[2026:RJ-JP:16411] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4203/2023 Lokesh Kumar son of Shri Jormal Singh, aged about 26 years, R/o Village Barkauli, Tehsil Uchchain, District Bharatpur (Raj.) ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan, through Home Secretary, Govt. of Rajasthan, Secretariat Jaipur. 2. Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur. 3. Commissioner of Police, Commissionarate, Jaipur. 4. Dy. Commissioner of Police (Head Quarter), Police Commissionerate, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Gordhan Singh Fauzdar For Respondent(s) : Ms. Somitra Chaturvedi HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA Judgment Reportable 1. Date of conclusion of Arguments 15.04.2026 2. Date on which the judgment was reserved 15.04.2026 3. Whether the full judgment or only operative part is pronounced Full 4. Date of pronouncement 19.05.2026 1. Petitioner Lokesh Kumar has filed the instant writ petition with the prayer that respondents be directed to give him appointment on the post of Constable in pursuance to the advertisement dated 29.10.2021, whereby more than 4,400 vacancies were advertised. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Gordhan Singh Fauzdar submitted that in pursuance to the advertisement dated 29.10.2021, the petitioner submitted his application form and he [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (2 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] cleared all the stages of selection process. Thereafter, the respondents vide press note dated 17.11.2022 called all the selected candidates along with him for document verification. In the press note dated 17.11.2022, the Selection Board of the respondents issued a list of 800 persons for document verification, in which the name of the petitioner appeared at Serial No. 101. After document verification, when the name of the petitioner did not appear in the list of finally selected candidates and he was not assigned the Belt Number and was not issued the appointment order, he inquired about the same from the respondents herein. He was informed that as per the disclosure made at the time of document verification, about pendency of a criminal case, he has not been issued the appointment order in terms of notification/circular issued by Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan and Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur. 3. Counsel submitted that after clearing all the stage of selection process, on being asked specific information regarding pendency of criminal case, he disclosed the complete and correct facts and there was no concealment on his part. 4. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner is an unmarried person and his bhabhi (wife of his elder brother Arvind) lodged an FIR against her husband and other family members including the petitioner herein, on which FIR bearing No. 235/2016 was registered for offences under Sections 498A, 323 and 406 of the IPC, 1860. He further submitted that at the time of document verification, the said criminal case was pending which he disclosed fairly. When the petitioner was not given [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (3 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] appointment, he immediately approached this Court by way of present writ petition in which the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 31.03.2023, issued notices and directed the respondents to keep one post vacant for the petitioner in the OBC Category. He further submitted that the respondents filed reply to the writ petition in which they have tried to justify their action of not giving the appointment in terms of the circular/notification as issued, which bars the appointment due to pendency of the criminal case, conviction etc. He further submitted that during the pendency of this writ petition, the said criminal case was concluded by the learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.05.2025 (Regular Criminal Case No. 68/2021) (CIS No. 68/2021). The learned Trial Court convicted the petitioner and all family members for offences under Sections 498A and 323 IPC but was not awarded the punishment and rather the benefit of Section 4 (1) of the Act of 1958 was given to him. The petitioner and all the family members challenged the order of the learned Trial Court dated 01.05.2025 by way of a criminal appeal bearing No. 10/2025. The learned Appellate Court, vide judgment dated 19.03.2026, allowed the appeal and the judgment of the learned Trial Court dated 01.05.2025 was quashed and the appellant, i.e., the petitioner herein, was acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. Counsel submitted that the complete case was nothing, but a matrimonial dispute which arose due to fallout in the relationship between the husband and the wife in which his bhabhi falsely dragged him by leveling false and baseless allegations, in which he was though convicted by the learned Trial Court, but was given the [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (4 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] benefit of Sections 4(1) and 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as 'Act of 1958') on the one hand and on the other, learned Appellate Court in the criminal appeal acquitted him. 4.1. Learned counsel further submitted that once the petitioner was granted the benefit under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1958 and the disqualification attached due to conviction was also removed by the learned trial Court exercising power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958 and thereafter he was acquitted by the learned Appellate Court upon allowing his appeal. After this, now there remains no reason/hurdle for the respondents to deny appointment to the petitioner on the post of Constable under the selection process which he had cleared, as mentioned in the previous paras. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, with regard to the pendency of a criminal case and acquittal thereafter, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court have examined the similar controversies in the respective case and directed employer (State/Central Government) to appoint the concerned candidate on merits with all consequential benefits. In support of his arguments, counsel relied upon the judgment dated 29.07.2025 passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9756/2023 titled as “Alok Kumar Chaturvedi vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors.” In the said case, the Co-ordinate Bench, by considering the judgment passed by another Co-ordinate Bench of this High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13198/2024 titled as “Amrit Pal vs. State of [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (5 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] Rajasthan” decided on 27.11.2024, held that pendency of a criminal case for offences under Sections 498 and 406 cannot be a ground to deny appointment. In the said case, the Co-ordinate Bench specifically observed that the guidelines, contained in the circular as issued by the relevant department in the said case are not to be treated so rigidly as to not even allow for the possibility that a candidate's past, even if marred by being a suspect or under-trial, may be outweighed by the subsequent reformation and exemplary behaviour. In the said case, the Co-ordinate Bench ordered for consideration of appointment of the petitioner on merits. The relevant para of Amrit Pal (supra), has been reproduced as under :- "7. In the opinion of this Court, the facts of the present case are substantially similar to that of case of Amrit Pal (supra), hence merely on account of implicating the petitioner in a criminal case of offence under Sections 498-A & 406 IPC, his candidature for appointment may not allow to be withheld in the light of Circular dated 04.12.2019. Petitioner has not been yet held guilty of such offence. Equity and hardship tilt in favour of petitioner, who claims to be a meritorious candidate and denial to consider his candidature on merits is violative to his fundamental right to get employment and life and liberty guaranteed under Articles 16 & 21of the Constitution of India." 6. In above referred case of Amrit Pal (supra), the Co- ordinate Bench placed reliance on the Judgment rendered by another Co-ordinate Bench at Principal Seat Jodhpur in the case of Mukesh Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2016(3) WLC 345, in which the issue of appointment in the Police Department was considered. The relevant para of Mukesh Kumar (supra), has been reproduced as under :- [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (6 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] “15. Viewed in light of the above factual scenario, it is evident that the Rules not post any hurdle against the petitioner’s right to be appointed in the police services. At best, a rider can be imposed in the petitioner’s appointment order that in the event of conviction in the above criminal case, he may be liable to be terminated from service without holding any enquiry and an undertaking in this regard can be procured from him in this regard. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The respondents are directed to offer appointment to the petitioner on the post of Sub Inspector of Police in the questioned selection process ignoring the pendency of the above criminal case against the petitioner. However, the appointment order shall bear a condition that the petitioner’s services may be terminated in the event of his conviction and he shall also submit an undertaking to this effect before joining to the post. Since the petitioner was gainfully employed as a Teacher during the intervening period, he is not entitled to any consequential benefits. However, the respondents shall grant him all notional services benefits from the date of the order Annex.6 dated 22.12.2009.” 7. In the above cited judgment, the Hon'ble Court while allowing the writ petitions, directed the respondents to issue the appointment order to the petitioners. 8. Counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pramod Singh Kirar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. in Civil Appeal Nos. 8934-8935 of 2022 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14571-72 of 2022, wherein the appellant Pramod Singh Kirar who disclosed the fact of being tried for an offence under Section 498A of the IPC in the verification form, was denied appointment. The learned Single Judge, in the said case ordered for appointment, however Hon'ble Division Bench set aside that judgment and therefore, the appellant approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court noted the fact that the appellant was acquitted for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. While setting aside the [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (7 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the respondents to appoint appellant on the post of Constable as per merit. The relevant para of Pramod Singh Kirar (supra), has been reproduced as under:- "9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above the impugned judgment(s) and order(s) passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is/are quashed and set aside. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge to the extent setting aside the order of cancelling the candidature and non- appointment of the appellant as Constable is hereby restored. The respondent(s) are directed to appoint the appellant to the post of Constable, as otherwise, he was found to be meritorious and eligible for the post of Constable within a period of four weeks from today. However, it is observed that he shall be entitled to all the benefits from the date of actual appointment only. Present appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs." 9. Lastly, counsel relied upon the recent judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court dated 23.01.2026, in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Rajesh in LPA 10/2026 & CM APPL. 1904-06/2026. In the case of Rajesh (supra), the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court considered the fact that though the employee Rajesh was convicted by the learned Trial Court for offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 506 of the IPC, however, the learned Trial Court gave the benefit of Section 4 and by exercise of power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958 removed the disqualification as attached due to conviction. 10. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, while considering the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shankar Dass vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in (1985) 2 SCC 358 and also considering the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Divsion Bench of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (8 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] the case of Shaitan Singh Meena vs. Union of India and Anr. reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8216, while distinguishing the opinion of the other Co-ordinate Bench, upheld the order of the learned Single Judge by which the respondents were directed to revive the appointment order and to appoint the petitioner on the post in question, more specifically for the reason that by exercise of power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958, learned trial Court removed the disqualification for the appointment due to the conviction. 11. In view of the above submissions, learned counsel prayed that the writ petition be allowed and respondents be directed to issue appointment to the petitioner against the one post which has been kept vacant in terms of interim order dated 31.03.2023 passed by the co-ordinate bench of this Court with all consequential, notional and actual benefit. 12. Per contra, the learned Government Counsel appearing for the respondent-State strongly opposed the prayer and submitted that during verification of documents, on disclosure of pendency of the criminal case for offences under Sections 498A and 406, the petitioner was rightly denied appointment in terms of the notification of Department of Personnel and the circular as issued by the Police Department. Learned Government Counsel further submitted that on the date of submission of application and on the date of appointment, the criminal case was pending and therefore, by strictly following the circular and the notification as issued by the Government, the petitioner was rightly denied the appointment on the post in question. He further submitted that ultimately it is the prerogative/discretion of the employer to [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (9 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] appoint a person considering the criminal antecedents and past pending/concluded criminal case. On the basis of the circular and the notification as enclosed with the reply, the learned Government Counsel supported the action and lastly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition as being devoid of merit. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record and considered the judgments as cited. 14. The issue as raised in the present case is that the petitioner, being a young boy aged about 26 years (at the time of filing the writ petition), was implicated in a criminal case in the year 2016. He was 19 years old when his bhabhi (wife of his elder brother Arvind), lodged a criminal case for offences under Sections 498A, 406 and 323 of the IPC. In the said case, the learned Trial Court, after recording the evidence, convicted the husband and all family members including the petitioner herein for the offences under Sections 498A and 323 of the IPC vide judgment dated 01.05.2025. While passing the judgment, learned Trial Court gave the benefit of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1958 and thereafter, in exercise of power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958, removed the disqualification attached to the conviction. Section 12 of the Act of 1958 starts with non obstante clause and provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law. 14.1. Section 4(1) and Section 12 of the Act of 1958 are reproduced as under:- [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (10 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] "4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.—(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. 12. 12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4 is subsequently sentenced for the original offence." 15. Section 4(1) specifically provides that the Court has power under the Act of 1958 to give the benefit of good conduct to a person. The benefit under Section 4(1) is granted when the person is found guilty of the offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. In the present case, the learned Trial Court while convicting the petitioner granted the benefit of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1958. 16. After giving the benefit of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1958, the learned Trial Court by exercising its power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958 further removed the 'disqualification attached to the conviction'. [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (11 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] 17. The issue of applicability of Section 12 of the Act of 1958 was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shankar Dass (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Court in para No. 4 discussed Section 12 of Act of 1958 which reads as under - "Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act must be placed out of way first. It provides that not withstanding any thing contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or 4 "shall not suffer disqualification" attaching to a conviction for an offence under such law. The order of dismissal from service consequent upon a conviction is not a disqualification" within the meaning of section 12. There are statutes which provide that persons who are convicted for certain offences shall incur certain disqualifications. For example, Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, entitled "Disqualifications for membership of Parliament and State Legislatures" and Chapter IV entitled "Disqualifications for Voting contain provisions which disqualify persons convicted of certain charges from being members of legislatures or from voting at elections to legislatures. That is the sense in which the word "disqualification" is used in section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act. There-fore, it is not possible to accept the reasoning of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court." 18. In the above-mentioned case, considering the provisions of Section 12 of the Act of 1958, the Hon'ble Apex Court while allowing the appeal, directed the respondents to reinstate the appellant in service forthwith, with full back wages from the date of his dismissal until reinstatement. 19. This Court considered the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner passed in the case of Rajesh (supra) by the Division Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court. In the said case, the employee-husband was convicted for offence under Sections 498A, 406 & 506 of IPC by the learned Trial Court and ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two years along with a fine. However, the husband challenged the order of [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (12 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] conviction before the Appellate Court, but during the pendency of the appeal, husband and wife entered into compromise and took decree of divorce through mutual consent by filing application under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the concerned Court. On account of the mutual settlement, the husband did not press the appeal as far as the conviction was concerned and therefore, the conviction remained as it is, however, the Appellate Court exercised its power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958 considering the mutual divorce by extending the benefit of probation under Section 4 of the Act of 1958, removed the disqualification. 20. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the said judgment also examined the provisions of Section 12 in the light of the previous pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shankar Dass (supra) and Union of India vs. Bakshi Ram, (1990) 2 SCC 426 as cited and held that a person cannot be denied appointment on the post in question. The relevant para of judgment as passed in the case of Rajesh (supra) is reproduced as under:- "18. The appeal filed by the employee was allowed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shankar Dass (Supra) with a further direction that he shall be reinstated in service, not on the ground that dismissal from service on conviction of the employee was a disqualification within a meaning of Section 12 of the Act, 1958, but on certain other grounds. However, the law which was laid down by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Shankar Dass (Supra) is that in case a certain disqualification occurs on account of conviction, where the convict is released on probation under Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act, 1958, on account of operation of Section 12 of the said Act, such a convict released on probation shall not incur any such disqualification. 19. Differently put, the law laid down in Shankar Dass (Supra) is that a convict who has been given the [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (13 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958 shall not suffer any disqualification, if such a disqualification is attached to his conviction of the offence. If we examine the provisions of Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003, what we find is that a person convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude is deemed to be ineligible for appointment with the appellant – AAI. A plain reading of Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003 reveals that the ineligibility for appointment flows from conviction of the person seeking appointment of an offence involving moral turpitude and thus, such ineligibility or disqualification for appointment with the appellant – AAI, in terms of Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003, is attached to his conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude and therefore, the protection, in such a case, of Section 12 of the Act, 1958 will be available. The ineligibility for appointment, in our considered opinion, as described in Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003, since stems from the conviction, therefore, such disqualification is directly related or attached to conviction of the person seeking appointment. 20. Accordingly, since in this case the respondent was held to be ineligible for appointment only on account of his conviction where he was given benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958, in our opinion, the respondent is entitled to protection of Section 12 of the Act, 1958 and he cannot be made to suffer such disqualification attached to his conviction as he was released on probation under Section 4 of the Act, 1958. 21. We may also note that dismissal of an employee from service as a result of his conviction cannot be said to be a disqualification attaching to his conviction for the reason that such dismissal of the employee concerned is permissible in terms of Clause (a) of the proviso appended to Article 311 of the Constitution of India. However, in the instant case, the ineligibility directly stems from the respondent‟s conviction in respect of which he was granted the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958. 22. Dismissal from service or any other punishment as described in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India is not a disqualification or ineligibility for an employee to be retained in service attaching to his conviction, whereas conviction of an offence is an ineligibility in terms of Regulation 6(7)(b) of the Regulations, 2003, and therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the respondent cannot be permitted to suffer the said ineligibility or disqualification from appointment with the appellant – AAI by virtue of Section 12 of the Act, 1958. [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (14 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] 23. The scope and effect of Section 12 of the Act, 1958 has more lucidly been enunciated in Union of India v. Bakshi Ram, (1990) 2 SCC 426 wherein, it has clearly been held that the offender shall not suffer disqualification attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law and further that such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. Hon‟ble Supreme Court has given an example as to the circumstance in which Section 12 of the Act, 1958 applied. It has been observed, for instance, that if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office, in view of his conviction, that disqualification by virtue of Section 12 stands removed. 24. Paragraph 13 of the Bakshi Ram (Supra) is relevant to be quoted here which reads as under: “13. Section 12 is thus clear and it only directs that the offender “shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law”. Such law in the context is other law providing for disqualification on account of conviction. For instance, if a law provides for disqualification of a person for being appointed in any office or for seeking election to any authority or body in view of his conviction, that disqualification by virtue of Section 12 stands removed. That in effect is the scope and effect of Section 12 of the Act. But that is not the same thing to state that the person who has been dismissed from service in view of his conviction is entitled to reinstatement upon getting the benefit of probation of good conduct. Apparently, such a view has no support by the terms of Section 12 and the order of the High Court cannot, therefore, be sustained.” 21. On the basis of the well settled law in regard to the benefit of Section 4(1) read with Section 12 of the Act of 1958, a person cannot be denied appointment as Section 12 starts with a non obstante clause. Any conviction shall not be a disqualification in case the benefit of Section 3 or 4 read with Section 12 is given by the Court in exercise of its statutory powers as provided under the Act of 1958. 21.1. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the petitioner herein, is an unmarried boy aged about 19 years at [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (15 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] the time of FIR, was implicated in a dispute which was purely matrimonial between the husband and wife arose due to fallout in the relationship. The learned Trial Court while convicting the petitioner herein along with all family members noted that the petitioner is a young boy and the conviction for the offences under Sections 498A and 323 of IPC may come in the way of future employment, etc.. Therefore, when the learned Trial Court gave the benefit of Section 4(1) read with Section 12 of the Act of 1958 which bars the employers, more specifically the State employer herein, from raising any objection in regard to the appointment of the petitioner on the post in question, on account of conviction, on the basis of the notification/circular as issued by the Police Department which are guiding in nature, as held by Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Amrit Pal (supra), and cannot have overriding effect on Section 12 of the Act of 1958. Section 12 of the Act of 1958 has overriding effect on any other law and any notification or circular cannot come in the way of appointment of a candidate, once he has been granted the benefit of Section 4(1) read with Section 12 of the Act of 1958 by Court of competent jurisdiction. 22. By exercising power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958, learned Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.05.2025, removed the disqualification as attached to the conviction therefore there remains no hurdles in the appointment of the petitioner on the post in question. This Court further noted that in the appeal as filed by the petitioner challenging his order of conviction dated 01.05.2025, the learned Appellate Court, while allowing the appeal quashed the judgment of the learned Trial Court [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (16 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] dated 01.05.2025 acquitted him by giving the benefit of doubt. 22.1. By considering both the orders, one passed by the learned Trial Court by which the benefit of Section 4 read with Section 12 was given, by which disqualification attached to the conviction was removed and further, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal, acquitted the petitioner by giving the benefit of doubt, this Court noted that now there remains no reason for the respondents to deny appointment to the petitioner on the post of Constable against the seat kept vacant for him by interim order. The case of Amrit Pal (supra) as cited, is not applicable to the present case, as in the said case appointment was denied due to pendency of criminal case which is not the case herein. 23. This Court further noted, from various judgments as cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the matrimonial disputes are very common nowadays in Indian families and majority of them ultimately result in compromise or settlement, however, few of them also result in conviction. The conviction in matrimonial disputes cannot be a base or reason to stop/restrict a person from living a normal life thereafter. The matrimonial disputes occurs depending upon the facts and circumstances of each family, however, even after conviction, where the allegations are not serious in nature, a person must be allowed to reform and move ahead in life and to seek employment otherwise same would be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Keeping this object in mind, Legislature made the Act of 1958 wherein Section 12 starts with a non obstante clause, giving overriding power on any other law, which gives a shield to an employee from [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (17 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] being disqualified or denied appointment on account of conviction when the person is granted benefit of Section 3 or 4 of Act of 1958. 24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a recent judgment passed in the case of Milind S/o Ashruba Dhanve & Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra reported in 2023 INSC 355 examined the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1958 and the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 as available to the offender. In the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed the object of the Act of 1958 and the intention of the Legislature in making provision to give benefit for the good conduct with the reform theory in mind. The relevant paras of Milind S/o Ashruba Dhanve & Ors. (supra) have been reproduced as under :- "11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation, therefore, keeping the legislative intent in mind, its provisions ought to be interpreted in a purposive manner. It is trite law that if two or more views are possible vis- a-vis interpretation of a beneficial legislation, it must be interpreted in favour of beneficiaries. The objects clause of the 1958 Act declares the act to provide for the release of offenders on probation or after due admonition and the matters connected therewith. While introducing the Probation of Offenders Bill, 1957 to the Lok Sabha on 14.11.1957, the then Minister of State for Home Affairs remarked as follows – “On a number of occasions, the Inspector-General of Prisons in the various States have met. From 1925 onwards there were a number of meetings and the Inspectors-General who are in close touch with the life of the convict behind the prison bars found that oftentimes the particular rigour to which the convict has been subjected or the life that he leads there produces certain results other than those expected. The expected result would be that the man must reform himself, and that after he comes out of the jail, he ought to lead a reformed life, he ought to return to the proper or social life to which every citizen has to confine himself. But oftentimes on account of the long period behind the prison bars, the man does not improve; on the other hand, he shows certain sign of deterioration or worse results. That was [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (18 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] the reason why it was considered necessary that the question of prison reform or the question of the reform of the convict or the prisoner ought to be considered not only from the point of view of the administration as such, not only from the point of view of its having a deterrent effect upon him, but also from the point of view of improving this particular man, namely the convict. The principle that is followed in this connection is that a man becomes a criminal on account of certain circumstances or on account of certain tendencies, which are anti-social and which are criminal, so far as he is concerned. So the way to reform him and to bring him back to human standards is to find out certain items of reform by means of which he would become a good man, and after some time, he would become a better man. These are two standards that we have taken into account.” 12. After introduction in the Lok Sabha, it was referred to the Joint Committee on 18.11.1957. Similarly, Rajya Sabha also agreed to said reference to the Joint Committee on 26.11.1957. The Joint Committee prepared its report on 19.2.1958 and the bill was again discussed in the Lok Sabha on 26.04.1958. In the opening statement, the then Dy. Minister of Home Affairs reflected upon the objectives of the act in following words – “…..Therefore we feel that if we have such good human material inside the prison, we should give this human material every opportunity to rehabilitate itself in society without the stigma of conviction and prison term…….. ……To avoid this stigma, we want to try out this most progressive measure in the country and see that the men and women who become offenders for the first time or even offenders for the second or the third time, as we call them hopeless, are given an opportunity…….. ……The meaning of probation is suspended sentence. Suspended sentence means that he will be left in society under the guidance and care of a probation officer or of a surety or of such other agent who would be able to look after him and assist him and see that he behaves well and is able once again to become what we call a good citizen…….. …..We are only trying to rehabilitate those many hundreds and hundreds of offenders who because of, may be, socio-economic considerations or other stringencies, or may be, their mental make-up, commit certain offences. Therefore, we have certain sections of the Indian Penal Code only in which probation would be permitted to be granted by courts…..” [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (19 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] 13. From the above, it can safely be gathered that the object and purpose of the 1958 Act is to rehabilitate offenders and make an attempt to reintegrate them into the mainstream of the society as reformed citizens, rather than to punish for their delinquent actions. What weighed in the mind of the law makers was that crime is, more often than not, a product of numerous socio-economic circumstances and that punishment may in fact lead to further deterioration of his character. In other words, the 1958 Act seeks to harmonize deterrence and reformation while empowering the courts to release the offenders after admonition or on probation of good conduct under supervision of the probation officer. It saves the offenders from the stigma of conviction as well as imprisonment and affords them an opportunity to return to the social life with dignity. In light of the above discussion, the 1958 Act requires purposive interpretation keeping in mind its objectives. xx xx xx xx 16. A perusal of the above makes it clear that if a person is found guilty of an offence which is not punishable with either death or imprisonment for life and the Court, having regard to the circumstances of the case which includes nature of the offence and the character of the offender, is of the opinion that it is expedient to do so, notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force, instead of sentencing at once of any punishment for such offence, the accused may be released on furnishing the bond, with or without sureties. It is also prescribed that the Court may direct him to appear and receive the sentence during such period when called upon, which may not exceed three years. In the meantime, such person has to keep peace and be of good behaviour. It is clarified that such an order ought to be passed by the Court only after recording satisfaction regarding place of stay of the offender or his surety or about the regular occupation in the place where the court exercises jurisdiction or at a place where the offender may likely reside during period of bond. The Court should also take into consideration the report of the probation officer while passing such order, if such report is available. An order of supervision can also be passed by the Court, if it is of the opinion that such an order will be in the interest of the offender and of the public, directing the offender to remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during period, which shall not be less than one year. The condition, if any, imposed by the Court, is required to be complied with by the offender, as prescribed in the supervision order. The offender is required to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, and to observe the conditions as contained hereinabove and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter which the Court may think fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. The conditions, as imposed for supervision and circumstances as indicated in the order has to be explained to the offender and a copy of such order has to be furnished to each offender, sureties and the probation officer. 17. At this stage, it is necessary to make it clear that under Section 3, a convict can be released by the Court after admonition only with respect to offences as specified therein. On the other hand, while exercising the power under Section 4, the Court may release the [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (20 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] offender on probation of good conduct with respect to the offences as prescribed. 18. It is not out of place to specify that in context of the object and reasons for which the 1958 Act was brought, powers have been conferred upon the Court primarily under Sections 3 and 4. As contemplated under Section 11, the Courts are competent to make such orders even during appeal and revision. Further, once the benefit either under Section 3 or Section 4 has been granted to such offender, it would entail the benefit of removal of disqualification, if any, attaching to the conviction. ... xx xx xx xx 19. On perusal, it is quite clear that in case a person has been released after admonition under Section 3 or on probation of good conduct under Section 4, they shall not face a disqualification attaching to such conviction. xx xx xx xx 34. At this stage, it is important to ascertain as to under what circumstances an offender, who was found guilty for offences as prescribed, can avail the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act. It is also necessary to enumerate what may be relevant factors for the Court that can be taken into consideration while passing orders under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act. In this regard, we can profitably refer to various precedents explaining the circumstances in which such benefit can be extended. 35. In Rattan Lal (Supra), this Court was having an occasion to consider the object of Sections 3 and 4, in general, and Section 6, in particular, of the 1958 Act. It was observed that – “4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issue to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case; including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.” 36. This Court, while considering the factors relevant for the purpose of extending the benefit of Section 360 CrPC or of 1958 Act, in Ved Prakash (Supra) opined that the Court must ascertain relevant material regarding social background and the personal information of the crime-doer. While releasing the accused on [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (21 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] probation of good conduct, this Court, through Krishna Iyer, J. observed as thus – “…..The materials before us are imperfect because the trial court has been perfunctory in discharging its sentencing functions. We must emphasise that sentencing an accused person is a sensitive exercise of discretion and not a routine or mechanical prescription acting on hunch. The trial court should have collected materials necessary to help award a just punishment in the circumstances. The social background and the personal factors of the crime-doer are very relevant although in practice criminal courts have hardly paid attention to the social milieu or the personal circumstances of the offender. Even if Section 360 CrPC is not attracted, it is the duty of the sentencing court to be activist enough to collect such facts as have a bearing on punishment with a rehabilitation slant….. …..In the present case, the offender is a young person and his antecedents have no blemish. His life is not unsettled or restless and the report indicates that he is an agriculturist, pursuing a peaceful vocation. His parents are alive and he has a wife and children to maintain. These are stabilising factors in life. A long period of litigation and the little period of imprisonment suffered, will surely serve as a deterrent. We are mindful of the fact that a firearm has been used by the appellant and we cannot sleep over the gravity of the offence. Nevertheless, the report of the Probation Officer states that the appellant is not given to any bad habits or stresses of poverty. A land dispute led to the crime and that does not survive any longer. The Probation Officer recommends that an opportunity be given to the appellant to improve himself and bring up his family by honest labour as an agriculturist so that the interests of social defence may be secured. We are inclined to agree that in this case the appellant may be given the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. We are satisfied that the offender has a fixed place of abode and regular occupation. We are inclined also to rely on the Probation Officer’s report which supports the direction for release on probation. We, therefore, direct that the appellant be released under Section 4(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and instead of sentencing him, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond before the trial court with two sureties, one of whom shall be his father, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during the period of three years from the date of release and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. In addition, we pass an order that the Probation Officer shall have supervision over the offender for a period of one year and shall make reports once every three months to the Sessions Court about the conduct of the offender. We direct further, that the appellant shall be specially supervised from the point of consumption of intoxicants and the matter brought to the notice of the court in case the appellant violates. The undertaking to be incorporated in his bond shall contain a term that he shall not consume alcohol during the period covered by the bond. We allow the appeals in the manner above indicated.” [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (22 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] As indicated, other factors that were considered are age, antecedents, character, habits, economic conditions, occupation, fixed place of abode, familial responsibilities, gravity of offence, origin of dispute etc., so that an opportunity can be given to the accused to improve himself and to bring up his family or may live with sense of social security. 45. Moreover, since all the Appellants have been extended the benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur any disqualification affecting their service career, if any, arising out of the conviction, in terms of Section 12 of the 1958 Act. 25. In view of the detailed consideration of Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 12 of the Act of 1958 by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above judgment, there is no iota of doubt about the fact that as far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the petitioner was convicted for offences under Sections 498A and 323 of the IPC, however he was granted the benefit of Section 4(1) read with Section 12 of the Act of 1958 by which the disqualification as attached was removed by learned trial Court which eliminates all kinds of hurdles in his appointment on the post in question. Further, on acquittal of the petitioner in the appeal as filed against the order of the learned Trial Court dated 01.05.2025 on the ground of benefit of doubt, there remains finally no hurdle in his appointment on the post in question. 25.1. In the judgment of Milind (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the Act of 1958 is a beneficial legislation. The Courts have been empowered to grant benefit of Sections 3 or 4 of the said Act and on that basis, they have been further empowered to remove the disqualification attached to a conviction. The Act of 1958 was made keeping in mind the theory of reformation. Once the Courts, in exercise of their powers under the Act of 1958, have granted benefit of Sections 3 or 4 and have further removed the disqualification so attached, no action on the part of the State can create a hurdle in the appointment of qualified and selected [2026:RJ-JP:16411] (23 of 23) [CW-4203/2023] person to the post in question, for which he is otherwise eligible and qualified. 26. On the basis of above discussion and considering the law as cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in the cases of Alok Kumar Chaturvedi (supra), Mukesh Kumar (supra) and Rajesh (supra), this Court has reached to a conclusion that as the petitioner was granted the benefit of Section 4(1) and learned Trial Court by exercising power under Section 12 of the Act of 1958 removed disqualification attached to conviction and later on, learned Appellate Court also acquitted him, therefore he deserves to be appointed on the post in question as per his merit against the one post lying vacant in terms of interim order dated 31.03.2023. Consequently, this writ petition is allowed and the action of the respondent of denying the appointment to the petitioner on the post of constable is declared as illegal and arbitrary. 27. Respondents are directed to appoint the petitioner on the post of Constable against the one post kept vacant in terms of the interim order of the Co-ordinate Bench of Court dated 31.03.2023 within a period of 30 days from the date of this order without making any delay in processing his case in terms of the judgment of this Court. The petitioner shall be entitled for all consequential, notional and actual benefits in accordance with law. 28. There shall be no order as to cost(s). 29. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (RAVI CHIRANIA),J RAHUL KUMAR /34-s