Page No.# 1/16 GAHC010214812022 2026:GAU-AS:7522 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : RSA/183/2022 KHANIKAR TEA ESTATE PVT. LTD. AND ANR. (UNDER COMPANIES ACT ) 2: THE MANAGING DIRECTOR NAMELY SABIR AHMED (AGE 49 YEARS) S/O LATE ALHAZ BAKHTIAR AHMED RESIDENT OF NIRMALIGAON MANKATA KHANIKAR MOUZA DIBRUGARH PS DIBRUGARH SADAR POLICE STATION PO AND DIST DIBRUGARH ASSA VERSUS SRI SRIDAKHINPAT SATRA AND ANR. REPRESENTED BY THE SATRADHIKAR SHREE SHREE NONI GOPAL DEBO GOSWAMI, S/O PITAMBAR DEVA GOSWAMI, RESIDENT OF MAJULI SHREE SHREE DAKHINPAT SATRA, MOUZA SALAMORA KAMALBARI SATRADHIKAR, DIST JORHAT, PO JORHAT, ASSAM 2:SRI BUP BAYAN S/O MOINA SAIKIA RESIDENT OF DAKHINPAT SATRA PS KAMALABARI PO DAKHINOAT SATRA MOUZA SALMARA MAJULI DIST JORHAT ASSA Page No.# 2/16 Advocate for the appellants : Mr. A. Sattar Advocate for the respondents : Mr. A.C. Sarma (Sr. Adv.); Mr. G. Bharadwaj. Date on which judgment is reserved : 31.03.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 29.05.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : N/A Whether the full judgment has been pronounced? : Yes BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. A. Sattar, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. A.C. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. G. Bharadwaj, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal, under Section 100 of the CPC, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.09.2022, passed by the learned District Judge, Nagaon, in Title Appeal No. 2/2021. 3. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and decree dated 20.09.2022, the learned District Judge, Nagaon (‘first appellate Court’, for short) had allowed the appeal by affirming the judgment and decree, dated 24.06.2019, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Nagaon (‘trial Court’, for short), in Title Suit No. 20/2014. Page No.# 3/16 3.1. It is also to be noted here that vide judgment and decree, dated 24.06.2019, the learned trial Court had decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondents herein, declaring that the lease deed, bearing registration No. 6827/85 is liable to be cancelled; issued precept to the concerned Sub- Registry for cancellation of the original registered deed of lease, bearing No. 6827/85; declared that the defendants are liable to be evicted from the suit Schedule-‘Ka’ land and the plaintiff Satra is entitled to recover possession of the land of Schedule-‘Ka’ by evicting the defendants; and further decreed the suit for realization of arrear rent for a period from 2008 till 2013, i.e. for a period of 6 years @ yearly rent of Rs. 8,554/-, i.e. for a sum of Rs. 51,324/- as claimed by the plaintiff Satra. 4. For the sake of convenience and also to avoid confusion, the parties will be referred to by their original status in suit before the learned trial court. Background Facts:- 5. The background facts, leading to filing of the present appeal, are briefly stated as under: “The plaintiff/respondent No. 1 herein, namely, Sri Sri Dakhinpat Satra leased out Schedule-‘Ka’ land to the defendant No. 1/appellant No. 1 herein, namely, Khanikar Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., by executing a deed of lease, bearing registration No. 6827/1985, dated 30.08.1985. As per the said deed of lease/lease agreement, Schedule-‘Ka’ land was leased out to the defendant No. 1 company for a period of 40 years commencing from 1st January, 1982 till 31st December, 2021 at a fixed yearly rent of Rs. 8,554/- only. The said yearly rent, as per the terms of the deed of lease, was to be paid within 28th February of each year, Page No.# 4/16 by account payee cheque of SBI, Jorhat Branch in the name of the lessor i.e. the plaintiff, Sri Sri Dakhinpat Satra or in cash to the lessor/plaintiff. As per lease agreement, the period of one year was the period commencing from 1st January and ending on 31st December, as per English Calendar year. One of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid deed of lease was that on failure of the defendant No. 1 company/the lessee in payment of yearly rent, to be paid within 28th February each year, the lease would stand determined automatically and the plaintiff/lessor would re-enter into the land of Schedule-‘Ka’ by evicting the defendant No. 1. Thereafter, the defendant No. 1 had defaulted in payment of rent of Schedule-‘Ka’, land since the year 2008 till 2013, in spite of verbal demands, made by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1 company, to clear the rent. Thereafter, the plaintiff, on 02.01.2014, issued an advocate notice to the defendant Nos. 1 and 2, asking them to vacate the land of Schedule-‘Ка’. However, in spite of receipt of such notice, they failed to vacate the land of Schedule-‘Ka’ and issued a cheque amounting to Rs. 59,878/- towards arrear rent till 2014, admitting that they had defaulted in payment of annual rent since 2008 till 2013. The plaintiff returned the said cheque to the defendants as it had decided to file civil suit for ejectment of the defendant No. 1, and accordingly, instituted the suit. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had filed their written statement in the said suit, taking different grounds, such as the suit is not maintainable, there is no cause of action and also the suit is barred by limitation, Page No.# 5/16 principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence, and also bad for mis- joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties etc. The defendants also stated that the plaintiff on 10.01.2010, 10.01.2011, 10.01.2012 and on 10.01.2013, asked the defendants to vacate the leasehold premises. The defendants offered rent to the representative of the plaintiff, but on various pretext, the plaintiff's representative refused to accept the rent, and that the plaintiff had suppressed the fact that previously, the land was leased out to Kaliabor and Siconee T.E. Company Ltd. for 99 years and the same had been purchased by the defendant company for 99 years and it was determined on 30th September, 1963 and defendants purchased the right, vide registered deed No. 2885 dated 30.08.1965, and the plaintiff consented vide registered lease deed, No.6827/1985, for a period of 40 years from 1st January, 1982 to 31st December, 2021. The defendants also stated that as per Section 35 of Assam Temporarily Settled Areas Tenancy Act, the plaintiff only had the right to file suit for arrear rent and not for ejectment and compensation and as per Section 51(1) of the said Act, the defendants were not liable to be evicted from the leasehold premises, and as such, they had contended to dismiss the suit. Upon the aforementioned pleadings, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues: (i) Whether cause of action arose for the suit? (ii) Whether the suit is maintainable? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (iv) Whether the defendant has violated terms of lease agreement No. 6827/1985? Page No.# 6/16 (v) Whether the defendants are defaulters in payment of rent to the plaintiff Sri Sri Dakhinpat Satra? (vi) Whether the lease deed No.6827/1985 is liable to be cancelled? (vii) Whether the defendants are liable to be evicted from the "Ka" schedule land? (viii) Whether the plaintiff refused to accept rent from the defendant? (ix) To what other relief/relief(s), parties are entitled to? Thereafter, the learned trial Court, by taking evidence of the witnesses of the parties and the documents exhibited by them and after hearing arguments, had decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and thereafter, decreed the suit as stated herein above. Being aggrieved, the defendants/appellants herein had preferred an appeal, under Section 96, read with Order 41 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, and thereafter, hearing both the parties, the learned first appellate Court had affirmed the judgment and decree, so passed by the learned trial Court. Being aggrieved, the defendants/appellants herein have preferred the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1) For that, the substantial question of law is whether the first appellate Court was right in deciding the appeal without formulating the points of determination as required under Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC, 1908? 2) For that, the substantial question of law is whether Page No.# 7/16 the Courts below were right in holding the suit of the plaintiff filed through Power of Attorney Holder Sri Bup Bayan to be maintainable when the schedule of the land given in the Deed of Power of Attorney bearing deed No. 379 dated 30.11.2013 (Exhibit No. 3) do not tally and with the schedule of property mentioned in the Plaint of Title Suit No. 20/2014? 3) For that, the substantial question of law is whether the Courts below were right in passing the decree for eviction of the defendants from the "Ka" schedule land of the plaint, when the said "Ka" schedule land of the plaint does not tally with the land and its boundaries given in the certified copy of the Deed of Lease bearing deed No. 6827/1985 (Exhibit No. 2)? 4) For that, the substantial question of law is whether the finding in respect of issue No. (v), i.e., regarding default in payment of rent is perverse to the evidence on record such as the deposition of the plaintiff's witness No. 2, Sri Bup Bayan, wherein he admitted that he had taken the rent for two years, i.e., 2004 and 2005 together on 12.04.2005? 5) For that, the substantial question of law is whether the decree for realization of rent for a period of 6 years, i.e., from 2008 till 2013 can be said to be in conformity with the provision of Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and/or is without jurisdiction and perverse?” Submission of learned counsel for the appellants:- 6. Mr. Sattar, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that though as many as 5 substantial question of law is formulated in this appeal, his main emphasis is upon substantial question of law No. 1 and 5 only. Mr. Sattar, firstly, pointed it Page No.# 8/16 out that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC mandated the appellate Court to frame point for determination and to answer the same. However, in the instant case, the learned first appellate Court had not framed any point for determination and as such the finding of the learned first appellate Court is vitiated and in that view of the matter, the substantial question of law No. 1 is involved in the present appeal. 6.1. Mr. Sattar also submits that it is the duty of the plaintiffs herein to establish that they had instituted the suit within the period of limitation and the burden is always upon them. Referring to Article 52 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Sattar submits that the period of limitation for filing the suit for recovery of arrear rent is 3 (three) years. But, the plaintiffs herein, had instituted the suit for recovery of rent after a period of 6 years, and the learned Courts below had passed the decree for realization of rent for a period of 6 years w.e.f. 2008 till 2013, whereas, the suit was filed on 06.03.2014, and since the period of limitation for recovery of arrear rent is 3 years, the learned Courts below ought not to have passed the decree for recovery of arrear rent w.e.f. 06.03.2011, in view of Article 52 of the Limitation Act, and as such the decree passed by the learned trial Court, is without jurisdiction, as such substantial question of law No. 5 is involved herein and on such count, it is arbitrary and illegal and requires interference of this Court. 6.2. Mr. 6.2. Mr. Sattar further submits that the lease was valid till 2021, but, before that, it was determined by the learned trial Court, which according to him, is illegal and arbitrary also and it requires interference of this Court. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, Mr. Sattar has contended to allow this appeal. Page No.# 9/16 Submissions of learned counsel for the respondent:- 7. Per contra, Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, pointed it out that the plea, regarding Article 52 of the Limitation Act, was not taken in the memo of appeal. He also submits that in case of continuous default, limitation does not arise and Article 52 has no application instead the applicable Article is Article 67 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period of limitation to be 12 years. And as the suit was filed within 12 years no fault can be found with the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court as well as learned first appellate Court. 7.1. Mr. Sharma further submits that though the learned first appellate Court had not framed any point for determination in the impugned judgment, yet it had discussed all the issues in the impugned judgment and as such the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 is substantially complied with. 7.2. Mr. Sharma also submits that the lease was determined as per Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, and also there is clause in the same to that effect under such circumstances, Mr. Sharma submits that no illegality or irregularity is committed by the learned Courts below. 7.3. Lastly, Mr. Sharma submits that though the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, none of the substantial question of law is involved here in this appeal and therefore he has contended to dismiss the appeal. Consideration and Analysis:- 8. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this Court has carefully gone through the memo of appeal and the grounds mentioned therein, and also gone through the substantial questions of law and Page No.# 10/16 the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellant Court and the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court. 9. The first substantial question of law is - whether the first appellate Court was right in deciding the appeal without formulating the points of determination as required under Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC. 9.1. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides as under: “ 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.— The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state— (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.” 9.2. Indisputably, the learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment had not framed any point for determination. Now it is to be seen whether failure to frame points for determination by the learned first appellate Court violated Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. This was came before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, in Civil Appeal No. 16965-16957 of 2017. Then considering the earlier decisions on the issue, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-, “Thus, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as Page No.# 11/16 that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. In this regard, useful reference may be made to G. Amalorpavam and others vs. R.C. Diocese of Madurai and others8, wherein this Court held as under: - ‘9. The question whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC has (2017) 2 SCC 415 (2006) 3 SCC 224 to be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance with it and the second appellate court is in a position to ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is possible to make out from the judgment that there is substantial compliance with the said requirements and that justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient. Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination. Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower appellate court to consider the controversy between the parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts and the other considerations appearing on both sides is clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it does not contain the points for determination. The object of the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to frame points for determination and to Page No.# 12/16 cite reasons for the decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival contentions which arise for determination and also to provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.” 9.3. Thus, it appears to be a settled proposition of law that procedural lapses in framing points for determination do not vitiate judgments if the appellate court addresses all substantive issues. 9.4. In the instant case, though the learned first appellate Court had not framed any point for determination, yet it had directed a discussion in respect of all the issues framed and discussed by the learned trial Court and thereafter recorded findings. In that view of the matter, relying upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta(supra), it can safely be held that failing to framing points for determination do not vitiate impugned judgments. 9.5. Under the given factual and legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the first substantial question of law is found to be not flows out the impugned judgment and accordingly the same stands answered in negative. 10. Moving forward to the substantial question of law No.5, this Court finds that in the instant case, the suit was filed on 06.03.2014 for recovery of arrear rent for a period w.e.f. 2008 till 2013 for 6 years @ yearly rent of Rs. 8,554/-, i.e. for a sum of Rs. 51,324/-. 10.1. Article 52 of the Limitation Act, provides that the period of limitation for recovery of the arrears of rent is 3 years from the date of the becoming due. In the instant case if the period of 3 years for filing the suit for recovery of arrear Page No.# 13/16 rent is taken note of, then the suit ought to have been filed on 06.03.2011. But, the same was indisputably filed on 06.03.2014. And as such, the relief so granted at point No. (iv) of the decree so passed by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the learned first appellate Court, to the considered opinion of this Court, is without jurisdiction. For recovery of rent w.e.f. 2008, the suit ought to have been filed within 06.03.2011. 10.2. Though, both the learned Courts below have arrived at a finding that the suit was filed within the period of limitation, yet it appears that the burden of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation, was upon the plaintiff/respondents herein, and from the materials placed on record and also from the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, this Court finds that the suit was not filed within the period of limitation. 10.3. Though Mr. Sarma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submits that in view of continuation of default in payment herein, the applicable Article is 67 of the Limitation Act, which provides that the limitation period is 12 years, yet the said submission left this Court unimpressed. 10.4. Article 52 and Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963, apply to different types of suits, and continuous default in rent payment does not make Article 52 inapplicable while automatically shifting everything to Article 67. Article 52 deals with suit for arrears of rent (recovery of money) and under this Article limitation period is 3 years from the date the arrears become due. On the other hand Article 67 deals with suits by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant. Limitation period is 12 years from the date the tenancy is determined (e.g., terminated by notice or forfeiture). For recovery of arrears of rent (a money suit or claim for past dues), Article 52 always applies. Rent can only be recovered as arrears, that fell due within the last 3 years, before filing the suit. Arrears, older Page No.# 14/16 than that, are time-barred. Continuous default does not extend or override this 3-year limit for the money claim itself. However, for an eviction suit (seeking possession of the property on the ground of non-payment of rent), Article 67 (or sometimes Article 66 in cases of forfeiture) generally applies, the period of limitation is 12-year period runs from the determination of tenancy, in such suits. 10.5. Section 22 of the Limitation Act, however, deals with continuing breaches and torts, allowing a fresh limitation period at every moment the breach continues. However, for rent arrears, Courts treat each due date separately under Article 52, rather than applying a single continuing cause of action, that overrides the 3 years limit for older arrears. 10.6. This issue came before Hon’ble Supreme Court for consideration in the case of Kamla Bakshi v. Khairati Lal reported in (2000) 3 SCC 681 wherein it has been held as under:-  A suit (or eviction petition under rent control laws) for recovery of arrears of rent is governed by Article 52 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  Only arrears that are "legally recoverable" (i.e., those for which a suit could be filed within the 3-year period) can be claimed.  Arrears beyond 3 years from the date they became due are time-barred and cease to be legally recoverable.  Continuous default does not extend the limitation period or attract Article 67 for the monetary claim of arrears. Article 67 applies only to suits for possession by a landlord against a tenant (12 years from determination of tenancy). 10.7. And in that view of the matter, decreeing the suit by the learned trial Page No.# 15/16 Court for recovery of arrears of rent w.e.f. 2008 till 2013, for a period of 6 years, is illegal and arbitrary and on such count, it is liable to be interfered with. It is to be noted here that a wrong application of law of limitation qualifies as a substantial question of law. 11. Accordingly, the relief granted in point No. (iv) of the decree passed by the learned trial Court for recovery of arrear rent w.e.f. 2008 till 2013, which was affirmed by the learned first appellate Court in the impugned judgment and decree, stands interfered with. The decree for recovery of rent is modified to the extent, covered by the period of limitation, i.e. 3 years from the date of becoming due. 11.1. And in that view of the matter, the decree is modified to the extent of recovery of rent for the admissible period, i.e. with effect from the years 2011, 2022 and 2013 only. 12. Further, in respect of substantial questions of law Nos. 2, 3 and 4, this Court under the given factual scenario, is of the view that none of them are flowing out of the impugned judgment and decree. Besides, in respect of the said questions, there is concurrent finding of facts by both the learned Courts below, and this Court in second appeal, is not entitled to appreciate the same. Reference in this context can be made to the following decisions: (i) Thiagarajan and Ors. vs. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and Ors., reported in (2004) 5 SCC 762. (ii) Commr., Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments vs. P. Shanmugama and Ors. , reported in (2005) 9 SCC 232. (iii) State of Kerala and Anr. vs. Mohd. Kunhi (Dead) by LRs. And Ors., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 139. (iv) Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (Dead) by LRs., reported Page No.# 16/16 in (2005) 10 SCC 553. 13. Accordingly, this appeal stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. 14. Registry shall send down the records of learned Courts below, along with a copy of this judgment and order. JUDGE Comparing Assistant