Page No.# 1/12 GAHC010085712026 2026:GAU-AS:7960- DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WA/174/2026 MINU BEGUM W/O. SOFI KAMAL FARUK, VILL.- KATHALGURI, P/O. MATHALGURI, P/S. CHAPOR, DIST. DHUBRI, ASSAM. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 5 ORS. REP. BY THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM, PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI, ASSAM, PIN-781006 2:THE VCOMMISSIONER PANCHAYAT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PANJABARI JURIPAR GUWAHATI ASSAM PIN-781006 3:THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION OF ASSAM REP. BY THE SECRETARY DISPUR GUWAHATI ASSAM PIN-781006 4:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER CUM DISTRICT MAGISTRATE DHUBRI DIST. DHUBRI ASSAM PIN-783301 5:JOYNAL ABEDIN S/O. ISRAIL HAQUE VILL.- KATHALGURI P/O. MATHALGURI Page No.# 2/12 P/S. CHAPOR DIST. DHUBRI ASSAM PIN-78332 Advocate for the Petitioner : MS A DAS, MR. H ALI,MS S DAS,MR F U BARBHUIYA,MR H R A CHOUDHURY Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, SC, ELECTION COMMISSION.,SC, P AND R.D. BEFORE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. ASHUTOSH KUMAR HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY ORDER 08.06.2026 (A.D.Choudhury, J). 1. We have heard Mr. H. R. A. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. F. U. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. D. K. Sarmah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4; Mr. S. Dutta, learned Standing Counsel for the P&RD Department representing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr N. B. Kayastha, learned counsel on behalf of Mr. R. Dubey, learned Standing Counsel for the Assam State Election Commission representing the respondent No. 3. 2. This intra-court appeal calls into question the correctness of the common Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.04.2026, passed in WP(C) No.6284/2025 and WP(C) No. Page No.# 3/12 3535/2025, whereby the order dtd.29.10.2025 passed by the District Commissioner removing the writ petitioner from the office of Member of Ward No. 7 of No. 4 Rangamati Gaon Panchayat Under No. 1 Folihamari Zilla Parishad in Dhubri District, on the grounds of disqualification under Section 111 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 was set aside. 3. The learned Single Judge held that the alleged disqualification, even if assumed to exist, pertained to a circumstance which existed on the date of filing of the nomination and therefore, could only be agitated through an election petition and not by recourse to the power of removal exercised by the District Commissioner. The judgment proceeds on the ratio formulated in Aysha Khatun –Vs- State of Assam, reported in 2026:GAU-AS:2734. 4. The principal submission urged by Mr. H. R. A. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant is that District Commissioner was vested with authority under Rule 62 of Assam Panchayat (Constitution), Rules 1995 to examine whether elected member suffered from any of the disqualifications contemplated under section 111(2) of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 and upon satisfaction regarding existence of such disqualification to remove member from office. 5. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the power under Rule 62 is not confined only to disqualifications incurred after election and extends equally to disqualifications which may have existed on the date of nomination but were Page No.# 4/12 discovered later. 6. The issue, therefore, concerns the constitutional relationship between electoral adjudication and statutory disqualification; between the authority of the election tribunal and that of the District Commissioner; and ultimately between the principles of electoral finality embodied in Part IX of the Constitution of India and the statutory mechanism for removal of members who incur disqualifications. 7. Part IX of the Constitution introduced Panchayat Raj institutions as constitutionally recognised units of democratic self-government. The constitutional design is not confined to the creation of local bodies. It also incorporates safeguards intended to preserve the integrity and stability of the electoral process. 8. Article 243-F under Chapter IX deals with disqualifications for membership of the panchayat. Clause 1 stipulates the circumstances in which a person shall be disqualified from being chosen as and for being a member of a panchayat. Clause 2 provides that where any question arises as to whether a member has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in Clause 1, such question shall be referred for decision to such authority and in such manner as may be provided by state legislation. 9. Equally significant is Article 243-O. Page No.# 5/12 The constitutional mandate contained therein excludes judicial or other collateral interference with elections and declares that no election to a panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to the authority and in the manner prescribed by law. 10. Articles 243-F and 243-O are not isolated provisions. They operate in tandem. Article 243-F recognises the existence of disqualification. Article 243-O prescribes the exclusive mechanism through which disputes affecting the validity of an election may be adjudicated. The constitutional balance lies in ensuring that disqualification provisions are enforced without permitting administrative authorities to unsettle the completed electoral process outside the framework contemplated by law. 11. The Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, was enacted to give effect to Part IX of the Constitution. 12. Section 111 embodies the statutory catalogue of disqualifications. A careful reading of Section 111 reveals that certain disqualifications relate to eligibility at the threshold stage of contesting an election, whereas others may arise during the tenure of office. 13. The legislative phraseology “shall not be elected or co-opted and remain” indicates that the provision contemplates both situations. Section 111(1)(h) assumes particular significance. It provides that Page No.# 6/12 where any question arises, whether a member has become subject to any disqualification, under the section, the matter shall be referred for decision to the authority prescribed by law. This provision is a statutory reflection of Clause 2 of Article 243F. 14. The procedure contemplated under Section 111 has been elaborated in Rule 62 of the Assam Panchayat (Constitution) Rules, 1995. Rule 62 prescribes the condition and procedure governing various forms of disqualification and identifies the authority competent to examine the issue. 15. It is true that Rule 62 authorises the District Commissioner, in certain circumstances, to remove a member who is found to have incurred a statutory disqualification. Yet, the rule must be construed within the boundaries of the parent enactment and the constitution. Delegated legislation cannot enlarge jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution permits. 16. The controversy in the present case turns upon a distinction of fundamental importance. A candidate may be disqualified if a disqualification exists on the date of nomination. If, despite such disqualification, the nomination is accepted and the candidate is subsequently returned as elected, the acceptance of the nomination becomes part of the electoral process itself. Conversely, a candidate may validly contest the election and Page No.# 7/12 thereafter incur a disqualification during the tenure of office. Such a case raises no issue regarding the validity of the election. It concerns only the continued entitlement of the elected member to remain in office. 17. The constitution treats these two categories differently. The former affects the validity of the election. The latter affects the continuation in office. 18. Therefore, the source of jurisdiction becomes apparent. Questions relating to the validity of an election fall within the domain of election adjudication. Questions relating to supervening disqualification fall within the jurisdiction contemplated by Article 243F(2) and section 111(1)(h). 19. Another important aspect is that Article 243-O embodies a constitutional principle of considerable significance. Elections cannot remain perpetually vulnerable to collateral attack. Democratic institutions require certainty. The will of the electorate, once expressed through a completed election, cannot be displaced except through the specialised mechanism created by law. 20. The expression “no election shall be called in question except by an election petition” has consistently received a broad interpretation in election jurisprudence. The phrase encompasses not merely the final declaration of result but every constituent stage of the electoral process culminating in the Page No.# 8/12 election of a candidate. 21. Acceptance or rejection of nomination is an integral component of that electoral process. An allegation that a candidate was ineligible on the date of nomination is, in substance, an allegation that the nomination ought not to have been accepted/the nomination has wrongly been accepted. 22. If the challenge is accepted, the inevitable consequence is that the election itself becomes vulnerable. Therefore, falls squarely within the constitutional prohibition contained in Article 243-O. 23. The Assam Panchayat Act gives statutory effect to this constitutional command through Section 129, which mandates that an election may be questioned only before the Election Tribunal by means of an Election Petition, within 60 days from the date of the declaration of the election result. Thus, the Election Tribunal is not an alternative forum but is the exclusive forum designated by the constitution and the statute for adjudicating disputes affecting the validity of elections. 24. The submission of Mr H. R. A. Choudhury, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, would effectively permit the District Commissioner to undertake, after declaration of results and enquiry into whether the returned candidate was disqualified on the date of nomination. Such an interpretation, projected by the Learned Senior counsel for the Appellant, would have serious consequences; It would enable Page No.# 9/12 what is essentially an election dispute to be adjudicated administratively. The consequence would be the creation of two parallel jurisdictions: one before the election tribunal under section 129 and another before the District Commissioner under Rule 62. The constitution does not countenance such duplication. 25. Thus, acceptance of the contention of the appellants would permit a defeated candidate who fails to invoke the election petition remedy within the prescribed limitation period to achieve the same result indirectly through the administrative route. 26. A construction producing such a consequence must be rejected for the reason that it would render Article 243-O and Section 129 substantially nugatory. 27. Rule 62 cannot be interpreted as creating adjudicatory jurisdiction upon a District Commission, which the constitution itself excludes. 28. Such a rule must be read harmoniously with Article 243-O and Section 129. The construction of Rule 62 makes it clear that it empowers the District Commissioner to act where the disqualification is incurred or operates during the tenure of office and not where the dispute essentially concerns the validity of the election itself. 29. In the present case, the allegation against the elected member pertains to facts that, according to the complainant, Page No.# 10/12 existed prior to the filing of the nomination paper. The case of the appellant is not that the disqualification was incurred after the election. 30. The entire foundation of the proceeding rests on the assertion that the candidate was already disqualified when the nomination was filed. If the allegations were correct, the nomination ought to have been rejected at the scrutiny stage. Once the nomination was accepted and the election concluded, the dispute became one concerning the propriety of accepting the nomination. 31. Such a challenge is to be raised only by way of an election petition before the competent tribunal within the statutory period. However, admittedly, no such election petition was instituted. 32. The jurisdiction which could not have been exercised by the District Commissioner immediately after declaration of results cannot become available merely for the reason that the information regarding alleged disqualification surfaced later. The jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the dispute and not upon the date on which the dispute is discovered. 33. During the course of the hearing, it was argued that if the order of the district commissioner is held to be without jurisdiction, liberty may nevertheless be reserved to the appellant or the complainant to pursue an election petition before the competent election tribunal. We are unable to accede to this submission, too. Page No.# 11/12 34. Clause (b) of Section 129 stipulates that no election to any panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented within 60 days from the date of declaration of election results to the election tribunal. 35. Election law consistently proceeds on the principle that where a statute creates a special remedy and simultaneously prescribes the period within which the remedy must be invoked, the limitation becomes an integral component of the remedy. The tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction beyond what the statute permits. Equally, the constitutional court cannot enlarge that jurisdiction by judicial directions. 36. Once the period prescribed for the question in the election has expired, the election attains finality. Subject only to such statutory exception as the legislature itself may create, courts cannot revive a remedy which the statute regards as extinguished. 37. Consequently, while holding that the District Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to entertain the complaint relating to a disqualification which occurred prior to acceptance of the nomination paper, we are equally of the view that no liberty be granted to initiate election proceedings before the Election Tribunal after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. 38. The consequence may appear harsh in an individual case, but certainly, electoral matters themselves are of constitutional value Page No.# 12/12 and cannot be sacrificed to accommodate individual equities. 39. The learned Single Judge correctly appreciated the constitution and statutory scheme. The judgment under appeal does not rest merely on a technical objection regarding procedure; It preserves the constitutional distinction between electoral adjudication and post-election disqualification. 40. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning adopted in Aysha Khatun (supra) and applied in the impugned judgment. 41. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 42. The common Judgment and Order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.04.2026, passed in WP(C) No.6284/2025 and WP(C) No.3535/2025, is affirmed. 43. While parting with the record, we clarify that we have expressed no opinion on the factual correctness of the allegations regarding disqualification. The appeal has been decided solely on the question of jurisdiction. JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE Comparing Assistant