Page No.# 1/9 GAHC040007442026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : WP(C)/230/2026 Keto Basar Son of Jumke Basar, resident of Village Nyigam, PO Basar, Leparada District, Arunachal Pradesh. 791101 VERSUS The State of AP and 7 Ors represented by the Principal Secretary, Department of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Itanagar 791111 2:The Principal Secretary Age: 0 Occupation : Department of Environment Forest and Climate Change Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar 791111 3:The PCCF and HoFF Age: 0 Occupation : Environment Forest and Climate Change Govt of Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar 791111 4:The Chief Conservator of Forest Age: 0 Occupation : Central Arunachal Circle Pasighat East Siang District Arunachal Pradesh 791102 5:The Chief Conservator of Forest Page No.# 2/9 Age: 0 Occupation : East Arunachal Circle Tezu Lohit District Arunachal Pradesh 792001 6:Goba Doka Age: 0 Occupation : Divisional Forest Officer Sagalee Forest Division Sagalee PO Sagalee Papum Pare District Arunachal Pradesh 791112 7:Amarjeet Kujur Age: 0 Occupation : Divisional Forest Officer Anini Forest Division Anini PO Anini Dibang Valley District Arunachal Pradesh 792101 8:Kardo Nyigyor Age: 0 Occupation : Deputy Speaker Office of the Deputy Speaker Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly Itanagar Arunachal Pradesh 79111 Advocate for the Petitioner : Teto Taba, Nang walika Jenow,Nimcha Hondique,Begi Taba,P Bordoloi Advocate for the Respondent : GA (AP), Honi Tana Tara,Oken Duggong,Atong Nangu,Baby Palon,Phurpa Wangmu,Nani Kuru,Kirpi Nyorak,Nikita Danggen Page No.# 3/9 BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI ORDER Date : 03.06.2026 Heard Shri P. J. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel, who is appearing online assisted by Shri T. Taba, learned counsel for the petitioner, who is physically present. Also heard Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, Arunachal Pradesh. Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel, is present for the respondent No. 6. 2. The challenge in the instant writ petition is against an order dated 18.05.2026, whereby the respondent No. 6 has been transferred from Sagalee Forest Division to Likabali Forest Division and the petitioner has been sought to be retained at Lohit Division. 3. As per the facts projected, the petitioner, who was holding the substantive post of ACF, was also the in-charge DFO of Lohit Division. Vide an order dated 13.10.2025, the petitioner was transferred from Lohit Division to Likabali Division. By the said transfer order, respondent No. 6 was transferred from Banderdewa to Sagalee Forest Division. There was, however, a remark in the order that the same would take effect after 31.03.2026. By the said transfer order, two other incumbents were also transferred. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that after the stipulated date of 31.03.2026 was over, he has joined at Likabali by submitting a joining report on 02.04.2026, and the same was forwarded to the appropriate authority. On 06.05.2026, the petitioner had made a communication to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Arunachal Pradesh, intimating that full charge was taken over by him. However, vide the impugned order dated 18.05.2026, the petitioner was sought to be retained at Lohit Division, and the respondent No. 6 was sought to be Page No.# 4/9 transferred from Sagalee to Likabali. The impugned order had mentioned that, insofar as the parties are concerned, there was a partial modification of the earlier order dated 13.10.2025. 5. Shri Saikia, learned Senior Counsel, at the outset, has submitted that the order dated 13.10.2025 was already executed and the petitioner had admittedly joined at Likabali on 02.04.2026 and therefore, the question of modification of the order dated 13.10.2025 would not arise. 6. On the merits of the case, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that though transfer is an incidence of service and the scope of challenge is limited, such challenge can be made if the transfer is not accompanied by bona fide or is not in accordance with the rules. He has submitted that normally the tenure is of two years. However, in the instant case, apart from violating the prescribed tenure requirement, the background would reveal that the impugned action has been taken only at the behest of the local MLA and Deputy Speaker, who has been arrayed as respondent No. 8. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the additional-affidavit filed, wherein Office Notings have been enclosed, which have been procured by RTI Act. He has referred to the Notings wherein the process was initiated on the recommendation of respondent No. 8 to accommodate the respondent No.6. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that while the respondent No. 6 may be favoured, the same cannot be done at the cost of the petitioner and in violation of the rules. He has submitted that there is a Note indicating that the proposal made by respondent No. 8 could be considered provided the incumbents had not joined. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to Note No. 107, wherein there is a clear reflection that the petitioner had joined and taken over charge. However, in spite of all the Notings, there was an approval by the highest authority, Page No.# 5/9 leading to passing of the impugned order dated 18.05.2026. 7. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the impugned order has been passed without there being any exigency of service or without there being any requirement of public interest. He has also highlighted that there is no allegation of any nature against the petitioner requiring his transfer. The learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the case of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in AIR 2001 SC 2524 (Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab & Ors.) and the following observations have been pressed into service. “15. In the system of Indian Democratic Governance as contemplated by the Constitution senior officers occupying key positions such as Secretaries are not supposed to mortgage there own discretion, volition and decision making authority and be prepared to give way or being pushed back or pressed ahead at the behest of politicians for carrying out commands having no sanctity in law. The Conduct Rules of Central Government Services command the civil servants to maintain at all times absolute integrity and devotion to duty and do nothing which is unbecoming of a Government servant. No Government servant shall in the performance of his official duties, or in the exercise of power conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior. In Anirudhsinhji Jadeja (1995) 5 SCC 302: (1995 AIR SCW 3543: AIR 1995 SC 2390), this Court has held that a statutory authority vested with jurisdiction must exercise it according to its own discretion; discretion exercised under the direction or instruction of some higher authority is failure to exercise discretion altogether. Observations of this Court in the Purtabpur Company Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 1896, are instructive and apposite. Executive of officers may in exercise of their statutory discretions take into account considerations of public policy and in some context policy of Minister or the Government as a whole when it is a relevant factor in weighing the policy Page No.# 6/9 but they are not absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for instructions by a superior to bind them. As already stated we are not recording, for want of adequate material, any positive finding that the impugned order was passed at the behest of or dictated by someone else than its author. Yet we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order betrays utter non- application of mind to the facts of the case and the relevant law. The manner in which the power under S. 22 has been exercised by the competent authority is suggestive of betrayal of the confidence which the State Government reposed in the Principal Secretary in conferring upon him the exercise of drastic power like removal of President of a Municipality under S. 22 of the Act. To say the least what has been done is not what is expected to be done by a senior official like the Principal Secretary of a wing of the State Government. We leave at that and say no more on this issue.” 8. Per contra, defending the impugned action, Shri S. Tapin, learned Senior Government Advocate, has submitted that posting for a period of two years is only a norm which is not give an indefeasible right to an incumbent. He has submitted that a transfer on the basis of a note of a public representative, per se, cannot be held to be illegal, as the note had taken into consideration certain relevant aspects, including the aspect that the respondent No. 6 was on the verge of his retirement and belongs to Likabali. He has relied upon the case of Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 2024 12 SCC 292. 9. Ms. N. Danggen, learned counsel for the respondent No.6, while endorsing the submissions of the learned State Counsel, has submitted that there was a stipulation in the original order of transfer dated 13.10.2025 that the same would take effect only after 31.03.2026. She has highlighted that the present Page No.# 7/9 process, which culminated in the order dated 18.05.2026, had started long back, more specifically on 28.10.2025, which would be reflected in the note sheet. She has accordingly submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality. She has also submitted that relevant factors were taken into consideration, which led to passing of the impugned order dated 18.05.2026. 10. Rival submissions have been duly considered and the materials placed before this Court have been carefully examined. 11. It is a settled position of law that transfer being an incidence of service, the scope of interference is limited and only in case of violation of statutory rules or presence of mala fide, such orders can be interfered. The original order of transfer dated 31.10.2025 has stipulated that the same would take effect after 31.03.2026. It is not in dispute that the petitioner, who was in Lohit, had joined his new place of posting at Likabali on 02.04.2026, and there are further communications to fortify this aspect. However, on 18.05.2026, the impugned order was passed, whereby the petitioner was sought to be retained at Lohit. This Court finds force in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that, after joining pursuant to the earlier order dated 13.10.2025, there was no scope for modification of the said order. The matter would have been different if a fresh order had been issued, which, however, would also be subject to judicial scrutiny if so instituted. 12. The reasons for passing the impugned order are placed on record by way of the additional-affidavit in the form of Office Notings, which are also not disputed. It is not in dispute that the process started with a recommendation by the respondent No.8, who is a local MLA and Deputy Speaker. While such a recommendation, per se, may not be termed illegal, the aspects of compliance Page No.# 8/9 with the applicable norms and public interest cannot be overlooked or ignored. In the instant case, the impugned order has been passed within a span of one and a half months from the date of joining. There is no element of public interest involved in the aforesaid transfer, as the same was done only on the basis of the note of the respondent No. 8. The Office Note would also reveal that there was a stipulation that the proposal could have been acted upon if the incumbents had not joined, and the subsequent Office Note would indicate that the petitioner had indeed joined in the new place of posting at Likabali. 13. That being the position, there was no occasion to pass the impugned order dated 18.05.2026 even though there was a recommendation/request by the respondent No.8. This Court makes it clear that while there is no absolute bar on a public representative making a recommendation or request, such a recommendation can be acted upon only when it serves public interest and is not done at the cost of any other incumbent. 14. So far as the case of Pubi Lombi (supra) is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, relying upon its earlier decisions, including Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357, has reiterated that public interest and lack of mala fide has to be the basis of any transfer order. 15. As observed above, the impugned order does not appear to have been passed in the public interest. 16. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that a case for interference is made out. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.05.2026 is interfered with and set aside. 17. The interference is only with regard to the transfer of the petitioner. Consequently, the petitioner shall be allowed to continue at Likabali in terms of Page No.# 9/9 the earlier transfer order under which the petitioner had already joined. 18. The authorities are at liberty to make appropriate arrangements to accommodate other officers, without disturbing the petitioner from his present place of posting at Likabali. 19. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant