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2026 DAILYLAW 7860 (CHH)

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH v. DEVDAS MANIKPURI

ACQA/100/2023 · 2026-04-22

Shri Sanjay Agrawal

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:18785 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR ACQA No. 100 of 2023 State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station AJK, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - Devdas Manikpuri S/o Shri Mangal Das Manikpuri, Aged About 44 Years R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 2 - Suresh Das Mahant @ Motu S/o Shri Karman Das Mahant, Aged About 25 Years, R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 3 - Saheb Das Mahant S/o Shri Nirdhin Das, Aged About 21 Years, R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 4 - Govinda Das Mahant S/o Shri Nirdhin Das, Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 5 - Suraj Das Mahant S/o Shri Karman Das Mahant, Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 6 - Tara Mahant S/o Shri Karman Das Mahant, Aged About 27 Years R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh 7 - Smt. Sheela Mahant W/o Shri Suraj Mahant, Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Tharakpur, Police Station Urga, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh NARESH KUMAR KAMDE Digitally signed by NARESH KUMAR KAMDE Date: 2026.04.24 10:28:26 +0530 2 8 - Smt. Chanda Bai Mahant W/o Late Punidas Mahant, Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Turi (Hiragarh), Police Station Nawagarh, District : Janjgir- Champa, Chhattisgarh 9 - Smt. Sushmita Mahant W/o Shri Govind Das Mahant, Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Dhodhipara, Chowki CSEB, Korba, District : Korba, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant/State : Shri Atanu Ghosh, Dy. Govt. Advocate. For Respondents : Smt. Juhi Jaiswal, Advocate. SB: Hon'ble Shri Justic e Sanjay S. Agrawal Order on Board 23/04/2026 1. Heard on I.A. No.1/2023 and I.A. No.2/2025, these are the applications seeking condonation of delay of 177 days in preferring of this appeal. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/State submits that, immediately after passing of the impugned judgment dated 16/06/2022, the copy of the same was communicated by the Special Public Prosecutor (Atrocity) Korba to the District Magistrate, Korba on 28/10/2022 while opining to prefer an appeal and, after receiving the said letter, the District Magistrate, Korba vide its letter dated 10/11/2022 has forwarded the same to the Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs Department, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, who in turn, issued a letter to the Office of the Advocate General for filing an appeal as a decision was taken to prefer an appeal against the said impugned judgment dated 16/06/2022. Further of his contention is that an appeal was drafted on 3 02/03/2023 as per the instructions issued by the Law and Legislative Affairs Department and, was placed for its approval which was approved on the same day and immediately, thereafter, i.e. on 10/03/2023, the instant appeal has been preferred. It is, therefore, contended that the delay of 177 days which has been occurred bonafidely in view of such circumstances in preferring this appeal be, condoned in order to provide substantial justice to the parties. 3. On the other hand, Smt. Juhi Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents while placing her reliance upon the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of ‘State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkumar Choudhary’ reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3612 submits that since the reasons for delay in preferring the appeal has been offered only much after the expiry period of the limitation of 90 days, prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, therefore, the same cannot be held to constitute a sufficient cause and, contended further that even the reasons of delay in preferring this appeal has not been explained in proper manner, as such, the applications as made and framed deserve to be rejected. 4. From perusal of the record, it appears that, by virtue of the impugned judgment dated 16/06/2022, the Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Korba, District Korba has acquitted the respondents with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 147, 294, 323/149 and 506 Part II of IPC read with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) and Section 3(2)(v a) (two times) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 4 Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1989’) and, a copy of it was delivered by the Special Public Prosecutor (Atrocity), Korba to the District Magistrate, Korba only on 28/10/2022, i.e. much after the expiry of the limitation period of 90 days, which expired on 14th September 2022 and, the copy of it, received by the District Magistrate, Korba on 31/10/2022, was forwarded to the Secretary of Law and Legislative Affairs Department for necessary action in this regard, who in turn, vide its letter dated 19/12/2022 has sent it to the Office of Advocate General for preparing an appeal, as the decision was taken for it. But, neither the particular was furnished as to when the decision was taken as such for preferring an appeal, nor any explanation was offered as to why it was kept for such a long time despite of its received on 29/11/2022. 5. It is to be seen further that, after receiving the said instructions from the Law and Legislative Affairs Department, an appeal was drafted on 02/03/2023 and was placed for its approval, which was approved on the same day, i.e. on 02/03/2023, but the instant appeal has been preferred only on 10/03/2023 even without any explanation for it. 6. What is, therefore, reflected from the aforesaid facts that no explanation, whatsoever, has virtually been offered by the appellant/State before the expiry of the limitation period of 90 days provided under sub-section (3) of Section 14-A of the Act, 1989 and, instead the reasons for delay in preferring this appeal has been offered only much after the expiry of the said statutory period and that too without any proper explanations. 5 7. In view of the such circumstances, the inordinate delay of 177 days cannot be held to be a sufficient one in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of ‘State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ramkumar Choudhary’ (supra), wherein, at para No.7, it has been held as under :- “7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without 6 the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation.” 8. Consequently, the applications (I.A. No.1/2023 and I.A. No.2/2025) seeking condonation of delay of 177 days in preferring this appeal is rejected and, consequent upon that, the appeal is dismissed. Sd/- (Sanjay S. Agrawal) JUDGE Kamde