1 2026:CGHC:17646 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR SA No. 614 of 2017 Gopal Ram S/o Ram Ratan Aged About 47 Years Caste- Gond, R/o Village Ketka, Police Station And Tehsil Surajpur, Revenue And Civil District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Jawahir S/o Girja Prasad Aged About 43 Years All The Respondents Are Gond By Caste And R/o Village- Ketka, Police Station And Tehsil- Surajpur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Dewari Lal S/o Girja Prasad Aged About 38 Years All The Respondents Are Gond By Caste And R/o Village- Ketka, Police Station And Tehsil- Surajpur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Fulesia S/o Girja Prasad, Aged About 48 Years All The Respondents Are Gond By Caste And R/o Village- Ketka, Police Station And Tehsil- Surajpur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Jagmohan S/o Nidhur, Aged About 52 Years All The Respondents Are Gond By Caste And R/o Village- Ketka, Police Station And Tehsil- Surajpur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. SOURABH BHILWAR Digitally signed by SOURABH BHILWAR Date: 2026.04.22 13:02:35 +0530 2 5 - Rai Singh S/o Nidhur Aged About 50 Years All The Respondents Are Gond By Caste And R/o Village- Ketka, Police Station And Tehsil- Surajpur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 6 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector, Surajpur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. …. Respondent(s) (Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Surfaraj Khan, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 17/04/2026 1. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 28.07.2017 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.) in Civil Appeal CNR No. CGSJ010000872012 (Gopal Ram vs. Jawahir & Ors.), affirming the judgment and decree dated 24.07.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Surajpur, District Surajpur (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 99-A/2004 (Gopal Ram vs. Girja Prasad (died) & Ors.), whereby the civil appeal filed by the appellant/ plaintiff was dismissed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. 2. The plaintiff has instituted the suit for declaration of title, 3 permanent injunction and, in the alternative, recovery of possession in respect of the suit land bearing Khasra No. 11 admeasuring 3.616 hectares situated at Village Ketka, Tahsil and District Surajpur, as described in Schedule “A” of the plaint, pleading inter alia that late Gahbar, being issueless, had kept the plaintiff with him for managing his agricultural land and for rendering personal care to him and his wife. After the death of Gahbar, his widow Sukhwaro Bai became the sole owner of the suit land in accordance with prevailing custom and her name was recorded in the revenue records. The plaintiff continued to serve her and manage the land, and being satisfied, she executed a registered Will dated 08.02.1994 in favour of the plaintiff (preceded by an unregistered adoption deed dated 01.08.1992). The plaintiff further asserts that after the death of Sukhwaro Bai, he became owner and came into possession of the suit land on the basis of the said Will. However, the defendants allegedly got their names recorded in the revenue records on the basis of a forged Will and are now attempting to dispossess the plaintiff, necessitating the filing of the suit. 3. Per contra, defendants No. 1 to 4, in their written statement, have contended that their father late Nidhur and late Gahbar were brothers born of the same mother, and that it was the defendants who were rendering services to late Gahbar and late Sukhwaro Bai and cultivating the suit land. It is further pleaded that late Gahbar had executed a Will dated 29.12.1987 in favour of the 4 defendants, on the basis of which they became the owners and are in possession of the suit property. The defendants have also asserted that the parties belong to the Gond community, wherein no such custom exists conferring absolute ownership rights upon women, and therefore, late Sukhwaro Bai had no authority to transfer or bequeath the suit property. The Will and adoption deed relied upon by the plaintiff are alleged to be forged and fabricated documents. It is thus contended that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest over the suit property and has filed the present suit only to harass the defendants, and hence, the same deserves to be dismissed. 4. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff failed to establish his title and possession over the suit land. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 24/07/2012, the plaintiff preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/ plaintiff submits that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as well 5 as the First Appellate Court are contrary to law and facts on record and are liable to be set aside. He submits that the appellant has duly proved his title on the basis of a registered Will dated 08.02.1994 (Exhibit P-7) executed by Sukhwaro Bai in his favour, which has not been properly appreciated by both the Court. He further submits that both the Courts have failed to consider the material evidence in its correct perspective and have arrived at erroneous conclusions, particularly ignoring the established custom prevailing in the Gond community, wherein after the death of the husband, the widow becomes the absolute owner of the property with full right to dispose of the same. Learned counsel contends that the appellant, being a member of the Gond community, is governed by customary law and not by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and therefore, the finding of the learned Courts to the contrary is legally unsustainable. Hence, he prayed that the impugned judgments and decrees, being perverse and not sustainable in the eyes of law, deserve to be set aside in the present appeal. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Charan & Ors. vs. Sukhram & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 9537 of 2025 and also the decision rendered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Kailash Singh vs. Mewalal Singh Gond reported in 2002 (2) MPLJ 163. 6 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined. 7. In the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently recorded findings against the plaintiff and have held that the plaintiff has failed to establish his title, ownership and possession over the suit land bearing Khasra No. 11 admeasuring 3.616 hectares situated at Village Ketka. Both the Courts have categorically held that the plaintiff’s claim based on the registered Will dated 08.02.1994 (Ex.P-7), allegedly executed by Sukhwaro Bai, is not reliable, as the execution of the said Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances and the attesting witnesses are interested witnesses. It has further been found that Sukhwaro Bai herself was not the absolute owner of the entire suit property, inasmuch as the earlier Will dated 29.12.1987 (Ex.D-6), executed by late Gahbar in favour of the defendants, has been duly proved in accordance with law, whereby only a limited right of enjoyment during her lifetime was conferred upon Sukhwaro Bai, with the property ultimately devolving upon the defendants. 8. Both the Courts have also concurrently held that the plaintiff has failed to prove the alleged custom prevailing in the Gond 7 community that a childless widow acquires absolute ownership over her husband’s property, inasmuch as no cogent evidence or instances have been brought on record to substantiate such custom. On the contrary, the evidence on record establishes the validity of the Will executed by late Gahbar in favour of the defendants. It has further been held that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land and the defendants are in settled possession thereof. In view of such findings, the plaintiff has been held not entitled to declaration of title, permanent injunction or recovery of possession. 9. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal Krishan and Ors. Vs. Daulat Ram and Ors. 2025 (2) SCC 804 laid down the principles which are required for proving of a WILL. Para 15 of the said decision reads as under:- 15. The requisites for proving of a will are well established. They were recently reiterated in a judgment of this Court in Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan. See also Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, The principles as summarised by the former are reproduced as below: (Meena Pradhan cases, SCC pp. 737-38, para 10) "10.... 10.1. The court has to consider two aspects: firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him: 10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind 8 has to be applied. 10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say: (a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and the said signature or affixation shall show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a will; (b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is necessary; (c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of such signatures; (d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, however, the presence of all witnesses at the same time is not required. 10.4. 10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined; 10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator's signatures but also that each of the 9 witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator. 10.6 If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be dispensed with; 10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence; 10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator's last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier; 10.9. The test of judicial conscience has been evolved for dealing with those cases where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious d circumstances. It requires to consider factors such as awareness of the testator as to the content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of the dispositions in the will, sound, certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of execution; testator executed the will while acting on his own free will; 10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence et cetera e has to prove the same. However, even in the 10 absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing explanation: 10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be "real, germane and valid" and not merely "the fantasy of the doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa". Whether a particular feature would qualify as "suspicious" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising suspicion legitimate in nature would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc." 10. The learned Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have duly examined the genuineness and sanctity of the Will dated 08.02.1994 (Ex. P-7), allegedly executed by Sukhwaro Bai in favour of the plaintiff, and have concurrently held that the execution of the said Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It has further been found that the attesting witnesses are interested witnesses, thereby rendering the Will doubtful. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Meena Pradhan (supra), this Court is of the considered opinion that no illegality or perversity can be found in the findings 11 recorded by both the Courts with regard to the validity of the aforesaid Will. 11. The concurrent findings recorded by both the learned Courts are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles of law, and the same do not suffer from any perversity, illegality or material irregularity warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law. 13. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ plaintiff failed to establish his case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded. 14. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any 12 substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 15. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding. 16. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. 17. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellant herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial 13 Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all. 18. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference. 19. Accordingly, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court. Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge $. Bhilwar