[2026:RJ-JP:21966] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6900/2024 1. Smt. Harjeet Kaur Wife Of Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha, Aged About 73 Years, Resident Of House No. J- 113, Ashok Chowk, Aadarsh Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 2. Gundeep Kaur Daughter Of Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha, Aged About 43 Years, Resident Of House No. J- 113, Ashok Chowk, Aadarsh Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan. 3. Roopneet Kaur Daughter Of Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha, Aged About 42 Years, Resident Of House No. J- 113, Ashok Chowk, Aadarsh Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Petitioners/Defendants Versus Jasmin Kaur Wife Of Shri Ravneet Singh Chaddha, Daughter Of Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha, Resident Of House No. J- 113, Ashok Chowk, Aadarsh Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan. ----Respondent/Plaintiff For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. Poonam Chand Bhandari with Mr. Rakesh Chandel, Ms. Pratibha Baresa, Mr. Vijendra Praeek HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BIPIN GUPTA Judgment Reportable Date of hearing and conclusion of arguments 15.05.2026 Date on which the judgment was reserved 15.05.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced Full Judgment Date of pronouncement 25.05.2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 22.03.2024, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 3, Jaipur Metropolitan-I, in Civil Suit No. 51/2022, [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (2 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] whereby the application preferred by the defendants-petitioners under Order VI Rule 17 CPC came to be dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the essential facts necessary for adjudication of the present controversy are that the plaintiff-respondent instituted a civil suit in the year 2022 seeking partition and permanent injunction in respect of the properties belonging to her father, Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha. Pursuant thereto, summons were issued to the defendants-petitioners, who, upon effective service, appeared before the learned Trial Court and filed their written statement, specifically denying the averments made in the plaint. 2.1 On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed as many as eight issues on 10.05.2023. Thereafter, the defendants-petitioners moved an application dated 02.02.2024 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC seeking amendment of their written statement. By way of the proposed amendment, it was averred that Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha had expired and that the dispute essentially related to one-fourth (1/4th) share in property bearing House No. J-113, Ashok Chowk, Adarsh Nagar. They further contended that the determination of the lawful legal heirs of Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha ought to be made by the Court on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties during trial. 2.2 The defendants-petitioners further asserted that the claim of the plaintiff-respondent to 1/4th share in the aforesaid property was founded on incorrect and misleading facts. While acknowledging that the plaintiff, being the daughter of Late Shri [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (3 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] Harbhajan Singh Chaddha, may be a legal heir under the law, it was contended that the precise extent of her entitlement, if any, in House No. J-113, Ashok Chowk, Adarsh Nagar, and the manner in which such share, if any, is to devolve, would be determined only upon adjudication of the evidence on record. 2.3 It was also averred that a comprehensive examination of all properties, transactions, financial arrangements, and business assets, including shops and stock holdings, was necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute. According to the defendants- petitioners, the plaintiff-respondent had already received her due share in the family business pursuant to a mutual settlement concerning shops and stock assets. Additionally, it was asserted that Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha had provided the plaintiff with a flat bearing No. A-3/12, Brahma Bhog Society, V.T., Kavde Road, Pune, towards which an amount of approximately Rs. 15,00,000/- had been fully paid. On this basis, it was contended that the plaintiff had no subsisting right, title, or interest in House No. J-113, Ashok Chowk, Adarsh Nagar, and that her claim deserved dismissal. 2.4 The defendants-petitioners further submitted that the proposed amendments were essential for the effective and complete adjudication of the controversy, particularly in view of the fact that the matter was still at a preliminary stage and evidence had not yet commenced. 2.5 Notably, the plaintiff-respondent did not file any reply to the said application. [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (4 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] 2.6 Thereafter, upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 22.03.2024, dismissed the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC and imposed costs of Rs. 500/- upon the defendants-petitioners. 2.7 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 22.03.2024, the defendants-petitioners have preferred the present writ petition before this Hon’ble Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that order dated 22.03.2024 is against the facts and material born on record and so against the provisions of law, as such the impugned order being unjust, illegal and unconstitutional is liable to be quashed and set aside. He further submitted that the learned Trial Court committed a manifest error in rejecting the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the written statement. He argued that Order VI Rule 17 CPC empowers the Court to permit amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings if such amendment is necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties. Since the trial has not yet commenced and evidence is yet to be recorded, the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC is not attracted in the present case. 3.1 Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the law relating to amendment of written statements is liberal in nature and stands on a different footing from amendment of plaints. Learned counsel submitted that even additional or inconsistent pleas in a written statement are permissible, provided no serious prejudice is caused to the opposite party. [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (5 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] 3.2 Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the petitioners, in paragraph 4(a) of the original written statement, had already stated that House No. J-113, Ashok Chowk, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur belonged to Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha and, after his demise, devolved upon all his legal heirs. By way of the proposed amendment, the petitioners merely sought to elaborate and clarify the said plea and not to withdraw any admission. Therefore, the learned trial Court erred in rejecting the amendment application. 3.3 Learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the plaintiff’s claim to 1/4th share in the suit property can only be adjudicated after examination of all relevant properties, business assets, transactions, shops, stocks, and financial arrangements. According to the petitioners, the plaintiff had already received her share in the family business through mutual settlement and had also been provided with a flat at Pune by Late Shri Harbhajan Singh Chaddha for which approximately Rs.15,00,000/- had been paid. Thus, the proposed amendment was necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the dispute. 3.4 Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that pre- trial amendments ought to be liberally permitted, particularly when no prejudice would be caused to the opposite party and the stage of evidence has not yet commenced. He, therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated 22.03.2024 be quashed and set aside, and that the application filed by the petitioners under Order VI Rule 17 CPC be allowed, with the amendments sought in the written statement being taken on record. [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (6 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] 3.5 Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Usha Balashahed Swami & Anr. vs. Kiran Appaso Swami & Anr.; (2007) 5 SCC 602, in support of his case. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submitted that the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was nothing but an attempt to delay the proceedings and prolong adjudication of the suit. He contended that the petitioners had already filed their written statement and were fully aware of all the facts now sought to be introduced by way of amendment; however, no sufficient or bona-fide explanation had been furnished for seeking such amendment at a belated stage. Learned counsel further submitted that the proposed amendment was not merely clarificatory in nature but sought to introduce new facts and pleas which were beyond the scope of the original written statement and would materially alter the defence already taken by the petitioners and will amount to withdrawal of admission. 4.1 Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that the learned Trial Court had rightly exercised its jurisdiction while rejecting the amendment application after considering the facts and circumstances of the case. He submitted that permitting such amendment would cause unnecessary delay in disposal of the suit and would seriously prejudice the respondent/plaintiff, who had already proceeded on the basis of the original pleadings. Learned counsel contended that the petitioners cannot be permitted to improve or change their defence under the garb of amendment [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (7 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] once the matter has substantially progressed before the learned Trial Court. 4.2 In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the respondent prayed that the present writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and the impugned order dated 22.03.2024 passed by the learned Trial Court be upheld. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record. 6. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be apposite to examine the scope of interference available to this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is well settled that the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is extremely limited in nature. 6.1 The said position of law has been reiterated time and again by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgments of Sadhana Lodh vs National Insurance Company Limited & Anr.; 2003 (3) SCC 524 and Ranjeet Singh vs Ravi Prakash; 2004 (3) SCC 682, wherein the Court has held that the interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is warranted only in cases where there is flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of law or justice, or where there is a patent error, not requiring elaborate examination. Thus, the Court ought not to re-appreciate or re- evaluate evidence as if it were exercising appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the Court is vested with limited role and cannot interfere in findings of fact unless the same are shown to be perverse, patently illegal or vitiated by a jurisdictional error. Keeping these [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (8 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] principles in mind, the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the parties have been considered. 7. Before adverting to the rival contentions canvassed on either side and the principal question involved in the present matter, it would be apposite to first examine the relevant statutory provisions upon which the controversy in issue substantially rests. A proper consideration of the same is necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute and for appreciating the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. For the sake of convenience and ready reference, the relevant provisions of Order VI Rule 17 CPC is reproduced hereinbelow: “17. Amendment of pleadings.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.” 7.1 In order to ensure complete, effective, and conclusive adjudication of disputes in a single proceeding, the legislature has incorporated the enabling provision of amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. The said provision permits parties to incorporate all necessary and material facts relevant to the real controversy between them, so that the Court may adjudicate upon the entire dispute in its entirety. This, in turn, furthers the ends of [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (9 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] justice by ensuring that no party is non-suited on account of technical defects in pleadings and that all interconnected issues are resolved in one comprehensive adjudication, thereby reducing unnecessary litigation and conserving judicial time and resources. 7.2 It is well settled that the principles governing amendment of plaints are equally applicable to amendments of written statements; however, the Courts ordinarily adopt a more liberal approach while considering amendments to written statements, as the likelihood of prejudice to the opposite party is comparatively less in such cases. Amendment of pleadings cannot be claimed as a matter of right; however, such prayer ought not to be rejected arbitrarily when refusal thereof may result in irreparable prejudice or multiplicity of proceedings. The underlying object of the provision is to advance substantial justice and not to defeat legitimate rights on technical considerations. Consequently, to allow amendment is the rule, whereas refusal remains an exception. The Court, while exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, is required to ascertain whether the proposed amendment is bona-fide, germane to the controversy involved, and capable of being permitted without causing injustice to the opposite party. 7.3 In the leading case of Cooper v. Smith; (1884) 29 Ch D 700, it was observed that the function of the Court is to determine the substantive rights of the parties and not to penalize them for bonafide mistakes in pleadings, provided correction thereof does not occasion injustice to the opposite side. The said principle continues to govern the exercise of jurisdiction under Order VI [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (10 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] Rule 17 CPC. For the sake of reference, the relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow: “It is well-established principle that the object of courts is to decide the rights of the parties and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights.....I know of no kind of error or mistake which is fraudulent or intended to overreach, the court ought not to correct it if it can be done without injustice to the other party, courts don't exist for the sake of discipline but for the purpose of deciding matters in controversy and I don't regard such amendment as a matter of favour or grace.....it seems to me that as soon as it appeals that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it correct if it can be done without injustice as anything else in case is a matter of right." 7.4 In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Sanjeev Builders Private Limited and Anr.; (2022) 16 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Apex Court comprehensively summarized the governing principles relating to amendment of pleadings and held, inter-alia, that amendments necessary for determining the real controversy and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings should ordinarily be permitted, provided they do not cause irreparable prejudice, withdraw clear admissions, introduce a wholly time- barred claim, or fundamentally alter the nature of the case. The Hon’ble Court further emphasized that a liberal approach is warranted, particularly where the amendment is sought prior to commencement of trial. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow: [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (11 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] “70. Our final conclusions may be summed up thus: 70.1. ……. 71.2.All amendments are to be allowed which are necessary for determining the real question in controversy provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. This is mandatory, as is apparent from the use of the word “shall”, in the latter part of Order 6 Rule 17CPC. 71.3. The prayer for amendment is to be allowed: 71.3.1. If the amendment is required for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy between the parties. 71.3.2. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings, provided (a) the amendment does not result in injustice to the other side, (b) by the amendment, the parties seeking amendment do not seek to withdraw any clear admission made by the party which confers a right on the other side, and (c) the amendment does not raise a time-barred claim, resulting in divesting of the other side of a valuable accrued right (in certain situations). 71.4. A prayer for amendment is generally required to be allowed unless: 71.4.1. By the amendment, a time-barred claim is sought to be introduced, in which case the fact that the claim would be time-barred becomes a relevant factor for consideration. 71.4.2. The amendment changes the nature of the suit. 71.4.3. The prayer for amendment is mala fide, or 71.4.4. By the amendment, the other side loses a valid defence. [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (12 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] 71.5. In dealing with a prayer for amendment of pleadings, the court should avoid a hypertechnical approach, and is ordinarily required to be liberal especially where the opposite party can be compensated by costs. 71.6. Where the amendment would enable the court to pin-pointedly consider the dispute and would aid in rendering a more satisfactory decision, the prayer for amendment should be allowed. 71.7. Where the amendment merely sought to introduce an additional or a new approach without introducing a time-barred cause of action, the amendment is liable to be allowed even after expiry of limitation. 71.8. Amendment may be justifiably allowed where it is intended to rectify the absence of material particulars in the plaint. 71.9. Delay in applying for amendment alone is not a ground to disallow the prayer. Where the aspect of delay is arguable, the prayer for amendment could be allowed and the issue of limitation framed separately for decision. 71.10. Where the amendment changes the nature of the suit or the cause of action, so as to set up an entirely new case, foreign to the case set up in the plaint, the amendment must be disallowed. Where, however, the amendment sought is only with respect to the relief in the plaint, and is predicated on facts which are already pleaded in the plaint, ordinarily the amendment is required to be allowed. 71.11. Where the amendment is sought before commencement of trial, the court is required to be liberal in its approach. The court is required to bear in mind the fact that the opposite party would have a chance to meet the case set up in amendment. As such, where the amendment does not result in [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (13 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] irreparable prejudice to the opposite party, or divest the opposite party of an advantage which it had secured as a result of an admission by the party seeking amendment, the amendment is required to be allowed. Equally, where the amendment is necessary for the court to effectively adjudicate on the main issues in controversy between the parties, the amendment should be allowed.” (Emphasis supplied) 7.5 Thus, this Court is of firm opinion that while adjudicating an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, the paramount consideration before the Court is whether the proposed amendment is bona-fide, necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute, and capable of being permitted without causing injustice or prejudice to the opposite party. 7.6 In the present case, a perusal of the impugned order reveals that issues had already been framed on 10.05.2023 and the trial had commenced thereafter. Therefore, the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC squarely applies, which mandates that no amendment shall ordinarily be permitted after commencement of trial unless the party demonstrates that despite due diligence, such plea could not have been raised earlier. 7.7 This Court finds that the defendants-petitioners failed to disclose any subsequent event or newly discovered fact warranting amendment at such a belated stage. In the original written statement, the defendants-petitioners had specifically pleaded that the disputed property bearing No.J-113, Ashok Chowk, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur belonged to Late Harbhajan Singh and, after his demise, devolved upon all his legal heirs. It was also admitted [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (14 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] that the plaintiff was residing in a portion of the said property. However, by way of the proposed amendment, the defendants- petitioners sought to introduce vague and inconsistent pleas regarding determination of shares and rights of legal heirs. Such proposed amendment was clearly inconsistent with the earlier stand already taken in the written statement and amount to withdrawal of admission. 7.8 This Court finds that if the defendants-petitioners had denied the right of the plaintiff in original reply and then sought the proposed amendment in regard to house then it could have amounted as clarification but in this case, the defendants- petitioners had accepted the right of the plaintiff in the disputed house and therefore, the amendment if allowed will lead to withdrawal of the admission which is impermissible as per Judgment of Sanjeev Builders (Supra). 7.9 This Court further finds that the amendment application did not clearly specify the exact pleadings sought to be amended and merely proposed insertion of vague paragraphs without furnishing any explanation as to why such pleas could not have been raised earlier despite due diligence. No foundation, as required under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC, was laid by the defendants- petitioners. 7.10 In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Trial Court rightly concluded that the amendment application was vague, belated, and intended to delay the proceedings. The imposition of costs of Rs. 500/- also cannot be said to be arbitrary or excessive. [2026:RJ-JP:21966] (15 of 15) [CW-6900/2024] 7.11 Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the well-reasoned order passed by the learned trial Court. The present writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The impugned order dated 22.03.2024 is affirmed. 7.12 Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. (BIPIN GUPTA),J Sudha/112