2026:HHC:1815 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No.79 of 2023 Decided on: 11.05.2026 Mohinder Singh (deceased) through his LRs & others .Appellants Versus Puran Chand (now deceased) through his LRs & others ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge Whether approved for reporting? For the appellants: Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate vice Mr.Sumeet Raj Sharma, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge (oral) The present appeal arises out of judgment and decree, as passed by learned Additional District Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Camp at Jawali, dated 26.11.2022, whereby the appeal preferred by the present appellants/defendants was dismissed and the judgment and decree as passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Jawali, District Kangra, dated 01.01.2020 was affirmed, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents for possession by way of Specific performance of agreement was decreed. 2 2026:HHC:1815 2. Brief facts of the case are that the deceased, Puran Chand, filed a suit for possession by way of Specific performance of an agreement of sell dated 06.06.2006. 3. It was averred in the plaint that defendant No.1 is real son of plaintiff's sister Shanti Devi. Defendant No.1 and his real brother Kartar Singh entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 06.06.2006 for selling their share in the suit land for a consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. The agreement was reduced in writing by Document Writer, Ramesh Chand, in Tehsil Complex, Jawali and it was duly witnessed by Sh. Nirmal Kumar (Up- Pardhan), Gram Panchayat, Jawali and Sh. Kushal Kumar son of Gurparshad of Jawali, District Kangra, HP. At the time of execution of said agreement, defendant No.1 received Rs.40,000/- and it was further agreed that remaining amount of Rs.60,000/- shall be paid by the plaintiff to him as per clause No.3 of the agreement dated 06.06.2016. The parties have agreed for the execution of sale deed pursuant to agreement on or before 06.06.2007. That plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of agreement. 4. The plaintiff who is real maternal uncle of the defendant No.1, requested him number of times to fulfill his part of agreement and to execute the sale deed in Tehsil Office upon 3 2026:HHC:1815 receipt of the remaining sale consideration. It has been further averred that other co-executant of the agreement dated 06.06.2006, namely, Kartar Singh has transferred his share in favour of the plaintiffs before 06.06.2007, so he has not been arrayed as a party defendant in the suit, as he has fulfilled his part of agreement. Notice was issued to defendant No.1 for the execution of the sale deed, but no action was taken by him for reasons best known to him. The plaintiff received revenue record from the Halqua Patwari in the 3rd week of June, 2007 and on receiving the same, he came to know that defendant No.1 has transferred his share to defendants No.2 & 3 by executing the sale deeds dated 12.02.2007 and 14.03.2007. Pursuant to the execution of said sale deeds, mutations No. 656 & 661 were wrongly attested against the plaintiff in collusion with the revenue authorities. It is further submitted that the plaintiff is still in possession of the suit land, which is ancestral property, and defendants No. 2 & 3 were fully aware of this fact. They were having the knowledge of execution of agreement, however, defendant No. 1 in collusion with other defendants executed the said sale deeds in order to harass the plaintiffs. 5. Therefore, it was prayed that decree for possession by way of specific performance be passed in favour of the plaintiff 4 2026:HHC:1815 and the sale deeds executed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 along with mutations No.656 and 661 be cancelled and declared as null and void. 6. The suit was contested by the defendants by filing separate written statements. Defendant No.1 raised preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, estoppel, locus standi etc. On merits, it was admitted that defendant No.1 and his brother Kartar Singh had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to sell their shares. It was averred that the sale was fixed for Rs.1,00,000/- per Kanal, therefore, the total sale consideration amount was settled at Rs.2,50,000/- as the land agreed to be sold was 2 Kanals 11 Marlas. It was admitted that defendant No.1 and his brother Kartar Singh received Rs.40,000/- and thus, defendant No.1 has received Rs.20,000/- as earnest money. When defendant No.1 fell seriously ill, he approached the plaintiff to make the payment of balance consideration and get the sale deed executed. However, the plaintiff failed/refused to pay the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.1,05,000/- to defendant No.1. Since he was in need of money, it compelled him to sell 5 marlas of land to the defendants No.2 and 3 to meet out his expenses as he was ill. It was further stated that the plaintiff was never ready to fulfill his 5 2026:HHC:1815 part of agreement because when plaintiff was asked to make him the balance payment, he refused to do so. It was stated that defendant No.1 is ready to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff for the remaining land at the rate of Rs.1,00,000/- per Kanal which was settled at the time of agreement. He has sold only 5 marlas of land under the compelling circumstances to defendants No.2 and 3. Further, it is submitted that defendant No.1 is ready to perform his part of agreement, but with a condition of settled rate of consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- per Kanal, which shall be paid by the plaintiff to defendant No.1. Therefore, defendant No.1 sought the dismissal of the suit. 7. Defendants No.2 and 3 filed separate written statement by raising various preliminary objections with respect to maintainability, cause of action, locus standi, estoppel etc. On merits, it was stated that the sale deeds have been executed by defendant No.1 in their favour and the said fact was well within the knowledge of the plaintiff. The plaintiff never raised any objection at the time of execution of the sale deeds. The mutations have rightly been attested after the execution of the sale deeds and thereafter both of the defendants are owners-in- possession of the suit land. Being the bonafide purchasers, they are owners-in-possession of the suit property. Sale deed No.162 6 2026:HHC:1815 dated 14.03.2007 and sale deed No.161 dated 14.03.2007 were duly registered in the office of sub registrar Jawali, District Kangra in which the land measuring 0-29-57 Hms and 0-00-20 Hms, measuring 0-00-19 Hms was sold to the defendants. Therefore, it was stated that being the bonafide purchasers, the suit filed by the plaintiff against them is not maintainable. 8. Learned trial Court framed the issues on 15.11.2007 and 06.12.2011 in the following manner: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of possession by way of Specific Performance of Agreement dated 06-06-2006, as claimed? OPP. 2 Whether Sale Deed dated 12-02-2007 bearing document No.87, Sale Deed dated 14-03-2007 bearing document No. 162 and Mutation No.656 & 661 are wrong, illegal, null & void, as claimed? OPP 2(A) Whether defendants No.2 & 3 are bonafide purchasers, value paid and without notice of the alleged claim of the plaintiff and are entitled to protect their rights U/S 41 of Transfer of Property Act? OPD 3 Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? 4. Whether suit of the plaintiff is without cause of action? OPD 5. Whether plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct from filing the present suit? OPD 6. Whether plaintiff has got no locus standi to sue? OPD 7 2026:HHC:1815 7. Whether plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and has suppressed the material facts before this Court? OPD 8. Relief. 9. Learned trial Court directed the respective parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions and vide its judgment and decree dated 01.01.2020 decreed the suit as filed by the plaintiff by passing a decree for specific performance of an agreement dated 06.06.2006 against defendant No.1 to execute and register a sale deed with respect to the suit land. Further, the sale deeds dated 12.02.2007 and 14.03.2007 along with mutation No.656 and 661 were declared wrong, illegal, null and void. 10. Feeling dissatisfied, defendants No.2 and 3 preferred an appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge (II), Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, Camp at Jawali on 17.02.2020. Learned first appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 26.11.2022 dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendants No.2 and 3 and affirmed the findings as returned by learned trail Court. 11. Still feeling dissatisfied, defendants No.2 and 3/appellants have approached this Court by filing the instant regular second appeal. 8 2026:HHC:1815 12. It is contended by Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellants, that the judgments and decrees as passed by learned Courts below, are erroneous and liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that it has come on record that appellants, being the bonafide purchasers, the suit filed by the plaintiff is neither maintainable nor decree for specific performance could have been passed in the present case. He further submits that the learned Courts below have wrongly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record. He submits that after accepting the appeal, the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent deserves to be dismissed. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate vice Mr.Sumeet Raj Sharma, Advocate, has defended the impugned judgments and decrees, as passed by learned Courts below. He submits that there are concurrent findings of fact as passed by learned Courts below, therefore, no interference is required in the present proceedings while invoking the provisions of Section 100 of CPC. He further submits that the learned Courts below have rightly decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff and in order to prejudice his rights, defendant No.1 has wrongly and illegally executed sale deeds in favour of defendants No.2 and 3, which are null, void and illegal and have rightly been quashed by 9 2026:HHC:1815 the learned trial Court and the said finding has rightly been affirmed by the learned first appellate Court. 14. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the case is finally heard at the admission stage on the following substantial question of law 1. Whether the findings of learned Courts below are perverse based on misreading of oral as well as documentary evidence, pleadings of the parties and drawing of wrong inference from the facts proved on record? 15. In the present case, the plaintiff late Shri Puran Chand had filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance of agreement/contract of sale deed dated 06.06.2006. It is the case of the plaintiff that by virtue of the said agreement, defendant No.1 had agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. As per the contents of the agreement, it was agreed that the sale deed was to be executed on or before 06.06.2007. The defendant No.1 along with his brother had agreed to sell the suit land in favour of the plaintiff. At time of execution of agreement, defendant No.1 and his brother had received a sum of Rs.40,000/- and the remaining sale consideration was agreed to be paid at the time of registration of sale deed. It is the further case of the plaintiff that 10 2026:HHC:1815 the other co-executant of the agreement dated 06.06.2006, namely, Kartar Singh has performed his part of agreement and has transferred his share in favour of the plaintiff on 06.06.2007. Since he fulfilled his part of agreement, therefore, he was not arrayed as party defendant in the present proceedings. The plaintiff had requested the defendant No.1 to perform his part of the agreement, but he failed to do so and in the third week of June 2007 when he went to the revenue authorities to obtain the revenue record and after receiving the said record, the plaintiff was surprised to know that defendant No.1 had executed sale deeds in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 on 12.02.2007 and 14.03.2007. On the basis of said sale deeds, mutation Nos.656 and 661 were entered and attested in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. 16. In order to corroborate his case, the plaintiff has examined Ramesh Chand, Document Writer as PW-1, who brought the record and has stated that he has seen the agreement Ext. PW-1/A written by him. He stated that the said agreement was written by him as per the directions of defendant No.1 Santosh Kumar, Kartar Singh and Shanti Devi daughter of Bhagya Singh. The said agreement was executed in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. He stated that second party 11 2026:HHC:1815 has received a sum of Rs.40,000/- from the plaintiff in the presence of the witnesses. The receipt of the same is Ext. PW- 1/B, which is written on the back side of the agreement. He stated that the parties had appended their signatures after admitting it to be correct and the same was witnessed by Nirmal Kumar and Kaushal Kumar, who appended their signatures in presence of the parties. He admitted that the agreement was executed for the sale and purchase of the land to the extent of 2 Kanals 11 Marlas of the land. He denied the suggestion that the agreement was not executed for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- rather, it was executed for sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/- per Kanal. 17. PW-2 Shri Kushal Chander has entered the witness box and admitted his signatures at place A & B of agreement dated 06.06.2006. He stated that defendant No.1 and Kartar Singh have executed an agreement for the sale of their land i.e. 2 Kanals and 11 Marlas in favour of the plaintiff for the consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. He stated that in their presence Rs.40,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. The agreement was written by PW-1, Ramesh Chand, Document Writer and the witnesses of the agreement were Nirmal Kumar and Kaushal Kumar. In the cross-examination, he denied that the deal was done for a sum of Rs.2,50,000/-. Self stated that the 12 2026:HHC:1815 agreement was executed for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. He stated that plaintiff Puran Chand asked him to become the witness of agreement. His signatures were obtained at different places of agreement and the signatures of the parties were also obtained. He admitted that Santosh Kumar and Kartar had not asked him to become a witness. This witness when asked was not aware that another registry was executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 on 14.03.2007 for the land measuring 0- 00-20 HMs. He admitted his signatures in Mark X under red circle as stamp vendor. 18. PW-3 is the statement of Nirmal Singh, who stepped into the witness box in order to corroborate the case of the plaintiff. In his testimony, he has deposed that the agreement dated 06.06.2006 Ext. PW-1/A and receipt Ext. PW-1/B were prepared in his presence and he has appended his signatures as a witness. He identified his signatures at places C and D and stated that the agreement was executed for a consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. Out of the said total amount, Rs.40,000/- was given in his presence. He further stated that the said document was written by PW-1 Ramesh Chand and the same was witnessed by Kaushal Kumar. He denied that in connivance with the purchaser, false agreement was prepared. He denied that 13 2026:HHC:1815 fraud was committed upon defendant No.1 to execute the agreement. In his cross-examination, he has deposed that the agreement was executed for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per Kanal and self stated that Rs.40,000/- was given and whole agreement was executed for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-. He stated that only Kartar Singh and Santosh Kumar were present at that time and no other person was present. 19. PW-4 is the statement of Krishan Gopal, who entered the witness box being the legal representative of original plaintiff Puran Chand. He filed his affidavit Ext. PW-4/A in which he has reiterated the contents of the plaint. During his cross-examination, he has stated that Santosh Kumar is the son of his aunt/Bua. He admitted that in disputed land Santosh, his brother and his mother Shanti Devi were having share but failed to depose their exact share. He admitted that Lal Chand has sold his share on the disputed land to defendants No.2 & 3 and others. He stated that defendant No.1 and his brother have sold 2 Kanals 11 Marlas land and that the agreement was executed with his father. Defendant No.1 and Kaushal Kumar came to their house and thereafter, they went to Tehsil for execution of agreement. He stated that the agreement was executed on 06.06.2006 and the date for the registry was written in agreement after one year of 14 2026:HHC:1815 the said agreement. He admitted that his father has given legal notice to execute the registry. He admitted that Santosh Kumar had transferred his share through registry vide document Mark X dated 14.03.2007 in faovur of defendant No.3. 20. In order to rebut the case of the plaintiff, defendant No.1, Santosh Kumar, entered the witness box and reiterated the averments as made in the written statement. In his cross- examination, he has specifically admitted his signatures and of his brother Kartar Singh over Ext. PW-1/A and Ext. PW-1/B. He has admitted that he has appended his signatures on 06.06.2006. He also admitted that the agreement was executed by them with the original plaintiff Puran Chand. He admitted that as per agreement his brother executed a sale deed in favour of Puran Chand, the original plaintiff, and further admitted that the agreement was written by Document Writer, Ramesh Chand and the same was witnessed by Nirmal and Kaushal. He has admitted the fact that out of Rs.1,00,000/-, he and his brother has received Rs.40,000/- on 06.06.2006. He has admitted that he has not executed the sale deed as per the agreement. Self stated that due to the less money in the agreement, he has not executed the registry. Further stated that after the execution of the agreement, he has executed sale deed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 on 15 2026:HHC:1815 12.02.2007 and 14.03.2007. He admitted that defendants No.2 and 3 are the residents of the same place where the suit land is situated. He has admitted the fact that they have inherited the suit land from their maternal grandfather. He admitted the fact that the plaintiff was already in possession of the suit land. He stated that due to the marriage of his daughter, under compelling circumstances, he has sold the land. He admitted that after the agreement he was not having any right to sell the land. He stated that after the execution of the agreement, the rates of the land have become high. Self stated that he went twice before the plaintiff, but the plaintiff has not given money to him. He admitted that the witnesses of the agreement are Nirmal Singh and Mohinder Singh and that Nirmal Singh was also the witness of sale deed dated 14.03.2007. 21. Sh. Roshan Singh (Defendant No.-2) has stepped into witness box as DW-2 and filed his affidavit Ex. DW-2/A in his examination-in-chief. He has deposed that he has purchased suit land vide sale deed 47 dated 12.02.2007 for consideration of amount of Rs.1,12,000/- from Santosh Kumar, which was duly registered with Registrar, Jawali. Further deposed that above sale deed was executed by Santosh Kumar in the presence of witnesses on account of free will and wish. Further deposed that 16 2026:HHC:1815 after due execution of the sale deed, necessary mutation was attested in favour of the defendant. He has stated that he is the bonafide purchaser as he has paid whole consideration amount and his rights are protected under section 41 of the Transfer of the Property Act. He deposed that the defendant No.1 executed two sale deeds vide document number 161 and 162 dated 14.03.2007 in favour of defendant No.3. He has stated the plaintiff has no concern with the suit land. He deposed that plaintiff is the real nephew of the defendant Santosh Kumar. He denied that he was having knowledge of the agreement dated 06.06.2006. 22. DW-3 is the statement of Mohinder Singh (defendant No.3). He filed his affidavit Ext. DW-3/A in his examination-in-chief and reiterated the averments as made in the written statement. In his cross-examination, he has admitted the fact that the sale deed was executed in his favour after the execution of agreement dated 06.06.2006. He deposed that he belongs to village Kehrian and he admitted that the suit land is joint between the plaintiff, Santosh and Kartar. He stated that he is not aware that on 06.06.2006, agreement Ext. PW-1/A was executed for the sale of the land in favour of the plaintiff. He stated that Puran Chand is the owner that is why he was in possession and in this regard he has not separately inquired anything. Admitted the fact that 17 2026:HHC:1815 Santosh Kumar never took him to the suit land. He denied that he was not aware about the fact that at the time of execution of sale deed Santosh Kumar was not having any right to sell the land. 23. DW-4 is the statement of Anju Lata, who came to the witness box as Registration Clerk of Tehsil Office, Jawali). She brought the record as per which on 12.02.2007 Santosh Kumar and Desh Raj had sold land for consideration of Rs.1,12,000/-. Further, she deposed that registry document number 87 dated 12.02.2007 Ext. PW-3/A is correct as per the original. She stated that on 14.03.2007 Santosh Kumar had sold the land for consideration of Rs.18,000/- and the copy of document number 162 is correct as per the original. 24. DW-5 is the statement of Rashpal Singh. He was the Pradhan of village Panchayat Lahru. He deposed that Santosh, Desh Raj and Roshan Lal are known to him. On 12.02.2007, Santosh Kumar and Desh Raj have sold their land in favour of Roshan Lal for a sale consideration of Rs.1,12,000/-. He stated that the said registry was written by document writer Ramesh as per the directions of Santosh and Desh Raj in favour of Roshan Singh. Deposed that money was handed over in presence of Registrar and possession was delivered at the spot. He deposed that Roshan Singh was already the co-sharer of the suit land and 18 2026:HHC:1815 they all put their signatures after admitting the registry to be true. In the cross-examination, he has stated that he is not aware that on 06.06.2006 Santosh had executed an agreement in favour of the plaintiff Puran Chand. He admitted that sale deed is the subsequent to the agreement. 25. DW-7 is the statement of Dharam Singh. He stated that on 14.03.2007 defendant No.1 sold land in favour of Mohinder Singh for a consideration amount of Rs.18,000/-. He stated that he has written the sale deed as per the directions of Santosh Kumar, defendant No.1. The sale deed was written in the presence of Santosh, Mohinder and witnesses Nirmal Singh and Ram Lal. The sale deed was registered in his register at Serial No.55. He further stated that Nirmal Singh and Ram Lal put their signatures at Place C and C1. He deposed that his signatures are present under red circle D of Ext. PW-3/B. He admitted that the sale deed is correct. During his cross-examination, he has admitted that the parties of the sale deed before the execution had not disclosed anything about the agreement. 26. A perusal of agreement Ext. PW-1/A, which was executed on 06.06.2006, reveals that defendant No.1 agreed to sell the suit land in favour of plaintiff for a sale consideration of Rs.1,00,000/-. It has come in the evidence that the defendant and 19 2026:HHC:1815 his brother had received a sum of Rs.40,000/- as part of sale consideration from the plaintiff and the said fact was witnessed by PW-2 Kaushal Chander and PW-3 Nirmal Singh. Both of them had admitted their signatures over the agreement. The document writer, PW-1 Ramesh Chand has corroborated the case of the plaintiff along with witness PW-2 and PW-3. 27. The only defence, as has been taken by defendant No1, is that the agreement is the result of misrepresentation. However, the defendants have failed to establish any misrepresentation in the pleadings and evidence. In order to prove his case, defendant No.1 Santosh Kumar (DW-1) has entered the witness box. He had admitted that he and his brother have appended their signatures on Ext. PW-1/A. It has also come on record that the brother of defendant No.1, Kartar Singh, had transferred his share in favour of the plaintiff on 06.06.2006. Therefore, he performed his part of the agreement. The defence which has been taken by defendant No.1 is that the parties had agreed to sell the land for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per Kanal. It is the case of the defendant No.1 that since he was in dire need of money due to illness, he sold the land to defendants No.2 and 3. In the cross-examination, he told a different story, stating that he required the money for the marriage of his daughter. It has come 20 2026:HHC:1815 on record that the brother of defendant No.1, who also agreed to sell the land in favour of the plaintiff, had executed sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant has failed to prove and establish any misrepresentation or fraud of any kind. The plaintiff has been able to establish the due execution of the agreement. Therefore, the learned Courts below have rightly decreed the suit as filed by the plaintiff. 28. Regarding the execution of sale deeds dated 12.02.2007 and 14.03.2007 which have been placed on record Ext. PW-1/A, it has come on record that the defendants did not inquire about the execution of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No.1. It has neither been pleaded nor proved that any inquiry was conducted by the defendants in order to verify about the execution of the agreement in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No.3 has admitted in his deposition that the plaintiff, Puran Chand, was in possession of the suit land and that he has separately inquired about it. Once there is admission that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit land, it clinches the entire controversy, it leads to an inference that the defendants were well aware of the execution of the agreement and in order to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, the sale deeds dated 12.02.2007 and 14.03.2007 have been executed. DW-3 in his deposition has 21 2026:HHC:1815 admitted that defendant No.1 never took him to the suit land. This suggests that the defendants did not act in good faith and they did not inquire about the fate of the suit land qua which agreement to sell Ext. PW-1/A was entered between the parties. 29. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that in order to prove the plea of bonafide purchaser, it is incumbent upon such purchaser to establish and prove that due diligence was conducted and appropriate steps were taken to inquire about the status of the suit land. In the present case, there is admission on the part of DW-3, Mohinder Singh, wherein he has stated that he had not inquired about the suit land by saying that no one visits the land which is about to be purchased. DW-3 has categorically admitted that the plaintiff, Puran Chand, was in possession of the suit land at the time of purchase. Now, therefore, the question arises that why was defendant No.1 not confronted by said defendant No.3 about the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. Defendants No.2 and 3 have failed to discharge the onus which lies upon them to prove that they are the bonafide purchasers. Therefore, the learned courts below have rightly determined the point in controversy by passing the decree of possession by means of specific performance of 22 2026:HHC:1815 agreement, and by declaring the sale deeds in favour of defendants No.2 and 3 and further mutations to be null and void. 30. The findings of facts as recorded by learned Courts below do not call for any interference especially in view of the judgment as passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521, wherein it has been held as under: “10. This Court, time without number, pointed out that interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciating the evidence just to replace the findings for the lower courts. 20. In our considered view the lower Appellate Court has fairly appreciated the evidence in the above background and has reached the conclusion that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re- appreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the First Appellate Court was based on no material.” 31. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others (1997) 5 SCC 438 has held as under: “10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case even at the 23 2026:HHC:1815 initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a later point of time, when the Court exercises its jurisdiction under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 C.P.C in formulating the substantial question of law, the opposite party should be put on notice thereon and should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to hear the appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court; and even after the formulation of the substantial question of law, if a fair or proper opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it will amount to denial of natural justice. The above parameters within which the High Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to state that the above aspects are seldom borne in mind in many cases and second appeals are entertained and/or disposed of, without conforming to the above discipline. 11. The guidelines to determine as to what is a "substantial question of law" within the meaning of Section 100 CPC, have been laid down by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd There is also a later decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India3. It is unnecessary to deal at length with that aspect any further.” 32. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 24 2026:HHC:1815 “5. It is not within the domain of the High court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court, in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 33. In Naresh and others vs. Hemant and others, (2022) 18 SCC 802, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “10. The High Court invoked the presumption without proper consideration and appreciation of the facts considered and dealt with by two courts holding by reasoned conclusions why the presumption stood rebutted on the facts. The High Court also committed an error of record by holding that there was no evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole 25 2026:HHC:1815 alone had constructed the house, a finding patently contrary to the admission of PW-1 in his evidence. The fact that mutation also was done in the name of Trimbakrao Ingole alone which remain unchallenged at any time was also not noticed. The conclusion of the High Court that improper appreciation of evidence amounted to perversity is completely unsustainable. No finding has been arrived at that any evidence had been admitted contrary to the law or that a finding was based on no evidence only in which circumstance the High Court could have interfered in the second appeal. 2. The High Court therefore manifestly erred by interfering with the concurrent findings on facts by two courts below in exercise of powers under Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, a jurisdiction confined to substantial questions of law only. Merely because the High Court may have been of the opinion that the inferences and conclusions on the evidence were erroneous, and that another conclusion to its satisfaction could be drawn, cannot be justification for the High Court to have interfered. 12. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa, (1964) 2 SCR 673, this court with regard to the scope for interference in a second appeal with facts under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code observed as follows: “12. ….The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which courts of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a 26 2026:HHC:1815 party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the courts of fact to contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal. Sometimes, this position is expressed by saying that like all questions of fact, sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a case is also left to the jury for its verdict. This position has always been accepted without dissent and it can be stated without any doubt that it enunciates what can be properly characterised as an elementary proposition. Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by s. 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, 27 2026:HHC:1815 must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid.” 13. Though precedents abound on this settled principle of law, we do not consider it necessary to burden our discussion unnecessarily except to rely further on Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546, holding as follows: “71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law. xxxx 28 2026:HHC:1815 73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100. xxxx 81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallised by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs.” 29 2026:HHC:1815 14. The order of the High Court interfering with concurrent findings of facts by two courts is, therefore, held to be unsustainable in exercise of the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The order of the High Court is consequently set aside. The orders dated 06.03.1998 and 13.06.2002 of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are restored. The suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. The present appeal is allowed.” 34. In Brij Narayan Shukla (dead )through legal representatives vs. Sudesh Kumar Alias Suresh Kumar (dead) through Legal Representatives and others, (2024) 2 SCC 590, the Hon’ble Supeme Court held as under: “10.2 The High Court was hearing the Second Appeal under section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it having reappreciated the findings to disturb findings of fact, committed an error.” 35. In Civil Apepal No.5131 of 2025, titled as R. Nagaraj (dead) through LRs and another vs. Rajmani and others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “7. By the impugned judgment and order and without answering anything on the substantial questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely in a casual manner, the High Court has allowed the Second Appeal and has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and thereafter has remanded the matter to the learned trial Court 30 2026:HHC:1815 permitting the original plaintiff to amend the plaint and pray for fixation of the boundary. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is not appreciable at all. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has exercised the powers as if the High Court was deciding the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has not appreciated at all that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and that too against the concurrent findings of fact by both the courts below, which were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on record. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.11. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the High Court was dealing with the Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. Neither at the stage of deciding the suit nor even before the first Appellate Court even such a prayer was made to amend the plaint, which is now permitted by the High Court, despite the fact that earlier in the suit during the course of trial, the plaint was amended. Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.” 31 2026:HHC:1815 36. Both the learned Courts below have rightly determined the point in controversy concurrently and there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below. 37. No other point urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 38. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 39. In view of above discussions, the present appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. ( Romesh Verma ) Judge May 11, 2026 (vt)