[2026:RJ-JP:20074] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3181/2019 Mahendra Kumar S/o Shri Ram Karan, R/o Plot No.18, Ward No.2, Bandikui, Police Station Bandikui, District Dausa. ----Accused-Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan, through PP 2. Station House Officer, Anti Electricity Theft Police Station Dausa, Raj. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Deen Dayal Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit Kumar Gupta, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Order 12/05/2026 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue involved in this petition has already been set at rest in identical criminal misc. petition submitted by the present petitioner bearing S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.3676/2019 (Mahendra Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another) alongwith connected petition filed by the other co-accused. Learned counsel further submits that in the aforesaid petition, time barred cognizance was taken and by treating the cognizance as time barred, the proceedings against the petitioner were quashed vide order dated 03.11.2025. Learned counsel further submits that in the instant petition also, the cognizance has been taken after the expiry of the period of limitation i.e. three years, hence, impugned order of cognizance deserves to be quashed and set aside. [2026:RJ-JP:20074] (2 of 5) [CRLMP-3181/2019] 2. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the prayer, but he is not in a position to controvert the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on record. 4. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Mahendra Kumar (supra) submitted by the present petitioner in paras No.6 to 9 observed as under:- “6. As the controversy revolves around the provisions of Section 468 and 473 of Cr.P.C., 1973, the same are being reproduced hereunder:- "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.—(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be— (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. [(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment.] 473. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been [2026:RJ-JP:20074] (3 of 5) [CRLMP-3181/2019] properly explained or that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice." 7. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions, provisions makes it clear that although, there is limitation for taking cognizance and Section 468 specifically bars the Court to take cognizance after a lapse of period of limitation, yet Section 473 provides for an extension of period of limitation if the court is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case that the delay has properly been explained and it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. 8. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, this Court examined the application for seeking condonation of delay filed by the Investigating Officer. However, a perusal of the same does not reveal any sufficient cause which could have prompted the court below to condone the delay of 4 years. It has been mentioned in the application that the investigation of the case was assigned to the Investigating Officer in respect of FIR lodged on 28.05.2011. It was further stated in the application that the Investigating Officer was transferred on 23.07.2013. However, nothing has been mentioned with regard to the details of the investigation conducted by him from 28.05.2011 to date of his transfer i.e. 23.07.2013. It has been further mentioned in the application that Investigating Officer was re-transferred to the same place on 30.10.2014, however, he was unaware about the whereabouts of the accused, therefore, the delay has occurred in investigation concerning whereabouts of the accused petitioners as well as in getting the record from the office of store in-charge, Dausa and office of Assistant Engineer, Baswa. Such reasons are totally vague, evasive, unexplained and unconvincing. Nothing has been placed on record to show the efforts made by the Investigating Officer during 7 years following the date of lodging of FIR. Merely stating that Investigating Officer was transferred in the meantime on 23.07.2013 and was re-transferred to the same place on 30.10.2014 would not support the contention of the Investigating Officer for seeking condonation and such justification cannot be said to be reasonable in the eye of law. As far as whereabouts of the petitioners are concerned, admittedly they were holding the posts of Assistant Engineer and Junior Engineer at the same place. Therefore, assertion that the Investigating [2026:RJ-JP:20074] (4 of 5) [CRLMP-3181/2019] Officer could not assertain the whereabouts of the petitioners is totally baseless and unfounded. Merely for the reasons that the offence is relating to public property would not make the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. redundant and otiose. In the case of Sarah Mathew Vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the provisions of Section 468 and 473 Cr.P.C. and has observed that for the purpose of computing the limitation from the date of complaint is material. It was also held that the provisions of penal statutes must be strictly construed. 9. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the considered opinion that no reasonable or satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the Investigating Officer for not concluding investigation for a period of 7 years from the date of lodging of FIR and for filing of challan after inordinate delay of 7 years. Period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. for offence under Sections 135 and 136 of Indian Electricity Act is 3 years. However, in the instant petitions, cognizance has been taken by the court below after expiry of limitation of 3 years without assigning any cogent reasons and in complete disregard of the facts that the explanation for delay offered by the Investigating Officer were neither reasonable nor justified.” 5. In the present case, the FIR was said to be registered on 01.06.2011 and after filing of the charge-sheet, the cognizance was taken by the concerned Magistrate on 16.04.2019 i.e. beyond the period of three years. 6. In view of the observations of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Mahendra Kumar (supra) and the facts that the cognizance in the present case has been taken after about six years, this Court is of the opinion that the reasons given by the learned trial Court for extension of limitation period is not convincing. [2026:RJ-JP:20074] (5 of 5) [CRLMP-3181/2019] 7. Accordingly, in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the present criminal misc. petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The order dated 16.04.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Dausa, District Dausa, whereby the period of limitation for taking cognizance was extended and also the whole criminal proceedings are quashed and set aside. 8. In view of the order passed in the main petition, stay application as well as pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J PRATEEK/36