1 2026:HHC:16334 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA LPA No. 637 of 2025 Date of decision: 12.05.2026 ________________________________________________________ Satpal & others ...Appellants Versus State of HP & others …Respondents ________________________________________________________ Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Sandhawalia, Chief Justice. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin C. Negi, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 ________________________________________________________ For the Appellants: Mr. Nishant Khidtta, Advocate for Mr. V.D. Khidtta, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Arsh Rattan, Deputy Advocate General. G.S. Sandhawalia , Chief Justice (Oral) The present appeal arises out of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 9976 of 2023, titled as Satpal & others Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others, dated 06.08.2025, whereby the learned Single Judge had chosen not to entertain the writ petition filed by the writ petitioners-appellants herein, on account of delay and laches. 1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 2. In the writ petition, challenge was to the Award (Annexure P-9), passed by the Labour Court in Reference Petition No. 64 of 2018, titled as Satpal & others Vs. The Director of Ayurveda & another, dated 31.07.2018, whereby the Labour Court had answered the Reference against the petitioners, while coming to the conclusion that the petitioners had failed to prove that their services were terminated by the respondents in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short ‘the Act’). The findings were recorded that the case of the petitioners fell within the exception as provided under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act and, therefore, the provisions of Chapter V-A of Act were held to be not applicable. 3. Apparently, the Award was passed on 31.07.2018 and the writ petition was filed on 20.10.2023, after a period of more than five years. Thus, the present appellants slept over the matter and did not choose to contest the Award by filing a writ petition within the prescribed period. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellants has tried to convince us that there were justifiable reasons 3 mentioned in the writ petition for not filing the writ petition within the prescribed period such as that the writ petitioners belong to a remote area of Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour and belong to under- privileged class and that they were getting meager salary and thus, the writ petition was thereafter filed by the writ petitioners after borrowing money from their friends. 5. We are not able to accept the arguments now being raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants, as there were as many as eight persons who had filed the Reference Petition before the Labour Court and it was not a case of solitary employee and Paonta Sahib as such cannot be said to be a far-flung area of District Sirmour and, rather it being situated in the plains, has better facilities than far-flung tribal areas in the State of Himachal Pradesh. 6. Apparently, the appellants were working as Class-IV employees in the Department of Ayurveda on job rated basis and they have worked in intervals and thus, the findings were recorded by the Labour Court 4 that they have not completed 240 days in a calender year. 7. The specific stand taken by the State in the reply to the claim petition was that the appellants were engaged purely on periodic basis for doing multifarious works like chopping of woods, filling, labelling of bottles, packing of medicines in boxes and polythene bags etc. and they were not required to work from 10.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. 8. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that it is the settled principle that all legal proceedings have to be challenged within the prescribed/reasonable period and on not doing so, a vested right accrues to the other side. Reference can be made to the recent judgment of the Apex Court in Shivamma (dead) by Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & others, reported in (2025) 4 Recent Civil Reports 134, whereby the whole case law as such was discussed regarding filing of belated appeal and the delay which had been condoned by the High Court while entertaining the Regular Second Appeal. Resultantly, plethora of judgments right from the year 5 1962 were considered as to whether such course of action was justified. Resultantly, It was held that the law of limitation was founded on public policy. The object of limitation was to put a quietus on stale and dead disputes and a person cannot be allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay and the parties cannot be allowed to resort to dilatory tactics. The object as such was not to destroy the rights of the parties, but life span as such has to be fixed for such remedy to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy, while relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123. 9. Thus, the fundamental principle that the law assists those, who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights, was highlighted. 10. Reference has also been made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, wherein the principle as such had been laid down that there should be a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented approach and 6 substantial justice being paramount and concept of liberal approach cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be kept in mind and that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. The right of remedy having not been exercised or availed for a long time, thus necessarily comes to an end or ceases to exist and the length of delay functions as a contextual indicator, but not a determinative factor. 11. The judgment in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & another, reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, was also referred to, whereby distinction was made while hearing the application for condonation of delay and sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay while giving reference of the landmark judgment of the Apex Court in Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and keeping in mind the fact that it had been held in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao & Ors, 7 reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, that the delay in governmental decision-making and the factum of bureaucratic difficulties which were in-built, could not be lost sight of. 12. Later, the reference was made to the judgment of the Apex Court in Government of Maharashtra, (Water Resources Department) represented by Executive Engineer VS. Executive Engineer Vs. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractor Pvt. Ltd., reported in  (2021) 6 SCC 460, wherein it was held that different yardsticks for condonation of delay cannot be laid down and eventually, it was held that one has to be diligent in prosecuting the matter and condonation is only exception to rule and delay cannot be granted merely on the ground of identity of the applicant. Resultantly, it was held that the delay of a period of almost eleven years would not be justified by the Corporation as such and whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay, be it at the instance of a private litigant or the State, the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts. Resultantly, the order of the High Court was set aside. The said 8 principles are thus directly applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. In the present cases, the appellants have been indolent and negligent in challenging the Award and the reason that merely on account of lack of resources, they could not challenge the award, cannot be accepted. If that was the position, they could have availed the service of the Legal Services Authority by approaching the said Authority at Paonta Sahib. 14. In these circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly exercised his powers in not interfering with the findings recorded by the Labour Court. Therefore, we do not find any plausible reason to hold that the order of the learned Single Judge suffers from any infirmity and thus, does not warrant any interference. 15. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (G.S. Sandhawalia) Chief Justice. May 12, 2026 (Bipin C. Negi) 9 (hemlata) Judge.