SMT LAXMI DEVI CHAUHAN AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
CRLA/7797/2026 · 2026-09-17
Santosh Rai
Criminal Appealbody2026
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 7431 (ALL) · dailylaw.ai ]
DailyLaw.ai
[ 2026 DAILYLAW 7431 (ALL) · dailylaw.ai ]
Judgment text
Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 7797 of 2026 Court No. - 93 HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Shri Pankaj Dwivedi, learned counsel for the appellants, Shri Prem Chandra Dwivedi, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and learned AGA for the State. 2. The present criminal appeal has been filed by the appellants with a prayer to set aside the cognizance/summoning order dated 15.01.2025 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Agra in Complaint/Special Case No.75 of 2024 (SST No.111 of 2025) under Sections 323, 452, 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, P.S.- Etmadaulla, District- Agra. 3. The application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was treated as a complaint during the course of inquiry. On the basis of the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., the appellants were summoned for the offences under Sections 323, 452, 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants have been falsely implicated in the complaint arising out of a prior dispute between the parties. It is submitted that a cross-FIR had already been lodged by appellant no. 1 on 27.11.2023, which culminated in a charge- sheet, whereas the present complaint was filed subsequently on
15.12.2023. It is further submitted that the allegations made in the complaint are false and exaggerated and that the complainant and his witness have merely reiterated the allegations without any independent Versus Counsel for Appellant(s) : Pankaj Dwivedi Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Prem Chandra Dwivedi Smt Laxmi Devi Chauhan And Another .....Appellant(s) State of U.P. and Another .....Respondent(s)
corroboration. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned summoning/cognizance order was passed without compliance with the mandatory requirement of the proviso to Section 223 BNSS, particularly without affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing. It is also submitted that the delay in approaching this Court occurred on account of lack of proper legal advice and knowledge of the impugned proceedings, and that the appellants have no criminal antecedents except the present case. On these grounds, the appellants seek condonation of delay and quashing of the impugned order and consequential proceedings. 5.
Per contra, learned AGA and learned counsel for opposite party no.2 submit that the complaint discloses specific and serious allegations against the appellants, including abuse by caste-related words, criminal intimidation, trespass and threatening the complainant with a pistol. It is submitted that the incident dated 27.11.2023 has been specifically narrated in the complaint and the version of opposite party no. 2 is supported by the statements of witnesses Ajay Pratap and Prem Lata recorded by the learned Magistrate. It is further submitted that the appellants have been regularly threatening and intimidating opposite party no. 2 and other persons of the locality and that complaints were also made before the police and administrative authorities. Learned counsel submits that the subsequent cross-case lodged by appellant no. 1 does not by itself discredit the complaint, and the learned Magistrate, after considering the complaint and the statements recorded in support thereof, rightly proceeded against the appellants. Accordingly, the prayer for quashing of the summoning/cognizance order and the consequential proceedings is opposed. 6. Admittedly, a cross-case, being Case Crime No. 647 of 2023, was registered from the appellants' side against the informant side under Sections 452, 323, 427, 354-B and 504 IPC and Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act. Learned counsel for the appellants as well as opposite party no. 2 both admit that charge-sheet has been filed in the said case, which is stated to be the cross-case. It is also an admitted fact that both parties are residents of the same locality and are neighbours. However, from a perusal of the complaint and the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., there is no specific averment that the alleged incident CRLA No. 7797 of 2026 2
took place within public view. Rather, it has been specifically stated in the complaint that the accused-appellants entered the house of the complainant. Further, there is no specific allegation that the accused- appellants used any casteist slur with the intention to insult or humiliate the complainant on the ground that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.
7. In the case of Swaran Singh vs State (2008) 8 SCC 435, the Hon'ble Apex Court drew a clear distinction between the expressions "public place" and "any place within public view." A private place may still be a place within public view if the incident is visible to members of the public. Conversely, merely because an incident occurs in a public building does not automatically satisfy the requirement if it is not within public view. The Supreme Court held that words such as "Chamar", though originally denoting a caste, may amount to an offence if used as a casteist abuse with intent to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Castes. The Court emphasized that words should be understood in their popular and social meaning, not merely their etymological meaning. For attracting Section 3(1)(x) (now Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s)), there must be intentional insult or intimidation; and intent to humiliate the victim because he or she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Mere abuse or quarrel, without the requisite intention contemplated by the Act, is insufficient. The Court reiterated that criminal proceedings should continue only where the allegations disclose a prima facie offence against the particular accused. Proceedings may be quashed where the FIR does not disclose the essential ingredients against an accused. 8. In Gorige Pentaiah vs state of AP & Ors 2009 Cri.L.J. 350, Honble Apex court held "when the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law." In the case of Hitesh Verma vs. State of Uttarakhand (2020) 10 SCC 710, the Hon'ble Suprme Court held that 'a dispute that arose inside the private house of a complainant over the possession of the land without the presence of independent public witnesses, does not satisfy the statutory threshold of Section 3(1)(r). CRLA No. 7797 of 2026 3
9.
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9. In the case of Shajan Skraria vs. State of Kerala and another, 2024 SCC Online SC 2249, the Hon'ble Apex Court by quoting the cases of Hitesh Verma (Supra) has held as under:
"13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that Respondent 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that Respondent 2 is a member of Scheduled Caste." In Khuman Singh v. State of M.P., (2020) 18 SCC 763
"15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Thus, the dictum as laid aforesaid is that the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is not established merely on the fact that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member for the reason that he belongs to such community.
In other words, it is not the purport of the Act, 1989 that every act of intentional insult or intimidation meted by a person who is not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe to a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe would attract Section CRLA No. 7797 of 2026 4
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 merely because it is committed against a person who happens to be a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. On the contrary, Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 is attracted where the reason for the intentional insult or intimidation is that the person who is subjected to it belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. I say so because the object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the reason of their caste status."
10. Accordingly, having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions and upon a careful scrutiny of the entire material available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to disclose even a prima facie case attracting the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The material collected during inquiry does not indicate that the alleged words or conduct were actuated by the caste of the informant or were intended to intentionally insult or humiliate the informant on the ground that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Equally absent is any material to establish that the alleged occurrence took place in a place within "public view", which is a sine qua non for constituting the offence under the aforesaid provisions, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swaran Singh (supra) further reaffirmed in Hitesh Verma & Shajan Skaria (supra). 11.
For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the essential ingredients constituting the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act are conspicuously absent from the material collected during investigation, and the continuance of proceedings for the said offences would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Consequently, the appeal under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act succeeds in part. 12. Consequently, the cognizance/summoning order dated 15.01.2025 passed by Special Judge, SC/ST Act, Agra in Complaint/Special Case No.75 of 2024 (SST No.111 of 2025) under Sections 323, 452, 504 and 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled CRLA No. 7797 of 2026 5
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, P.S.- Etmadaulla, District- Agra, is modified to the extent that the appellants stand discharged of the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(va) of the SC/ST Act. 13. However, there is sufficient material available on record to proceed against the appellants under the provisions of IPC. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellants under the provisions of Sections 323, 452, 504 and 506 IPC shall continue and be concluded expeditiously in accordance with law. The trial court shall proceed uninfluenced by any observation made herein on the merits of the case. 14. With the above observation, the appeal is partly allowed. 15. If the appellants are not on bail, they are directed to appear before the court concerned and move bail application, within two weeks from today. It is made clear that no application seeking extension of the aforesaid period shall be entertained by this court. 16. In case, the appellants move bail application before the court concerned, the same shall be considered and decided by the trial court expeditiously and preferably on the same day, in light of principles laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court regarding surrender and bail. 17.
In case, the appellants fail to appear before the court concerned within the stipulated period, the trial court will be at liberty to adopt appropriate coercive proceedings, in accordance with law, for securing the presence of the appellants. 18. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to serve a copy of this order by FAX/e-mail to the court concerned through District & Sessions Judge, Agra within four days. September 18, 2026 Ankit. CRLA No. 7797 of 2026 6 (Santosh Rai,J.) Digitally signed by :- ANKIT VISHWAKARMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad