1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA RFA No. 257 of 2015 Reserved on: 20.03.2026 Date of decision: 20.05.2026 Date of uploading on website: 21.05.2026 ________________________________________________ The State of Himachal Pradesh & others …..Appellants. Versus Vijayandra Singh & another ……Respondents. ________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes. For the appellants/State: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with Mr. Raj Kumar Negi, Additional Advocate General, Mr. Balwinder Singh and Ms. Swati Draik, Deputy Advocates General. For the respondents: Mr. R.L. Sood, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Arjun Lall & Ms. Sanjivini Sood, Advocates. Sushil Kukreja, Judge. The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellants/State, who were defendants before the learned Court below (hereinafter referred to as “the defendants”) under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against judgment and decree, dated 03.10.2012, passed by learned District Judge, Solan, H.P., in Civil suit No. 12-NL/1 of 1985, 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) whereby the suit filed by the plaintiffs, Sh. Vijayanndra Singh and Smt. Madhunandani Kumari, who are respondents herein and Smt. Yadunandni Kumari and Smt. Rati Kumar, who were plaintiffs before the Court below, but during the pendency of the instant appeal their names have been deleted (hereinafter referred to as “the plaintiffs”), was decreed, with a prayer to quash and set-aside the impugned judgment and decree by dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent injunction before the learned Court below to restrain the defendants permanently from interfering in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs in the land comprised in khewat khatauni No. 1/1, khasra No. 1, measuring 113 bighas, 12 biswas, situated in village Jungle Nand Pargana Nawan-Nagar, Tehsil Nalagarh (for short “the suit property”), which was entered in the jamabandi for the year 1956-57 in the ownership and possession of Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh, which position continued till the year1971. 2(a). As per the plaintiffs, in the revenue record the suit property was recorded to be owned and possessed by Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh, who died on 05.05.1971 3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) and subsequently the suit property was mutated in the name of the plaintiffs. It was averred that the suit property originally belonged to Raja Surinder Singh, the Ruler of Princely State of Nalagarh before its merger into “B” Part State of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union in the year 1948 and thereafter Raja Surinder Singh, in accordance with the covenant surrendered all his property except those, which were kept by him and were declared to be his private properties, including the suit property known as Jungle Nand. The plaintiffs further averred that the suit property was declared to be the property of Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh in accordance with Article XII of the covenant, qua which a letter, dated 11.04.1949, was received from Raj Parmukh of Patiala and East Punjab States Union. Thus, the suit property, before the merger of Nalagarh State and thereafter remained in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest and it was recognized by all, including defendant No. 1 (the State of H.P.) and its officers. As per the plaintiffs, the suit property was not declared to be surplus land under the provisions of Ceiling of Land Holding Act, 1972. 2(b). The plaintiffs further averred that on 03.03.1984 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) defendants No. 3 and 4, i.e., Divisional Forest Officer, Kunihar at Nalagarh and Forest Range Officer, Kohu, respectively, threatened to interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs over the suit property, consequently, the plaintiffs initiated proceedings under Section 145 of Criminal Procedure Code before Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nalagarh, who, on 07.03.1984, issued order appointing Naib Tehsildar, Ramshehar to be the receiver of the suit property, which action was wrong and illegal, as the plaintiffs are the owners- in-possession of the suit property and could not have been deprived of their possession, by appointing a receiver compelling them to file a suit against the defendants before the Court below. 2(c). The plaintiffs also averred that whenever the Government takes possession of land or other property, the title of which vests in a citizen, it cannot do so only in exercise of powers under a statute and in case for any reason the plaintiffs are found to be out of possession of having been dispossessed from the suit property during the pendency of the suit and the suit property was found to be in possession of the defendants, such possession of the defendants can only be traced under the Authority of law and 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) there are two distinct provisions under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 where the State Government could take possession of a forest owned by a person other than the State Government. Firstly, it could be under Section 36 of the Act and in that case the net profit arising from the management of such forest or land is required to be paid to the owner and such possession could be taken under Section 38 of the Act at the request of the owner of the forest, on such terms, as may be mutually agreed upon and it was neither the case of the plaintiffs nor the defendants that the possession of the forest of the plaintiffs, i.e., the suit property was taken by the defendants at the request of the plaintiffs for management, thus possession and management of the forest of the plaintiffs could be retained by the defendants only under Section 36 of the Act, as the defendants had no ground upon which they can retain the possession and management of the suit property. On the basis of these averments, the plaintiffs had filed the suit against the defendants. 3. The defendants by filing written statement contested the suit and they raised preliminary objections of maintainability and estoppel. As per the defendants, from 1924-25 to 1952-53 the suit property was in the name of 6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Raja Sahib Bahadur and it was in possession of Forest Department. The defendants further averred that for the first time, in the jamabandi for the year 1956-57 the suit property was recorded to be in the ownership and possession of Raja Sahib Shri Surinder Singh, which entries are mere paper entries and the suit property right from the beginning till date was in continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the State through Forest Department, who had been continuously auctioning forest produce to private contractors from time to time and had been granting trees to right holders on concessional rates and since the suit property was never private property, as such Raja Surinder Singh had no authority to declare the public property to be private property, as such the defendants have become owner of the suit property by way of efflux of time. 4. The defendants, on merits averred that the suit property got wrongly entered in the revenue record as private property of the plaintiffs, which was contrary to Article 12 of the Covenant, thus the nature of the entries qua the suit property depicting the same to be private property are incorrect. As per the defendants, entries showing Raja Surinder Singh to be the owner in possession of the suit 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) property in the jamabandi for the year 1956-57 is only a paper entry, whereas the defendants have been dealing with the suit property as owners. Even prior to the merger of Nalagarh State, the suit property was not private property of Raja Surinder Singh and it was public property and entered in possession of forest department till the entry was changed in jamabandi for the year 1956-57 and the defendants came to know about the wrong revenue entries, when Raja Vijayendra Singh moved an application under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nalagarh, whereupon Naib Tehsildar, Ramshehar, was appointed as receiver qua the suit property, but ultimately the said application was dismissed, as the plaintiffs failed to prove their possession over the suit property and possession of the suit property was handed over back to the Forest Department. 5. The defendants admitted that State of Nalagarh was Princely State and plaintiffs and their predecessors were rulers of the same. During the merger of the Princely State of Jind, Malerkotkla, Nabha, Nalagarh etc., Patiala and East Punjab State Union came into existence and Covenant was entered, but as per Article 12 of the Covenant, the Ruler of 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) State could not have declared such property to be private properties, which were not in his full ownership, use and enjoyment. As per the defendants, the entries qua the suit property were wrongly changed from State property to private property of Raja Surinder Singh. The defendants denied that the suit property is in possession of the plaintiffs and averred that the same is in possession of the Forest Department. The defendants admitted that the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. were initiated at the instance of the plaintiffs by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nalagarh, in which Naib Tehsildar, Ramshehar, was appointed as receiver of the suit property. It was averred that the suit property was classified as “Demarcated Forest” in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Patiala Forest Act, 1919, after complying with sub-section (3) of that Section and under the said section only such forests could have been declared to be protected forests, which were property of the government or over which government has proprietary rights and no private forest or waste land owned by any individual could be declared to be protected forest. Lastly, the defendants averred that as the suit property was in open, peaceful and continuous possession of the 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) defendants, who were exercising and asserting their rights of ownership over the suit property, by managing the forest standing on the suit property, as such the defendants have becomes owners-in-possession of the suit property by efflux of time. 6. The plaintiffs filed replication to the written statements filed by the defendants, wherein it was averred that the suit property had been declared as their private property and when, in the year 1948, the Princely States were integrated into Union of India, Government of India had asked Rulers of these States to select the property which they wanted to keep for themselves and surrender rest of the property in favour of New Administrative Unit and it was in this background that Raja Nalagarh selected two forests of Shilnu and Nand to be his private property out of sixty forests and the rest 58 forests were surrendered in favour of newly formed state of PEPSU. As per the plaintiffs, list of private property and annual expenditure of Royal family of Nalagarh, on which Privy Purse was fixed by the Government of India, was submitted by Raja Surinder Singh to the Government of PEPSU, who further forwarded it alongwith comments of Government of India and the final decision on the private 10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) property and Privy Purses of Ex Rulers was taken by the Government of India and not by the Rulers themselves. The plaintiffs further averred in their replication that Notification of Punjab Government, dated 10.03.1960, whereby forest comprising the suit property had been declared as demarcated protected forest, was in violation of Section 29 of the Patiala Forest Act, as it was not applicable to the area of Nalagarh, as Nalagarh was never part of Patiala State. Moreover, at the time of the issuance of such notification, the Government had not fulfilled the requirement of Section 29(3), wherein an enquiry determining the rights of private persons in the forest had to be conducted. In addition to the above averments, the plaintiffs reiterated the averments made in the plaint after refuting the averments made in the written statement. 7. Out of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court on 04.12.1985 and 17.03.2012 framed the following issues: “1. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP 2. Whether the suit has been property valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP 11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) 3. Whether the suit property was the private property of late Raja Surinder Singh and the plaintiffs are now its owners in possession? OPP 3A. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit land in alternative as alleged? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit land in alternative as alleged? OPD 5. Whether a valid notice under Section 80 CPC has been served upon the defendants? OPP 6. Whether the present suit for mere injunction is not maintainable? OPD 7. Relief.” 8. After the parties led their evidence and after hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties, the learned Trial Court, decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for possession of the suit property. Hence, the instant appeal preferred by the appellants/State (defendants) against the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. 9. I have heard the learned Advocate General for the appellants/State, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents and carefully examined the entire records. 10. Shri Bhupender Singh (resident of Fort, 12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Nalagarh), appeared in the witness-box as PW-1 and deposed that he was holder of general power of attorney of the plaintiffs. As per this witness, disputed property was 113 bighas 12 biswas, commonly known as jungle Nand. The owner of the property in dispute was late Raja Surinder Singh, who was erstwhile Ruler of Princely State of Nalagarh, which was merged in Part-B State of PEPSU in the year 1948. He further deposed that on the basis of covenant entered into with the Government of India, the disputed property was one of the properties declared as private property of late Raja Surinder Singh and the plaintiffs are the heirs of said Surinder Singh. He also deposed that the earlier the disputed property remained in possession of late Raja Surinder Singh and after his death it was in possession of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had deployed one Tulsi Ram of village Bharota, Sub Tehsil Ramshahr, District Nalagarh through him to look after the disputed property on their behalf. This witness deposed that for the first time in the year 1984, the defendants, through defendants No. 3 and 4 started interfering with the rights of the plaintiffs in the disputed property. This witness also deposed that when Shri Tulsi Ram was getting fenced the property, a dispute arose in 13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the year 1984 and the plaintiffs asked the defendants not to dispute the title and possession of the plaintiffs and on failure to their request, they (plaintiffs) got served a notice (Ex. P1) under Section 80 CPC upon the defendants on October 13, 1984. Postal receipts are Exs. P-2 to P-5 and AD receipts are Ex. P-6 to P-8. This witness also tendered in evidence copies of jamabandies Exs. P-9, P-9/A to P-12, copy of letter dated 20th April, 1949 (Ex. P-13), from Deputy Secretary (Home Department) PEPSU to Deputy Commissioner, Kandaghat, alongwith lists of properties declared to be the private property of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. Copy of covenant was tendered as Ex. P-14 and letter dated 11th April, 1949, from Rajparmukh PEPSU alongwith its annexures as Ex. P15. 11. Shri Tulsi Ram appeared in the witness-box as PW-2 and deposed that he was employed by plaintiff No. 1 and he had seen the disputed property, which was commonly known as jungle Nand. As per this witness, in the year 1984, he was getting the disputed property fenced at the behest of the plaintiffs, through PW-1. He further deposed that after sometime, Forest Range Officer, Kohu, Tehsil Nalagarh, raised objection and asked him to withdraw from the forest, 14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) as the same was stated to be belonging to the defendants. Thereafter, he reported the matter to PW-1. He was not cross-examined, despite opportunity granted by the Court. 12. The defendants have led evidence and examined as many as nine witnesses. Shri Lachhmi Singh appeared in the witness-box as DW-1 and deposed that he was residing in village Nand permanently and was born in the said village. His father was Lamberdar and after his death he became Lamberdar of village Nand and Dhar. He further deposed that he had seen Jungle Nand, which adjoins his property. He was resident and right-holder in village Nand alongwith other right-holders in village Nand and had been grazing cattle in the said forest and had also paying Rs.6/- per annum as grazing fee to the Forest Department. He also deposed that as right-holders, they were exercising right of cutting trees with permission of the Forest Department from this forest. As per this witness, there were cheel (pine) trees in the said forest and resin was extracted from these trees. Previously, the Forest Department used to auction the rights to collect resin and now it is the H.P. State Forest Corporation, which is extracting resin. As per this witness, the Forest Department started getting resin extracted from 15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the year 1955-56 and the Forest Department was in possession of this forest. 13. Shri Sita Ram, another resident of village Nand, appeared in the witness-box as DW-2 and deposed that he was born in the above village and had agricultural property in the said village. He further deposed that Jungle Nand adjoins his property and the jungle had cheel trees. He, in the capacity of right-holder, used to graze his cattle in the forest and also used to cut cheel trees, after seeking permission from the Forest Department, for his domestic use. The estate right-holders of village Nand used to pay Rs.6/- per annum to the Forest Department for the above purpose and the receipt must be with the village Lamberdar. He further deposed that he had not personally deposited the sum of Rs.6/- towards the grazing fee with the Forest Department and it was the Lamberdar, who used to deposit the amount. 14. Shri Ram Lal, the then Forest Guard, Kohu Forest Range, Bhini Beat, appeared in the witness-box as DW-3 and deposed that Nand forest was located within Bhini Beat and he had performed various duties as Forest Guard within the Beat, i.e., guarding forest trees, recommending 16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) applications of right-holders seeking permission to fell trees, getting forest roads repaired/constructed and other miscellaneous works. He further deposed that during his stint H.P. State Forest Corporation used to extract resin from Cheel trees and he, in the capacity of Forest Guard, had been guarding Nand forest, which was under the control of the Forest Department. He also deposed that from March 1984 to March, 1985, Naib Tehsildar Ramsehar was handed over the charge of this forest, as per the directions of the Court and during the period the forest remained under the charge of Naib Tehsildar and he was not guarding the forest. 15. Shri Ganga Ram, appeared in the witness-box as DW-4 and deposed that for the last about twenty eight years he was employee of the Forest Department and was posted within Bhini Forest Beat in Kohu Range. Jungle Nand was within his Beat. He further deposed that the above forest was under the control and management of the Forest Department and he, in the capacity of Forest Guard, used to guard the same and also used to keep vigil to prevent unauthorized felling and removal of the forest produce. He also deposed that he used to keep vigil over the work of extraction of resin, as Himachal Pradesh State Forest 17 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Corporation used to extract resin from cheel trees. As per this witness, estate right holders had rights to graze their cattle in the forest and to have trees for their domestic use. He deposed that the right holders were required to pay certain fee for grazing their cattle in the forest, which was collected through Lamberdar. Sometimes, Lamberdar used to hand over the fee to him and he, in turn, used to hand over the same to the Range Officer, who deposited the same in the Government Treasure and a proper receipt was issued qua such payment. 16. Shri Deep Ram, Resin Contractor, appeared in the witness-box as DW-5 and deposed that he was registered Resin Contractor and recognized by the Forest Department of Himachal Pradesh. During the year 1972-73, work for extraction of resin from Nand forest was put to auction and he was declared as successful highest bidder. Thereafter, a regular agreement was entered into between him and the government, through Forest Department, embodying the terms whereupon he was permitted to extract resin from Nand forest. He further deposed that possession of the forest was handed over to him qua which he was given receipts to the Forest Department. Exs. D-1 and D-2 are two 18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) receipts, which he had given to the forest Department. As per this witness, possession was handed over to him by the Forest Ranger at the behest of the Divisional Forest Officer. He was not in possession of the agreement entered into with the State Government, but he had seen the copy of agreement, Ex. D-3, which was signed by him. He also deposed that the above agreement was entered into before he took possession of the Nand Forest. As per this witness, prior to 1972 M/s Bhagwan Finance Corporation was granted lease by the State Government for extraction of resin in Nand forest. The entire consideration qua the extraction was paid by him to the government through Forest Department by depositing the same in the government treasury. He further deposed that during the entire period, when resin was extracted by him, no objection was ever raised by the plaintiffs or their servants/representatives. He continued the process of extracting resin from Nand forest during the years 1972-73 and 1974-75 and after 1975 he did not work in the forest, as the work of extraction of resin was handed over by the government to Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation. 17. Shri R.S. Rana, appeared in the witness-box as 19 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) DW-6 and deposed that presently (at the time of the examination of the witness) he was posted as Divisional Manager, Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation, Solan. As per this witness, Forest Department had handed over the possession of Nand Forest located in Tehsil Nalagarh to Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation since the year 1980 for the purpose of extraction of resin therefrom. 18. Shri Tulsi Ram, appeared in the witness-box as DW-8 and deposed that he was posted in Kohu Range since June, 1989 and used to look-after the staff as well as the working in the forest. He further deposed that Nand forest was within Kohu Range and he had been going to Nand forest since the time he took over charge of Kohu Range. The forest was in their possession and since he took charge of the same, the forest was not in possession of anyone else. He also deposed that during his time, no one objected to their possession and working in the forest. As per this witness, people had bartandaran rights in the forest and official record was in his possession. Exs. DW-8/1 to DW- 8/82 are true copies of original reflecting collection and deposit of money realized from Nand forest from 01.02.1962 20 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) to 06.03.1984. These cash books were maintained in the regular course of official business. He had also brought the official record of grazing permits issued qua the Nand forest and these copies had been taken out of the original and are marked as Exs. DW-8/83 to DW-8/85. He deposed that through these permits the Forest Department had realized grazing fee from the right-holders through the Lamberdars. This witness had brought the original record of damage reports qua Nand forest and true photo copies of it are Exs. DW-8/86 to DW-8/88. He had also brought original counterfoils of Form No. 14, which are receipts issued by the Forest Department for fee realized for grazing rights, damages and royalty etc. These are Exs. DW-8/89 to DW- 8/114. He had also brought counterfoils of the original record qua damage reports caused in Nand Forest, true copies of original are Exs. DW-8/115 to DW-1/125. This witness got the above record from Shri Himat Singh, Forest Ranger, who was succeeded by him. As per this witness, settlement report was prepared for Nand forest on 13.04.1915 and he had brought the original copy of it, wherein relevant extract was Item No. 47, copy of which is Ex. DW-8/126. He also deposed that subsequently, no other settlement report was 21 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) prepared and it was prepared by Wazir Indar Singh of Nalagarh State. He further deposed that there was a working plant for this forest which had been prepared, copy whereof is Ex. DW-8/127. This witness deposed that the forest had cheel trees wherefrom resin was extracted. By notification dated 10th March, 1960, the forest was declared as demarcated protected forest. He had no notification whereby the forest had been de-notified as protected forest. 19. Shri Sant Ram, appeared in the witness-box as DW-9, brought the original Gazette of Punjab Government for the year 1960, which contained Notification No. 2133-FT- 60/1779, dated 10.03.1960, Ex. DW-9/A. 20. On 06.01.2026 this Court allowed the application filed by the appellant /State under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC, for placing on record the documents annexed with the application. On the same day, copy of order in Ceiling Case No. 1/93, dated 25.10.1993, decided by Collector Nalagarh, District Solan, Ex. A1, certified copy of decision in REV Appeal no. 34/94, dated 16.08.1994, decided by Commissioner, Shimla Division, Ex. A2, certified copy of decision in CWP No. 718, 719, 72- and 721 of 1991, decided on 19.10.1992 by Hon’ble H.P. High Court Ex. A3, certified 22 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) copy of return filed in Ceiling Act 1972, as Ex. A4 and certified copy of register of Revenue Department qua entry of Ceiling Case No. 1/1993 Ex. A5 were tendered in evidence. 21. The learned Advocate General vehemently contended that the land is owned and possessed by the State as it has been proved on record that the Forest Department of the State has been managing the Jungle Nand and has been reaping financial benefits therefrom. The State did this continuously for over 100 years, showing long- term control and had managed the land by collecting fee, managing forests and auctioning forest produce and the plaintiffs did nothing. He further contended that the plaintiffs never objected, paid taxes or used the land and basically they abandoned it. He also contended that the State had declared the jungle as a protected forest, vide Notification dated 10.03.1960, and declared all the standing trees as protected species and on the same day, trees standing on the said land were also declared as reserved and currently the property is protected forest and cannot be used for non- forestry purposes, in view of the bar under Forest Conservation Act, 1980, or Van Samvardhan Act. He also submitted that this case highlights a lack of evidence from 23 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the plaintiffs’ side, as they have failed to prove that after the alleged correction of revenue entries, they or their predecessor made any attempt to take possession from the State till date, on the contrary pleadings in suit are vague as plaintiffs have never mentioned when their predecessor made an attempt to take over the possession, what steps were taken to take the possession even after change of entries, why the notification dated 10.03.1960 was accepted and not assailed, hence, according to him, suit must fail on this count. He further submitted that because of the State’s long, open control and plaintiffs’ lack of involvement, the contention of the plaintiffs that they became owner based on paper entries is absolutely wrong. 22. Conversely learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contended that the State of Himachal Pradesh is the sole maker and custodian of the revenue records and the State of Himachal Pradesh, through its revenue officials, periodically check and ascertain the correct position on the spot regarding the ownership and actual possession of the property and it is only after the checking of the property that the State of Himachal Pradesh, through its revenue officials, recorded the ownership and possession of Raja Surinder 24 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Singh of Nalagarh as the owner-in-possession of the suit property, i.e., Jungle Nand after it was recognized as the private property of Raja Surinder Singh under Article XII of the Covenant, Ex. P-14. He further contended that in view of the aforementioned position, where the State of Himachal Pradesh itself continued to record Raja Surinder Singh as the owner-in-possession of the suit property, i.e., Jungle Nand, it is precluded and estopped in law from claiming that the possession of Raja Surinder Singh in the suit property is a mere paper entry. He also contended that the State of Himachal Pradesh is precluded from claiming ownership of the suit property on the ground that the revenue entries to the contrary in favour of Raja Surinder Singh are mere paper entries. He contended that in so far as the revenue entries reflected in the jamabandies are concerned, the same are relevant under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act and there is a statutory presumption of correctness attached to the revenue entries in various jamabandies commencing from the year 1956 onwards under Section 114 (e) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972. 23. This Court has given a thoughtful consideration to rival contentions raised and also closely scrutinized the 25 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) entire evidence on record. The first question which arises for consideration before this court is as to whether the suit property was declared as private property of Raja Surinder Singh, the erstwhile ruler of the State of Nalagarh, at the time of merger of the States, in consonance with Article XII of the Covenant, Ex. P14. 24. It is admitted case of the parties that covenant, Ex. P14, was executed by the Rulers of the erstwhile Princely States as well as Raja Surinder Singh, the former Ruler of the Princely State of Nalagarh. The perusal of Article XII of the Covenant reads as under: “Article XII” (1). The Ruler of each covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh. (2). He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the 20th day of September, 1948, an inventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held by him as such private property. (3) If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler or State property, it shall be referred to such person as the Government of India may nominate in consultation with the Raj Pramukh and the decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned. Provided that no such dispute shall be so referable after the 31st day of December, 1948.” 25. Perusal of the record reveals that pursuant to the aforementioned Covenant, the list of private properties 26 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) of the Raja Sahib, Nalagarh, was prepared in accordance with Article XII of the Covenant. The said list was admittedly sent to the Government of India, Ministry of States and was duly approved and accepted by the Government of India. Later on, after the list was finally approved and accepted, a letter (Ex. P-15), which included the list of private properties was received by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The said letter is dated 11th April, 1949 and signed by the Raj Pramukh of PEPSU and was addressed to Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh. The perusal of the aforesaid letter confirmed that as per the approval and acceptance of the private list of properties of Raja Surinder Singh by the Government of India, Jungle Nand, measuring 21 acres amongst other properties, detailed therein, had been included in the aforementioned approved list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh, the erstwhile Ruler of the State of Nalagarh. The plaintiffs have also adduced in evidence letter dated 09.04.1949, Ex. P-13, from the Deputy Secretary, Department of Home, PEPSU Patiala to Deputy Commissioner, Kandaghat, wherein copy of a list of private properties of the Rulers of Kalsia and Nalagarh were forwarded with directions to take necessary action. It is on 27 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the basis of such directions that Jungle Nand was mutated on 21.02.1951, vide Ex. Z-53. Hence in the revenue records, Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh was recorded as owner-in- possession of the suit property Jungle Nand, which was his private property, as per the list approved by the Government of India. Needless to state that a presumption of truth is attached to an entry in a jamabandi being a part of the record of rights maintained by the State of Himachal Pradesh which is not only the maker of the record, but also the custodian of the same. In the revenue record of the State of Himachal Pradesh, Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh has been continued to be reflected as owner-in-possession of the suit property Jungle Nand. The jamabandies on record are Ex. P9 for the year 1956-57, Ex. P-9/A for the year 1960-61, Ex. P-10 for the year 1965-66, Ex. P-11 for the year 1974-75 and Ex. P12 for the year 1979-80. It is not understandable that on one hand the State of Himachal Pradesh claims to be in uninterrupted possession of the suit property, yet on the other hand, the revenue record maintained by its own revenue department and its officials from 21.02.1951 continues to reflect Raja Surinder Singh as owner-in- possession of the suit property. 28 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) 26. In the opinion of this Court, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents is not devoid of any force, as only a private litigant may be permitted in circumstances that are acceptable/proved to put forward a plea that the revenue entries are wrong or that the same are manipulated or that these are mere paper entries. The plea, which has been raised by the State cannot be permitted to be raised, which itself is the maker and custodian of the record. The appellant-State being the maker and custodian of the record cannot be permitted in law to raise a plea against its own record. It is not the case of the State that the revenue entries were manipulated or wrongly entered by its own revenue officials. Neither there are any pleadings nor any evidence has been led by the State to prove such a case. The State has failed to prove that the revenue entries showing Raja Surinder Singh as the owner-in-possession of the suit property, i.e, Jungle Nand, were erroneously or falsely made and the same were manipulated. Till date the said entries have neither been challenged in any Court of law nor they have been corrected. The entries are more than 75 years old as on date and the same were made by the government officials in discharge of their official duties, 29 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) therefore, there is a presumption of truth in favour of such entries. If the plea of the appellant-Sate, as urged by the learned Advocate General is accepted, it will result in eroding the confidence of the general public in the correctness and sanctity of the revenue record maintained by the Revenue Department of the appellant-State. Therefore, in the said circumstances, this Court finds favour with the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents (plaintiffs) that the recorded possession of Raja Surrender Singh in the revenue entries cannot be brushed aside or ignored, being mere paper entries, as contended by the learned Advocate General. The appellant-State is bound by its own revenue record, wherein Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh continues to be recorded as the owner-in- possession of the suit property, i.e., Jungle Nand. Moreover, in ground No. 4 of the grounds of appeal, the appellant-State has itself admitted that it came in possession of the suit property as per the consent and agreement of the Ruler. In this context, the relevant text of the ground No. 4 is reproduced as under: “(4). That in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the entire judgment and decree is void and without jurisdiction in as much as a thing which was agreed by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs who were the erstwhile Ruler of Nalagarh 30 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Society where the suit property is situated and kept seeing and not objecting the management done by the appellants/State would disentitle the plaintiffs to claim the relief. Such relief being time barred and otherwise not tenable and sustainable ought to have been rejected but the contrary conclusion has caused a great prejudice to the appellants/State with the illegal approach of the learned trial court.” 27. Thus, the State of Himachal Pradesh is precluded from questioning the revenue entries reflecting Raja Surinder Singh as the owner-in-possession of Jungle Nand as the State is not only the maker of the revenue record, but also is the custodian of the same and the said entries having admittedly been made by the State itself (through its officials of the Revenue Department) in the revenue record. 28. The learned Advocate General next contended that Jungle Nand could not have been included by Raja Surinder Singh in the list of his private properties as it was actually a State’s property (Crown’s property) and the revenue entries from the year 1925 to year 1951 initially showed “Raja Sahib Bahadur” and being in possession of the Forest Department of the Princely State of Nalagarh. The learned Advocate General further submits that due to the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation, the entries were later changed to “Raja Surinder Singh” and in fact, “Raja Sahib Bahadur” typically indicated State property, while private properties were recorded in the name of a person who was recognized 31 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) as “Raja” and the plaintiffs’ claim that both entries denote private property is incorrect, hence it was wrongly included in the list of private properties. Further it is contended by him that notwithstanding such inclusion, Jungle Nand in the list of private properties under Article XII of the Covenant and the approval/acceptance of the list by Government of India, the State of Himachal Pradesh is the rightful owner of the suit property. The learned Advocate General further submitted that this Court should dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs and should not perpetuate a wrong that was deliberately made by Raja Surinder Singh, by including Jungle Nand in his list of private properties. He further submitted that this Court should hold in favour of the State by declaring that Jungle Nand was wrongly included in the list of private properties of the Raja Surinder Singh and further it should be held that the State of Himachal Pradesh is the actual owner-in-possession of the suit property, i.e., Jungle Nand. 29. On the other hand, Mr. R.L. Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs vehemently urged that the stand of the State of Himachal Pradesh, as advocated by learned Advocate General was not permissible even before the country gave itself the Constitution. He further submitted 32 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) that this argument is not available to the State because when the Government of India did not raise any dispute relating to the inclusion of the Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh and on the contrary, approved and accepted the said list, then the State of Himachal Pradesh cannot in law question the inclusion of Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of the Ruler after 31st December, 1948 ,there being a statutory bar as per Article XII(3) of the Covenant. In this respect, he has drawn the attention of this Court to Article XII(3) of the Covenant, Ex. P-14, which reads as under: “Article XII” (1). … … … (2). … … … (3) If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler or State property, it shall be referred to such person as the Government of India may nominate in consultation with the Raj Pramukh and the decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned.” Provided that no such dispute shall be so referable after the 31st day of December, 1948.” 30. It is admitted case of the appellant-State that Jungle Nand was recognized and accepted by the Government of India as the private property of Raja Surinder Singh under Article XII of the Covenant, Ex.P14, and the 33 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) same was included in the final and accepted list of private properties by the Government of India. It is also the admitted case of the State that no dispute regarding the inclusion of Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh was ever raised by the Government of India or the PEPSU State, as per the mandatory provisions of Article XII(3) of the Covenant. The State of Himachal Pradesh is only a successor State to PEPSU and thereafter to the Government of India. If the Government of India did not raise any dispute relating to the inclusion of the Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh and on the contrary, approved and accepted the said list, then, the State of Himachal Pradesh cannot in law question the inclusion of Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of the Ruler after 31st December, 1948 in view of Article XII(3) of the Covenant, Ex. P-14, 31. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs further submits that in any case no such dispute could be raised even by the Government of India in view of the constitutional bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. At this juncture, it would be relevant to reproduce Article 363 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under: 34 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) “363. Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. (2) In this article— (a) “Indian State” means any territory recognized before the commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and (b) “Ruler” includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognized before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.” 32. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr. R.L. Sood, further submits that Article 363 commences with a “non- obstante clause” and in view of the aforementioned constitutional bar, as provided under Article 363, the State of Himachal Pradesh cannot be permitted to question the inclusion of Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh of Nalagarh. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Colonel His Highness Sawai Tej Singhji of Alwar vs. The Union of India & another, AIR 1979 SC 126. The relevant portion of 35 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the judgment (supra) reads as under: “9. … … … …This contention if also without substance. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any agreement which was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to which the government of India was a party. The operation of the article is not limited to any “Parent” Covenant and every agreement whether it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a preceding agreement would fall within the ambit of the article. Thus the fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated the 14th Sept., 1949 had resulted from action taken under the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that Art. 363 of the Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the two suits, although we may ad that that agreement did not flow directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and departing from the provisions of Cl. (2) of Artc. XII thereof.” 33. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ushadevi, 2015 (8) SCC 672. The relevant paras of the judgment (supra) read as under: “24. Before adverting to the various arguments advanced by the learned counsel on both sides and the findings recorded by the courts below, were would deem it appropriate to extract Article 363 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under: “363. Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party 36 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.” A plain reading of clause (1) of Article 363 emphatically gives the impression that no court in this court, including this Court shall have jurisdiction to deal with any dispute arising out of treaties, agreements, etc. entered into between the Rulers of the erstwhile Indian States and the Government of India. … … … … … … … … 27. The suit scheduled properties which are in possession of the plaintiff find no mention in the entire list of properties, but the plaintiff derives her title to the property from Clause 14 of the list of properties which speaks about all properties under the control of the Household Department. The plaintiff, to substantiate her case that the suit scheduled properties are private properties is relying upon Clause 14 of the list of properties, the taxes paid by her and her father in respect of these properties, the communication dated 7-5-1948 and letter dated 30-1-1956 wherein the suit scheduled properties were retransferred to the Household Department. Though lot of evidence was adduced on behalf of the plaintiff about paying taxes to substantiate her case that the suit scheduled properties are the private properties of the Ruler, the core issue that required to be adjudicated is whether it is the personal property of the Ruler or the property was belonging to the State. To given any finding with regard to the ownership of the property invariably we have to look at the covenant for the reason the covenant is the source of title for the plaintiff. At any stretch of imagination, we cannot agree with the finding of the appellate court that the right of the plaintiff is a pre-existing right. By all means the right of the plaintiff flows from the covenant by virtue of which the plaintiff claims title over these properties, which according to her are declared as private properties of the Ruler. 28. A bare perusal of Article 363 and the relief sought by the plaintiff in the suit in unequivocal terms attracts the bar contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India. The court below distinguished the judgment in Draupadi Devi case (Draupadi Devi vs. Union of India, (2004) 11 SCC 425) that it is not applicable to the facts of the present case. We are of the considered opinion that the rule of law laid down in that case applied to the case on hand. This Court in Draupadi Devi held: 37 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) “44. … The covenant is a political document resulting from an act of State. Once the Government of India decides to take over all the properties of the Ruler, except the properties which it recognizes as private properties, there is no question of implied recognition of any property as private property. On the other hand, this clause of the covenant merely means that, if the Ruler of the covenanting State claimed property to be his private property and the Government of India did not agree, it was open to the Ruler to have this issue decided in the manner contemplated by Clause (3). Clause (3) of Article XII does not mean that the Government was obliged to refer to the dispute upon its failure to recognize it as private property. Secondly, the dispute as to whether a particular property was or was not recognized as private property of the Ruler was itself a dispute arising out of the terms of the covenant and, therefore, not adjudicable by municipal courts as being beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal courts by reason of Article 363 of the constitution.” (emphasis supplied) 29. The above ratio laid down by this Court makes one to understand that prior to the covenant, the ownership of all the properties remain vested with the Ruler, but once the covenant is entered into, the Government takes over all the properties except those which the Government recognizes as private properties of the Ruler. This Court had categorically held that there cannot be any implied recognition of the property as private property at any later stages when an opportunity had already been granted to raise this issue in terms of when a opportunity had already been granted to raise this issue in terms of Clause (3) of Article XII of the covenant before the defined period. In the cause on hand also, similar clause existed where a dispute to recognize a property as private property could be raised only before 1-7-1949. A dispute whether a property was recognized as private property or not was held to be a dispute arising out of the terms of the covenant, thereby barring the courts to adjudicate the same in view of Article 363 of Constitution. 30. Also in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia (1971 (1) SCC 85) this Court while interpreting Article 363 of the Constitution, observed that (SCC p.139, para 68) a dispute relating to the enforcement, interpretation or breach of any treaty, etc. is barred from the Courts’ jurisdiction. The bar comes into play only when the dispute is arising out of the provisions of a treaty, covenant, etc. as in the present case. This Court held that Article 363 has two parts. The first part 38 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) relates to disputes arising out of agreements and covenants, etc. The jurisdiction of this Court as well as of other courts is clearly barred in respect of disputes falling within that part. Then comes the second part of Article 363 which refers to disputes in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any agreement, covenant, etc. It was specifically mentioned that right as mentioned in Article 363 signifies property.” 34. Thus, in view of the aforesaid pronouncements of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in view of the constitutional bar created under Article 363 of the Constitution of India, the State of Himachal Pradesh is precluded from questioning the inclusion of Jungle Nand in the list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh, the erstwhile Ruler of the State of Nalagarh, prepared as per Article XII of the Covenant, Ex. P14, which list was approved and accepted by the Government of India, which was the only authority competent to do so. 35. The learned Advocate General next contended that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove on record the order dated 06.10.1950 passed by the competent authority to prove ownership whereby the alleged revenue entries were entered. He further contended that respondents/plaintiffs allegedly became owner of the land due to order dated 06- 10-1950 but such order has never seen the light of the day, therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the 39 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) plaintiffs. He also contended that unless order dated 06.10.1950 is produced, mere change in revenue entries cannot establish ownership. However, this contention of the learned Advocate General is also devoid of any force as the plaintiffs have already exhibited on record letter dated 28.04.1949, Ex. P-13, addressed by Deputy Secretary, Home, Department of PEPSU at Patiala to the Deputy Commissioner, Kandaghat. A perusal of which shows that under the cover of this letter, a list of private properties of the Rulers of Kalsia and Nalagarh were forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, Kandaghat, for necessary action. The plaintiffs have also produced on record letter dated 11.04.1949, Ex. P-15, which is signed by the competent authority, i.e., Raj Pramukh of PEPSU State and with it attached is a list of “property declared as the private property of Raja Sahab of Nalagarh”. Jungle Nand finds mention therein as one of the properties of Raja of Nalagarh. It has also been admitted by the appellant/State that Jungle Nand was accordingly accepted and recognized by the Government of India, as having been included in the list of private properties of the Raja of Nalagarh. Hence, it is obvious that all such correspondence/letters, which ought to 40 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) have been produced or exhibited have been produced by the plaintiffs. Moreover, the original correspondences/letters/ documents, on the basis of which, certain properties were included in the list of private properties of the Rulers were and are only in possession of the State Authorities or the Government of India. Therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the plaintiffs for not producing order dated 06.10.1950, as the plaintiffs have already proved on record letter dated 28.04.1949 Ex. P13, covenant Ex. P-14, and letter, dated 11.04.1949, Ex. P-15, which clearly establish that Jungle Nand was included in the list of private properties of Raja Surinder Singh, the erstwhile Ruler of the Nalagarh. 36. Now the next question, which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the State of Himachal Pradesh has perfected its title to the suit property by way of efflux of time on the basis of adverse possession and whether the State can take the plea of adverse possession? 37. The learned Advocate General has forcefully contended that it has been proved on record to show that the State of Himachal Pradesh was managing the Jungle Nand and was also reaping financial benefits from the same and 41 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the Rulers of Nalagarh State never objected to the management and possession of the suit property, i.e., Jungle Nand through the Forest Department. The appellant-State in para 1, para 2 and in para 4 of the grounds of appeal raised the following grounds: “1. … … …The entries in the revenue record right from 1900 onwards would show the possession of the appellants Forest Department over the land in dispute. However, the above change in the year 1956 showing the land in possession of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs was without any authority besides it was against the covenant in Article XII when the Princely State was agreed to be merged into with Union of Inida for formation of Patiala and East Punjab State Union (PEPSU) despite the fact of entry in the name of plaintiffs over the suit land as owner in possession, the department of Forest right from the earlier times till date the suit land is being managed by the Department of Forest being the property of the State of Himachal Pradesh.” ………. 2. … … …In spite of the change of entry from the name of the Forest Department to the name of plaintiffs, the appellants have been using the suit property considering it of its own right from the early 1900, the Forest Department has been enjoying the yield, selling of trees, resin etc.” ……… 3. ……… 4. That in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the entire judgment and decree is void and without jurisdiction in as much as a thing which was agreed by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs who were the erstwhile Ruler of Nalagarh society where the suit property is situated and kept seeing and not objecting the management done by the appellants/State would disentitle the plaintiffs to claim the relief.” …….. 38. Mr. R.L. Sood, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that a perusal of the aforementioned grounds of appeal show that it is the case of the appellant- State that the predecessor-in-interest of the present plaintiffs, 42 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Shri Vijayandra Singh & others had agreed that the Forest Department of the State of Himachal Pradesh would manage Jungle Nand, therefore, the possession of the Forest Department was permissive and in any case, it cannot entitle the State of Himachal Pradesh to claim ownership of the suit property on the basis of the alleged long possession. The aforementioned grounds, as reproduced above, leave no manner of doubt that the appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh is claiming to be the owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession. The appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh has taken the plea in para 4 of the written statement that the plaintiffs have no right title or interest whatsoever in the suit land and in case they had any, the same has been lost by the afflux of time. The relevant portion of para 4 of the written statement, for the sake of ready reference, is extracted hereunder: 4. ……..the plaintiffs never exercised the rights of ownership and possession of defendants and the defendants have always been exercising all rights of ownership and possession by auctioning forest produce, to the private contractors. Thus, the plaintiffs have no right title or interest whatsoever in the suit land and in case they had any, the same has been lost by the afflux of time”…….. 39. Now the question, which arises for consideration before this Court is whether the State can be permitted to raise the plea of adverse possession. This question is no 43 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) longer res integra as it is a settled law that the State cannot be permitted to raise the plea of adverse possession and claim the property of a citizen as has been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of judgments. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar & others, (2011) 10 SCC 404, held that no government department, public undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens. The relevant portion of the judgment (supra) is reproduced as under: “45. If the protectors of law become the grabbers of the property (land and building), then, people will be left with no protection and there would be a total anarchy in the entire country. It is indeed a very disturbing and dangerous trend. In our considered view, it must be arrested without further loss of time in the larger public interest. No government department, public undertaking, and much less the Police Department should be permitted to perfect the title of the land or building by invoking the provisions of adverse possession and grab the property of its own citizens in the manner that has been done in this case.” 40. In Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & others, (2020) 2 SCC 569, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 12.11 has held that the state cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens. 44 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) The relevant para of the judgment (supra) is extracted hereunder: ”12.11 We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty or a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The state cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.” 41. In State of Haryana & anr. vs. Amin Lal (since deceased) through his LRs & others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3368, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens. The relevant paras of the judgment (supra), for the sake of ready reference, is as under: “9. The appellants’ next submission that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiffs to establish their title is equally not borne out from the records. It is a well-settled principle that in a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiffs must establish their ownership. In the present case, the plaintiffs have done so by producing revenue records and, subsequently, the registered sale deeds and mutation entries. Furthermore, as the appellants failed to deny the plaintiffs' title specifically and instead relied on adverse possession, the burden has shifted to the appellants to prove their adverse possession. In the present case, the plaintiffs have sought possession based on their title, which they have established through documentary evidence. 10. The appellants claim that due to their long and continuous possession of the suit property since 1879-80, they have perfected their title, is also not sustainable in law. However, it is a fundamental principle that the State cannot claim adverse possession over the property of its own citizens. In Vidya Devi v. State of H.P1, this Court emphatically held that the State cannot be permitted to 45 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) take the plea of adverse possession. The relevant paragraphs from this judgment are reproduced hereunder: “12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 : (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure (2020) 2 SCC 569 for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi- faceted dimension. 12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case.” 11. Allowing the State to appropriate private property through adverse possession would undermine the constitutional rights of citizens and erode public trust in the government. Therefore, the appellants' plea of adverse possession is untenable in law. The appellants' possession, as evidenced by the Misal Hakiyat of 1879-80 (Exhibit DW10/1), was permissive and conditional. The entry describes the possession as "Bikhar Bahali Kaza," meaning till the existence of an orchard. Such permissive possession cannot be the basis for a claim of adverse possession.” 42. Thus, in view of the aforesaid pronouncements of law, the plea of adverse possession or long possession, as 46 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) put forth by the learned Advocate General, cannot be accepted, as the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant-State of Himachal Pradesh 43. It is the settled position of law that the moment a plea of adverse possession is raised, it follows that the ownership of the property of the person has been admitted against whom a plea of adverse possession is raised. Since the appellant/State has raised the plea of adverse possession, it follows that it had admitted the ownership of the plaintiffs over the suit land. Therefore, after perusal of the entire evidence on record, it is manifest that the ownership of the plaintiffs/respondents has been established. Otherwise also, as observed earlier, in view of the bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India, the ownership of the plaintiffs cannot be questioned. 44. The learned Advocate General next contended that the suit is barred by limitation as the same has been filed after a delay of about 34 years after alleged change of revenue entries and in support of his contention he has placed reliance upon Article 65 of the Limitation Act. He has also relied upon the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab & ors. vs. Bhagwant Pal 47 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) Singh alias Bhagwant Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives, (2024) 15 SCC 139, in order to non-suit the plaintiffs. 45. No-doubt, Article 65 of the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation of 12 years for filing a suit for seeking possession of the immovable property, however, the aforesaid period of 12 years, commences only from the date “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff”. Therefore, the argument of the learned Advocate General is mis-conceived because as observed earlier, the plea of adverse possession is not available to the State. Hence, it naturally follows that since the plea of adverse possession is not available to the State, the suit of the plaintiffs cannot be said to be barred by limitation. The judgement in Bhagwant Pal Singh’s case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as there was no bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India in the said case. Moreover, para 5 of judgment supra shows that the land in question had been donated by the predecessors-in- interest of the plaintiffs to the State of Punjab and after accepting the donated land, the State of Punjab had constructed a veterinary hospital in the year 1958-59 over 48 Neutral Citation No. ( 2026:HHC:18957 ) the suit land, whereas, in the instant case no such donation of the suit land has taken place. 46. No other point was urged. 47. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court does not require any interference and the same is upheld. The instant appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of. ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 20th May, 2026 (virender)