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2026 DAILYLAW 7630 (GAU)

SHAHITON BIBI v. THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS.

WP(C)/5203/2019 · 2026-06-08

Pranjal Das, Sanjay Kumar Medhi

Writ Petition (Civil)body2026

Judgment text

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Page No.# 1/19 GAHC010170592019 2026:GAU-AS:8095 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/5203/2019 SHAHITON BIBI D/O. LT. HASEN ALI, W/O. ABDUL MAZID KHAN, VILL. SIMALUBARI, P.S. TAMULPUR, DIST. BAKSA, BTC, ASSAM, PIN-781367. VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA AND 6 ORS. REP. BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI-01. 2:THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA NEW DELHI-01. 3:THE STATE OF ASSAM REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM HOME DEPTT. DISPUR GUWAHATI-06. 4:THE ASSAM CO-ORDINATOR OF NRC BHANGAGARH ASSAM GHY.-05. 5:THE DY. COMMISSIONER BAKSA BTC ASSAM Page No.# 2/19 PIN-781343. 6:THE SUPDT. OF POLICE (B) BAKSA BTC ASSAM PIN-781343. 7:THE OFFICER IN CHARGE TAMULPUR POLICE STATION DIST. BAKSA BTC ASSAM PIN-781368 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. M U MAHMUD, MR S ISLAM,MS. R AHMED,MS K GOGOI,MS F N ZAMAN Advocate for the Respondent : ASSTT.S.G.I., SC, NRC,SC, ECI,SC, F.T B E F O R E Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI Hon’ble MR. JUSTICE PRANJAL DAS Advocate for the petitioner : Shri MU Mahmud Advocates for the respondents : Shri J. Payeng, SC- Home Deptt. & NRC, Shri P. Sarma, GA, Assam; Shri N. Kalita, for ECI. Shri K. Gogoi, CGC. Date on which judgment is reserved : 25.05.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 09.06.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : NA Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes Page No.# 3/19 Judgment & Order (S.K. Medhi , J.) The extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked by filing this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by putting to challenge the opinion rendered vide impugned order dated 27.05.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal, Baksa in F.T. Case No. 1993/BAKSA/2016. By the impugned judgment, the petitioner, who was the proceedee before the learned Tribunal, has been declared to be a foreigner post 25.03.1971. 2. The facts of the case may be put in a nutshell as follows: (i) A reference was made by the Superintendent of Police (B), BaksaDistrict, against the petitioner giving rise to the aforesaid F.T. Case No. 1993/BAKSA/2016. (ii) As per requirement u/s 9 of the Foreigner’s Act, 1946 to prove that the proceedee is not a foreigner, the petitioner had filed the written statement on 26.11.2018 along with certaindocumentsand adduced evidence. (iii) The learned Tribunal, after considering the facts and circumstances and taking into account of the provisions of Section 9 of the Foreigners’ Act, 1946 had come to a finding that the petitioner, as opposite party, had failed to discharge the burden cast upon her and accordingly, the opinion was rendered declaring the petitioner to be a foreign national post 25.03.1971. 3. We have heard Shri MU Mahmud, learned counsel for the petitioner. We have also heard Shri J. Payeng, learned Standing Counsel, Home Department & Page No.# 4/19 NRC; Shri P. Sarma, learned GA, Assam, Shri N. Kalita, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Shri A.I. Ali, learned Standing Counsel, Election Commission of India and Shri K. Gogoi, learned CGC. We have also carefully examined the records which were requisitioned vide an order dated 29.09.2019. 4. Shri Mahmud, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner could prove her case with cogent evidence and in view of the fact that there was no rebuttal evidence, the learned Tribunal should have accepted the said proof and accordingly hold the petitioner to be a citizen of India. In this regard, he has referred to the evidence adduced by the DWs and also the following documentary evidence: (i) Ext-1 - Xerox copy of NRC details of Chabiran; (ii) Ext-2 – Certified copy of the extract of 1970 electoral roll; (iii) Ext-3 – Copy of Voter List of 1960; (iv) Ext-4 – Certified copy of the extract of 1997 electoral roll; (v) Ext-5 – certified copy of the extract of 2006 electoral roll; (vi) Ext-6 - certified copy of the extract of 2009 electoral roll; (vii) Ext-7 –Electoral PI Card No.GGF7540354; (viii) Ext-8 - certified copy of the extract of 1997 electoral roll; (ix) Ext- 9- certified copy of the extract of 2006 electoral roll; (x) Ext-10 - certified copy of the extract 2009 electoral roll; (xi) Ext-11–PAN Card; (xii) Ext-12 – Revenue Clearance Certificate; (Xiii) Ext-13 – Link Certificate; Page No.# 5/19 (xiv) Ext-14 – Certificate No. 257 dated 10.01.19 by Mahen Rajbongshi. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the written statement, all material disclosures were made. It is submitted that a certified copy of a Chitha was proved as Ext.1 containing the name of her grandfather – Alam Sheikh of village – Katajhar. The Voters List of the year 1970 has been relied upon containing the name of her father as Hasen Ali followed by the Voters List of 1985 containing the name of her mother as Sabiran Nessa. He has submitted that the father of the petitioner had expired after 1975. The next Voters Lists relied upon are of the years 1997, 2006 and 2009 containing the name of her mother as Sabiran Bibi. She has also relied upon a Voters List of 2016 containing the name of her brother – Mato Ali. The said list is however an uncertified copy. The petitioner has relied upon the EPIC of her mother followed by Voters Lists of 1997, 2006 and 2009 containing her name. It is submitted that in the year 2013, her name was prefixed with “D” in the Voters List. She has also relied upon the PAN Card describing herself to be the daughter of Hasen Ali. Reliance has also been placed on a Revenue Clearance Certificate containing her name and this Certificate was proved by the Mouzadar as DW3. A Certificate issued by the Chairman, VCDC dated 07.05.2018 had also been relied upon along with a Certificate dated 10.01.2019 by the Gaonburah. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that evidence was adduced by the petitioner as DW1 and the said evidence could not be refuted in the cross-examination. A similar submission has been made with regard to the evidence adduced by her brother – Moto Ali as DW2. The Revenue Certificate was proved by the Assistant Helper of the Gobordhana Mouza as DW3. He has also submitted that the observation by the learned Tribunal to push back the petitioner is without jurisdiction inasmuch as, the role of the Tribunal is only to Page No.# 6/19 give an opinion. 7. He has submitted that wrong recording of names, ages and other details in the Voters List cannot cause prejudice to the proceedee as those are the duties of the enumerator. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Abdul Muttali Vs. UoI reported in 2015 (2) GLT 617. Reliance has also been placed in the case of Sirajul Hoque Vs. UoI reported in (2019) 5 SCC 534 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that minor inconsistencies can be overlooked. By submitting that Section 106 of the Evidence Act,per se would not relieve the prosecution, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Sucha Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2001) 4 SCC 375 and Vikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2006) 12 SCC 306. He has submitted that Section 9 of the Foreigners Act is pari materia to Section 106 of the Evidence Act. He has also relied upon the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Andhra Bank Financial Services Ltd. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 94 regarding the burden of proof. Reliance has also been placed in the case of Rahim Ali Vs. UoI reported in AIR 2024 SC 3551. 8. The learned counsel accordingly submits that in view of the availability of the aforesaid materials, the impugned opinion could not have been rendered against the petitioner and therefore, the same requires interference. 9. Per contra, Shri Payeng, the learned Standing Counsel, Home Department has categorically refuted the stand taken on behalf of the petitioner. Hesubmits that a proceeding under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 relates to determination as to whether the proceedee is a foreigner or not. Therefore, the relevant facts are especially within the knowledge of the Page No.# 7/19 proceedee and accordingly, the burden of proving citizenship rests absolutely upon the proceedee, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, 1872 and this is mandated under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act, 1946. However, in the instant case, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden. It is also submitted that rebuttal evidence is not mandatory in every case and would be given only if necessary. Hefurther submits that the evidence of a proceedee has to be cogent, relevant, which inspire confidence and acceptable and only thereafter, the question of adducing rebuttal evidence may come in. 10. The learning Standing Counsel has further submitted that the written statement is the basic document which is supposed to lay down the foundation of the case of the proceeding and the written statement in the instant case lacks details and is totally vague. There is no date or year of the birth of the petitioner and there is no details of the family members. In this connection, he has relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal vs. Union of India reported in(2005) 5 SCC 665: “17. There is good and sound reason for placing the burden of proof upon the person concerned who asserts to be a citizen of a particular country. In order to establish one's citizenship, normally he may be required to give evidence of (i) his date of birth (ii) place of birth (iii) name of his parents (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Sometimes the place of birth of his grandparents may also be relevant like under Section 6-A(1) (d) of the Citizenship Act. All these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. After he has given evidence on these points, the State authorities can verify the facts and can then lead evidence in rebuttal, if Page No.# 8/19 necessary. If the State authorities dispute the claim of citizenship by a person and assert that he is a foreigner, it will not only be difficult but almost impossible for them to first lead evidence on the aforesaid points. This is in accordance with the underlying policy of Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 11. He has submitted that there are no pleadings regarding owning of any land. He has pointed out that the written statement was filed on 26.11.2018 and the land document which has been relied upon is dated 15.11.2018. Therefore, the said document was very much available in spite of which, the same was not even mentioned in the Written Statement. However, it is only in the evidence that this document has been mentioned. He has submitted that there are not statements of any inheritance or of any land record in the name of the father and Ext. 1 pertains only to the grandfather. He has also highlighted that there is a statement that the family had shifted from Katajhar to Samulbari in the year 1973, but the land revenue document is of the year 2018 which pertains to Katajhar. He has also submitted that the land revenue receipts cannot be construed to be evidence to prove citizenship and, in any case, DW3, who is the Assistant Helper in the Gobardhana Mouza did not bring the connected records. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of Jabeda Begum v. Union of India [ WP(c) 7451/2019; Disposed of on 12.02.2020] and the following observations have been pressed into service: “The learned Standing Counsel has further submitted that the land document is not the land for which the revenue receipt has been relied upon. While one document pertains to Miyadi land, the other is Eksona Page No.# 9/19 land. He further submits that the landrevenue has been paid only after initiation of the proceedings. He submits that the Gaonbura certificate has not been proved and therefore would not constitute as any evidence. Similarly, the VCDC certificate was not proved.” 12. As regards the case laws, Shri Payeng, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that those are not applicable. He submits that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sirajul Haque(supra)has put a rider that minor inconsistencies may be ignored provided that all other things are consistent. He has also relied upon the case of Basiran Bibi v. UOI reported in 2018 (1) GLT 372wherein the case of Abdul Muttali (supra) has been distinguished. For ready reference, the following observations have been pressed into service: “30. Reliance placed in the case of Abdul Matali @ Mataleb (Md.) (supra), can be of no assistance to the petitioner inasmuch, as it has already been clarified by this Court in previous decisions that the said decision did not lay down any law and was a decision confined to the facts and circumstances of that case. Regarding discrepancies in the voters' lists which the petitioner contended were not her creation being entered into by officials of Election Commission and therefore should not be used adversely against the petitioner, such contention is without any substance. The voters' lists were adduced as evidence by the petitioner herself to prove her case that she was not a foreigner but a citizen of India. Petitioner cannot insist that only that portions of the voters' lists which are in her favour should be accepted and those portions going against her should be over-looked. This is not how a document put forward as a piece of evidence should be examined. The document has to be appreciated as Page No.# 10/19 a whole.” 13. Shri Payeng has also submitted that oral evidence of the projected brother would not by itself be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof unless such evidence is supported by documentary evidence. He further submits that the case of Rahim Ali(supra) was decided without the Hon’ble bench being apprised of the binding decision of a Larger Bench in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra).In this regard, he relies upon the case of Iman Ali Vs. UOI reported in 2026 (1) GLT 294 wherein this aspect has been explained. 14. In support of his submission that a certificate has to be proved from contemporaneous records, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of Romila Khatun vs. Union of India reported in 2018 (4) GLT 373 and the following observations have been pressed into service. “20. It is trite that documentary evidence would have to be proved on the basis of the record and the contemporaneous record must substantiate and prove the contents of the document. Proof of document is one thing and proof of contents is another. Not only the document would have to be proved but its contents would also have to be proved. That apart, the truthfulness of the contents of the document would also have to be established from the record. A document or the contents of the document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge. …” 15. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the case of Nur Begum Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 2020 (3) GLT 347wherein certain observations regarding exercise of Certiorari jurisdiction have been made which read as follows: Page No.# 11/19 “9. On the available materials, we find that the Tribunal rendered opinion/order upon due appreciation of the entire facts, evidence and documents brought on record. We find no infirmity in the findings and opinion recorded by the Tribunal. We would observe that the certiorari jurisdiction of the writ court being supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction, this Court would refrain from reviewing the findings of facts reached by the Tribunal. No case is made out that the impugned opinion/order was rendered without affording opportunity of hearing or in violation of the principles of natural justice and/or that it suffers from illegality on any ground of having been passed by placing reliance on evidence which is legally impermissible in law and/or that the Tribunal refused to admit admissible evidence and/or that the findings finds no support by any evidence at all. In other words, the petitioner has not been able to make out any case demonstrating any errors apparent on the face of the record to warrant interference of the impugned opinion.” 16. He has also relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupajan Begum vs. Union of India reported in(2018) 1 SCC 579, wherein it has been laid down that a certificate has to be proved on two aspects, firstly, the authenticity of the same and secondly, the authenticity of the contents. 17. The learned Standing Counsel has accordingly submitted that the writ petition be dismissed and the interim order be vacated. 18. The learned counsel for the rest of the respondents have supported the submissions advanced on behalf of the Home Deptt. & NRC and have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. They have submitted that this Court in exercise of its Certiorari jurisdiction does not act as an Appellate Court and it is only the decision making process which can be the subject matter of scrutiny. It is Page No.# 12/19 submitted that there is no procedural impropriety or illegality in the decision making process and therefore, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed. They have further submitted that the procedure adopted for adjudication of a reference by a Foreigners Tribunal is summary in nature and there is also a time frame for completion. It is also submitted that there is a question of national security by the unabated influx of foreign nationals and before any action is taken, the proceedee is given an opportunity whereby he or she is required to prove the citizenship through cogent, credible and acceptable evidence. 19. The rival submissions made have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court including the records of the Tribunal have been carefully perused. 20. With regard to the aspect of burden of proof as laid down in Section 9 of the Act of 1946, the law is well settled that the burden of proof that a proceedee is an Indian citizen is always on the said proceedee and never shifts. In the said Section, there is non-obstante clause that the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not be applicable. For ready reference, Section 9 is extracted hereinbelow- “9. Burden of proof.—If in any case not falling under Section 8 any question arises with reference to this Act or any order made or direction given thereunder, whether any person is or is not a foreigner or is or is not a foreigner of a particular class or description the onus of proving that such person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), lie upon such person.” Page No.# 13/19 21. In this connection, the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Mohd. Vs. Delhi Administration [AIR 1963 SC 1035]which followed the principles laid down by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Ghaus Mohammad Vs. Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 1526] in the context of Foreigners Act, 1946 would be relevant which is extracted hereinbelow- “22. This Act confers wide ranging powers to deal with all foreigners or with respect to any particular foreigner or any prescribed class or description of foreigner for prohibiting, regulating or restricting their or his entry into India or their presence or continued presence including their arrest, detention and confinement. The most important provision is Section 9 which casts the burden of proving that a person is not a foreigner or is not a foreigner of such particular class or description, as the case may be, shall lie upon such person. Therefore, where an order made under the Foreigners Act is challenged and a question arises whether the person against whom the order has been made is a foreigner or not, the burden of proving that he is not a foreigner is upon such a person. In Union of India v. Ghaus Mohd. the Chief Commissioner of Delhi served an order on Ghaus Mohammad to leave India within three days as he was a Pakistani national. He challenged the order before the High Court which set aside the order by observing that there must be prima facie material on the basis of which the authority can proceed to pass an order under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act, 1946. In appeal the Constitution Bench reversed the judgment of the High Court holding that onus of showing that he is not a foreigner was upon the respondent.” 22. Before embarking to adjudicate the issue involved vis-a-vis the submissions and the materials on record, we are reminded that a Writ Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would confine its powers to examine the decision making process only. Further, the Page No.# 14/19 present case pertains to a proceeding of a Tribunal which has given its findings based on the facts. It is trite law that findings of facts are not liable to be interfered with by a Writ Court under its certiorari jurisdiction. 23. Law is well settled in this field. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after discussing the previous case laws on the jurisdiction of a Writ Court qua the writ of certiorari, in the recent decision of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences and Anr. Vs. Bikartan Das & Ors [Civil Appeal No. 3339 of 2023]has laid down as follows: “49. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important in the aforesaid context: Two cardinal principles of law governing exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when it comes to issue of writ of certiorari. 50. The first cardinal principle of law that governs the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, more particularly when it comes to the issue of a writ of certiorari is that in granting such a writ, the High Court does not exercise the powers of Appellate Tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. The writ of certiorari can be issued if an error of law is apparent on the face of the record. A writ of certiorari, being a high prerogative writ, should not be issued on mere asking. 51. The second cardinal principle of exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is that in a given case, even if some action or order challenged in the writ petition is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties. Article 226 Page No.# 15/19 of the Constitution grants an extraordinary remedy, which is essentially discretionary, although founded on legal injury. It is perfectly open for the writ court, exercising this flexible power to pass such orders as public interest dictates & equity projects. The legal formulations cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the fact situation of the case. While administering law, it is to be tempered with equity and if the equitable situation demands after setting right the legal formulations, not to take it to the logical end, the High Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice equitable consideration and mould the final order in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other approach would render the High Court a normal court of appeal which it is not.” 24. In the instant case, the written statement is absolutely vague and apparently, has not met the requirements,as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). There is a requirement to disclose the following: (i) his date of birth; (ii) place of birth; (iii) name of his parents; (iv) their place of birth and citizenship. Further, there may be a requirement to give the details of the grandparents. It has been stated that all these facts would necessarily be within the personal knowledge of the person concerned and not of the authorities of the State. 25. As rightly pointed out on behalf of the respondents, the revenue clearance certificate is a document dated 15.11.2018 which, however, was not even mentioned in the WS filed on 26.11.2018. The said document was sought to be introduced only at the stage of evidence which is not permissible. The said document is of a different plot of land than the land proved as Exhibit 1. The Page No.# 16/19 Assistant Helper of the Gobardhana Mouza as DW3 also did not prove the document along with contemporaneous records and we have also noted that the land revenue has been paid after the initiation of the proceedings and yet not pleaded. We endorse the views of the Learned Coordinate Bench in Jabeda Begum Vs. Union of India [decided on 12.02.2020 in WP(C)/7451/2019] wherein it has been held that Land Revenue Paying Receipts do not prove a citizenship of a person. 26. In the case of Momin Ali Vs. Union of India,reported in 2017 (2) GLT 1076,it has been clearly laid down that there cannot be a variance between pleadings and evidence. 27. As regards the Voters’ Lists sought to be relied upon by the petitioner, the list of 1955 is an uncertified copy which would not constitute any evidence as such. The first Voter List is that of 1970 which contains, the name of the projected father, who is, however, aged 40 years. No previous lists have been proved having the name of the projected father. The next Voter List is of 1985 with the name of the mother as 35 years. The year of birth of the petitioner being about 1967, there ought to have been Voters’ List containing the names of the parents together, more so when it is stated in paragraph 12 of the WS that the father had expired after 1975. Strangely, in the Voters’ List of 1997, the age of the projected mother becomes 70 years and the same continues to be 70 even in 2006. Furthermore, though one Mato Ali had deposed as DW2 as the projected brother, there is not a single document to connect him with the petitioner and the Voters’ List of 2016 containing his name is an uncertified copy. It is a settled law that Electoral Photo Identity Card (EPIC) and PAN Card are no conclusive prove of citizenship. Page No.# 17/19 28. So far as the certificate by the Gaon Burah (Ext. 14) is concerned, apart from the fact that there is an unauthorized use of the national emblem on the said certificate, the author of the certificate was not adduced and therefore, the same would not be of any relevance. In this connection, we find force in the contention advanced by the learned Standing Counsel who has relied upon the case of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rupjan Begum(supra). 29. We find force in the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that the case of Sirajul (supra) lays down a rider that minor inconsistencies may be ignored provided that all other things are consistent(emphasis supplied). In the said case, except a minor inconsistency in the name of the grandfather of the procedee from “Kematullah” to “Kefatullah”. For ready reference, the relevant observations are extracted hereinbelow: “3. There is no doubt that the great grandfather`s name Amtullah appears as Amtullah throughout the document. Equally, there is no doubt about the father's name which appears as Hakim Ali throughout. The only discrepancy found is that in some of the documents Kefatullah later becomes Kematullah. However, what is important to note is that his father's name Amtullah continues as Amtullah and the other family members associated continued as such. Also produced are NRC Registration details of the year 1971 of the grandfather who is noted to be Kefatullah in this document. Other voters lists are then produced where the letter F becomes the letter M with other family names remaining the same. …” 30. In the instant case, the names, age of Hasen and Sabiran change Page No.# 18/19 invariably. We also find force in the submission of the learned Standing Counsel who by relying upon the case of Basiron Bibi (supra)has submitted that the decision of Abdul Muttali (supra)is not applicable. 31. As rightly pointed out by the learned Standing Counsel, it clearly appears that while deciding the case of Rahim Ali(supra), the decision of the Larger Bench in Sarbananda Sonowal (supra)was not brought to the notice. This aspect has been dealt with by this Court and explained in Iman Ali (supra), the relevant observations are extracted hereinbelow: “23. The case of Md. Rahim Ali (supra) has been relied upon by the petitioner. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid judgment. It however appears that though the case of Sarbananda Sonowal I (supra) which is a judgment of a Larger Bench was considered, the relevant observations on the point do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Court while deciding the case of Md. Rahim Ali (supra). The relevant observations made in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal I (supra) have already been extracted above. The argument advanced by Shri Ahmed, learned counsel would amount to adopting the procedure of the IM(D)T Act which has already been declared ultra vires.” 32. The reliance on the case of Standard Chartered Bank (supra) is misplaced inasmuch as, the same is on Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act pertain to the legal presumption that a person in possession of property is the owner. It shifts the burden of proof to the person who disputes this ownership. The facts and issue in the present case are wholly different. As mentioned above, the present subject matter is governed by Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, which, as observed above, start with non obstante clause qua the Evidence Page No.# 19/19 Act. 33. In the case of Bijoy Das Vs. UOI reported in2018 (3) GLT 118, this Court has laid down that in proceedings of this nature, oral evidence alone would not be enough and such evidence is required to be supported and corroborated by documentary evidence and contemporaneous records. However, in this case, the same has not been able to be done by the petitioner. We are of the view that the petitioner as proceedee had failed to discharge her burden to prove her citizenship. 34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 27.05.2019 passed by the learned Foreigners Tribunal, Baksa in F.T. Case No. 1993/BAKSA/2016does not call for any interference. 35. The writ petition accordingly stands dismissed. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. The actions consequent upon the opinion rendered by the learned Tribunal would follow in accordance with law. 36. The records be returned to the concerned Foreigners Tribunal forthwith, along with a copy of this order. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant