1 2026:CGHC:8456 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 486 of 2025 Agriculture Insurance Company Of India Ltd. Through Regional Manager, Address - Regional Office Lic Investment Building, Phase - 2, Second Floor, Pandri, Raipur (C.G.) Alternate Address - Office Block - 1, Fifth Floor, Plate B And C, East Kidwai Nagar, New Delhi, 110023 ... Petitioner Versus 1 - Janak Ram Patel S/o Trilochan Patel Aged About 72 Years R/o Village-Bilaigarh, Tehsil - Saraipali, District-Mahasamund (C.G.) 2 - The Branch Manager State Bank Of India Branch Bichiya, Tehsil - Saraipali, District- Mahasamund (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) For Petitioners : Mr. Shobhit Mishra and Mr. Suraj Patel, Advocates For Respondent No. 1 For Respondent No. 2 : : None. Mr. Sudhanshu Upadhyay, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Sharad Mishra, Advocate HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SINGH RAJPUT Order on Board 17/02/2026 1. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by the learned 2 National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) in Revision Petition No. 2759/2024, dated 08.01.2025, whereby the application preferred by the petitioner for condonation of delay was rejected and consequently, the revision petition was dismissed. 2. The facts of the present case, are that the petitioner/Agriculture Insurance Company of India Ltd. is primarily engaged in providing insurance coverage and financial support to farmers in the event of crop failure. The petitioner company is the implementing agency for the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana. The State of Chhattisgarh notified the scheme in the State vide notification dated 08.07.2019, wherein the petitioner was designated as the implementing agency for the districts of Rajnandgaon, Raipur, Surguja, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Bemetara, Balodabazar, Durg, Bastar, Korba, Balod, Koriya, Mahasamund, Sukma, Dhamtari, Gariyaband, Surajpur, Raigarh, Kanker, Dantewada, and Bilaspur. 3. Respondent No. 1/Complainant, a farmer of Village Bilaigarh, RIC-11, Tehsil and District Rajnandgaon, made a complaint regarding crop damage during the year 2019-20. He stated that an amount of ₹7,101/- was deducted from his bank account as crop insurance premiums. He further stated that he suffered a loss in the year 2019 and other farmers of the same village were paid more compensation, whereas he was not paid compensation amount for his alleged crop loss. 4. A consumer complaint (CC No. 32/21) was filed against the petitioner and Respondent No.2, claiming compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,46,062/-. Additionally, ₹50,000/- was claimed for mental harassment and ₹5,000/- for financial loss. 3 5. The petitioner filed a reply before the District Commission, denying the allegations. The District Commission, vide order dated 13.12.2023, partly allowed the complaint and directed the petitioner to calculate the loss caused due to crop damage to the respondent No. 1/complainant in 7.79 hectares according to village Bilaigarh, RIC-11 Tehsil: Saraipali & District Mahasamund and make payment of crop insurance claim amount within a period of 45 days, Rs.7,000/- for mental harassment, and ₹3,000/- for litigation costs. The said amount was to carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint till the date of payment. 6. The petitioner preferred First Appeal (FA No. 53/2024) before the Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Raipur, which modified the order on 20.06.2024 and directed that the petitioner and the bank shall pay the amount jointly and severally. 7. The petitioner filed a revision petition (Revision Petition No. 2759/2024) before the Commission, New Delhi, with a delay ranging between 27 to 31 days. The learned Commission rejected the application for condonation of delay on the ground that complaints under the Consumer Protection Act are to be decided in a time-bound manner, and condoning delay without sufficient cause would defeat the spirit and objective of the Act. 8. The Commission further held that the application for condonation of delay did not assign sufficient reasons to justify the delay. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner, being the implementing agency, was not liable, and the responsibility to pay compensation rested with Respondent No.2/Bank. He contended that the delay of 27 to 31 days was sufficiently explained. He further 4 submitted that the delay occurred due to the time required for the translation of documents from Hindi to English and for procuring relevant documents. He argued that the learned Commission ought to have taken a liberal view while considering the application for condonation of delay. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 11. Admittedly, the crop was insured with the petitioner, and the premium was deducted by Respondent No.2/Bank from the bank account of the complainant. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and Respondent No.2 paid more compensation to other farmers of village Chiwri, but Respondent No.1 was not paid compensation amount for his alleged crop loss. Respondent No.1 filed a complaint before the District Consumer Forum, which was partly allowed. The petitioner preferred an appeal, which was dismissed but Respondent No.2 was also held jointly and severally liable. A revision petition was preferred by the petitioner before the Commission, New Delhi, with a delay ranging from 27 to 31 days, whereas the limitation period to prefer a revision was 90 days. 12. In the application for condonation of delay, the petitioner stated that the delay occurred due to the translation of documents from Hindi to English and the time taken for procurement of relevant documents. However, the petitioner has not enclosed a copy of the application for condonation of delay with this petition. It is a well-settled principle of law that consumer complaints are to be decided in a time-bound manner. A litigant approaching the court for condonation of delay must properly explain the delay. Before the Commission, the petitioner failed 5 to properly explain the delay, and the reasons assigned were neither plausible nor acceptable. 13. The learned commission has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), wherein, it is held that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if the court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the order of the Consumer Forums. 14. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein- below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at 6 all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 15. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 7 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 16. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial 8 justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 17. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out 9 a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 19. Taking into consideration the reasons assigned by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay; the findings recorded by the learned Commission and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above-cited judgment, in my opinion, no case is made out for interference. 20. Accordingly, this writ petition is hereby dismissed at the admission stage itself. No cost(s) Sd/- Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Saurabh