HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT - B No. - 4095 of 2026 Jag Singh …..Petitioner(s) Versus State of U.P. and 5 others …..Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Anshu Chaudhary, Sunil Verma Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Nitin Srivastava, Sunil Kumar Singh Court No. - 51 HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J. 1. Heard Sri Anshu Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 4, Sri Rohit Yadav, Advocate holding brief for Sri Sunil Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no. 5, and Sri Madhu Ranjan Pandey, Advocate holding brief for Sri Nitin Srivastava, learned counsel for respondent no. 6. 2. The present petition has been filed challenging the final decree dated 17.6.2014, the orders passed by respondent nos. 3 and 2 dated 6.2.2024 and 21.8.2026, respectively, and the order passed by respondent no. 4 dated 13.6.2023, rejecting the recall application, arising out of proceedings under Section 176 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. 2 WRIB No. - 4095 of 2026 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner and respondent no. 6 are co-tenure holders of the plot in question, which was jointly purchased by them through a registered sale deed dated 1.2.1999. The names of the vendees were mutated in the revenue records and, on the basis of a mutual agreement, the petitioner entered into possession of the eastern side and respondent no. 6 of the western side. 4. Counsel for the petitioner states that in the year 2022, it was discovered that a partition suit had been filed under his signature, in which a final decree had been passed on 17.6.2014, and the lots had been prepared with the consent of the parties. The petitioner had been allotted a share on the western side and respondent no. 6 on the eastern side. He immediately moved a recall application before respondent no. 4 for setting aside the preliminary and final decrees on the sole ground that the suit itself had not been filed by the petitioner, nor had he put his signatures on the Vakalatnama, plaint, compromise and qurras submitted in his name. 5. Respondent no. 4, by the order dated 13.6.2023, rejected the application on the ground that the delay had not been satisfactorily explained and that no interference was warranted, as the entire proceedings had been undertaken with the consent of the parties. 6. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the allegation of the petitioner that the records of the plaint and the compromise did not bear his signatures was not investigated to determine the veracity of the signatures on the plaint and the compromise. It is submitted that respondent nos. 3 and 2 erred in upholding the order passed by respondent no. 4 rejecting the recall application filed by the petitioner and upholding the preliminary and final decrees without considering the claim of the petitioner, who had raised specific grounds disputing his signatures on the memo of the plaint, the compromise and the qurras allegedly submitted by the parties. It is further submitted that the concurrent findings recorded by respondent nos. 2 and 3 that no 3 WRIB No. - 4095 of 2026 interference was warranted, as the orders had been passed with the mutual consent of the parties, are erroneous, in view of the fact that the filing of the suit itself was denied by the petitioner. It is contended that the rejection of the second appeal on the ground that no substantial question of law was framed in the memo of appeal was a curable defect, which could have been removed by affording an opportunity to cure the defect before dismissing the second appeal on the said ground. 7. Per contra, the counsel for respondent no. 6 has tried to defend the orders passed by respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4 and contended that the suit was filed by the petitioner and the record bears his original signature. He has further tried to justify the orders passed by respondent nos. 2 and 3, holding that the first appeal filed by the petitioner was not maintainable against the decree passed by the trial court and that the second appellate court was justified in dismissing the second appeal, as no substantial question of law was framed in the memo of appeal. 8. The counsel for respondent no. 6 has admitted the fact that the order of respondent no. 4 rejecting the recall application does not record any finding on the question of the veracity of the signatures of the petitioner on the plaint, Vakalatnama and consented qurras filed by the parties, as the application itself was rejected on the ground of being barred by time. However, the learned counsel for respondent no. 6 has agreed that, if the Court considers it proper, the matter may be relegated back for the limited purpose of verification of the signatures of the petitioner on the plaint, Vakalatnama and qurras submitted by the parties before respondent no. 4, and for fresh consideration of the recall application filed by the petitioner. The learned counsel for respondent no. 6 has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishun @ Ram Kishun Vs. Behari, (2005) 6 SCC 300, where the Court, under similar circumstances, after setting aside the orders impugned therein, directed the Trial Court to make an enquiry regarding the genuineness of the compromise on the record. 4 WRIB No. - 4095 of 2026 9. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. It is not in dispute that the recall application filed by the petitioner was based on the ground that the suit for division of holding had not been filed by the petitioner, nor had he submitted any qurra bearing his signature before the Trial Court, respondent no. 4. The explanation for the lack of knowledge of the decree dated 17.6.2014 given by the petitioner was that only when he approached the Bank for the purpose of obtaining a loan did he come to know about the existence of the decrees passed in the suit for partition. Respondent no. 4, while rejecting the recall application filed by the petitioner, has not recorded any finding disbelieving the aforesaid explanation for the delay in moving the recall application, but has rejected it on the ground of delay, holding that the preliminary and final decrees, having been passed on the basis of the consent of the parties, could not be recalled after eight years. The said finding appears to be unsustainable in view of the fact that the petitioner had denied the very filing of the suit and had also disputed his signatures on the Vakalatnama and the joint qurra submitted by the parties in the subsequent proceedings. 11. In my opinion, while deciding the recall application, the basic finding required to be recorded by respondent no. 4 was whether the plaint of the original suit for partition bore the signature of the petitioner as the plaintiff therein and whether the suit had, in fact, been instituted by him. Once a finding was recorded on the said issue, the validity of the signatures appearing on the Vakalatnama, compromise and qurra could thereafter be considered in accordance with law. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 manifestly erred in upholding the order of respondent no. 4, dated 13.6.2023, rejecting the recall application of the petitioner on the ground that the parties had submitted the qurras with mutual consent and respondent no. 6 had accepted the claim of the petitioner in the original suit. The said finding is erroneous on the ground that the filing of the suit itself is disputed by the petitioner. Therefore, the observations regarding the validity of the subsequent proceedings, without first determining 5 WRIB No. - 4095 of 2026 whether the suit had been instituted by the petitioner, were unsustainable. 12. The petitioner having specifically disputed the institution of the suit as well as his signatures on the relevant documents, the question whether the decree could be treated as having been passed with his consent could not have been conclusively determined without first examining the said dispute. The principle recognised by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishun @ Ram Kishun v. Behari, (2005) 6 SCC 300, is that where the existence of a compromise is disputed, the Court is required to hold an appropriate enquiry into that question before treating the resulting decree as a decree passed with the consent of the parties. 13. The respondent no. 2, while dismissing the second appeal on the ground that no substantial question of law had been framed in the memo of appeal, also did not consider the grievance raised by the petitioner regarding the very institution of the suit and the disputed signatures. If the defect in the memo of appeal was capable of being cured, an opportunity to cure the defect could have been afforded before dismissal of the second appeal on that ground. The issue, however, need not be examined further in view of the fact that the fundamental dispute regarding the institution of the original suit and the genuineness of the petitioner's signatures remains to be adjudicated. 14. As the adjudication of the recall application by respondent no. 4 is found to be vitiated in the absence of any finding recorded after enquiry as to whether the original suit for partition had actually been filed by the petitioner, the order dated 13.6.2023 cannot be sustained. Respondent nos. 2 and 3 also erred in dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioner without the real issue regarding the actual filing of the suit by the petitioner and the genuineness of his signatures on the relevant documents having been properly adjudicated. 15. In view of the discussions made above and the principle laid down in the judgment of Kishun @ Ram Kishun (supra), cited by the counsel for respondent no. 6, it is proper that the orders impugned in the writ 6 WRIB No. - 4095 of 2026 petition be set aside and the matter be relegated back to respondent no. 4 to decide the recall application filed by the petitioner afresh, after making a proper enquiry as to whether Original Suit No. 106 for division of holding was actually filed by the petitioner and whether the signatures of the petitioner appearing on the plaint, Vakalatnama, compromise and qurra submitted before the Trial Court are genuine. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 17. The orders of respondent nos. 3 and 2, dated 6.2.2024 and 21.8.2026, respectively, passed in the appeals filed by the petitioner challenging the preliminary and final decrees, are set aside. The order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Tehsil Baraut, District Baghpat, respondent no. 4, dated 13.6.2023, rejecting the recall application filed by the petitioner, is also set aside. The recall application is restored to the original case filed before respondent no. 4 for being decided afresh on merits, after due enquiry regarding the genuineness of the signatures of the petitioner appearing on the plaint, Vakalatnama, compromise and qurras of the original suit. 18. Respondent no. 4 shall conduct the aforesaid enquiry in accordance with law and, after recording a finding as to whether Original Suit No. 106 for division of holding was instituted by the petitioner and whether the signatures of the petitioner appearing on the plaint, Vakalatnama, compromise and qurra are genuine, decide the recall application afresh on merits. 19. It is expected that the entire exercise as directed above shall be carried out in accordance with law by respondent no. 4 expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. (Arun Kumar,J.) September 16, 2026 Ranjeet Sahu Digitally signed by :- RANJEET SAHU High Court of Judicature at Allahabad