Kizhuvilam Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. No. 2405, Represented By Its Secretary v. Sooryan S. S. , S/o. Sujathan
2026-04-01
Basant Balaji, Devan Ramachandran
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The appellants – a co-operative society and its functionaries - challenge the impugned judgment of a learned Single Judge because, it has directed them to fill up vacancies in the services of the first among them from a rank list, which they had prepared earlier. 2. According to the appellants, they had notified only three vacancies in the notifications issued by them; and that such number of candidates were also appointed, from a Rank List prepared and published later, consequent to a selection process. They admit that there arose two more vacancies during the validity of the Rank List; and that the respondent / writ petitioner was also included therein; but contends that the learned Single Judge could not have directed them to appoint him against one such, since it was not an originally notified vacancy. 3. Sri.Arjun Raghavan - learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the law has been well settled that, once the notified vacancies are filled up from a Rank List, the next arising vacancies cannot be so done; and relied upon the judgment of this Court in Ibey Susan Issac v. Anicadu Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., Pathanamthitta [2013 (2) KHC 399]. He argued that the directions of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment are contrary to the declarations in the afore precedent; and hence, are liable to be set aside. 4. In response, Sri.Amrita Arun - learned counsel for the 1 st respondent, submitted that Ibey Susan Issac (supra) is a precedent only in the factual situation where the Rank List is not for a particular period; and where the number of notified vacancies are immediately filled up. She contended that, contrary to this, in the case at hand - as evident from Ext.P1 Rank List - it was meant for a period of two years from its date, namely from 24.02.2024. She maintained that, in such circumstances, the directions of the learned Single Judge are without error. 5. We find force in the afore submissions of Smt.Amrita Arun, because, as rightly argued by her, Ext.P1 Rank List was notified to be in effect until 23.02.2026. True, there were only three notified vacancies and all the same had been filled up.
She maintained that, in such circumstances, the directions of the learned Single Judge are without error. 5. We find force in the afore submissions of Smt.Amrita Arun, because, as rightly argued by her, Ext.P1 Rank List was notified to be in effect until 23.02.2026. True, there were only three notified vacancies and all the same had been filled up. But, it is also conceded that there were two more vacancies that arose before 23.02.2026; and the germane question is whether the writ petitioner could have been directed to be appointed against one such, as has been ordered by the learned Single Judge. 6. We are without doubt that the declarations in Ibey Susan Issac (supra) did not constrain the learned Single Judge from issuing the impugned judgment because, the factual scenario involved herein is at total variance to that noticed in the above precedent. In Ibey Susan Issac (supra), the selection was based on a Circular issued by the Co- operative Society, but it did not postulate preparation of a Rank List, or for it to be kept alive for a specified period so as to facilitate appointments to subsequent vacancies from it. The learned Division Bench, in such singular factual backdrop, held that, since there was no authority for the Bank therein to prepare a Rank List, or to keep it alive for a particular period, their actions in having appointed persons in excess of the notified vacancies was untenable. The specific observations in Ibey Susan Issac (supra), is reproduced for favour of its reading: “4. ……………...The post of peon has not been brought within the purview of the Examination Board under section 80B. The interpretation put to Sub Rule (5) of Rule 182 by the counsel for the 1st respondent does not appeal to us. Under rule 182 (5) a separate procedure has been prescribed for selection to the post not covered by section 80(3)(a) and 80B of the Co-operative Societies Act. The selection and appointment has to be made after conducting the written examination and interview as per the guidelines issued by the Registrar. The Registrar has in fact issued Ext.A5 circular laying down the guidelines for selection and appointment which specifically prescribe that the notification inviting applications should specifically mention the number of vacancies available.
The selection and appointment has to be made after conducting the written examination and interview as per the guidelines issued by the Registrar. The Registrar has in fact issued Ext.A5 circular laying down the guidelines for selection and appointment which specifically prescribe that the notification inviting applications should specifically mention the number of vacancies available. That circular does not postulate preparation of a rank list and keeping it alive for a specified period and making appointments to subsequent vacancies arising during the currency of the rank list, in excess of the notified vacancies, from the rank list prepared. Therefore evidently there is no Rule enabling the 1st respondent bank to prepare a rank list pursuant to Ext.P1 notification and to make appointments to vacancies, which arose in excess of the notified vacancies also from the rank list so prepared keeping the rank list alive for a specified period.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. However, in contra-distinction, in the case at hand, the appellant/bank prepared a Rank List and specified that it will be alive until 23.2.2026. This cardinal difference in the factual scenario, differentiates this case from Ibey Susan Issac (supra). When the appellants themselves prepared a Rank List, as said above; and expressly concede that the same was alive until 23.2.2026, one fails to understand how they rely upon Ibey Susan Issac (supra), to assert that only the notified vacancies could have been filled up there. 8. Merely to reiterate, Ibey Susan Issac (supra) cannot be employed as a precedent in the factual matrix, as discernible in this case. In summation, we obtain no reason to entertain this appeal; and consequently, dismiss it.