MR. LAKSHMIKANT DIGAMBAR JOSHI v. RUTURAJ CO-OP. HO.SOC.THR.ITS CHAIRMAN-KANTILAL S. MUNOT AND SECRETARY R. P. SHAH
CRA/353/2026 · 2026-09-01
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 7684 (BOM) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 7684 (BOM) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC Santosh IN THE HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 353 OF 2026 Lakshmikant Digambar Joshi ...Applicant Versus Ruturaj Co-op. Housing Society Through its Chairman and Ors. …Respondents WITH INTERIM APPLICATION NO.3471 OF 2026 Mr. S. C. Wakankar, for the Applicant. Mr. Jaydeep Deo, for Respondents
CORAM:
N. J. JAMADAR, J. DATED:
1st SEPTEMBER, 2026
Order:-
1. This revision application is directed against an order dated 4th March, 2026, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Pune, whereby an application preferred by the Applicant – Original Defendant No. 1 for the return of the plaint for the presentation to the proper Court under the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code’), came to be rejected. 2. The Respondent No. 1 – Plaintiff is a Housing Co-operative Society, registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 ("the Act, 1960"). The Respondent 1/8 SANTOSH SUBHASH KULKARNI Digitally signed by SANTOSH SUBHASH KULKARNI Date: 2026.09.05 17:47:56 +0530
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC No. 1 instituted the suit with the assertions that the Applicant – Defendant No. 1 is its member. The Society was formed with the object to provide plots to its members for the construction of bunglows/residential premises for their own use. As per the approved by-laws of the Society and its resolutions, the plots can only be used for the private residence of the members and their respective families, and no multi-storied ownership scheme is allowed to be implemented on the plots allotted by the Society. 3. Defendant No.1 and Defendant Nos. 2 to 4, who are the family members of the Defendant No.1, started development on the subject plot of land. It transpired that the Defendant Nos.1 to 4 had surreptitiously entered into a registered Development Agreement with Defendant No. 5, a registered partnership firm of which Defendant Nos. 5A and 5B are the partners, to construct a multi-storied building over the subject plot. Irrevocable Power of Attorney has also been executed in favour of Defendant No. 5, and thereby, cumulatively, transferring the development rights in favour of Defendant No. 5, which, inter alia, empowered the Defendant No. 5 to sell/transfer units in the multi-storied structure to be erected on the subject plot. 4. The Plaintiff further asserted, Defendant Nos. 6 and 7; the Planning Authorities, have sanctioned the building plan without 2/8
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC examining the permissibility of such development. Hence, the suit seeking declaration that the Development Agreement and the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 11th March, 2022, and the Correction Deeds dated 1st April, 2022, in respect of the suit property executed by and between the Defendant Nos.
1 to 4 and Defendant No. 5 are null and void, and not binding upon the plaintiff Society and its members, the building plan sanctioned by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 is illegal, and the consequential reliefs of injunction. 5. The Applicant – Defendant No. 1 appeared in the suit and filed application for the return of the plaint, contending, inter alia, that the pivotal issue in the suit revolved around the disputes between the plaintiff Society and Defendant No. 1 member on account of the alleged breach of the by-laws of the Plaintiff Society. Therefore, the Co-operative Court had exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes. Conversely, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction was barred by the provisions contained in Section 163 of the Act, 1960. 6. By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge was persuaded to reject the application observing, inter alia, that the dispute was not covered by the provisions contained in Section 91 of the Act, 1960, and having regard to the prayers in 3/8
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC the suit, only the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the suit. 7. Mr. Wakankar, the learned Counsel for the Applicant, submitted that, at the heart of the controversy is the construction of a multi-storied building, which the plaintiff asserts is impermissible as per the by-laws of the Society. Resultantly, the essential dispute is in regard to the business of the Society and since that dispute has arisen between the Society, and one of its members, only the Co-operative Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the dispute of the present nature in view of the provisions contained in Section 91(1) of the Act, 1960. 8. Mr.
Wakankar, took the Court through the averments in paragraphs 3, 4 and 11 of the plaint, to bolster up the submission that, the essential dispute was in relation to the alleged violation of the by-laws and resolutions passed by the Society, and the declarations sought by the Plaintiff in regard to the instruments executed by the Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5 were in the nature of subsidiary reliefs. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Wakankar placed reliance on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of N. Jethani v. Shri Shivaji Co-operative Housing Society 4/8
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC Ltd. Pune and others1. 9. Per contra, Mr. Deo, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 – Plaintiff, submitted that the dispute was not only between the parties enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of Sub- section (1) of Section 91 of the Act, 1960. Nor the subject matter of the dispute fell within the specified categories. The reliefs of declaration and injunction sought by the Plaintiff were beyond the remit of the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. Thus, only the Civil Court has the jurisdiction. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Deo placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Margaret Almeida and Others vs. Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society Limited and Others2. 10. The legal position as to the interplay between the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the Co-operative Court under the Act, 1960 is well settled by a catena of decisions. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is plenary and omnipresent. Conversely, the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in the Act, 1960; in the context of the controversy at hand, Section 91 under the caption “disputes”. To attract the provisions contained in 1 2015(2) Mh.L.J. 589. 2 (2012) 5 SCC 642. 5/8
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC Section 91, the twin test of the “type” of the dispute and the
“identity” of the parties must be satisfied.
In other words, the dispute must be of the “type” described in Sub-section (1) of Section 91, and such dispute must have arisen between the parties who belong to any of the categories specified in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section (1) of that section. 11. In the case of Margaret Almeida (supra), the Supreme Court, after an analysis of the provisions contained in Section 91, Section 163 and related provisions of the Act, 1960, enunciated in clear and explicit terms that, the disputes which are mandatorily required to be referred to the Co-operative Court should be of the category which are referred to in Section 91(1), and such disputes must have arisen between the parties to dispute who should belong to one or the other categories specified under clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 91, referred to therein as, “enumerated persons”. The Supreme Court exposited that, both the subject matter as well as the parties to the dispute must be those specified under that section. In other words, the Supreme Court clarified, if either of the aforementioned requirement is not satisfied then the dispute cannot be adjudicated by the Co-operative Court. If one of the parties to the dispute is not an enumerated person, the 6/8
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC question, whether the subject-matter of the dispute is one which falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court need not be examined. Similarly, if it is found in a given case that the subject-matter of the dispute is not covered by Section 91, an inquiry into the question whether the parties to the dispute fall under any of the categories enumerated under Section 91 would become irrelevant. 12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case at hand, especially in the light of the nature of the instruments executed by Defendant Nos.
1 to 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5, which broadly indicate that, in lieu of the transfer of development rights, Defendant No. 1 is to get two flats and monetary consideration of Rs.1 Crore only, and the Defendant No. 5 is entitled to sell, transfer and monetize rest of the land and constructed units that may become available, it becomes abundantly clear that, the twin test is not satisfied. Neither the dispute is confined to the type of the disputes covered by sub- section (1) of Section 91, nor the parties to the suit belong to the categories of persons enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub- section (1) of Section 91. Moreover, the Co-operative Court has no jurisdiction to grant the declarations in regard to the legality and validity of the instruments executed by Defendant Nos. 1 to 7/8
901-CRA353-2026+.DOC 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5, much less in regard to the development permission granted by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7. 13. The submission of Mr. Wakankar that, the dispute ultimately boils down to the binding character of the bye-laws and resolutions of the Society restricting the development over the plots does not carry the matter any further, as even if some part of the dispute may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court, yet, the entirety of the dispute is completely beyond the remit of its jurisdiction, and only the Civil Court having plenary jurisdiction can entertain, try and decide the controversy and grant the reliefs of the nature claimed in the suit. 14. Resultantly, the learned Civil Judge committed no error in rejecting the application for return of the plaint. Thus, there is neither any jurisdictional error nor material irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction by the trial Court, so as to warrant exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court. 15. The application thus stands dismissed. 16. In view of dismissal of the revision application, IA/3471/2026 also stands disposed.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.] 8/8