o Kotba Road Lailunga, Post and Tahsil Lailunga District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh Respondent (s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. Hemant Kumar Agrawal, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Mr. Sourabh Gupta and Ms. Harneet Kaur, Advocates Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Digitally signed by R NIRALA 2 Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad CAV Judgment Per Rajani Dubey J. 1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants/plaintiffs against the judgment and decree dated 28.02.2019 passed by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Raigarh in Civil Suit No.B/57/2014, whereby the suit of the appellants/plaintiffs for recovery of Rs.10,38,988/- has been dismissed. (The parties herein shall be referred as per their nomenclature before the learned Trial Court). 2. The respondent has also filed cross appeal under Order 14 Rule 22 read with Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC and Section 151 of CPC against the aforesaid judgment challenging the issue No.3, which was decided in favour of the plaintiffs and the learned Trial Court held that the suit is not barred by limitation. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the original plaintiff Brajmohan Agrawal had filed a suit for recovery of Rs.10,38,988/-. It had been pleaded by the plaintiff that defendant had taken loan in the form of cash of Rs.4,26,720/- from the plaintiff on 27/10/2006 and on the same date he executed an agreement and as per agreement defendant gave 33 cheques for the period of 27.11.2006 to 27.07.2009 to the plaintiff and each cheque was worth Rs.12192/-. The defendant had got the cheques written by his son and then signed on it and he also assured to the plaintiff 3 that the remaining amount will be paid after 27/08/2009 and he also gave cheque no.681699 to the plaintiff for part of remaining amount. The defendant had also agreed that if cheques will not be honoured then in that condition Rs. 500/- will be given by the defendant for each cheque in respect of expenses and he will also give 3% monthly interest. It is specifically mentioned in the agreement Ex. P/1 vide dated 27/10/2006. As per appendix "A", cheques which were given by the defendant to the plaintiff, plaintiff couldn't get the payment due to insufficient funds in account of the defendant, difference in signature of the defendant and also directions which were given by the defendant to the concerning Banks. The defendant also didn't give remaining amount which should have been paid after 27/07/2009. As per appendix "A" when plaintiff couldn't get payment of cheques due to above reasons, then he filed 16 complaints against the defendant under section of 138 the Negotiable Instrument Act 1881. The defendant again assured to the plaintiff in above criminal complainant cases, he will pay the whole amount with interests and expenses which are claimed by the plaintiff, then plaintiff made compromise to the defendant in some of above complaint cases. Compromise applications were filed before the concerning Criminal Courts by the defendant and the plaintiff on 01/09/2017& 30/10/2017. In the above filed compromise applications, again the defendant had admitted he took loan in the form of cash from the plaintiff. The defendant has not repaid 4 loan amount with interest and expenses to the plaintif. Ultimately the suit for recovery of the sum of Rs. 10,38,988/- (Ten lacs thirty eight thousands nine hundreds eighty eight)/ was filed before the learned Trial Court by the original plaintiff. In rebuttal of above pleadings the present respondent/defendant submitted written statement and admitted that the plaintiff had filed criminal complaints against him under section 138 of The Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. He also said that the plaintiff took his sign in blank papers and stamp paper. He admitted that then he had compromised with the plaintiff in cheques dishonour cases and he gave Rs.6,50,000/- to the plaintiff in between month of December 2017 and month of march 2018. He also said that when he asked about receipt to the plaintiff then plaintiff didn't give receipt and threatened him and said he will involve the defendant in other cases. The learned trial court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants. Hence the present appeal has been filed by the appellants. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge is perverse and unsustainable in the eyes of law. The leaned trial Court failed to appreciate the terms and conditions of the agreement and passed judgment on the basis of groundless imagination. It has been admitted by the defendant in Ex.P/1 that cheques were signed by him. It has been also admitted fact by the defendant 5 that the plaintiff had filed various complaints cases against him under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 before different criminal Courts about said loan amounts and concerning cheques which were given by the defendant. In criminal complaints, above compromise application has been filed by both parties before the concerning Courts on 01/09/2017 and on 30/10/2017. In that above compromise application defendant admitted that he took loan amount from the plaintiff on 2710/2019 and he also gave 33 cheques to the plaintiff and same day he signed an agreement, which is Ex.P/1. The defendant is bound to the rule of ESTOPPEL too. The defendant said that he had paid total amount (loan amount &expenses) Rs.6,50,000/-(Six lacs fifty thousand rupees) to the plaintiff in between month of December 2017 and month of March 2018. But he failed to prove his averment through reliable and cogent evidences. The leaned trial court has passed judgment on the basis of groundless imagination. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge is absolutely bad, illegal, incorrect, inappropriate and also against well settled principles of law and facts and accordingly it is liable to be set-aside. Reliance has been placed on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P., reported in (2003) 8 SCC 752 and Grasim Industries Limited and another vs Agarwal Steel, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 83. 6 5. Learned counsels for the respondent supports the impugned judgment and decree except the finding related to Issue No.3. The respondent has filed cross-appeal against the said finding under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that in para 21, the learned Trial Court gave finding that the suit is not time barred but looking to the oral and documentary evidence and facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear that the suit is time barred and under the Limitation Act, there is no acknowledgment by the defendant and once time runs cannot be stopped and time limit for filing recovery suit is 3 years and the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Though specific defence has been raised in the written statement and the evidence has been laid by the defendant but the same has been ignored by the learned Trial Court while deciding the issue No.3. The suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay also, as such the finding given by the learned Trial Court in para 21 is perverse and is liable to be set aside and the suit is also liable to be dismissed on limitation point also. Reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered by the M. P. High Court in the matter of United Law Publisher vs Mohammad Hussain, passed in C.R. No.44/1986, decided on 24.07.1986, Babulal Agrawal vs Smt. Jyoti Shrivastava and another, reported in AIR 2000 MP 83 and Sardar Surendra Singh Bedi vs Dhannalal, reported in 2011 (5) MPHT 502. 7 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the plaintiff filed recovery of suit against the defendant for recovery of Rs.10,38,988/-. The learned Trial Court framed 4 issues, which are as under:- Page 14 dz- fopkj.kh; iz’u fu"d"kZ 1 D;k oknh izfroknh ls nkok jkf’k 10]38]988-00 :i;s izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ Þ izekf.kr ughß 2 D;k oknh izfroknh ls nkok jkf’k 10]38]988-00 :i;s ij nkok izLrqfr fnukad ls Hkqxrku fnukad rd 03 izfr’kr ekfld Bgjko ds lkFk ,xzhesaV fnukad 27-10-2006 ds vuqlkj C;kt Hkh izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS \ Þ izekf.kr ughß 3 D;k oknh dk nkok le; ckkf/kr gS \ Þ izekf.kr ughß 4 lgk;rk ,oa O;; \ ÞdafMdk dzekad ----ds fu”d”kZ ds vuqlkj oknh dk okn fujLr fd;k x;kAß 8. The plaintiff filed agreement dated 27.10.2006 (Ex-P/1) and as per this agreement, the defendant/respondent admitted that he took loan of Rs.4,26,720/- from the original plaintiff and gave 33 post pay cheques from 27.11.2006 to 27.07.2009 and every cheque was of Rs.12192/- as monthly installment. The operative part of this agreement is as under:- 8 “………….आज द☿ा㸪क 27.10.2006 क बⱃजम⹋ हा㸪 आत⑍म⹋ज स㡍व. ቦ暍 कल㉀चरण अ्䵇वल㉀ द☿ा㸪वस㡀 ा㸪प⨾र, तह. व ज᰿जल㉀- रयगढ∼ (छ.ग.) स㡀" 4,26,720/- (चर ल㉀ख छबⱍबⱃस㡀 हजर स㡀त स㡀% बⱃस㡀 रあप⨾य" म⹋्䵔) ा㸪ग उध✾र ज᰿ल㉀य ह*+। ज᰿जस㡀क" भⵁ.गता㸪 ह"त. म⹋/ बⱃजम⹋ हा㸪 अ्䵇वल㉀ क 33 च"क भⵁरतय स㡍ट὇"ट὇ बⱃ/क ऑफ इ܂द☿4य ኋ譞च ल㉀6ल㉀7ग क ्䵚त⑍य"क च"क 12192/- (बⱃरह हजर एक स㡀% द☿बⱃयन⡍बⱃ" रあप⨾य" म⹋्䵔) द☿ा㸪क 27.11.2006 स㡀" ्䵚f त ekg 27 तर぀ख क" 27.07.2009 तक क " द☿य ह*+।" 9. Learned counsel for the appellants objected that the plaintiff never admitted receiving of any amount and the learned Trial Court gave wrong finding that the plaintiff admitted receiving of amount in para 45 of his cross-examination. In para 15 of the judgment, the learned Trial Court gave erroneous finding regarding admission of plaintiff so this finding is liable to be set aside. 10. PW-1 Brajmohan Agrawal stated in para 45 as under:- “45. म⹋.झᵇ" इ܂स㡀 बⱃत क< जा㸪कर ा㸪ह= ह6 द☿क आयकर अज᰿ध✾द☿ा㸪यम⹋ क" अा㸪.स㡀र बⱃस㡀 हजर स㡀" अज᰿ध✾क रद☿> क ा㸪ग उध✾र च"क क" म⹋ध❍यम⹋ स㡀" ह द☿य ज स㡀कत ह6 यह कहा㸪 स㡀ह ह6 द☿क म⹋"र बⱃ/क एकउट὇ ह6। म⹋.झᵇ" इ܂स㡀 बⱃत क< जा㸪कर ा㸪ह= ह6 द☿क म⹋ध✾.कर ज᰿स㡀घᠾद☿ा㸪य ा㸪" 4,26,720 /- रぁप⨾य" म⹋"र" प⨾.्䵔 अजय क द☿य ह6 अथव ा㸪ह=। म⹋/ आज यह ा㸪ह= बⱃत स㡀कत द☿क च"क ्䵅म⹋क 680299 द☿ा㸪क 27.01.2008 म⹋7ल㉍य 12192 /- क द☿कस㡀 द☿ा㸪क क अा㸪र〿रत द☿कय गय। गवह स㡍वतF कहत ह6 द☿क इ܂स㡀 च"क स㡀" स㡀बⱃज᰿ध✾त ቄ䒌H4क ्䵚करण "ख क" बⱃत स㡀कत ह*। गवह क अद☿भⵁल㉀"ख द☿खय" जा㸪" प⨾र गवह अद☿भⵁल㉀"ख "खकर कहत ह6 द☿क भⵁरतय स㡍ट὇"ट὇ बⱃ/क क" अा㸪रण ሺ㪋प⨾ा㸪 म⹋J तरख क उቤ撔"ख ा㸪ह= ह6 और य7द☿ा㸪या㸪 बⱃ/क क" अा㸪रण ሺ㪋प⨾ा㸪 म⹋J च"क अा㸪र〿रत ह ा㸪" क द☿ा㸪क 12.04.2008 क उቤ撔"ख ह6। गवह कहत ह6 द☿क भⵁरतय स㡍ट὇"ट὇ बⱃ/क क" ሺ㪋प⨾ा㸪 म⹋J 12 ज᰿ल㉀ख हMआ ह6 द☿क त. उस㡀क" आग" स㡍प⨾्䵖 ा㸪ह= ह6।" 9 11. It is clear from the statement of plaintiff that he did not admit that he received Rs.4,26,720/- from the defendant. He only stated that he did not know that Madhukar gave Rs.4,26,720/- to his son Ajay. Plaintiff’s son Ajay Kumar filed affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 of CPC in support of the plaintiff but he did not appear for cross-examination before the learned Trial Court. The defendant examined 3 witnesses. DW-1 Sanjay Kumar Panigrahi, defendant himself as DW-2 and Rajeev Lochan Singhaniya as DW-3. The plaintiff filed certified copies of criminal cases. The defendant also admitted that the plaintiff filed various cases against him for dishnourment of cheque under Section 138 of NI Act. 12. The appellants/plaintiffs have filed agreement (Ex-P/1), which is executed between Madhukar Singhaniya and Ajay Kumar. This agreement was executed between son of plaintiff and defendant and the defendant pleaded that he returned all amount to plaintiff’s son Ajay and he gave Rs.6,50,000/ to him- and all criminal cases were compromised between the parties. The plaintiff filed the documents from Ex-P/63 to Ex-P/71. The compromise application was filed before the Criminal Court. In all these compromise applications, in paras 4, 5 & 6, it is held as under:- “(4) यह द☿क प⨾र〿रव ा㸪" ए्䵇म⹋Jट὇ द☿ा㸪क 27.10.2006 क" द☿यत⑍वO क" प⨾ल㉀ा㸪 म⹋J द☿य" गय" च"कO क" अा㸪रण ह जा㸪" क" करण स㡀्䵌म⹋ न⡍ययल㉀य म⹋J व㕍यवहर व ्䵚स㡍त.त द☿कय ह6 ज᰿जस㡀क ्䵅म⹋क 204/2014ह6। 10 (5) यह द☿क उप⨾र ्䴹 करण स㡀" प⨾र〿रव क" ቛ宋र ्䵚स㡍त.त उप⨾र ्䴹 ቄ䒌H4क ्䵚करण म⹋J प⨾र〿रव अद☿्䵇म⹋ कयTवह ा㸪ह= करा㸪 चहत ह6 तथ अप⨾ा㸪 प⨾र〿रव स㡍व"चᩍछ स㡀" वप⨾स㡀 ल㉀"ा㸪 चहत ह6। (6) यह द☿क ऐस㡀 ቄ䒌स㡍थद☿त म⹋J अद☿भⵁय.्䴹 क" द☿वरあ्䵍 उप⨾र ्䴹 ቄ䒌H4क ्䵚करण म⹋J कयTवह स㡀म⹋्䵎 करत" हMए प⨾र〿रव क अप⨾ा㸪 ्䵚करण वप⨾स㡀 ल㉀"ा㸪" क< अा㸪.म⹋द☿त ्䵚ा㸪 करा㸪" क< क प⨾ करJ।" 13. It is an admitted position that based on these applications, the Criminal Court acquitted the respondent/defendant from the charges under Section 138 of NI Act. The plaintiff objected that in all these applications, receiving of loan amount was not mentioned but the learned Trial Court appreciated this fact that and held that it is not possible that without taking money from the defendant, the plaintiff could have compromised. It is held in para 19 of the judgment as under:- “19. व㔾द♀ कᕇ ቛ宋र぀ स㡍व㔾य⼂ य⼂ह स㡍व㔾कᕇर぀ कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ ह कᔿकᕇ उसन⡇ ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ कᕇ कᔿव㔾रあ्䵍 ज᰿तन⡇ भⵀ द♀कᔿकᕇ ्䵚कᕇर぀ण ्䵚स㡍तत कᔿकᕇय⼂ थ╇ उन⡇ े䜰! स 4 ्䵚कᕇर぀ण े䜰! ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ कᕇ" स भⵀ द♀ गई थ╇ उन⡇ ्䵚कᕇर぀ण" े䜰! उसन⡇ र぀न⡇े䜰 आव㔾द♀न⡇ ्䵚स㡍तत कᕇर぀ े䜰ज᰿स㡍቏侔ट न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ स लकᔿ)त ्䵚कᕇर぀ण तथ╇ अप⩀ल न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ स अप⩀ल कᕇ लकᔿ)त ्䵚कᕇर぀ण कᕇ" से䜰प⩍त कᕇर぀ ल㈿लय⼂ थ╇ उसन⡇ इस स)ध े䜰! ्䵚द♀्䵦1 प⩀ 63 स ्䵚द♀्䵦1 प⩀ 71 तकᕇ कᕇ द♀स㡍तव㔾 ्䵚स㡍तत कᔿकᕇय⼂ ह2। उप⩀र぀"कᕍत र぀न⡇े䜰 आव㔾द♀न⡇ कᕇ स)ध े䜰! व㔾द♀ कᕇ5 ओर぀ स य⼂ह कᕇहन⡇ कᕇ ्䵚य⼂स कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ ह कᔿकᕇ ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ ቛ宋र぀ प⩀स द☿द♀य⼂ न⡇ कᕇ आቫ残सन⡇ द☿द♀य⼂ गय⼂ थ╇ इस कᕇर぀ण स उसन⡇ र぀न⡇े䜰 कᕇर぀ कᔿन⡇म⹍न⡇ न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ और぀ अप⩀ल न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ े䜰! ्䵚कᕇर぀ण से䜰प⩍त कᕇर぀ ल㈿लय⼂ ह। उकᕍत तथ╍य⼂ कᕇ" अकᔿव㔾ቫ残सन⡇य⼂ न⡇ह< े䜰न⡇  सकᕇत, कᕍय⼂=कᔿकᕇ ज᰿स ्䵚कᕇर぀ स व㔾द♀ ቛ宋र぀ न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ े䜰! द♀स㡍तव㔾 ्䵚स㡍तत कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ ह2 ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ ቛ宋र぀ उसकᕇ अव㔾ध ऋण द♀न⡇ कᕇ ्䵤व㔾सय⼂ कᕇ" ्䵚े䜰ण⌿णत कᕇर぀ उसकᕇ तथ╍य⼂= कᕇ" खकᔿत कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ ह उसस य⼂ह ्䵚े䜰ण⌿णत ह"त ह कᔿकᕇ व㔾द♀ अव㔾ध रあप⩀ स सह㥂कᕇर぀ कᕇ ्䵤व㔾सय⼂ कᕇर぀न⡇ व㔾ल ्䵤ሹ㦌कᕍत ह " बⱍय⼂ लन⡇ हत ल"ग= कᕇ" ऋण द♀कᕇर぀ अव㔾ध सह㥂कᕇर぀ कᕇ ्䵤व㔾सय⼂ कᕇर぀त ह㥁ए उन⡇कᕇ5 े䜰)Fर぀ कᕇ लभⵀ उठ‾कᕇर぀ उन⡇स ्䵚प⩍त कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ बⱍल2कᕇ चᩇकᕇ प⩀र぀ र぀कᕇे䜰 भⵀर぀कᕇर぀ उस द♀कᔿकᕇ एव㔾 ल㈿सकᔿव㔾ल े䜰े䜰ल= े䜰! ्䵚स㡍तत कᕇर぀ उसकᕇ द♁रあप⩀य⼂"ग कᕇर぀त ह। य⼂ह कᔿव㔾चᩇर぀ कᔿकᕇय⼂ न⡇ य⼂"गᝍय⼂ तथ╍य⼂ ह " कᕇ"ई ्䵤ሹ㦌कᕍत ज᰿स े䜰ज᰿स㡍቏侔ट न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ प⩀र぀ቅ䖋म⹍य⼂ ल㈿लखत अध✿धकᔿन⡇य⼂े䜰 ्䵚कᕇर぀ण े䜰! 4 ्䵚कᕇर぀ण= े䜰! स द♀ द☿द♀य⼂ गय⼂ ह और぀ उसकᕇ कᔿव㔾रあ्䵍 6 अन⡍य⼂ ्䵚कᕇर぀ण लकᔿ)त ह। ऐस ሹ㦌Nकᔿत े䜰! ) तकᕇ व㔾ह प⩀स न⡇ह< द♀ द♀ग, त) तकᕇ व㔾द♀ उसस र぀न⡇े䜰 कᕇर぀ हस㡍त्䵌र぀ कᕍय⼂= कᕇर぀ग । व㔾द♀ कᕇ कᔿव㔾ቛ宋न⡇ अध✿धव㔾कᕍत े䜰ह"द♀य⼂ ቛ宋र぀ ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ स य⼂ह ्䵚कᔿत प⩀र぀्䵌ण े䜰! प⩀Fछᬾ गय⼂ ह कᔿकᕇ र぀न⡇े䜰 आव㔾द♀न⡇ ्䵚द♀्䵦1 प⩀ 63 स 71 े䜰! र぀कᕇे䜰 कᕇ5 )त न⡇ह< ल㈿लख गई ह और぀ न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ कᕇ" भⵀ र぀कᕇे䜰 द♀ द☿द♀य⼂ न⡇ कᕇ स)ध े䜰! उल㉍लख न⡇ह< कᔿकᕇय⼂ ह। उकᕍत ्䵚कᔿत प⩀र぀्䵌ण कᕇ5 )त! इस कᕇर぀ण स स㡍व㔾कᕇर぀ य⼂"गᝍय⼂ न⡇ह< ह कᕍय⼂=कᔿकᕇ र぀न⡇े䜰 कᕇर぀न⡇ व㔾ल ्䵤ሹ㦌कᕍत ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ न⡇ ह"कᕇर぀ े䜰खᙍय⼂ रあप⩀ स व㔾द♀ थ╇ और぀ न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ हे䜰्䵦 ्䵚त⑍य⼂थ╇T अथ╇1त ल㈿्䵦कᕇय⼂त कᕇर぀न⡇ 11 व㔾ल य⼂ प⩀र〿र぀व㔾द♀ ्䵚स㡍तत कᕇर぀न⡇ व㔾ल ्䵤ሹ㦌कᕍत स ह प⩀Fछᬾत ह कᔿकᕇ आप⩀कᕇ र぀कᕇे䜰 ध✿े䜰ल गय⼂ ह अथ╇व㔾 न⡇ह< और぀ कᕍय⼂ आप⩀ प⩀Fण1 सतध✿V प⩀र぀ र぀न⡇े䜰 कᕇर぀ र぀ह ह अथ╇व㔾 न⡇ह<। अतW व㔾द♀ , ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ कᕇ ቛ宋र぀ ्䵚द♀्䵦1 प⩀ 63 स 71 तकᕇ द♀ न⡍य⼂य⼂लय⼂ े䜰! ्䵚स㡍तत कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ र぀न⡇े䜰 आव㔾द♀न⡇ े䜰! भⵀल ह र぀ल㈿्䵦 न⡇ह< ल㈿लख गई ह प⩀र぀त य⼂ह उप⩀धर぀ण कᕇ5 य⼂ग कᔿकᕇ ्䵚कᔿतव㔾द♀ ቛ宋र぀ व㔾द♀ कᕇ" 650 लख रあप⩀य⼂ अद♀ कᔿकᕇय⼂  चᩇकᕇ थ╇ इस कᕇर぀ण ह व㔾द♀ ቛ宋र぀ प⩀Fण1 सहे䜰कᔿत अथ╇व㔾 सतध✿V स र぀न⡇े䜰 कᔿकᕇय⼂ गय⼂ ह। व㔾द♀ ) इतन⡇ ल"ग= कᕇ" अत⑍य⼂त चᩇलकᕇ5 प⩀Fव㔾1कᕇ ऐस र぀कᕇे䜰 प⩀Fण1 द♀स㡍तव㔾 ज᰿से䜰! अन⡇)ध तथ╇ बⱍल2कᕇ चᩇकᕇ े䜰! हस㡍त्䵌र぀ कᕇर぀ ल㈿लय⼂ त ह। ऐस ሹ㦌Nकᔿत े䜰! उसकᕇ ቛ宋र぀ कᔿ)न⡇ र぀कᕇे䜰 ल㈿लय⼂ स ्䵚प⩍त ्䵤ሹ㦌कᕍत स इस आቫ残सन⡇ प⩀र぀ कᔿकᕇ )द♀ े䜰! प⩀स द♀ द♀ग र぀न⡇े䜰 कᕇर぀ ल य⼂ह से䜰न⡍य⼂ े䜰ቜ岌स㡍तष㝍कᕇ कᕇ ቛ宋र぀ भⵀ ऐस र぀न⡇े䜰 कᔿकᕇय⼂ न⡇ कᕇ5 उप⩀धर぀ण न⡇ह< कᕇ5  सकᕇत। अतW व㔾द♀ कᕇ ቛ宋र぀ भⵀ इस आቫ残सन⡇ प⩀र぀ र぀न⡇े䜰 कᕇर぀न⡇ न⡇ह< े䜰न⡇  सकᕇत ।" 14. It is clear from the order sheets of the plaint that after filing these applications on 30.10.2017, the plaintiff amended his plaint on 22.10.2018 that he did not receive any amount and he compromised criminal cases on assurance of defendant. The learned Trial Court rightly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and found that the plaintiff has failed to prove Issue Nos.1 & 2 in his favour. It is also clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the plaintiff’s son Ajay Kumar did not appear before the learned Trial Court for his cross-examination and as per defendant he paid all amount to his son Ajay Kumar. The learned Trial Court also minutely appreciated all documents and statement of both the parties and rightly gave finding with regard to Issue Nos.1 & 2 against the plaintiff and in favour of defendant. 15. As regards cross objection of defendant, appellant objected that the defendant is liable to pay ad valorum court fee but the Hon’ble High Court of M.P. in case of Babulal (supra) held in para 20-A & 21 as under:- 12 “20A. Under Order 41. Rule 22. C.P.C. cross- objection in lieu of cross appeal is permissible as also cross-objection is permissible against an adverse finding. The Explanation added below Order 41. Rule 22 was introduced by. Amendment Act of 1976 with a specific purpose that cross-objection may be allowed to be filed even against adverse finding by the respondent who may have been successful on other findings of the Court below. The cross objection which is merely against an adverse finding would not attract applicability of Art. 1-A but where the cross- objection is in lieu of cross appeal as contemplated by Order 41. Rule 22 (1). C.P.C. it would attract ad valorem Court-Fees under Art. 1-A and omission of the words 'cross-objection ' in Art. 1-A would have no different legal effect. The cross-objection against adverse finding and cross-objection in lieu of cross appeal have thus to be treated differently for the purpose of Court-fee. 21. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the memorandum of cross-objection in so far as it challenges the adverse finding on legal necessity, order to support of the decree of dismissal of suit for specific performance is, on this additional ground, clearly maintainable and would not attract any payment of ad valorem Court-fees. Thus, in view of the same, the objection of the plaintiff with regard to payment of advalorum court fee by the defendant is not sustainable. 16. As regards the finding of the learned Trial Court in para 21 related to Issue No.3, the learned Trial Court found that limitation started from the date of last installment and as per details of cheque Nos.12 to 17, the same are prior to 3 years and 1 month and the last cheques in Schedule-A of the plaint are cheque Nos.18, 19 & 20 dated 27.07.2009, 27.08.2009 & 27.09.2009 so the limitation is counted from the last payment of installment. 13 17. In Sardar Surendra Singh (supra), the Hon’ble High Court of M.P. held in paras 11 & 12 as under:- “11. From perusal of the record, it is evident that Exh P-1 is dated 10-7-1999, which contains 12 transactions which took place between the parties between 3-10-1992 to 25-2- 1993. Suit was filed by the respondent on 26-10-2002, which is not within 3 years from the date of execution of document dated 10-7-1999. Since the document (Exh P-1) contains the terms of repayment in monthly instalments, therefore, the amount was required to be repaid in twelve months. Articles 36 and 37 of Limitation Act deals with the law of limitation relating to money suit for recovery of money where the loan has to be repaid in instalments which reads as under:- Articles 36 and 37 Description Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 36. On a promissory note or Three years payable by bound installments Three years The expiration of the first term of payment to the part then payable, and for the other parts, the the expiration of the respective terms of payment. 37. On a promissory note or Three years bond payable by instalments, which provides that, if default be made in payment of one or more instalments, the whole shall be due. Three years When the default is made, unless where the payee or obligee waives the benefit of the provision and then when fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver. 12. In the matter of Bhagwant Rao Vs. Mohammad Khan, 1977 JLJ 751, wherein the money was repayable in instalments this Court has held that plaintiff has no right to bring the suit for the whole amount before expiry of 10 months from the date of demand, therefore, the cause of action accrued by the plaintiff after expiry of 10 months. In the matter of United Law Publisher Vs. Mohammad Hussain. 1986 (II) MPWN 146, this Court has held that right to sue accrues after expiry of full period of instalments.” 14 18. In light of the above and considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the guidelines of the Hon’ble High Court of M.P., it is clear that the learned Trial Court minutely appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record and has rightly decided the suit with regard to Issue Nos.1 & 2 in favour of the defendant and has rightly decided Issue No.3 in favour of the plaintiff, as such the appeal of the appellants as well as the cross appeal of respondent are without any merit. 19. Consequently, the appeal as well as cross appeal are liable to be and are hereby dismissed accordingly. Sd/- Sd/- (Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Judge Nirala