( 2026:HHC:6753 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 2445/2026 Decided on: 12.03.2026 Roop Dei ….Petitioner Versus State of H.P. & Ors. .…Respondents. ……………………………………………………………………………. Coram Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the petitioner: Mr. Tek Chand, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Y.P.S. Dhaulta, Additional Advocate General. Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J The petitioner feels aggrieved by the award passed by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala on 09.04.2024, whereby her claim petition was dismissed. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and considered the case record. 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes 2 ( 2026:HHC:6753 ) 3. Following reference was sent by the appropriate Government for adjudication to the learned Labour Court-cum- Industrial Tribunal: - "Whether alleged termination of services of Smt. Room Dei W/O Shri Nekh Ram Village Tikri Luj Tehsil Pangi, Distt. Chamba, H.P from October, 2003 by the Executive Engineer, HPPWD Division, Pangi at Killar Tehsil Pangi District Chamba, H.P. who had worked as beldar on daily wages basis only for 711 days during the year 1994 to 1997 and 2001 to 2003 and has raised her industrial dispute vide demand notice dated 23/12/2011 after more than 8 years, without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is legal and justified? If not, keeping in view of working period as mentioned above and delay of more than 8 years in raising the industrial dispute, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above ex- worker is entitled to fro the above.” Name of the petitioner in the reference was ordered to be corrected by way of an addendum dated 17.05.2022 issued by the appropriate Government. The case set up by the petitioner was that she was engaged as a Beldar in the respondent-department in the year 1991 and worked with intermittent breaks till 2002; Breaks were deliberately given by the respondents from time to time to ensure that the petitioner would not complete 160 days in each calendar year of her service; Petitioner’s services were terminated orally by the respondents without giving one month's notice and without paying compensation, in violation of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the 3 ( 2026:HHC:6753 ) Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner further contended that the breaks imposed upon her ought to be counted towards continuous service for the purpose of calculating 160 days in terms of Section 25- B of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was also alleged that juniors to her named in the petition had been retained in service continuously without any break, in violation of the principle of “last come first go.” The respondents contested the claim of the petitioner. Their defence was that the petitioner had been engaged as a Beldar in the year 1994 and had worked intermittently with the department till 2003, whereafter she left the job voluntarily. The respondents denied petitioner having worked for more than 160 days continuously in any calendar year of her service. Petitioner’s mandays chart was also placed on record. All other allegations levelled by the petitioner were also refuted. The petitioner appeared as PW-1 in support of her claim, whereas the respondents examined Engineer Joginder Kumar as RW-1. After appreciating the entire evidence on record, the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. 4. Scope for interference with the awards passed by learned Labour Court was summed up in K.V.S. Ram Vs. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation2 as under: - 2 (2015) 12 SCC 39 4 ( 2026:HHC:6753 ) “14. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” Petitioner has placed on record her mandays chart that was produced by the respondents before the learned Labour Court as Ext. R-1. As per this chart, petitioner had worked with the respondents for 58 days in 1994, 47 days in 1995, 174 days in 1996, 148 days in 1997. Petitioner did not work at all during the years 1998, 1999 and 2000. She worked for 57 days in the year 2001, 110 days in 2002 and 117 days in 2003. Save & except the year 1996, the petitioner did not complete 160 days (minimum requirement set down by the State Government for regularising services of daily wage workers in tribal areas) in any calendar year. In the background of petitioner’s mandays chart, which was duly proved by the respondents, her allegations of respondents giving her fictional breaks cannot be accepted. Learned Labour Court has rightly concluded that the petitioner failed to produce any cogent evidence to establish that she had continuously worked from 1994 till October, 2003. Even if it is assumed that the respondents had given 5 ( 2026:HHC:6753 ) fictional breaks in service and exploited the petitioner as alleged, it was incumbent upon her to raise her grievance at the relevant time. The petitioner failed to do so. In view of the evidence placed on record, learned Labour Court has justly drawn the conclusion that the petitioner had worked intermittently and not continuously further not from 1991, but only from 1994 to 2003, and that the period reflected in the mandays chart (Ext. R-1) had to be accepted as correct. Concerning petitioner’s allegation that her services had been terminated in October, 2003 without issuing any notice, the learned Labour Court has elaborately discussed the plea of abandonment of service raised by the respondents. That absence of employee for long period gives rise to an inference of voluntary abandonment of service. It was established on record that the petitioner had only intermittently worked with the respondents from July, 1994 to October, 2003. According to the petitioner, she had approached the respondents time and again for re-engagement. However, as rightly observed by the learned Labour Court, no cogent evidence was led by the petitioner to prove that she had ever reported for duty or approached the respondents for re-engagement after her alleged termination in October, 2003. The demand notice was issued on 23.12.2011, i.e., after about eight years. In view of the evidence on record, the learned Labour Court justly held that 6 ( 2026:HHC:6753 ) respondents’ plea of the petitioner reporting for duty or approaching them for re-engagement after 2003 was only in the year 2011 would lead to the inference that she had abandoned the service, which fact stands established on record. The petitioner having not served for 160 days in the calendar year during the period of 12 months preceding the date of retrenchment could not be held to be in continuous service in terms of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. For the same reason, the respondents were not required to serve any notice upon the petitioner under Section 25-F of the Act. The petitioner also failed to prove her allegations that juniors to her had been retained in service. Learned counsel for the petitioner, during the course of hearing, could not demonstrate that observations made and findings recorded by the learned Labour Court were contrary to the evidence led by the parties. It is well settled that in exercise of powers of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal unless the same are shown to be perverse, suffering from patent illegality, or based on no evidence on record. Learned Labour Court has aptly considered the entire case and returned findings after proper appreciation of the case. The 7 ( 2026:HHC:6753 ) impugned award, which was passed almost two years ago does not call for any interference. The petition being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. Jyotsna Rewal Dua Judge 12th March, 2026(rohit)