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2026 DAILYLAW 7858 (AP)

Boddu Nageswararao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

CRLA/2105/2018 · 2026-08-10

K Suresh Reddy, Sumathi Jagadam

Criminal Appealbody2026

Judgment text

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1 Date of reserved for orders : 08.07.2026 Date of pronouncement : 11.08.2026 Date of uploading : .08.2026 APHC010536312018 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI TUESDAY, THE 11th DAY OF AUGUST 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY AND THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 2105 OF 2018 Between: Boddu Nageswararao, Toddy Tapper, r/o Settibalijapeta, Kondavali Village, Gollaprolu Mandal. Appellant AND The State of Andhra Pradesh, Through S.H.O., Gollaprolu P.S., East Godavari District. Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court Hyderabad. ...Respondent Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C praying that the High Court may be pleased to to allow the Criminal Appeal by setting aside Judgment passed in S.C.No. 30 of 2014 dt. 13-4-2018 on the file of the Special Judge for Trial of Case under SCs and STs (POA) Act-cum-X Addl District and sessions Judge East Godavari at Rajamahendravaram, and to pass. IA NO: 1 OF 2018 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone the delay of 37 days in filing the above Criminal Appeal, in the interest of Justice, and pass 2 IA NO: 1 OF 2023 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to release the petitioner on bail by suspending the sentence passed in S.C. No.30 of 2014, Date:13-4-2018, by the court of the Hon'ble Xth Additional District & Sessions Judge, Rajamahendravaram at East Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh and pending disposal of CrI.A.No.2105/2018, before this Hon'ble High court and Counsel for the Petitioner: ROSEDAR S.R.A, LEGAL AID Counsel for the Respondent PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP) The Court made the following order: Whether the order is : Speaking Yes Reasoned Yes Reportable Yes Non-Reportable No 3 HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2105 OF 2018 Between: Boddu Nageswararao, Toddy Tapper, R/o Settibalijapeta, Kondavali Village, Gollaprolu Mandal. … Appellant AND The State of Andhra Pradesh, Through S.H.O., Gollaprolu P.S., East Godavari District, Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court Hyderabad.. … Respondent Date of Judgment Pronounced : 24.07.2026 SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY And HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM 1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No 2. Whether the copy of judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No 3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment? Yes/No ________________________ JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY __________________________ JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM 4 * HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY And THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM + CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2105 OF 2018 %Dated: 11.08.2026 # Boddu Nageswararao, Toddy Tapper, R/o Settibalijapeta, Kondavali Village, Gollaprolu Mandal. … Appellant Vs. $ The State of Andhra Pradesh, Through S.H.O., Gollaprolu P.S., East Godavari District. Rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court Hyderabad. … Respondent !Legal Aid counsel for the appellant : Sri ROSEDAR S.R.A, ^Counsel for the respondent : Learned Public Prosecutor <GIST: >HEAD NOTE: ? Cases referred: 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 (2024) 8 SCC 60 (2012) 6 SCC 403 (2017) 8 SCC 204 (1981) 4 SCC 116 5 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI TUESDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX SPECIAL DIVISION BENCH PRESENT HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY And THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 2105 OF 2018 J U D G M E N T (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Suresh Reddy) Sole accused in S.C.S.T.S.C.No.30 of 2014 on the file of the Court of the Special Judge for Trial of Cases under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - cum-X Additional District and Sessions Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmahendravaram is the appellant. He was tried by the learned Special Sessions Judge under the following charges. 1. First Charge was under Section 302 IPC 2. Second Charge was under Section 307 IPC 3. Third Charge was under Section 37A of Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and the 4. Last charge was under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 6 2. Substance of the charge is that, on the intervening night of 13/14.01.2012, the accused mixed a poisonous substance in M.O.1, toddy pot tied to palmyra tree from which he was tapping toddy, with an intention to cause death of the persons who were habitually and regularly consuming toddy collected therefrom stealthily, and that, on consumption of the said toddy, Chavala Arjunudu and Bathina Venkata Ratnam (hereinafter referred to as "D.1" and "D.2" respectively) died, while P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 to 7 who also consumed the said toddy had suffered ill-health, thereby committed offences under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, Section 37-A of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short ‘SC’s and ST’s Act). 3. After completion of trial, the learned Special Judge convicted the appellant/accused under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for ‘LIFE’ and also to pay a fine of Rs.100/- in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for fifteen (15) days. Learned Special Judge further convicted the appellant/accused under Section 307 IPC and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for three (3) years and also to pay a fine of Rs.100/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for fifteen (15) days. Learned Special Judge also convicted the 7 appellant/accused under Section 37-A of A.P. Excise Act and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for five (5) years and also to pay a fine of Rs.100/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for fifteen (15) days. All the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. However, the learned Special Judge acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 3(2) (v) of SC’s and ST’s Act. 4. Case of the prosecution, as emanated from the evidence of prosecution witnesses, briefly is as follows:- (i) The accused, as well as the material prosecution witnesses, are residents of Kodavali Village, Gollaprolu Mandal, East Godavari District. Both the deceased were also residents of the same village. The accused had taken three (3) palmyra trees from P.W.4 and two others on oral lease, which were situated in their respective cotton fields adjoining the land taken on lease by the accused, and was eking out his livelihood by tapping toddy from the said trees. According to the prosecution, the accused noticed that certain members of the Scheduled Caste community of the village were stealthily removing toddy from the said palmyra trees by damaging the toddy pots, thereby causing financial loss to him. The accused informed P.W.4 that some persons were secretly committing theft of the toddy collected by him and further expressed his intention to mix poison in the toddy pots so as to prevent them from stealthily 8 consuming the toddy. P.W.4 advised the accused not to indulge in any such act. However, disregarding the said advice, the accused mixed poisonous substance in the toddy pots on the evening of 13.01.2012 and tied the same to the palmyra trees. (ii) On the intervening night of 13/14.01.2012, P.Ws.2, 3, and 5 to 7, along with D.1 and D.2, went to collect firewood for the purpose of lighting the Bhogi bonfire in celebration of Bhogi festival. After collecting the firewood, D.1, D.2, P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 to 7, along with P.W.9, loaded the same into tractor and sent P.W.11 to the village with the firewood for the Bhogi festival celebrations. Thereafter, D.1, D.2, P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 to 7 consumed toddy which had been brought down from the palmyra tree by P.Ws.2 and 3. Except P.W.9, all others consumed the toddy. They consumed a portion of the toddy beneath the palmyra tree of the accused and thereafter consumed the remaining toddy in the agricultural field of one Chavala Appa Rao. After consuming toddy, while they were proceeding towards the village and on reaching canal, they developed severe stomach pain, vomiting and motions. Immediately, P.W.9 rushed to the village, brought some of the villagers to the scene, and shifted all the affected persons to the Government Hospital, Prathipadu, from where they were referred to Trust Hospital, Kakinada, for better treatment. While undergoing treatment, 9 D.1 and D.2 succumbed to the effects of poison, whereas P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 to 7 survived after receiving treatment at the said hospital. (iii) Having come to know of the incident through the villagers, P.W.1, the then Village Revenue Officer of Kodavali Village, Gollaprolu Mandal, called the accused, who informed him that he had mixed Monocrotophos, an insecticide, in M.O.1, toddy pot tied to one of the palmyra trees taken by him on lease. Immediately, P.W.1 proceeded to the Police Station and lodged a report. (iv) P.W.19-the then Head Constable, Gollaprole Police Station received Ex.P1 report from P.W.1 and registered a case in Crime No.8 of 2012 under Section 302 IPC, Section 37-A of A.P. Excise Act and Section 3(2) (v) of the SCs and STs (POA) Act. He issued copies of FIR to all the concerned. FIR was marked as Ex.P20. (v) Having received information, P.W.20-the then Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Kakinada took up investigation. She visited Government General Hospital and posted police picket to maintain law and order. She went to the scene of offence and prepared an observation report-Ex.P2 in the presence of P.W.1 and another. She also prepared a rough sketch-Ex.P22 at the scene of offence. She seized Mos.1 to 3 at the scene of offence in the presence of P.W.1 and another under a Panchanama. She recorded statements of P.Ws.1, 4 and two others at the scene of offence. 10 Thereafter, P.W.20 went to Kakinada and held inquest over the dead body of D1 in the presence of P.W.12 and others. At the inquest, she recorded statements of P.Ws.8 and 9. Inquest report pertaining to D1 was marked as Ex.P6. (vi) On the same day, C.I. of Police held inquest over the dead body of D2 in the presence of P.W.14 and others. Inquest report pertaining to D2 was marked as Ex.P8. (vii) P.W.20 also got the dead bodies photographed. Photographs were marked as Ex.P5. On the same day, on credible information, she apprehended the accused in the presence of mediators, P.W.1 and another. On the confession made by the accused, P.W.20 recovered MO4-Pesticide Tin under a Panchanama, Ex.P4. The accused was remanded to judicial custody. She sent the dead bodies for postmortem examination. (viii) P.W.17, Associate Professor, Forensic Medicine, Rangaraya Medical College Kakinada conducted autopsy over the dead bodies of D1 and D2. He also preserved viscera of D1 and D2 for sending them to R.F.S.L. (ix) P.W.20 sent the preserved viscera of D1 and D2 and forwarded the same to the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory (RFSL) for chemical analysis under the letters of advice marked as Ex.P24. The report of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory was marked as Ex.P15. She also forwarded M.Os.1 to 3 to the Regional 11 Forensic Science Laboratory under the letter of advice marked as Ex.P26 for forensic examination. After receiving Forensic Science Laboratory Report-Ex.P15, P.W.17 gave his final opinion under Ex.P16, opining the cause of death of both the deceased was due to organophosphate insecticide poisoning. (x) On 29.01.2012, as P.Ws. 2, 3, 7 and 11 had recovered, P.W.20 recorded their statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. On 13.02.2012, P.W.20 received the caste certificates of the accused, P.Ws.1 to 7 and both the deceased. On 22.02.2012, she recorded statements of P.Ws.5 and 6 after they recovered. She received wound certificate pertaining to P.W.6, marked as Ex.P13, from P.W.16, the M.D. General, Trust Hospital, Kakinada. She also received the wound certificates pertaining to P.Ws.2, 3 and 5, marked as Exs.P9 to P12, from P.W.15, the Managing Director of Trust Hospital, Kakinada. He further received wound certificate pertaining to P.W.7, marked as Ex.P19, from P.W.18, Consultant Cardiologist, Care Hospital, Visakhapatnam. After completion of investigation and after collecting all the relevant documents, P.W.20 filed charge sheet. 5. In support of its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 22, got marked Exs.P1 to P27 and exhibited Mos.1 to 4. Exs.X1 and X2, Case sheets were marked. On behalf of the defence, Ex.D1 12 relevant portion of statement of P.W.9 recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was marked. 6. When the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he denied the incriminating evidence appearing against him from the prosecution witnesses, but he did not choose to examine any witness on his behalf. 7. Accepting the evidence of prosecution witnesses, the learned Special Judge convicted the appellant/accused as aforesaid. 8. Heard Sri Rosedar S.R.A., learned Legal Aid Counsel for the appellant/accused, and Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned Additional Public Prosecutor.” 9. Learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the prosecution has failed to produce any documentary evidence to establish that the accused had taken the palmyra trees on lease from P.W.4 and two other owners. He would submit that there is absolutely no evidence on record to establish that the accused was tapping toddy from the said palmyra trees at the relevant point of time. Learned counsel further contended that there is no evidence of whatsoever to establish that the accused had mixed any insecticide poison in M.O.1, toddy pot. According to the learned counsel, the Investigating Officer-P.W.20 failed to trace the source from where the accused had allegedly procured the 13 insecticide poison and did not conduct any investigation in that regard, thereby leaving a vital gap in the prosecution case. 10. Learned counsel further contended that the alleged extra- judicial confession said to have been made by the accused before P.W.1 cannot be relied upon, particularly when P.W.1 had also acted as a panch witness for the scene observation report as well as the arrest and recovery proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the evidence of P.W.1 does not inspire confidence and, therefore, the alleged extra-judicial confession is wholly unreliable. He further submitted that no reliance can be placed on the alleged recovery said to have been effected pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the said recovery is neither credible nor established in accordance with law. 11. Learned counsel also contended that the medical evidence is not in consonance with the prosecution case. Placing reliance on the wound certificates, he submitted that they disclose that the deceased as well as the injured prosecution witnesses had consumed toddy at about 9.00 p.m. on 13.01.2012, whereas the prosecution case is that the occurrence took place during the intervening night of 13/14.01.2012. According to the learned counsel, the said discrepancy creates a serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version. 14 12. Lastly, the learned counsel contended that the prosecution has failed to establish that the motive for the accused either to cause the death of D.1 and D.2 or to attempt to cause the death of P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 to 7. According to him, even assuming, without admitting, that poison had been mixed in the toddy, the object of the accused was only to prevent unknown persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste community from stealthily consuming the toddy tapped by him and not to cause the death of any particular individual. He would, therefore, submit that the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 307 IPC have not been established beyond reasonable doubt. As such, learned counsel for the appellant requests this Court to allow the appeal by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Special Judge. 13. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and contended that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He would submit that, though there is no written document evidencing the lease of the palmyra trees in favour of the accused, it is the specific case of the prosecution that the accused had taken on oral lease three (3) palmyra trees from P.W.4 and two (2) other palmyra trees from their respective owners. The absence of a written lease deed, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, is 15 of no consequence inasmuch as the oral evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly establish the said fact. 14. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the evidence of P.W.13, the then Prohibition and Excise Inspector, Tanuku, clearly establish that the accused was tapping toddy from the said palmyra trees at the relevant point of time. In support of the said contention, he placed reliance on Ex.P7, the identity card issued by P.W.13 in favour of the accused authorising him to tap toddy. 15. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that the prosecution has established that it was the accused who had mixed the insecticide poison in M.O.1, toddy pot. According to him, M.O.4, pesticide tin, was recovered from the house of the accused pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him and in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, which constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance against the accused. He would further submit that merely because the Investigating Officer did not investigate the source from where the accused had procured the insecticide poison, the same cannot, by itself, be treated as a circumstance sufficient to discredit the prosecution case. 16 16. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further contended that there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the testimony of P.W.1, the then Village Revenue Officer, or to infer that he had falsely implicated the accused. According to him, the extra-judicial confession made by the accused before P.W.1 is voluntary, truthful and inspire confidence of the Court. He further submitted that the recovery of M.O.4, pesticide tin, pursuant to the confession made by the accused lends assurance to the truthfulness of the extra-judicial confession and provides corroboration to the prosecution case. 17. Refuting the contention regarding the alleged discrepancy in the medical evidence, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that no material inconsistency exists between the medical and ocular evidence. He would submit that all the material witnesses have consistently deposed that they went to collect firewood on the night of 13.01.2012 for the purpose of lighting Bhogi bonfire and that the incident occurred during the intervening night of 13/14.01.2012. Therefore, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the reference to the date in the wound certificates cannot be treated as a material discrepancy so as to discredit the cogent and convincing evidence. As such, the learned Public Prosecutor requests this Court to dismiss the appeal by confirming the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Special Judge. 17 18. We have carefully scrutinised the entire evidence on record. 19. Admittedly, the prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence, as there are no eyewitnesses to the alleged incident. The criminal law was set into motion on the basis of the report lodged by P.W.1, the then Village Revenue Officer of Kodavali Village, Gollaprolu Mandal. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine the evidence of P.W.1 in detail. 20. P.W.1, in his evidence, stated that on the morning of 14.01.2012, he came to know through the villagers that eight persons had consumed toddy belonging to the accused and that, after consuming the said toddy, all of them developed stomach pain, vomiting and motions and were admitted in the Government Hospital. He further stated that he immediately called the accused and questioned him, whereupon the accused disclosed that he had mixed pesticide in the toddy pot, M.O.1, as certain persons belonging to the Scheduled Caste community were stealthily consuming the toddy tapped from his palmyra trees. On coming to know of the said disclosure, P.W.1 proceeded to the Police Station and lodged Ex.P1 report stating that the accused had mixed Monocrotophos, an insecticide poison, in the toddy pot. 18 21. A careful perusal of Ex.P1 discloses that, by the time the report was lodged, D1 had already succumbed and the remaining victims were undergoing treatment in the Hospital at Kakinada. Ex.P1, which was lodged on the morning of 14.01.2012, specifically records that the accused himself informed P.W.1 that he had mixed Monocrotophos poison in the toddy pot. Significantly, the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory Report, Ex.P15, dated 28.04.2012, reveals that the material objects contained Monocrotophos, an organophosphate insecticide poison. Thus, the version recorded in Ex.P1, lodged immediately after the incident, that the accused had disclosed to P.W.1 that he mixed Monocrotophos poison in the toddy pot, stands substantially corroborated by the scientific evidence contained in Ex.P15, which came into existence more than three months later. The subsequent forensic report confirming the presence of Monocrotophos lends considerable assurance to the truthfulness of the extra-judicial confession made by the accused before P.W.1. Merely because P.W.1 also acted as a mediator for the scene observation report, the recovery of M.O.4, and the arrest of the accused, his evidence cannot be discarded on that ground alone. His testimony also finds substantial corroboration from the independent scientific evidence in the form of Ex.P15. Further, nothing has been elicited in his cross-examination nor has any material been placed on record to indicate that P.W.1 bore any 19 animus against the accused or had any motive whatsoever to falsely implicate him in the present case. Being the person, who first received the information from the accused and immediately set the criminal law into motion by lodging Ex.P1, the evidence of P.W.1 inspires confidence and cannot be brushed aside merely on the ground that he subsequently acted as a mediator during the course of investigation. 22. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no documentary evidence to establish that the accused had taken the palmyra trees on lease is concerned, the same cannot be accepted. From the very inception, the consistent case of the prosecution has been that the accused had taken three (3) palmyra trees from P.W.4 and two (2) other palmyra trees from their respective owners on an oral lease. It is well settled that an oral lease is legally valid and, therefore, the mere absence of a written lease deed is not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. Further, the evidence of P.W.13, the then Prohibition and Excise Inspector, Tanuku, clearly establishes that the accused was engaged in tapping toddy at the relevant point of time. P.W.13 categorically deposed that he had issued Ex.P7–Identity Card to the accused authorising him to tap toddy. The issuance of Ex.P7 lends due corroboration to the prosecution case that the accused was in possession of the leased 20 palmyra trees and was carrying on toddy tapping therefrom. Therefore, the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence to establish that the accused had taken the palmyra trees on lease or that he was tapping toddy therefrom is devoid of any merit and is accordingly rejected. 23. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the prosecution has failed to establish the source from where the accused procured the poisonous substance and that there is no evidence to show that the accused had mixed poison in the toddy pot cannot be accepted. 24. P.W.20, the Investigating Officer, categorically stated that M.O.4, pesticide tin, was recovered from the house of the accused pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, in the presence of the mediators, P.W.1 and another, under a duly prepared panchanama. Recovery of M.O.4 pursuant to the voluntary disclosure made by the accused constitutes a relevant incriminating circumstance against him. 25. Further, the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory Report- Ex.P15 clearly establishes that the poisonous substance detected in the viscera of D1 and D2 was Monocrotophos, an organophosphate insecticide poison. The said report also discloses that the poisonous substance detected in M.O.4, the pesticide tin recovered from the 21 house of the accused, was the very same insecticide. Thus, the scientific evidence unmistakably establishes the nexus between the poison recovered from the accused and the poison detected in the bodies of the deceased. 26. The evidence of P.W.4 also lends considerable corroboration to the prosecution case. P.W.4 categorically stated that the accused had taken three (3) palmyra trees from him on oral lease for tapping toddy. He further stated that, prior to the incident, the accused informed him that certain persons were stealthily consuming toddy from the leased palmyra trees and expressed his intention to mix pesticide in the toddy pots in order to prevent such theft. Although P.W.4 advised the accused not to resort to such an act, the accused, disregarding the said advice, mixed Monocrotophos, an insecticide poison, in M.O.1, toddy pot. 27. At this juncture, it is sine qua non and also profitable to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayyav. King Emperor [Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor1], which still holds the field even today wherein it was held that the provided information must be directly relevant to the discovered fact, including details about the physical object, its place of origin, and the accused person's awareness of these aspects and the pertinent Paragraph of said decision is as follows: 1 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 22 “ … it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. … Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with which I stabbed A” these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.” 28. Further, in the case of Dharmendra Kumar v. State of M.P., 2, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had categorially noted the brief summed up criteria for admissibility of a disclosure statement within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, as under: “55. The question that requires determination is whether the abovestated disclosure statement is admissible in evidence? The issue regarding the 2 (2024) 8 SCC 60 23 admissibility of a disclosure statement within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence Act was comprehensively addressed by this Court in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor [Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47] , delineating the following briefly summed up criteria: (i) There should be a discovery of the fact. (ii) The discovery of fact should be in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence. (iii) The person giving the information should be in the custody of a police officer. (iv) Only that portion of information which relates distinctly or strictly to the fact discovered can be proved.” 29. Further, it is pertinent to refer to the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Sahadevan v. State of T.N.,3, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession is an admissible piece of evidence and pertinent Paragraph 16 is extracted hereunder:- The principles 16. Upon a proper analysis of the abovereferred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra- judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of 3 (2012) 6 SCC 403 24 conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused: (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law. 30. In conspectus and after applying the settled principles of law, the aforesaid evidence of P.W.4, read in conjunction with the recovery of M.O.4 pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and the scientific evidence contained in Ex.P15, forms a complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly guilt towards the accused. The mere fact that the Investigating Officer did not ascertain the precise 25 source from where the accused procured the insecticide poison does not, by itself, create any dent in the prosecution case when the evidence on record otherwise conclusively establishes that it was the accused who mixed Monocrotophos, an organophosphate insecticide poison, in M.O.1, toddy pot. 31. Accordingly, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing, through clear, cogent and convincing evidence, that it was the accused who mixed Monocrotophos, an organophosphate insecticide poison, in M.O.1, toddy pot, with an intention to cause the death of persons who stealthily consuming the toddy tapped by him from the leased palmyra trees. 32. Coming to the alternative submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the accused had no intention to cause death of D1 and D2 or to cause injuries to P.Ws.2, 3 and 5 to 7, as the sole object of the accused was only to prevent unknown persons, who were stealthily consuming the toddy tapped by him from the leased palmyra trees, and, therefore, even if the entire prosecution case is accepted, the offence would fall under Section 304 IPC and not under Section 302 IPC. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the said submission. 26 30. Section 300 IPC reads as follows; ―Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Murder 300. Murder.— Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done— Firstly—If the act is done with the intention of causing death; or Secondly—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or Thirdly—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or Fourthly—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Illustrations (a)A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder. (b)A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is 27 guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death. (c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death. (d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual. Exception 1.— When culpable homicide is not murder.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos:— (First)— That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. 28 (Secondly)— That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. (Thirdly)— That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.— Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Illustrations a)A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills. Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation. (b)Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide. (c)A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers. (d)A appears as witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is 29 moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder. (e)A attempts to pull Z’s nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence. (f)Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homi-cide, but A is guilty of murder. Exception 2.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Illustration: Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide. 30 Exception 3.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. Exception 4.— Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.— It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Exception 5.— Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. Illustration A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.‖ 33. Section 300 IPC defines the circumstances under which culpable homicide amounts to murder. A careful reading of the said provision would show that the act committed by the accused 31 squarely falls within the Fourth Clause of Section 300 IPC, which provides that culpable homicide is murder if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury. The facts of the present case also aptly attract illustration (d) appended to the said clause. 34. It is profitable to refer to the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court of India in the case of State of Haryana v. Krishan4 wherein it was categorically held as under:- “33. Insofar as argument predicated on Section 120-B IPC is concerned, even if we proceed on the basis that charge of conspiracy is not proved, it would be suffice to observe that adequate evidence is produced showing the culpability of the respondents, individually. Once it is shown that the spurious liquor was sold from the local vends belonging to the respondents coupled with the fact that after this tragedy struck, the respondents even tried to destroy remaining bottles clearly establishes that the respondents had full knowledge of the fact that the bottles contain substance methyl and also had full knowledge about the disastrous consequences thereof which would bring their case within the four corners of Section 300 Fourthly. The 4 , (2017) 8 SCC 204 32 respondents cannot be treated as mere cat's paw and naive. They have exploited the resilient nature of bucolic and rustic villagers.” 35. In the case on hand, the evidence on record clearly establish that the accused deliberately mixed Monocrotophos, an organophosphate insecticide poison, in the toddy pot in M.O.1, fully knowing that the persons who were stealthily consuming the toddy from his palmyra trees would consume the poisoned toddy. The act of mixing a highly toxic insecticide in a consumable liquid is inherently and imminently dangerous that any prudent person would know that it would, in all probability, result in death or cause such bodily injury that would likely cause death. Therefore, even assuming that the accused did not intend to cause the death of any particular individual, the knowledge attributable to him clearly brings the act within the ambit of the Fourth Clause of Section 300 IPC. Consequently, the offence committed by the accused squarely falls under Section 302 IPC, and not under Section 304 IPC, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. 36. Admittedly there are no eyewitnesses who witnessed the accused mixing the poisonous substance in the toddy pot. However, the prosecution case rests on a chain of circumstantial evidence and that each circumstance having been duly established by reliable and cogent evidence. The circumstances established form a complete 33 and unbroken chain, unerringly points guilt towards the accused alone and to none others. The evidence is wholly inconsistent with any hypothesis of his innocence. 37. In this connection, it is trite that the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of judgments including the decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra5, has laid down five (5) golden principles, which govern a case based only on circumstantial evidence: “(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be followed, AND (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 5 (1981) 4 SCC 116 34 38. Applying the aforesaid well-settled principles to the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that the prosecution has successfully established every incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence relating to the motive attributed to the accused, the extra-judicial confession made before P.W.1, the recovery of M.O.4 pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, the scientific evidence adduced through Ex.P15, and the medical evidence, when read conjointly, form a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the offences were committed by the accused and none else. The chain of circumstances is so complete that it unerringly points guilt towards the accused alone and rules out the involvement of any other person. The findings recorded by the learned Special Judge are founded upon a proper appreciation of the evidence and are fully supported by cogent, convincing and legally admissible material on record. We do not find any factual or legal infirmity, much less any perversity, warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. We are, therefore, of the considered view that there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Special Judge. 39. In the result, the present Criminal Appeal is dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the 35 learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act - cum-X Additional District and Sessions Judge, East Godavari at Rajahmahendravaram, in S.C.S.T.S.C.No.30 of 2014, dated 13.04.2018. Needless to state that the period already undergone by the appellant/Accused shall be given set off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Criminal Appeal, shall stand closed. JUSTICE K.SURESH REDDY _______________________________ JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM Date:11.08.2026 Note: LR copy to be marked B/o GR 36 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K SURESH REDDY And THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE SUMATHI JAGADAM CRIMINAL APPEAL No.2105 of 2018 (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice K. Suresh Reddy) Date: 11.08.2026 GR 37