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2026 DAILYLAW 7835 (CHH)

MAYANK CHHABRA v. LOVELY SINGH

MA/186/2025 · 2026-04-19

Shri Bibhu Datta Guru

body2026

Judgment text

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1 2026:CGHC:17767 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MA No. 186 of 2025 1. Mayank Chhabra S/o Dilip Singh Chhabra, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village - Munrethi, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.) 2. Gurjeet Kaur Chhabra, W/o Mayank Chhabra, Aged About 33 Years C/o Nishant Sharma, R/o House No. E-52, Sumit City Of Dreams, Kachna, Raipur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1. Lovely Singh S/o Dilip Singh Chhabra Aged About 39 Years R/o Flat No. E-104, Ashoka Ratan, Khamardih, Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.) 2. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Raipur, Office Of Collector, Ge Road, Raipur, Tehsil And District - Raipur (C.G.) 3. Sub-Divisional Officer (R), Arang, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.) 4. Additional Tehsildar, Mandir Hasaud, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. G.A. Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 20/04/2026 1. The appellants/defendants have preferred the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, JYOTI SHARMA Digitally signed by JYOTI SHARMA Date: 2026.04.21 11:24:54 +0530 2 being aggrieved by the order dated 04.09.2025 passed by the learned 9th District Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 14-A/2023 (Lovely Singh Vs. Mayank Chhabra & Ors.), whereby the learned trial Court allowed the application filed by the respondent No. 1/plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 r/w Section 151 of CPC. 2. The plaintiff/respondent No.3 instituted a civil suit seeking partition of suit land pleading, inter alia, that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 are real brothers and defendant No.2 is the wife of defendant No.1. It is averred that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 jointly purchased the agricultural land situated at Village Munrethi, Patwari Halka No.11/12, R.N.M. Mandir Hasaud, Tahsil Arang, District Raipur, bearing Khasra No.151/1, area 0.690 hectare, by registered sale deed dated 27.05.2008 for a consideration of Rs.5,25,000/-, and thereby acquired title and possession over the same (hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’). Since the suit land was jointly purchased, the plaintiff claims half share therein. Thereafter, the names of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 were duly mutated in the revenue records. It is further pleaded that for proper management of the suit land and payment of land revenue, defendant No.1 obtained from the plaintiff a relinquishment deed/consent letter on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.50/-, representing that the same was merely a formal document and, being unregistered, would have no legal effect. Thereafter, both parties signed the mutation register of Village Munrethi on 3 25.09.2012, which was certified by the Tahsildar on 14.12.2012. The original relinquishment deed/consent letter is stated to be in possession of defendant No.1. It is also pleaded that when defendant No.1 started showing the suit land to prospective purchasers, the plaintiff obtained a certified copy of the mutation order dated 14.12.2012 and challenged the same before the Tahsil Court, but the said application was dismissed by the Additional Tahsildar by order dated 15.01.2021 and the appeal preferred thereagainst was also dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Thereafter, defendant No.1 executed a registered gift deed in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of the entire suit land, thereby making her ostensible owner thereof. It is further pleaded that during pendency of the suit, defendant No.2 published an advertisement in the daily newspaper Dainik Bhaskar dated 25.01.2023 for sale of the suit land, whereupon the plaintiff issued a rebuttal publication on 27.01.2023. Along with the suit, the plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC contending that he has a strong prima facie case and is likely to succeed in the suit; however, if during pendency of the suit the land is alienated to a third party, it would result in multiplicity of proceedings and cause irreparable loss to him. On these grounds, prayer has been made for grant of temporary injunction. 3. Per contra, the defendant filed the written statement along with the reply to the application under Section 39 Rule 1 & 2 stating 4 therein that the suit land was purchased by defendant No.1 from his own income and, out of goodwill, the name of his younger brother, i.e., the plaintiff, was also included therein. It is further pleaded that a few days after purchase of the suit land, the plaintiff expressed his desire to start a business and demanded money, whereafter he voluntarily relinquished his rights in the land through a consent deed, without any fear, pressure or coercion. The defendants further contend that the documents filed by the plaintiff himself clearly show that in the year 2010 a partition in respect of the purchased property had taken place, which was approved by the Tahsildar. Thereafter, on 12.11.2012, the plaintiff personally appeared before the Tahsil Court along with defendant No.1 and submitted a relinquishment deed in respect of the suit property, on the basis whereof mutation proceedings were carried out and the plaintiff’s name was deleted, while the name of defendant No.1 was recorded as exclusive bhoomiswami of the entire suit land. It is also pleaded that the plaintiff personally signed the mutation register. According to the defendants, the plaintiff has no right, title or possession over the suit property and, in fact, he was never in possession thereof. It is further pleaded that the application and appeal preferred by the plaintiff before the Tahsil Court have already been dismissed and, no further appeal or revision having been preferred thereagainst, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer has attained finality. It is contended that the present suit has been instituted deliberately and without 5 any cause of action only with an intention to create dispute over the property. It is also pleaded that after execution of the gift deed dated 03.06.2022 in favour of defendant No.2, she has acquired title and possession over the suit land. The defendants further state that the publication made by the plaintiff in the newspaper dated 02.05.2025 was duly rebutted by them through a public notice published on 03.05.2025. According to the defendants, the balance of convenience lies in their favour and, therefore, the application filed by the plaintiff deserves to be rejected. 4. After hearing the parties and considering the material available on record, the trial Court held that the sale deed dated 27.05.2008 prima facie showed the plaintiff and defendant No.1 as joint purchasers of the suit land. Though both parties relied upon a relinquishment deed/consent letter, the same was not produced before the Court and its validity could be decided only after trial. Accordingly, the plaintiff was held to have established a prima facie case. The Court further found that defendant No.1 had got his name mutated in the revenue records and had thereafter executed a gift deed in favour of defendant No.2, who was alleged to be intending to sell the suit property. It was held that any transfer during pendency of the suit may lead to multiplicity of proceedings and cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff, whereas no prejudice would be caused to the defendants if restrained from alienating the land. Accordingly, holding that prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury were in favour of 6 the plaintiff, the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC was allowed and defendant Nos.1 and 2 were restrained from selling the suit property during pendency of the suit. Thus, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned order granting temporary injunction is arbitrary, perverse and has virtually prejudged the merits of the suit by erroneously recording a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. It is contended that the mutation register for the year 2012-13, filed by the plaintiff himself, clearly reflects the plaintiff’s relinquishment of his rights in the suit property before the competent revenue authority and, therefore, no prima facie case survived in his favour after lapse of several years. It is further submitted that merely because the original relinquishment deed/consent letter was not produced, the transaction of relinquishment could not have been ignored at the interim stage, particularly when the mutation entries supported the same. Learned counsel argues that the plaintiff was never in possession of the suit land and, therefore, neither balance of convenience nor irreparable loss lay in his favour. It is also contended that the trial Court wrongly relied upon newspaper publications alleging proposed sale of the property while ignoring the rebuttal publications issued by the appellants. According to learned counsel, irrelevant allegations beyond the pleadings were also considered by the trial Court, resulting in a wholly misconceived exercise of discretion warranting interference in 7 appeal. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record with due circumspection, this Court is of the considered opinion that no ground is made out for interference with the discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court. It is well settled that while considering an appeal against an order granting temporary injunction, the Court would not substitute its own discretion unless the order impugned is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or contrary to settled principles governing grant of interim relief. 7. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 27.05.2008 prima facie demonstrates that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 were shown as joint purchasers of the suit property. Thus, at this stage, the claim of the plaintiff cannot be said to be wholly devoid of substance. The principal defence raised by the appellants is founded upon an alleged relinquishment deed/consent letter said to have been executed by the plaintiff, on the basis whereof mutation entries were subsequently made in the name of defendant No.1. However, the said relinquishment deed itself has not been produced before the Court. In absence of the primary document, its true nature, due execution, voluntariness, validity in law and legal effect cannot be conclusively examined at the interlocutory stage. Whether the plaintiff had in fact relinquished his rights voluntarily, whether the document was legally enforceable, and what effect the mutation entries based thereon 8 would carry, are all matters requiring evidence and detailed adjudication during trial. 8. The mutation entries or revenue proceedings relied upon by the appellants do not by themselves conclusively determine title, particularly when the very basis of such entries is under challenge in the civil suit. The learned trial Court, therefore, committed no error in holding that the defence founded upon the alleged relinquishment deed is a matter to be tested after parties lead evidence. 9. So far as balance of convenience and irreparable injury are concerned, the learned trial Court has rightly noticed that if the suit property is transferred during pendency of the suit, third party rights may be created, resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and further complications in final adjudication. On the contrary, the injunction granted merely restrains alienation of the property and does not dispossess the appellants or finally determine rights of either party. Thus, greater hardship would ensue in permitting transfer than in maintaining the property intact till disposal of the suit. 10. In view of the aforesaid, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court regarding existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury cannot be said to be arbitrary or perverse. The order impugned is only protective in nature and subject to final outcome of the suit. Accordingly, no 9 interference is warranted in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Accordingly, the instant appeal being devoid of merit is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti