1 2026:CGHC:18835-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 331 of 2026 Vijay Babu Dwivedi W/o Late Shri Dharmdash Dwivedi Aged About 56 Years R/o Mig Q.No. 05, Junior Keshar Awas Near Aryan School, Rajkishore Nagar, Police Station Sarkanda, District- Bilaspur (C.G.) ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Public Works Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Engineer In Chief Public Works Department, North Block, Sector-19, Construction Building New Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Chief Engineer Public Works Department Zone-Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Superintendent Engineer Public Works Department, Circle- Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 5 - Executive Engineer Public Works Department, Bilaspur, Division-2, District- Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ravi Kumar Bhagat, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Dy. A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2026.04.25 11:27:10 +0530 2 Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 24.04.2026 1. Heard Mr. Ravi Kumar Bhagat, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents / State. 2. The appellant has filed this writ appeal against the order dated 15.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S). No. 4548/2018 (Vijay Babu Dwivedi vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others) whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / appellant herein. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant initially entered service as a Lower Division Clerk on 15.11.1988 and subsequently approached the Labour Court seeking classification as a permanent employee, which relief was granted in his favour and upheld by the Industrial Court upon dismissal of the respondent department’s appeal. Thereafter, owing to certain representations made by the appellant to higher authorities, the respondents issued a show cause notice dated 01.12.2016, replied to on 05.12.2016, culminating in a punishment order dated 16.12.2016, followed by a second show cause notice dated 28.12.2016 on identical allegations, again replied to on 03.01.2017, and eventually a charge-sheet dated 23.10.2017 on the same set of charges, compelling the appellant to institute W.P. (S) No. 4548/2018 before this Court. The respondents filed their reply on 17.09.2018 and the appellant placed the entire charge-sheet on record via memo dated 17.07.2018, and upon final hearing on 3 15.12.2025, the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the appellant had been subjected to a second departmental enquiry on identical charges for which he had already been punished on 16.12.2016. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred W.A. No. 138/2026, which was withdrawn with liberty to file afresh vide order dated 12.02.2026, and in compliance thereof, the appellant deposited the requisite cost on 17.02.2026, hence filing the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned charge- sheet dated 23.10.2017 is ex facie arbitrary, illegal, and without jurisdiction, as it seeks to reopen a concluded departmental enquiry in which the appellant had already been subjected to due process and punished vide order dated 16.12.2016, and once such proceedings had attained finality, the respondents lacked the authority in law to initiate a de novo enquiry on the very same cause of action. It is contended that the subsequent proceedings are founded upon an identical set of facts and allegations, and it is a well-settled principle that a second departmental enquiry on the same charges, after imposition of punishment in the first enquiry, is wholly unsustainable and impermissible in law. Further, such action amounts to subjecting the appellant to double jeopardy, offending the fundamental principles of natural justice by effectively punishing him twice for the same alleged misconduct; it is further urged that the impugned action is vitiated by legal malice, inasmuch as it attempts to unsettle and nullify the earlier concluded proceedings without the existence of any fresh material or evidence, rendering the same 4 vague, arbitrary, and devoid of bona fides. Learned counsel also submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate these settled legal principles and the factual matrix demonstrating repeated and unwarranted harassment of the appellant through successive enquiries on identical charges. It is further contended that such arbitrary exercise of power is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, subjecting the appellant to unfair, unreasonable, and discriminatory treatment despite his exoneration in departmental proceedings and acquittal by a competent criminal court. Lastly, it is submitted that even though the appellant has superannuated on 31.07.2024, the respondents have unjustifiably withheld his retiral benefits, thereby compounding the illegality and causing grave prejudice to the appellant. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents opposes the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner / appellant herein, in which no interference is called for. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal. 7. On a perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition primarily on the ground that no interference is warranted at the stage of issuance of the charge-sheet, holding that the contention of the writ petitioner 5 regarding identity of charges does not merit acceptance. The Court has observed that the charge-sheet dated 23.10.2017 contains two distinct charges, namely, (i) failure of the writ petitioner to properly discharge official duties during his tenure in the office of the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department, Bilaspur, coupled with repeated refusal or avoidance of assigned work and disobedience of official orders, and (ii) engaging in unnecessary and excessive correspondence with higher authorities, including constitutional functionaries, beyond the prescribed administrative channel, allegedly in violation of the applicable departmental rules and conduct regulations. The learned Single Judge further held that although the earlier show-cause notice may have included similar allegations, the writ petitioner would be at liberty to raise all permissible objections, including the plea of identity of charges, before the competent departmental authority during the course of enquiry. However, at the threshold stage, the Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction to quash the charge-sheet, observing that such interference is not warranted, and accordingly concluded that the writ petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 8. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and upon a careful perusal of the impugned order, we find that the same has been passed by the learned Single Judge upon due consideration of the material on record and is supported by cogent, sound, and legally sustainable reasons. It is well settled that in an intra-court appeal, interference is warranted only when the impugned order suffers from patent 6 illegality, palpable infirmity, or perversity apparent on the face of the record. In the present case, on a plain and meaningful reading of the impugned order, no such infirmity or perversity is discernible so as to warrant interference by this Court. It is also noteworthy that although the appellant had already superannuated at the time of filing of the writ petition, the said fact was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge and has been disclosed for the first time in the present writ appeal, which further does not persuade this Court to take a different view in the matter. 9. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet