2026:HHC:6567 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 180 of 2013 Reserved on: 24.02.2026 Date of Decision: 11.03.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Punjab Singh ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant/State: Mr. Prashant Singh, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr. Parth Sanar, Advocate, vice Mr. Manoj Pathak, Advocate Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.09.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. (1), Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:6567 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police filed a charge sheet against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341 and 427 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant, Amarjeet Singh (PW-2), had purchased the land in Mauja Bhangani and Singhpura. The accused used to interfere with his land. The informant filed a civil suit and obtained an injunction order from the court. The informant made a complaint to the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), and the accused had assured in writing not to interfere with the informant’s land. The informant was coming to Paonta Sahib on 27th June 2006 in his vehicle bearing registration number CH- 03E-8907 at about 11:45 AM. The accused parked his motorcycle at village Khodawalla and obstructed the informant’s passage. Kinnaur Singh and 5–6 persons were accompanying the accused. They abused the informant, and when the informant enquired about the reason, the accused alongwith his brother Kinnaur Singh and another person gave him beatings with kicks and fist blows. The informant’s shirt was torn in the incident. Pawan Kumar (PW-3) and Parvinder rescued the informant from the accused. The accused pelted stones at the informant’s vehicle, 3 2026:HHC:6567 and it was damaged in the incident. The incident was reported to the police, and an FIR (Ex. PW-1/A) was registered. SI Mohar Singh (PW5) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex. PW-5/A). He took the photographs (Ex. P1 to Ex. P7) whose negatives are Ex. P8 to Ex. P14). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He found after the investigation that only accused Punjab Singh was involved in the incident, hence the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court against the accused, Punjab Singh. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under sections 341 and 427 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined five witnesses to prove its case. Inspector Manish Chauhan (PW1) signed the FIR. Amarjit Singh (PW2) is the informant/victim. Pawan Kumar (PW3) and Kaka Ram (PW4) are eyewitnesses. SI Mohar Singh (PW5) investigated the matter. 4 2026:HHC:6567 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that he had obtained an injunction order against the informant who had cut trees from the government land. The informant tried to hit the motorcycle of the accused with his car, and the accused had also reported the matter to the police. He examined Rupender Singh (DW1) and Om Prakash (DW2) to prove his innocence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the informant had exaggerated and improved his version in the Court. His testimony that the accused had pelted stones at the car, which damaged the car and the window glass, was not corroborated by any dent in the car or the recovery of any broken pieces of the glass. It was proved by the evidence that the accused had reported the matter to the police and made complaints against the informant. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341 and 427 of the IPC. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal 5 2026:HHC:6567 asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the prosecution’s evidence from its proper perspective. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. Prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had stopped and damaged the informant’s car. The bill of repairs established this version. Learned Trial Court had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Parth Sanar, learned counsel representing the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court ignored the statements of eyewitnesses and the bill of repairs without any cogent reason and had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 6 2026:HHC:6567 10. Mr Parth Sanar, learned counsel representing the respondent/accused, submitted that the informant had materially improved upon his version. His statement was not corroborated by the recovery of any damaged glass or dent to the car. The relationship between the parties was strained, and the informant’s sole testimony could not have been relied upon. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: 7 2026:HHC:6567 “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 8 2026:HHC:6567 15. Informant Amarjeet Singh (PW2) had specifically stated in the FIR (Ex. PW1/A) that the accused Punjab Singh, Kinnaur Singh and 5–6 persons had obstructed his passage. He had also stated that the accused Punjab Singh, Kinnaur Singh, and another person gave him beatings with kicks and fist blows. The police found the involvement of only Punjab Singh in the incident and filed the chargesheet against him before the Court. Therefore, the informant’s version was not found to be true during the investigation. 16. Informant Amarjeet Singh (PW2) abandoned the initial version while appearing in the Court. He stated in the Court that the accused had parked his motorcycle in the middle of the road and obstructed his (the informant’s) passage. The accused abused and threatened him. The accused gave him beatings and pelted stones upon the car, which damaged the rear window and caused dents to the vehicle. Thus, he had changed the initial version projected in the FIR that the accused was accompanied by other persons who had given beatings to him (the informant). It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Badri v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 442: 1976 SCC (Cri) 60: 1975 SCC OnLine SC 417  that where a witness can ‘modulate his 9 2026:HHC:6567 evidence to suit a particular prosecution theory for the deliberate purpose of securing a conviction, such a witness cannot be considered as a reliable person and no conviction can be based on his testimony’. It was held in Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 815: 1975 SCC (Cri) 225: AIR 1975 SC 1026] that if there be a material departure in the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR, it would cause a dent to the edifice on which the prosecution case is built, as the prosecution cannot project two entirely different versions of a case. 17. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the informant’s testimony because of the change of his initial version. 18. Pawan Kumar (PW3) stated in his examination in chief that the window glass of the vehicle was damaged. Kaka Ram (PW4) stated in his examination-in-chief that the accused damaged the window glass by pelting a stone on it. The informant, Amarjeet Singh (PW2), stated in his cross- examination that some pieces of glass fell inside the car and some fell on the road. SI Mohar Singh (PW5) stated in his cross- examination that he had not found any pieces of glass on the spot or inside the vehicle. Therefore, he had not seized any pieces 10 2026:HHC:6567 of the glass. This admission falsifies the testimonies of the informant, Pawan Kumar (PW3) abd Kaka Ram (PW4) that the window glasses were damaged or had fallen on the road or inside the vehicle. SI Mohar Singh (PW5) also stated in his cross- examination that no marks of damage caused by the stone were visible in the car, whose photos were taken by him. This falsifies the informant’s version that the stones were pelted at the car, which had caused damage to it. 19. The relationship between the informant and the accused was strained. They had filed complaints against each other. The accused had also reported the matter to the police. In these circumstances, the learned Trial Court was justified in insisting upon the corroboration of the informant’s testimony, doubting the prosecution’s version when no corroboration was provided. 20. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 21. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 11 2026:HHC:6567 22. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court 23. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 11th March, 2026 (Nikita)