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2026 DAILYLAW 7425 (HP)

STATE OF HP AND ANOTHER v. Payru

RSA/169/2025 · 2026-03-17

Romesh Verma

Civil Appealbody2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

2026:HHC:7943 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA RSA No. 169 of 2025 Date of decision: 17.03.2026. The Government of H.P. & another ...Appellants. Versus Pyaru ...Respondent. Coram: The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the appellants : Mr. Manish Thakur, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent : Mr. Bhupinder Singh Ahuja, Advocate. Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral): The present appeal arises out of judgment and decree as passed by the learned District Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P. dated 21.08.2024 in Civil Appeal No. 412/13 of 2023, whereby the appeal filed by the present appellants has been dismissed and the judgment and decree as passed by the learned Civil Judge, Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P. dated 31.07.2023 in Civil Suit No. 186-1 of 2021/2018, has been affirmed. 2. The respondent in this appeal was the plaintiff before the first Court in the civil suit. The parties 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? -2- hereinafter, for convenience, will be referred to by the same status as they held before the first Court. 3. Brief facts of the present case are that plaintiff owns land in Village Dhrarshani, Post Office Rishikesh, Tehsil Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh. Defendants constructed “Auhar-Kohina” road and during such process utilized the land of plaintiff without acquisition and payment of compensation. Plaintiff filed the suit seeking decree of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction. 4. Defendants contested the suit by raising preliminary objections qua of maintainability, estoppel, non joinder of necessary parties, valuation and limitation etc. 5. It was submitted that the road had been constructed in the year 1981. Plaintiff was to file suit within three years and due to long delay the suit was alleged to be not maintainable. 6. Learned trial Court held the plaintiff entitled to the relief and defendants were directed to take steps for acquisition of land of plaintiff utilized for construction of -3- “Auhar-Kohina” road and to disburse the assessed compensation to him. The learned trial Court also directed that if the State failed to pay the compensation to the plaintiff, then the plaintiff shall be entitled for the relief of injunction and possession of the land comprised in Khasra Nno. 579/495/201/2, Kita 2, Khewat No.121, Khatoni NO. 122 min, measuring 1-17 bighas and Khasra No. 303/1/1/2, land measuring 0-11 bighas and Khasra No. 263/2, land measuring 0-10 bighas, situated in village Dhrarshani, Post Office Rishikesh, Tehsil Jhandutta, District Bilaspur, H.P. 7. The defendants filed appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Bilaspur vide impugned judgment and decree dated 21.08.2024, hence the present appeal. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material available on the case file. 9. With the consent of the parties, the case is finally heard at admission stage. -4- 10. The Court of the first instance as also the First Appellate Court have concurrently held that the land of the plaintiff was utilized for construction of “Auhar-Kohina” road without payment of compensation to him. No dispute has been raised as to such findings of fact. It has only been contended on behalf of the defendants that the suit filed by the plaintiff after almost 38 years was hopelessly time barred. In alternative, it was pleaded that plaintiff having remained silent for such a long period was estopped from raising the claim. Principle of acquiescence has also been sought against him on the premise that the plaintiff was aware about the construction of road and the road was constructed with his implied consent and now he cannot turn around to raise objections against the construction of road. 11. Defendants are constituents of a welfare State. It is settled that the welfare State cannot claim adverse possession against its citizens. Thus, the suit on the basis of title cannot be said to be time barred, which right could only be defeated by proof of perfection of title by way of adverse possession by the other. -5- 12. Admittedly, the defendants were not in possession of any documents to show that the plaintiff had consented for construction of road through their lands. 13. The issue is no longer res-integra. In Sukh Dutt Ratra vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, (2022)7 SCC 508, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in almost identical fact situation, after placing reliance on Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, (2020)2 SCC 569, has held as under:- “23. This court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost identical set of facts and circumstances – rejected the contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined the responsibility of the State: “12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC [Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 (2013) 1 SCC (Civ) 491] wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar [State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 404 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 769] held that the -6- right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension.” 24. And with regards to the contention of delay and laches, this court went on to hold: “12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. [P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., (1975) 1 SCC 152: 1975 SCC (L&S) 22]” 25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person of their private property without following due process of law, was violative of both their human right, and constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken by this court in Vidya Devi -7- (supra) is squarely applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the present case.” 14. In light of above analysis, the suit of plaintiff was neither barred by limitation nor the principle of estoppel or acquiescence would apply against him. 15. No other point was urged. 16. In result, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Accordingly, the impugned judgments and decrees passed by learned Courts below are affirmed. No order as to the costs. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 17. Decree sheets be prepared accordingly. (Romesh Verma) Judge 17th March, 2026. (kck)