CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) IN THE HIGH COURT OMAXE Ltd. Shyama Yadav & another CORAM: Present: GURVINDER SINGH GILL, J. 1. The petitioner passed by the National whereby an appeal filed (Annexure P Commission of delay of 300 days in filing the appeal. 2. The dispute in instituting a No.1 had booked a flat in a residential complex Ltd. (petitioner) the petitioner had failed to hand over p stipulated time (Annexure P to respondent No.1 (O&M) ( 1 ) IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES AT CHANDIGARH CWP Date of Decision: Ltd. Versus Shyama Yadav & another HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GURVINDER SINGH GILL HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE DEEPAK MANCHANDA Mr. Karanjeet Singh Mainee, Advocate, for the petitioner. GURVINDER SINGH GILL, J. petitioner – OMAXE Ltd. assails order dated passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission n appeal filed by the petitioner challenging (Annexure P-2) passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC), has been dismissed of delay of 300 days in filing the appeal. The dispute in nutshell, which led to respondent No.1 instituting a complaint under the Consumer Protection Act No.1 had booked a flat in a residential complex td. (petitioner), but despite respondent No.1 having paid the agreed amount the petitioner had failed to hand over possession of the same within the stipulated time-frame. The SCDRC vide (Annexure P-2) directed the petitioner to refund to respondent No.1 along with interest @ FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH WP-6589-2026 (O&M) ate of Decision: 12.03.2026 … Petitioner ... Respondents HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GURVINDER SINGH GILL DEEPAK MANCHANDA Advocate, assails order dated 11.08.2025 (Annexure P- Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) challenging order dated 30.11.2022 ) passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal has been dismissed being time barred i.e. on account espondent No.1 – Shyama Yadav complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, is that respondent No.1 had booked a flat in a residential complex to be developed by Omaxe espondent No.1 having paid the agreed amount ossession of the same within the vide its order dated 30.11.2022 directed the petitioner to refund an amount of Rs.20,88,060 @ 6% per annum from the date of -1) (NCDRC), 30.11.2022 ) passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal being time barred i.e. on account Shyama Yadav espondent developed by Omaxe espondent No.1 having paid the agreed amount, ossession of the same within the .11.2022 amount of Rs.20,88,060/- date of VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) respective deposit Rs.50,000/- expenses. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 30 petitioner filed an appea filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and there was a delay of 300 days, the same was dismissed being time 11.08.2025 4. Learned counsel for the pet impugned order passed by the SCDRC conveyed to the petitioner although the SCDRC was obliged to convey the same, therefore, the petitioner was not aware of the assigned therein by the S and as such period of limitation. rules prescri limitation is should be afforded to the litigants to avail remedy of first appeal. It has been the appeal in time was not fact that he was not aware of the order had occurred. It has further been submitted that the rules rules of procedure when the facts suggest that there would be miscarriage of justice in case litigant is not afforded (O&M) ( 2 ) deposits till realization apart from awarding another amount of - towards mental & physical agony and Rs.2 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 30 petitioner filed an appeal before the NCDRC, but since the same had been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and there was a delay of 300 days, the same was dismissed being time-barred 11.08.2025 (Annexure P-1). Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that impugned order passed by the SCDRC i.e. order dated 30 conveyed to the petitioner although the SCDRC was obliged to convey the herefore, the petitioner was not aware of the assigned therein by the SCDRC for deciding the matter against the petitioner and as such, was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. Learned counsel further submitted that in any case, the rules prescribing limitation ought to be interpreted liberally as the purpose of limitation is not to defeat the ends of justice should be afforded to the litigants to avail remedy of first appeal. It has been submitted that the petitioner by not filing the appeal in time was not to gain anything fact that he was not aware of the order passed by the SCDRC had occurred. It has further been submitted that the rules rules of procedure are handmaid of justice and when the facts suggest that there would be miscarriage of justice in case litigant is not afforded opportunity to avail of his right of appeal. apart from awarding another amount of agony and Rs.25,000 as litigation Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 30.11.2022 (Annexure P-2), the l before the NCDRC, but since the same had been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and there was a delay of 300 barred vide impugned order dated itioner submitted that since the copy of the order dated 30.11.2022, was never conveyed to the petitioner although the SCDRC was obliged to convey the herefore, the petitioner was not aware of the said order or the reasons for deciding the matter against the petitioner was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed Learned counsel further submitted that in any case, the bing limitation ought to be interpreted liberally as the purpose of of justice and rather a fair opportunity should be afforded to the litigants to avail of remedies, particularly the submitted that the petitioner by not filing anything, as it was only on account of the passed by the SCDRC that the delay had occurred. It has further been submitted that the rules of limitation being of justice and not its mistress, particularly when the facts suggest that there would be miscarriage of justice in case the to avail of his right of appeal. Learned apart from awarding another amount of ,000 as litigation , the l before the NCDRC, but since the same had been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and there was a delay of 300 vide impugned order dated copy of the was never conveyed to the petitioner although the SCDRC was obliged to convey the or the reasons for deciding the matter against the petitioner was prevented from filing the appeal within the prescribed Learned counsel further submitted that in any case, the bing limitation ought to be interpreted liberally as the purpose of and rather a fair opportunity remedies, particularly the submitted that the petitioner by not filing as it was only on account of the that the delay being mistress, particularly the Learned VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) counsel in order to hammer reliance upon the following judgments: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 5. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and have also gone through the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. There is no denying the fact that in a fit case where the Courts in order to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice would condoning the delay, if some justifiable reasons are shown by the litigant seeking condonation of delay. delay of how many days is to be treated as an inordinate delay inasmuch as it is the facts considering as to whether the delay is sufficiently explained or not. The Courts are not expected to be liber prescribing limitation is defeated. judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Patil, (2001) 9 SCC 106 made where delay is inordinate and that in the case of an inordinate delay, the consideration of prejudice to the opposite side would be a relevant fact 7. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 (O&M) ( 3 ) counsel in order to hammer-forth his aforesaid submissions has placed reliance upon the following judgments: Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 Rita Kesh Vs. Biswanath Singha, 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 120 Hemlata Verma Vs. ICICI Prudent Life Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine SC 2451) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & another Vs. Katiji & others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 We have considered the aforesaid submissions and have also gone through udgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. here is no denying the fact that in a fit case where the Courts in order to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice would condoning the delay, if some justifiable reasons are shown by the litigant seeking condonation of delay. However, t delay of how many days is to be treated as an inordinate delay inasmuch as it is the facts of each case which are required to be considering as to whether the delay is sufficiently explained or not. The Courts are not expected to be liberal to the prescribing limitation is defeated. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Vedabai Vs. Shantaram Baburao , (2001) 9 SCC 106, , wherein it was observed that a distinction must be made where delay is inordinate and a case where that in the case of an inordinate delay, the consideration of prejudice to the opposite side would be a relevant factor. Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, it was held as under: forth his aforesaid submissions has placed Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) Rita Kesh Vs. Biswanath Singha, 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC Hemlata Verma Vs. ICICI Prudent Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & another Vs. Katiji & We have considered the aforesaid submissions and have also gone through udgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner. here is no denying the fact that in a fit case where the Courts in order to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice would tend to be liberty in condoning the delay, if some justifiable reasons are shown by the litigant However, there is no broad yard-stick that delay of how many days is to be treated as an inordinate delay inasmuch as it of each case which are required to be borne in mind while considering as to whether the delay is sufficiently explained or not. The the extent that the very purpose of juncture, it is apposite to refer to a Vedabai Vs. Shantaram Baburao observed that a distinction must be case where the delay is of few days and that in the case of an inordinate delay, the consideration of prejudice to the Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, forth his aforesaid submissions has placed We have considered the aforesaid submissions and have also gone through here is no denying the fact that in a fit case where the Courts in order to to be liberty in condoning the delay, if some justifiable reasons are shown by the litigant that delay of how many days is to be treated as an inordinate delay inasmuch as it while considering as to whether the delay is sufficiently explained or not. The very purpose of juncture, it is apposite to refer to a Vedabai Vs. Shantaram Baburao observed that a distinction must be of few days and that in the case of an inordinate delay, the consideration of prejudice to the Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) “23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the fac matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the d explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay 8. Hon’ble the Apex Court in 7 SCC 556 as under: “11. ……….. Law of limitation fixes a life the redress of the legal injury so wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life remedy. Unending unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim reipublicae u be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive time.” (O&M) ( 4 ) What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the fac matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay the Apex Court in N. Balakrishnan Vs. 7 SCC 556, while dwelling upon the purpose of prescribing limitation, held ……….. Law of limitation fixes a life- the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of ” What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack elay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) , while dwelling upon the purpose of prescribing limitation, held -span for such legal remedy for suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life-span must be fixed for each period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every for a legislatively fixed period of M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) , while dwelling upon the purpose of prescribing limitation, held VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) 9. Coming to the facts of present case, we find that the order passed by the SCDRC was passed in the presence of the counsel for the parties. As can be discerned from the impugned order dated observed the mandate of the law and had sent copies of the order passed by it to the parties concerned. The relevant para 6 from the order passed by the reproduced herein “6. In pursuant of the said order, records of the State Commission have been received. A perusal of the same shows that the certified copy of the impugned order dated copy was dispatched to a Commission i.e. the complainant and the two Opposite Parties on 15.12.2022 vide dispatch No.1981 10. The aforesaid position clearly shows that the plea raised by the petitioner that the order passed by the SCDRC was not conveyed to him is rather hollow. The order having for the parties and the copy thereof also having been conveyed to the petitioner needs mu builder/developer would have its right of appeal. No justifiable explanation is forth what prevented the petitioner from filing the appeal within the prescribed time-frame. 11. As far as the judgments pressed into service by the learned petitioner are concerned, regarding limitation as set facts of the present case being distinct, the petitioner cannot derive any advantage from the said judgment. Similarly, we find that the judgment in (O&M) ( 5 ) Coming to the facts of present case, we find that the order passed by the SCDRC was passed in the presence of the counsel for the parties. As can be discerned from the impugned order dated 11.08.2025 observed the mandate of the law and had sent copies of the order passed by it to the parties concerned. The relevant para 6 from the order passed by the NCDRC, wherein the said fact has been clearly referred to is roduced herein-under: In pursuant of the said order, records of the State Commission have been received. A perusal of the same shows that the certified copy of the impugned order dated 30.11.2022 was prepared on copy was dispatched to all the three parties before the State Commission i.e. the complainant and the two Opposite Parties on 15.12.2022 vide dispatch No.1981-1983. The aforesaid position clearly shows that the plea raised by the petitioner that the order passed by the SCDRC was not conveyed to him is rather hollow. having been passed by the SCDRC in the presence of the counsel for the parties and the copy thereof also having been conveyed to the petitioner needs much to be explained on part of the petitioner builder/developer would have access to expert its right of appeal. No justifiable explanation is forth what prevented the petitioner from filing the appeal within the prescribed . As far as the judgments pressed into service by the learned petitioner are concerned, while we are certainly bound by the broad principles regarding limitation as set-forth in Esha Bhattacharjee’s case (supra) facts of the present case being distinct, the petitioner cannot derive any age from the said judgment. Similarly, we find that the judgment in Coming to the facts of present case, we find that the order passed by the SCDRC was passed in the presence of the counsel for the parties. As can be 11.08.2025, the SCDRC had duly observed the mandate of the law and had sent copies of the order passed by it to the parties concerned. The relevant para 6 from the order dated 11.08.2025 NCDRC, wherein the said fact has been clearly referred to is In pursuant of the said order, records of the State Commission have been received. A perusal of the same shows that the certified copy of 30.11.2022 was prepared on 07.12.2022 and ll the three parties before the State Commission i.e. the complainant and the two Opposite Parties on 1983.” The aforesaid position clearly shows that the plea raised by the petitioner that the order passed by the SCDRC was not conveyed to him is rather hollow. been passed by the SCDRC in the presence of the counsel for the parties and the copy thereof also having been conveyed to the on part of the petitioner, who being a to expert legal opinion so as to exercise its right of appeal. No justifiable explanation is forth-coming to show as to what prevented the petitioner from filing the appeal within the prescribed As far as the judgments pressed into service by the learned counsel for the while we are certainly bound by the broad principles Esha Bhattacharjee’s case (supra), but the facts of the present case being distinct, the petitioner cannot derive any age from the said judgment. Similarly, we find that the judgment in Coming to the facts of present case, we find that the order passed by the SCDRC was passed in the presence of the counsel for the parties. As can be , the SCDRC had duly observed the mandate of the law and had sent copies of the order passed by it dated 11.08.2025 NCDRC, wherein the said fact has been clearly referred to is The aforesaid position clearly shows that the plea raised by the petitioner that the order passed by the SCDRC was not conveyed to him is rather hollow. been passed by the SCDRC in the presence of the counsel for the parties and the copy thereof also having been conveyed to the who being a opinion so as to exercise as to what prevented the petitioner from filing the appeal within the prescribed counsel for the while we are certainly bound by the broad principles , but the facts of the present case being distinct, the petitioner cannot derive any age from the said judgment. Similarly, we find that the judgment in VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) Rita Kesh’s case (supra) inasmuch as in the said case, it is specifically observed that the limitation for filing appeal or revision jurisdiction would start from the date when the copy of the certified order is communicated to the parties, whereas unlike in the cited case, order had been duly communicated to the petitioner. case (supra) record of the said case, but the cited judgment, it will be difficult to apply the said judgment to the facts of the present case. 12. Another judgment pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. Katiji’s case (supra) Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach and no discrimination should be made merely because State seeks condonation of delay. In the cited case, there was delay of 4 days only and the Hon’ble Apex Court reversed the order of High Court, which had dismissed the appeal filed by the State being time barr case of delay of 300 days cannot be held to be at par with cited cases. we are in agreement with the observations recorded by the NCDRC in order dated 11.08.2025 justification for 13. In any case, the scope of interference in writ jurisdiction said order would be very limited i.e. if there is some sheer perversity in the impugned order or there in the instant case. (O&M) ( 6 ) Rita Kesh’s case (supra) would also be not of any help to the petitioner inasmuch as in the said case, it is specifically observed that the limitation for filing appeal or revision in respect of a case under jurisdiction would start from the date when the copy of the certified order is communicated to the parties, whereas unlike in the cited case, had been duly communicated to the petitioner. case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court condoned the delay in view of the record of the said case, but since the facts not having been detailed therein in the cited judgment, it will be difficult to apply the said judgment to the facts the present case. judgment pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner Katiji’s case (supra), also lays a broad proposition of law to the effect that Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach and no discrimination should be made merely because State seeks condonation of delay. In the cited case, there was delay of 4 days only and the Hon’ble Apex Court reversed the order of High Court, which had dismissed the appeal filed by the State being time barred being 4 days. case of delay of 300 days cannot be held to be at par with cited cases. agreement with the observations recorded by the NCDRC in order 11.08.2025 (Annexure P-1) inasmuch as justification for explaining the delay of 300 In any case, the scope of interference in writ jurisdiction said order would be very limited i.e. if there is some sheer perversity in the order or if there is some sheer misreading of evidence, which is not there in the instant case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in would also be not of any help to the petitioner inasmuch as in the said case, it is specifically observed that the limitation for in respect of a case under consumer protection jurisdiction would start from the date when the copy of the certified order is communicated to the parties, whereas unlike in the cited case, a copy of the had been duly communicated to the petitioner. In Hemlata Verma’s , the Hon’ble Apex Court condoned the delay in view of the the facts not having been detailed therein in the cited judgment, it will be difficult to apply the said judgment to the facts judgment pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner a broad proposition of law to the effect that Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach and no discrimination should be made merely because State seeks condonation of delay. In the cited case, there was delay of 4 days only and the Hon’ble Apex Court reversed the order of High Court, which had dismissed the appeal filed ed being 4 days. The petitioner’s case being a case of delay of 300 days cannot be held to be at par with cited cases. Thus, agreement with the observations recorded by the NCDRC in order inasmuch as there is no plausible days in filing the appeal. In any case, the scope of interference in writ jurisdiction so as to assail the said order would be very limited i.e. if there is some sheer perversity in the there is some sheer misreading of evidence, which is not The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Garment Craft would also be not of any help to the petitioner inasmuch as in the said case, it is specifically observed that the limitation for rotection jurisdiction would start from the date when the copy of the certified order is copy of the Hemlata Verma’s , the Hon’ble Apex Court condoned the delay in view of the the facts not having been detailed therein in the cited judgment, it will be difficult to apply the said judgment to the facts judgment pressed into service by learned counsel for the petitioner a broad proposition of law to the effect that Court should adopt a liberal and justice oriented approach and no discrimination should be made merely because State seeks condonation of delay. In the cited case, there was delay of 4 days only and the Hon’ble Apex Court reversed the order of High Court, which had dismissed the appeal filed The petitioner’s case being a Thus, agreement with the observations recorded by the NCDRC in order plausible so as to assail the said order would be very limited i.e. if there is some sheer perversity in the there is some sheer misreading of evidence, which is not M/s Garment Craft VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-6589-2026 (O&M) Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, AIR 2022 SC 422 interference under Article 227 of the “18. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercis India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is b jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in a cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must b miscarriage of justice. 14. Examining the impugned order in the light of ratio of law Garment Craft’s case (supra) impugned order jurisdiction. dismissed. 12.03.2026 Vimal (O&M) ( 7 ) Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, AIR 2022 SC 422 interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, held as under: Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is b jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in a cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.” Examining the impugned order in the light of ratio of law Garment Craft’s case (supra), we do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned order so as to warrant any interference jurisdiction. Finding no merit in the instant petition, the same is hereby dismissed. (GURVINDER SINGH GILL (DEEPAK MANCHANDA Whether speaking/reasoned: Whether reportable: Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, AIR 2022 SC 422, while defining the scope of Constitution, held as under: Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction ed by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that e exercised to ensure there is no Examining the impugned order in the light of ratio of law laid down in M/s e do not find any perversity or illegality in the any interference in exercise of writ Finding no merit in the instant petition, the same is hereby GURVINDER SINGH GILL) JUDGE DEEPAK MANCHANDA) JUDGE Yes/No Yes/No , while defining the scope of M/s e do not find any perversity or illegality in the in exercise of writ Finding no merit in the instant petition, the same is hereby VIMAL KUMAR 2026.03.19 11:53 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document