25_WP11678_26.doc IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.11678 OF 2026 Awadesh Ramnarayan Vishwakarma … Petitioner Vs. State of Maharashtra and others … Respondents None for Petitioners. Ms. G. R. Raghuwanshi, AGP for Respondents-State. CORAM : MANISH PITALE & SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ. DATE : SEPTEMBER 09, 2026 P.C. : . None for the petitioner. 2. The petitioner is a borrower, who has filed this petition challenging an order passed by the Competent Magistrate under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Securitisation Act). The petitioner also seeks a direction from this Court restraining the Court Commissioner from taking physical possession of the secured asset. 3. The present petition cannot be entertained in the face of alternative efficacious statutory remedy available to the petitioner of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the provisions of the Securitisation Act. 4. In the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and others, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Supreme Court held as follows:- “43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with 1/3 MINAL SANDIP PARAB Digitally signed by MINAL SANDIP PARAB Date: 2026.09.10 16:31:13 +0530 25_WP11678_26.doc greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 5. It appears that despite the said position of law being repeatedly indicated by the Supreme Court, the High Courts were still entertaining the writ petitions, and therefore in the case of Celir LLP Vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and others, (2024) 2 SCC 1, the Supreme Court was constrained to observe as follows:- 2/3 25_WP11678_26.doc “101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon, it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.” 6. In view of the above, we decline to entertain the present writ petition. Accordingly, it is dismissed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to approach the DRT under the provisions of the Securitisation Act in accordance with law, if the petitioner has not already availed of the said alternative remedy. (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.) 3/3 Minal Parab