APHC010157792026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE 7 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 925/2026 BETWEEN: 1. SINGAREDDY VENKATA SATISH KUMAR REDDY, S/o. S. MADHUSUDHANA REDDY AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, OCC CONTRACTOR, R/o.VAIMPALLI TOWN AND MANDAL, KADPA DISTRICT. 1. RACHAMALLU RAMA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, OCC: CULTIVATION, R/o. PULIVENDULA TOWN AND MANDAL, KADAPA DISTRICT. Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the circumstances stated in the ground may be pleased to allow the Revision by setting aside the orders dated 27-11-2025 passed in I.A. No. 1880/2025 in O.S. No. 13/2017 on the file of Principal District Judge, Kadapa, and consequently dismiss I.A. No. 11/2019 and pass such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioner: 1. RAMALAKSHMANA REDDY SANEPALLI Counsel for the Respondent: 1. J JANAKIRAMI REDDY The Court made the following: IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) FRIDAY, THE 7th DAY OF AUGUST 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 925/2026 SINGAREDDY VENKATA SATISH KUMAR REDDY, S/o. S. MADHUSUDHANA REDDY AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, OCC CONTRACTOR, R/o.VAIMPALLI TOWN AND MANDAL, KADPA …PETITIONER AND RACHAMALLU RAMA CHANDRA REDDY, S/o. JAYARAMI REDDY, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, OCC: CULTIVATION, R/o. PULIVENDULA TOWN AND MANDAL, KADAPA DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be pleased to allow the Revision by setting aside the orders dated 2025 passed in I.A. No. 1880/2025 in O.S. No. 13/2017 on the file of Principal District Judge, Kadapa, and consequently dismiss I.A. such other order or orders. Counsel for the Petitioner: RAMALAKSHMANA REDDY SANEPALLI Counsel for the Respondent: J JANAKIRAMI REDDY The Court made the following: [3330] THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO SINGAREDDY VENKATA SATISH KUMAR REDDY, S/o. S. MADHUSUDHANA REDDY AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, OCC CONTRACTOR, R/o.VAIMPALLI TOWN AND MANDAL, KADPA …PETITIONER CHANDRA REDDY, S/o. JAYARAMI REDDY, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, OCC: CULTIVATION, R/o. PULIVENDULA TOWN AND MANDAL, KADAPA DISTRICT. ...RESPONDENT Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that s filed herein, the High Court may be pleased to allow the Revision by setting aside the orders dated 2025 passed in I.A. No. 1880/2025 in O.S. No. 13/2017 on the file of Principal District Judge, Kadapa, and consequently dismiss I.A. 2 ORDER: The present Civil Revision Petition is filed against order dated 27.11.2025 in I.A. No.1880 of 2023 in O.S. No.13 of 2017, on the file of the Principal District Judge, Kadapa. The respondent herein who is the plaintiff filed suit for recovery of money basing upon the promissory note dated 18.07.2013 and the said Suit was posted to 17.04.2018 for recording of plaintiff’s exparte evidence and the petitioner/defendant remained exparte on 11.08.2017. The respondent/plaintiff has not attended the Court on 17.04.2018 and the Suit was dismissed for non- prosecution/default on 17.04.2018. 2. The respondent/plaintiff filed I.A. No.1880 of 2023 to condone the delay of 1983 days in filing the restoration petition under Order IX, Rule 9 of CPC stating that the suit was posted to 17.04.2018 for recording plaintiff’s exparte evidence, though the chief affidavit was prepared, he was unable to attend the Court to depose before the Court, as he suffered from Prolapse Interventebine Disc 2, 3-4, 4-5, which resulted in severe pain in low back and he was not able to do his regular work and confined to bed only, later, he was affected with Covid19. As such, the delay of 1983 days was occurred in filing the application to set aside the exparte order, under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC. And further stated that there was mediation has taken place, in fact the defendant promised to pay money within a shorter time and the defendant has not keep his 3 promise, this is also one of circumstances for delay in filing application under order IX, Rule 9 CPC. Under the aforesaid reasons it is prayed to condone the delay of 1983 days in filing application under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC. 3. To the extent of this pleading, the respondent/plaintiff was examined Doctor of Pragathi Orthopedic and General Hospital and he examined one G. Ramgopal Reddy who acted as mediator. The trial Court Judge after considering the evidence of the witnesses examined by the petitioner/respondent has condoned the delay of 1983 days, on payment of cost of Rs.5,000/- i.e. payable to DAC. 4. The present Civil Revision Petition filed by the petitioner/defendant aggrieved by the order dated 27.11.2025 in I.A. No.1880 of 2023 in O.S. No.13 of 2017, on the file of the Principal District Judge, Kadapa, on the underlying cause that was assigned by the respondent/plaintiff is not just and sufficient reason for condonation of delay and the cause is invented and the learned trial Court erroneously allowed the application and therefore prayed to set aside the order dated 27.11.2025. 5. Whether the learned trial Court Judge is right in condoning the delay of 1983 days in the event, that cause raised by Plaintiff is a sufficient cause?. 4 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others v. the Special Deputy Collector (LA)1 , in the said case, the High Court has dismissed the application filed for condonation of delay. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that there is no occasion for interference with the discretion so exercised by the High Court for the reasons recorded. The reason that stated is that the deceased is survived with one son and two daughters, the elder who was living in her matrimonial home and she has no knowledge about the case, one of the grandson has visited the office of Land Acquisition Officer for obtaining submersion certificate to secure job, then he came to know about the dismissal of reference. Both the High Court, Apex Court has not accepted as a just and sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 7. And also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India & anr., v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (DP through his LR2. Wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court by extracting the observation made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathapur Nafar Academy & Others reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, which is extracted hereunder: 1 (2024) 12 SCC 336 2 (2024) SCC OnLine SC 489 5 "21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3. (ii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 6 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 7 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and the vital test is, whether the party is diligent in prosecuting the case. 9. Hence, prayed to allow the Civil Revision Petition and to set aside the impugned order dated 27.11.2025. 8 10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff inter alia supporting the order of the trial Court stated that the petitioner is vigilant and diligent in prosecuting his case, due to ill health he was unable to file application within time and he was affected with the covid-19 and in spite of that he remarked that there was a mediation has taken place, with no sign of progress as such the delay was caused. Therefore, prayed to dismiss the Civil Revision Petition and relied on the judgment in the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy3, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has enumerated the following guidelines: (1) Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. (2) Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to 3 (1998) 7 SCC 123 9 dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. It is observed that the law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation) (3) The Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. (4) It must be remember that in every cause of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. 11. Recently, the Supreme Court, in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board (2025 INSC 1104), after referring the earlier all its judgments on the subject "sufficient cause", held and observed as follows: "that, the phrase "sufficient cause" is an expression of elastic import, incapable of precise definition, yet not without boundaries. Its purpose is to empower courts to advance the cause of justice by preventing genuine litigants from being shut out on account of unavoidable delays. At the same time, it is equally clear that the phrase is not charter for indolence or a device to revive stale claims that the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes. The Supreme Court has further observed that, the burden to establish the sufficient cause lies upon the parties seeking condonation and court must be satisfied that the cause is real, Bonafide 10 and free of negligence. The sufficiency of the cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the undefined conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite parties. The courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction or casual indifference. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity but rather by judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where the explanation is bona fide, plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where the negligence, want of good faith or casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The Supreme Court further on the subject "length of delay" held and observed that, the length of delay is immaterial and what matter is acceptability of explanation as the decisive factor is the adequacy of the cause shown, not the length of delay. What is critical is whether the party seeking condonation acted with reasonable diligence during the prescribed period and whether the reasons advanced demonstrate a genuine inability to file within time." 12. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant took a loan of Rupees ten lakhs by executing a promissory note in the year 2013. When substantial justice is pitted against technical justice, substantial justice should prevail. 11 13. As per the guidelines that enumerated in Balakrishnan case referred supra, once the trial Court has accepted the explanation as sufficient, normally the revisional Court should not disturb such finding. 14. The petitioner/defendant filed counter affidavit in I.A. No.1880 of 2025 and asserted that there is no mediation in between the plaintiff and the defendant as alleged. The witness stated that he acted as a mediator, but he cannot remember the date. The Doctor who was examined as witness stated that he treated the plaintiff. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion vested in the Court in condoning the delay as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court. This Court should be vigilant while exercising powers under Article 227, this Court should not interfere with the discretion so exercised by the trial Court for the reasons recorded. And the money involved in the present suit is more than ten lakhs in 2013. 15. Hence, this Court see no flaw in the impugned order. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. However, no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any, pending in this civil revision petition shall stand closed. __________________________________ JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO Date: 07.08.2026 Harin 12 146 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO C.P.No. 925 OF 2026 Date: 07-08-2026 Harin