Page No.# 1/12 GAHC010085802025 2026:GAU-AS:7727 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/2936/2025 MINU CHOUDHURY WIFE OF SHAHJAHAN ALI, RESIDENT OF MADHAV DEV NAGAR, NERA JAI MATAJI MANDIR, GOSALA BOARAGAON ROAD, P/O. MALIGAON, P/S. JALUKBARI, DIST. KAMRUP METRO, ASSAM, PIN-781011. VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR. TO BE REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM, EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI-781006 2:MISSION DIRECTOR SAMAGRA SHIKSHA AXOM KAHILIPARA GUWAHATI-781019 Advocate for the Petitioner : MR R I BHUYAN, MR. M H SAIKIA,MS. L WAJEEDA,MR. N H MAZARBHUIYAN,MR H TALUKDAR Advocate for the Respondent : SC, SSA, Page No.# 2/12 BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR ORDER 01/06/2026 Heard Mr. N H Mazarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S Bora, learned Standing counsel, Samagra Siksha Abhijan, Assam. 2. The petitioner by way of instituting the present writ petition has assailed an order dated 01.04.2025, issued by the Mission Director, Samagra Siksha Axom, releasing the petitioner from her contractual services on the ground that her contract, which had expired on 31.07.2024, was not renewed thereafter. 3. The petitioner in pursuance to a process of selection, was appointed as a Draughtsman in Rashtriya Madhyamik Siksha Abhijan in the month of November, 2011. The said Rashtriya Madhyamik Siksha Abhijan was subsequently amalgamated with Sarba Siksha Abhijan and thereafter, the organization was renamed as Samagra Siksha Axom. 4. The petitioner projects that she continued in her services and there was no order issued extending her services and/or agreements executed renewing her such contractual services. Accordingly, the petitioner projects that she was continuing in her services, like any other regular employee in a Government Department. 5. The petitioner submits that poised thus the respondent authorities without any prior intimation, proceeded to terminate the services of the petitioner, vide issuance of the order dated 01.04.2025, on the ground that the agreement executed between the organization and the petitioner had expired on Page No.# 3/12 31.07.2024 and the same was not renewed, thereafter. It was further projected that the services of the petitioner would no longer be required in the organization, w.e.f. 02.04.2025. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted the present writ petition. 6. Mr. Mazarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the petitioner, by reiterating the facts noticed hereinabove, has submitted that since November, 2011, the petitioner was continued as a Draughtsman in the Samagra Siksha Axom and she had discharged her duties without any blemish. 6.1 It is submitted that the necessity for continuing with the services of the petitioner can be viewed from the fact that her such continuation on contractual basis was automatic with the authorisation of annual increments to her. It is projected that there is no order issued towards extending the contractual appointment of the petitioner. Further, no agreement as otherwise, was required to be so executed, in respect of extension of service of employees in Samagra Siksha, Axom, was required to be executed for the extension of service of the petitioner and extension of her services were being effected by grant to her Annual Increments. 6.2 The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the ouster of the petitioner was only with a view to appoint person close to the powers that be for the works that the petitioner was discharging prior to being released from the organization vide order dated 01.04.2025. 7. Per contra, Mr. Bora, learned Standing counsel, Samagra Siksha Abhijan, has submitted that the services of the petitioner was being extended after fresh agreements in this connection were being executed between the petitioner and Page No.# 4/12 the authorities of the SSA, Assam. He submits that the last of such agreement was so executed with the petitioner for the period, w.e.f. 01.09.2023 to 31.07.2024. Accordingly, it is submitted that the petitioner by projecting that there was no agreement executed between her and the organization for extension of her services, had tried to misrepresent before this Court. 7.1 It is submitted by Mr. Bora, that the petitioner’s release from her services with the organization was on account of the fact that the work for which the petitioner was so engaged did not arise for execution any further and accordingly, there was no requirement for continued engagement of a Draughtsman in the Samagra Siksha Abhijan, Assam and accordingly, basing on the conditions of the contract executed between the petitioner and the organization, the petitioner came to be released from her services. 7.2 Mr. Bora, learned Standing counsel, Samagra Siksha Abhijan submits that no misconduct has been alleged against the petitioner in the order dated 01.04.2025 and accordingly, the said order being an order of termination simpliciter, the same would not mandate any interference from this Court. 8. Mr. Bora, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance of a decision of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Gau 1499. Mr. Bora, submits that the said decision was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali Vs. State of Assam [Judgment and Order dated 19.05.2026, in WA No. 416/2024]. 9. Rejoining his submissions, Mr. Mazarbhuiyan, learned counsel for the petitioner admits that the contract of the petitioner had expired on 31.07.2024. However, in the same breath, it is contended that the agreement brought on Page No.# 5/12 record as Annexure-1 to the affidavit filed by the respondent was not executed by the petitioner. 10. Accordingly, it is submitted that the petitioner being continued in her services since November, 2011, with the payment of enhanced remunerations over the years, the respondents without demonstrating as to why the services of the petitioner was not further required in the organization, the order dated 01.04.2025, which is protected to be only in the nature of a camouflage, would mandate an interference from this Court. 11. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. 12. The facts as noticed hereinabove, are not disputed by either of the parties to the proceeding. It is not disputed that the last contract agreement entered into between the petitioner and the Sarba Siksha Abhiyan authorities, had come to an end on 31.07.2024, and thereafter, there is no renewal of such contractual engagement of the petitioner, herein, although, she had continued in her service till the issuance of the impugned order, dated 01.04.2025. 13. In view of the factual matrix arising in the present proceeding and more particularly, on the date, the present proceeding was instituted by the petitioner before this Court; there being no order renewing the contractual engagement of the petitioner, herein; this Court is required to examine as to whether it would be permissible for this Court to direct the respondent authorities to re-engage the petitioner, herein, as Draughtsman in the Samagra Siksha Abhijan, Assam, in terms of her earlier contractual engagement. 14. This Court from the materials coming on record finds that the Page No.# 6/12 contractual engagement of the petitioner was terminated on the ground that there was no further requirement for continuous engagement of a Draughtsman in the organization and the agreement entered into with the petitioner, which had ended on 31.07.2024, was not extended any further. 15. The issue pertaining to the legal rights of a contractual appointee came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GRIDCO Limited & anr. v. Sadananda Doloi & ors.[reported in (2011) 15 SCC 16]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon noticing the earlier decisions on the issue, held as follows: “38. A conspectus of the pronouncements of this Court and the development of law over the past few decades thus show that there has been a notable shift from the stated legal position settled in earlier decisions, that termination of a contractual employment in accordance with the terms of the contract was permissible and the employee could claim no protection against such termination even when one of the contracting parties happened to be the State. Remedy for a breach of a contractual condition was also by way of civil action for damages/compensation. With the development of law relating to judicial review of administrative actions, a writ court can now examine the validity of a termination order passed by public authority. It is no longer open to the authority passing the order to argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not open to judicial review. 39. A writ court is entitled to judicially review the action and determine whether there was any illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the action is in the realm of contract. Having said that we must add that judicial review cannot extend to the Court acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over the decision. The Court cannot sit in the armchair of the Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable decision or course of action could have been taken in the circumstances. So long as the action taken by the Page No.# 7/12 authority is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities referred to above and so long as the action is not demonstrably in outrageous defiance of logic, the writ court would do well to respect the decision under challenge.” 16. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Textile Corporation Limited v. Suresh Kumar [reported in (2011) 15 SCC 180] being relevant to the issue arising in the present proceeding, is being noticed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the said case; considering the effect of non- extension of the period of contractual engagement, held that the contractual engagement of the respondent, therein, having come to an end, no relief beyond that period, could have been granted. Accordingly, the directions passed in the matter by the High Court allowing the respondent (before Hon'ble Supreme Court) to continue in his services, came to be modified and the respondent was deemed to be in service till the currency of his contractual engagement. The relevant paragraphs of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Kumar(supra) is reproduced hereinbelow : “4. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised primarily two arguments before us. He has contended that the reference to the unauthorised absence of the respondent could not in any manner be said to be stigmatic and that the finding to the contrary was unsustainable. Alternatively, he has contended that the respondent had joined the post on 7-9-1987 for a period of three years which would have come to an end on 6-9-1990 and as such the direction for reinstatement could not have been granted to him. It has been pleaded that as a consequence of the order of the Tribunal and of the High Court, the respondent has been put back into service. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent has however supported the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court. 6. In the facts of the case we need not examine the effect of the order dated 26-4- Page No.# 8/12 1989 whereby the services of the respondent had been terminated as being stigmatic or not as we are of the opinion that in the light of the fact that appointment itself was for a fixed period of three years which would have come to an end on 6-9-1990, no relief beyond that period could have been given to the respondent by the Tribunal or the High Court. We accordingly feel that these orders need to be modified to the extent that the appellant shall be deemed to be in service up to 6-9-1990 and not thereafter.” 17. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali (supra) with regard to the issues arising in the present proceedings had drawn the following conclusions: “11. At the outset, it should be noted that the appellant/petitioner was a contractual employee and did not hold a civil post. His engagement was governed entirely by the terms of the contract. 12. Upon expiry of the contractual tenure on 30-11-2022, no vested or enforceable right accrued in favour of the appellant/petitioner to seek continuation or renewal of the contract. The employer was legally entitled to release the appellant/petitioner upon completion of the contractual period. 13. Law is well settled that judicial review in matters of contractual employment is limited and confined to examining whether the action complained of is vitiated by illegality, arbitrariness, malafides, or colourable exercise of power. Courts cannot compel the renewal of a contract, nor can they confer continuity contrary to the expressed terms of engagement. 14. Coming to the argument on the foundation of the impugned order, the distinction between motive and foundation in service jurisprudence is well settled. 15. Motive refers to the background or inducing factors which may have prompted the employer to act, such as suspicion or pending allegation, but which are not themselves adjudicated or made the basis of the decision. Page No.# 9/12 16. Foundation, on the other hand, denotes the substantive basis of the action, in which allegations of misconduct have been examined and culminated in a finding, expressed or implicit, leading to the adverse order. 17. If misconduct is merely the motive, the action remains innocuous. If it constitutes the foundation, the action assumes a punitive character, attracting the requirement of due process. 18. Equally well settled is the distinction between the motive for an administrative action and the foundation of the impugned order. 19. The Allegations of misconduct, the pendency of a criminal case, or the issuance of notices may constitute the background or motive. Unless such allegations form the foundation of the order and are reflected therein, either expressly or by necessary implication, the order cannot be characterised as punitive or stigmatic. 20. Tested on the above principle, the impugned action cannot be construed as punitive. The order of discontinuation is ex facie innocuous and does not impose any civil consequences on the appellant/petitioner beyond those inherent in the contractual stipulation itself. 21. Mere existence of an FIR or the issuance of a show cause notice, which did not fructify into any proceeding or culminated in any finding, remains in the realm of motive and does not elevate the action to one founded on misconduct. To hold otherwise would be to read into the order what it does not state and treat an unproven allegation as determinative. 22. In these circumstances, the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the impugned action constitutes a simpliciter non-renewal of a contractual engagement calls for no interference. 23. In the present case, a plain reading of the order dated 19.06.2023 makes it evident that the appellant/petitioner was released solely on the ground that the contractual engagement had expired. The order does not refer to the FIR, does not Page No.# 10/12 advert to the alleged misappropriation, does not record any findings of misconduct, and does not cast any stigma upon the petitioner. 24. The order is expressly innocuous and referable only to the contractual terms. The submission that the issuance of a notice and the submission of a reply obligate the employer to hold a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry cannot be accepted. 25. The plea of colourable exercise of power or camouflage termination also deserves rejection. If the employer intended to terminate the petitioner on the basis of alleged misappropriation, nothing prevented them from expressly invoking such allegations and initiating disciplinary proceedings. The employer consciously refrained from doing so and confined the order strictly to the expiry of the contractual tenure. Judicial review does not permit the court to speculate on hidden motives. 26. We also find no merit in the claim for reinstatement. Reinstatement after expiry of a contractual tenure is legally impermissible. Even otherwise, reinstatement is not a natural or automatic consequence in cases of contractual employment. 27. The arguments of the appellants regarding non-adherence to the procedure for discontinuation prescribed under the Service Regulation and the Financial Regulation 2003 of the Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission also do not find favour with us. 28. The relevant regulation provides that any person engaged on contract service for a specific period under an agreement shall be liable to be discharged or released if he/she fails to discharge his/her duties satisfactorily and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Such a prescription thus cannot support the case of the appellant inasmuch as the appellant is not discharged for any unsatisfactory performance but for the reason that the terms of the contract were over. 29. The other regulation relied on relates to the continuance of an employee on deputation and attachment, and to the further engagement of employees on contract, and prescribes that any deviation from the prescribed process of continuation, in any form, is to be reported to the Executive Committee. Therefore, in the face of such Page No.# 11/12 regulation, the same is relatable to continuance beyond the contract period dehors the prescription, and not to an action for release of an employee after expiry of the contract period.” 18. Applying the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Giyas Ali (supra), noticed hereinabove, to the facts as arising in the present proceeding, it being crystal clear that the contractual engagement of the petitioner had come to an end on 31.07.2024 and thereafter, admittedly, there being no order of extension of such contractual engagement of the petitioner; this Court in the guise of exercise of the power of judicial review, would not substitute its decision, for the decision of the executive authority on the ground that the decision of this Court is more reasonable. This Court cannot extend the period of the contractual engagement of the petitioner, herein, after the same had come an end. 19. This Court upon examination of the order dated 01.04.2025, finds that no allegation of commission of any misconduct in the matter was leveled against the petitioner, therein. The order dated 01.04.2025 cannot be construed as punitive. The said order is ex-facie and innocuous order effecting termination simpliciter of the contractual engagement of the petitioner. Further, as already held in the decisions noticed hereinabove, reinstatement after expiry of a contractual tenure is legally impermissible. 20. If the period of contractual engagement of the petitioner was in currency and a termination of the engagement had occasioned, it would have been open to this Court by exercising its power of judicial review, to examine the legality, or, otherwise of such termination, but, in the facts involved in the present case; that is no longer permissible in view of the expiry of the period of the Page No.# 12/12 contractual engagement of the petitioner on 31.07.2024, which was, thereafter, not extended. 21. If any breach has occasioned with regard to the discontinuation of the services of the petitioner, it would only give rise to a cause of action for damages/compensation, for which, the remedy available is institution of a Civil Suit and not a writ petition. 22. In view of the conclusions drawn hereinabove, the prayer of the petitioner for a direction towards continuation of her contractual engagement, cannot be accepted. 23. Accordingly, the impugned order, dated 01.04.2025, would not call for any interference from this Court. 24. In view of the conclusions drawn hereinabove, the present writ petition is held to be devoid of any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant