2026:HHC:16770 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MP(M) No. 497 of 2026 Reserved on: 08.05.2026 Date of Decision: 14.05.2026. Mukul Bhardwaj …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr Vikram Thakur, Legal Aid Counsel. For the Respondent/State: Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 282 of 2025, dated 22.11.2025, registered at Police Station Sadar, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 21, 27A and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act and Sections 221 and 132 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:16770 2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police party was present at Bhatti Nala near Sultanpur-Chamba- Pathankot, NH-154A on 22.11.2025 at about 7 AM. They were checking the vehicles when they received secret information that one Binta Mahajan and her son Aryan Mahajan were indulging in the sale/purchase of heroin. A huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching their house. The police reduced the information into writing and went towards the house of Binta Mahajan. They joined one independent witness on the way. Aryan Mahajan was present in his home. The police searched the house and recovered one electronic weighing machine, two burnt foil papers, one folded and burnt ₹20 currency note, and one syringe. Binta Mahajan came to the spot and raised a hue and cry. One lady was bolted inside the room. The room was opened, and a polythene bag was recovered containing numerous foil papers and small packets containing 20.65 grams of heroin. The police checked the accounts of Binta and Aryan Mahajan and found that the petitioner had made a financial transaction of ₹98,960/- in their account. The police arrested the petitioner based on these transactions. The allegations against the petitioners are false. The investigation has been completed, and custodial 3 2026:HHC:16770 interrogation of the petitioner is not required. No recovery of contraband was effected from the petitioner. The petitioner is ready and willing to abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police were checking the vehicles on 22.11.2015. They received secret information that Binta Mahajan and her son Aryan Mahajan were selling heroin, and a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered by searching their house. The information was sent to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Chamba, who issued an authorisation letter. The police joined Seema Kumari and Mahender Kumar and went to the house of Binta Mahajan. The police found Aryan Mahajan in the house. The police searched the house and recovered an electronic weighing machine, two burnt foil papers, one burnt and one folded currency note of ₹20/- and one syringe. Binta Mahajan also came to the spot. The police conducted a further search of the house and recovered 14 mobile phones, jewellery, 20.65 grams of heroin, and ₹2,33,377/- in cash. The police seized all these articles and arrested the occupants. The police checked 4 2026:HHC:16770 their accounts and found that various persons, including the petitioner, had transferred the money to their accounts. The police arrested those persons, including the petitioner. The investigation revealed that Swati Mahajan, Binta and Aryan Mahajan had sold the heroin to Mukul Bhardwaj (petitioner), Saurav, Sachin, Ankush, Rajesh, Karan, Suraj, Kirpal, Vinod Kumar and other persons. There were financial transactions between them. They were in constant touch with each other. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on 20.1.2026. The prosecution has cited 41 witnesses. The petitioner had transferred ₹69,920/- between 21.08.2024 and 31.08.2025 in the joint account of Aryan and Binta Mahajan. FIR No. 35 of 2025, dated 16.04.2025, has been registered against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 21 and 25 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his release on bail. The statement of any witness has not been recorded, and the petitioner would influence the witnesses. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5 2026:HHC:16770 4. I have heard Mr Vikram Thakur, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State. 5. Mr Vikram Thakur, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he has been falsely implicated. There is no material against the petitioner except the financial transaction between him and Aryan and Binta Mahajan. The police had not recovered any contraband from the petitioner, and the petitioner should not be detained in custody merely because of some financial transactions. The co-accused have already been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Kirpal Singh versus State of H.P. 2026:HHC:8823 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had purchased heroin from Aryan and Binta Mahajan, which is evident from the transfer of money to their account. The heroin 6 2026:HHC:16770 is adversely affecting society, and no leniency should be shown to the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: (i) Broad principles for the grant of bail 56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9) “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being. [Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 7 2026:HHC:16770 9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied) 57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8) “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied) 8 2026:HHC:16770 58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3) “3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied) 59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors 9 2026:HHC:16770 which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9) “9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied) xxxxxxx 62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35) 10 2026:HHC:16770 “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis supplied) 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308: 2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 11 2026:HHC:16770 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. The status report mentions that the police checked the bank accounts of the main accused and found that the petitioner had transferred various amounts to the main accused. This is not sufÏcient to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Amal E vs State of Kerala 2023:KER:39393 that financial transactions are not sufÏcient to connect the accused with the commission of a crime. It was observed: “From the perusal of the case records, it can be seen that, apart from the aforesaid transactions, there is nothing to show the involvement of the petitioners. It is true that the documents indicate the monetary transactions between the petitioners and some of the accused persons, but the question that arises is whether the said transactions were in connection with the sale of Narcotic drugs. To establish the same, apart from the confession statements of the accused, there is nothing. However, as it is an aspect to be established during the trial, I do not intend to enter into any finding at this stage, but the said aspect is sufÏcient to record the satisfaction of the conditions contemplated under section 37 of the NDPS Act, as the lack of such materials evokes a reasonable doubt as to the involvement of the petitioner.” 12. The police also relied upon the call detail record to conclude that the petitioner had talked to the co-accused. This is 12 2026:HHC:16770 also not sufÏcient. It was laid down by this Court in Dinesh Kumar @ Billa Versus State of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4564, that the phone calls are not sufÏcient to deny bail to a person. It was laid down by this Court in Saina Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh 2022 Law Suit (HP) 211 that where the police have no material except the call details record and the disclosure statement of the co-accused, the petitioner cannot be kept in custody. It was observed: - “[16] In the facts of the instant case, the prosecution, for implicating the petitioner, relies upon firstly the confessional statement made by accused Dabe Ram and secondly the CDR details of calls exchanged between the petitioner and the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram. Taking into consideration the evidence with respect to the availability of CDR details involving the phone number of the petitioner and the mobile phone number of the wife of co-accused Dabe Ram, this Court had considered the existence of a prima facie case against the petitioner and had rejected the bail application as not satisfying the conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. [17] Since the existence of CDR details of the accused person(s) has not been considered as a circumstance sufÏcient to hold a prima facie case against the accused person(s), in Pallulabid Ahmad's case (supra), this Court is of the view that the petitioner has made out a case for maintainability of his successive bail application as also for grant of bail in his favour. [18] Except for the existence of CDRs and the disclosure statement of the co-accused, no other material appears to have been collected against the petitioner. The disclosure made by the co-accused cannot be read against the petitioner as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tofan Singh Vs State of Tamil Nadu, 2021 4 SCC 1. 13 2026:HHC:16770 Further, on the basis of the aforesaid elucidation, the petitioner is also entitled to the benefit of bail. 13. A similar view was taken by this Court in Dabe Ram vs. State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 1894 of 2023, decided on 01.09.2023, Parvesh Saini vs State of H.P., Cr.MP(M) No. 2355 of 2023, decided on 06.10.2023 and Relu Ram vs. State of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 1061 of 2023, decided on 15.05.2023. 14. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be prima facie connected to the commission of a crime merely because of financial transactions and call detail records. 15. The police have also added Section 27A of the NDPS Act, which deals with the financing of the drugs. The term financing was explained by the Bombay High Court in Rhea Chakraborty v. Union of India 2021 Cr LJ 248 as under: - “66. Section 27A is much wider if sub-clause (iv) of Sec- tion 2(viiia) is taken into account. This sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(viiia) takes in its sweep all the remaining activi- ties which are not mentioned in sub-clauses (i),(ii) & (iii). This covers just about every activity that can be described as dealing in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The interpretation of Section 27A should not be stretched to the extent of rendering the classification of sentences depending on the quantities in penal Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 otiose. 67. Sub-clause (viiia) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act is an inclusive definition. The inclusive part mentions 14 2026:HHC:16770 financing, abetting, conspiring and harbouring. The financing and harbouring parts are specifically made punishable under Section 27A. 68. The activities mentioned in Section 2(viiia)(iii) and Section 8(c) refer to sale, purchase, export, import, etc. All these activities involve monetary transactions. For every sale or purchase, there can be a use of money. But that will not mean that either of the parties has “financed” the transaction. Such sales and purchases are separately prohibited and made punishable under Section 8(c), read with Section 20 and other similar Sections. Therefore, “financing” is something more than just paying for purchases and other activities involving contraband as defined under Section 8(c). Contravention of that Section and indulging in activities mentioned in Sections 20, 21, 22 and 23 incur punishment depending on the quantity of the contraband. 69. For interpreting Section 27A harmoniously with the Scheme of the Act and other Sections, it is necessary to go to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for incorporating this Section in the Act w.e.f. 29.5.1989. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1989 Amendment, which is reproduced hereinbefore, mentions that India was facing a problem of transit trafÏc in illicit drugs. The spillover from such trafÏc was causing problems of abuse and addiction. Therefore, a need was felt to amend the Law to further strengthen it. 70. Thus, the aim was to control the trafÏc in illicit drugs as the spillover from such trafÏc was causing problems of abuse and addiction. The Legislature wanted to attack the basic cause of the illicit trafÏc of drugs. The prohibitory Section 8 already existed at that time. Therefore, a separate Section 27A was introduced to check these activities, which were the root cause of illicit trafÏc. “Financing” and “harbouring” such activities were, therefore, specifically mentioned under Section 27A. 71. “Financing” is not defined under the Act. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word “finance” as “(1) the 15 2026:HHC:16770 management of (esp. public) money, (2) monetary support for an enterprise, (3) (in pl.) the money resources of a state, company, or person, to provide capital for (a person or enterprise)”. 72. Black's Law Dictionary gives the meaning of the word “finance” as “to raise or provide funds”. 73. Thus, “financing” as generally understood is offering monetary support or providing funds. 74. Therefore, simply providing money for a particular transaction or other transactions will not be financing of that activity. Financing will have to be interpreted to mean to provide funds for either making that particular activity operational or for sustaining it. It is the financial support that directly or indirectly causes the existence of such illicit trafÏc. The word “financing” would necessarily refer to some activities involving illegal trade or business 75. The allegations against the Applicant of spending money in procuring drugs for Sushant Singh Rajput will not, therefore, mean that she had financed illicit trafÏc.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Thus, the purchase of the drugs will not amount to financing, and the petitioner cannot be prima facie held liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 27A of the NDPS Act. 17. There is no other material to connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime. 18. It was submitted that the petitioner was involved in the commission of a similar offence, and he would indulge in the commission of a crime if released on bail. The criminal 16 2026:HHC:16770 antecedents would have been material had the prosecution brought any material to show the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the crime. Since there is insufÏcient material at this stage; therefore, the petitioner cannot be detained in custody simply because he has criminal antecedents. 19. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions: - (I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever. (II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments. (III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court. (IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and (V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from 17 2026:HHC:16770 the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change. 20. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail. 21. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent, District Jail, Chamba, District Chamba, HP and the learned Trial Court by FASTER. 22. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th May, 2026 (Nikita) CHANDER SHEKHAR Digitally signed by CHANDER SHEKHAR Date: 2026.05.14 14:46:54 +0000