1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF MARCH, 2026 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM RFA NO. 9 OF 2012 (PAR) BETWEEN: 1 . MR. H. NARASIMHA MURTHY SINCE DECEASED BY LRS SMT. M.P MANJULA W/O H. NARASIMHA MURTHY AGED 59 YEARS 2 . SMT. GEETHA RASHMI H.N D/O H. NARASIMHA MURTHY AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS 3 . MR. SACHIN H.N S/O H. NARASIMHA MURTHY AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS ALL ARE R/AT 943, 42ND CROSS 3RD BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR BANGALORE-560 010. ...APPELLANTS (BY SRI. C.S. PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . MR. K. LAKSHMINARAYANA S/O H. KADA SETTY SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS 2 (A) SMT. SARASWATHI W/O LATE K. LAKSHMINARAYANA AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS R/AT MUDUVAGALAIAH STREET MUDIPETTE CROSS, CHANNAPATNA RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-571501. (B) MR. L. RAVI S/O LATE LAKSHMINARAYANA MAJOR MUTHKUR VILLAGE, M.N. SANDRA POST HUNUGOHALLI HOBLI HOSKOTE TALUK-562114. (C) SMT. L. RAJANI D/O LATE K. LAKSHMINARAYANA MAJOR R/AT SHRI SRINIVAS TRADERS MANDIPET, CHANNAPATNA-571 501. (D) SMT. L. ROOPA D/O LATE LAKSHMINARAYANA MAJOR R/AT NO.3660-C, 4TH MAIN ROAD B BLOCK, SUBRAMANYANAGAR RAJAJINAGAR II STAGE BANGALORE-560021. 2 . (A) SRI. K.A. KADA SETTY SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS SMT. CHANNAMMA @ BHAGYALAKSHMI D/O LATE H. KADA SETTY AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS R/AT NO.534, 10TH E MAIN ROAD 3 6TH BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR BANGALORE-560010. (B) (B)(I) (B)(II) (B)(III) (B)(IV) SMT. VARALAKSHMI D/O LATE H. KADA SETTY AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS R/AT 175, LIG, B CROSS KABIR MUTT, KENGARI UPPANAGAR BANGALORE-560060 SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRs MR. RAGHU AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS SMT. MEGHANA AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS SMT. SHASHI KANTH AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS SMT. PADMA W/O NAGENDRA .B.G AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS ALL ARE R/AT NO.562 6TH MAIN ROAD, 1ST CROSS K.C.H.S LAYOUT, DODDABASTI MAIN ROAD, BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR, BENGALURU-560 56. (C) (C)(I) (C)(II) SMT. JAYAMMA D/O LATE H. KADA SETTY SINCE DECEASED BY LRS MR. K. PARTHA MAJOR MR. K. CHANDRA 4 MAJOR BOTH ARE R/AT 175, LIG, B CROSS KABIR MUTT, KENGERI UPPANAGARA BANGALORE-560 060. 3 . SMT. KAMALAMMA W/O LATE H. KADA SETTY SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRS WHO ARE ALREADY PARTIES MR. H. LAKSHMANA S/O LATE HUTCHE THIMMAIAH MAJOR R/AT NO.619/H, 36TH CROSS 2ND BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR BANGALORE-560010. 4 . MR. G. DAYANAND S/O GIRIYAPPA AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.42, 16TH CROSS 8TH MAIN, MALLESWARAM BANGALORE-560055. 5 . SMT. NINGAMMA W/O BORE GOWDA MAJOR 6 . SRI. H.B. THAMMANNA S/O BORE GOWDA MAJOR 7 . SRI. LAKSHMAMMA W/O VENKATARAMU MAJOR 5 R6 TO R8 ARE RESIDING AT HALLEGERE GRAMA VASARALU HOBLI MANDYA TALUK AND DISTRICT-571 416. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. Y. HARIPRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R2(A AND B) R2(B)(I-IV) AND R2(C)(I AND II); SRI. R. VIDYASAGAR AND SRI. RAGHAVENDRA .K, ADVOCATES FOR R1( A TO D); SRI. G. SUKUMARAN AND SRI. CHETAN .B, ADVOCATES FOR R4; SRI. UMESH .C AND SRI. ANANTHAPADMANABHA .G.N, ADVOCATES FOR R6 AND R7; R3 IS SERVED; V/O DATED 22.08.2022, APPEAL IS ABATED IN RESPECT OF DECEASED R5) THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 30.11.2010 PASSED IN O.S.2282/1996 ON THE FILE OF THE I-ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE, DECREEING THE SUIT FOR PARTITION AND SEPARATE POSSESSION. THIS RFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 09.02.2026, THIS DAY JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER: CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM 6 C.A.V. JUDGMENT The captioned appeal is preferred by the legal heirs of the defendant No.3 calling in question the legality and correctness of the preliminary decree passed in O.S. No.2282/1996, wherein the suit instituted by the original plaintiff for partition and separate possession came to be decreed, granting him 7/24th share in the suit schedule properties. 2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. Family tree is as under: H. KADA SETTY (FIRST DEFENDANT) KAMALAMMA K.LAKSHMI BHAGYA VARALAXMI JAYAMMA N.NARASIMHA (WIFE) NARAYANA (1ST dtr.) (2nd dtr) (3rd dtr.) MURTHY (Plaintiff) (3rd Defendant) 7 4. The facts, in brief, leading to the filing of the present appeal are as under: The original plaintiff, Sri K.Lakshminarayana, who is the eldest son of Sri Kada Shetty, arrayed as defendant No.1, instituted the suit for partition contending that the suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that defendant No.1, who is his father, acquired the suit schedule properties out of joint family nucleus and joint family funds. The plaintiff asserted that notwithstanding repeated requests and demands made by him for effecting partition and separate possession of his legitimate share, defendant No.1 failed and refused to accede to the same, though assurances were allegedly given from time to time. It is in this background that the present suit came to be filed, seeking partition and separate possession of the plaintiff’s lawful share in the suit schedule properties. 5. Upon service of summons, defendant No.1 entered appearance and filed his written statement, stoutly denying all 8 material averments made in the plaint. While admitting the relationship between the parties, defendant No.1 specifically set up a plea of prior partition, contending that there was already a severance of status in the joint family under a registered partition deed executed in the year 1984, pursuant to which all joint family and ancestral properties were partitioned among the father and his sons. Defendant No.1 categorically pleaded that the said partition was fair, just, and equitable, and that consequent to the said partition, the joint family ceased to exist, thereby disentitling the plaintiff from seeking a fresh partition. 6. Defendant No.1 further pleaded that after the partition of 1984, the properties which are the subject matter of the present suit are his self-acquired properties. It was specifically contended that defendant No.1 was in gainful employment and that he constructed the residential house standing on Item No.1 of the suit schedule property out of his own earnings. He further asserted that for the purpose of construction, he had availed a housing loan by mortgaging 9 Item No.1 of the property and that the loan was repaid by him from his salary. 7. It was further pleaded that a total of 64 monthly instalments, each at the rate of Rs.75/-, were paid by defendant No.1 by way of EMI from his salary during his service period. The balance outstanding loan amount, if any, was cleared after his superannuation, out of the pensionary benefits received by him. On these specific pleadings, defendant No.1 contended that the suit schedule properties were not acquired out of joint family funds and therefore, do not partake the character of joint family properties. 8. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, defendant No.1 specifically contended that the plaintiff, having already taken his legitimate share under the registered partition deed of 1984, is not entitled to claim any further share in the suit schedule properties. It was therefore prayed that the suit for partition be dismissed as not maintainable both on facts and in law. 10 9. The Trial Court, upon a meticulous appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the original plaintiff, defendant No.1, and defendant No.3, recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiff has successfully established that the suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties. While arriving at this conclusion, the Trial Court placed substantial reliance on the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff, particularly the series of registered sale deeds marked as Exs.P-2, P-3, P-4, P-6, and P-7. 10. The Trial Court noticed that the said sale deeds were executed by defendant No.1 himself and pertained to alienation of certain ancestral properties of the family. A careful reading of the recitals contained in these documents revealed that the alienations were effected much prior to the alleged partition of the year 1984. More significantly, the recitals in the aforesaid sale deeds expressly disclose that the sales were undertaken with the specific intention of mobilizing funds for the purchase of a site at Bengaluru and for putting up construction of a residential house thereon. 11 11. The Trial Court found that these recitals, coupled with the timing of the transactions, clearly demonstrated that the consideration received under the said sale deeds formed part of the joint family nucleus and that the said nucleus was utilized for acquisition of the site and subsequent construction of the residential house standing on Item No.1 of the suit schedule property. The contention of defendant No.1 that the property was acquired exclusively out of his salary income and housing loan repayments was found to be unsubstantiated and contrary to the documentary evidence on record. 12. Placing reliance on these clinching documents and the admissions emanating there from, the Trial Court held that the plaintiff had discharged the burden cast upon him to prove the existence of sufficient joint family nucleus and its utilization for acquisition and development of the suit schedule properties. Consequently, the Trial Court rejected the plea of self-acquisition set up by defendant No.1 and held that the suit schedule properties retain the character of joint family ancestral properties. On the aforesaid reasoning, the Trial 12 Court proceeded to decree the suit for partition, granting the plaintiff his lawful share in the suit schedule properties by passing a preliminary decree. 13. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant No.3 and learned counsel appearing for the respondents. This Court has given its anxious consideration to the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence. On meticulous examination, the following points would arise for consideration: (i) Whether the Trial Court was justified, on facts and in law, in holding that the suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties? (ii) Whether the Trial Court was right in concluding that the plaintiff had proved the existence of sufficient joint family nucleus and that such nucleus was utilized for the purchase of the site and construction of the residential house comprised in Item No.1 of the suit schedule properties? 13 (iii) Whether the appreciation of documentary evidence by the Trial Court, particularly Exs.P-2, P-3, P-4, P-6, and P-7, suffers from perversity, misreading of evidence, or error apparent on the face of the record? (iv) Whether the Trial Court failed to properly consider the plea of prior partition under the registered partition deed of the year 1984 and the consequential severance of joint family status pleaded by the defendant No.1? (v) Whether the Trial Court erred in discarding or inadequately considering the evidence adduced by the defendant No.1 relating to his employment, housing loan, repayment of EMIs from salary, and clearance of outstanding dues from pensionary benefits, while determining the nature of the suit schedule properties? 14 (vi) Whether the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court granting 7/24th share in favour of the plaintiff is sustainable in law and on facts? (vii) Whether the judgment and preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court warrant interference by this Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure? (viii) Whether the suit for partition is liable to be dismissed on the ground that plaint does not disclose specific cause of action and whether trial Court committed an error in entertaining and decreeing the suit in absence of specific pleading with regard to cause of action and whether these objections can be entertained at appellate stage when appeal is of the year 2012? (ix) In the event the suit schedule properties are held to be joint family ancestral properties, what would be share of the plaintiffs? 15 Findings on Point Nos.(i) to (v); 14. It is not in dispute that the ancestral properties of the family stood partitioned under a registered partition deed dated 16.11.1984, and the plaintiff has candidly admitted that a definite share was allotted to him under the said partition. The plaintiff, however, has consistently contended that the present suit schedule properties situated at Bengaluru were not the subject matter of the said partition, as they were acquired by defendant No.1 prior thereto, out of the sale proceeds of ancestral properties which had fallen to the share of defendant No.1 in an earlier partition of the year 1949. It is also not seriously disputed that defendant No.1 was employed as a Superintendent in an Engineering College and retired from service in the said capacity, nor is it disputed that defendant No.1 had availed housing loans either from the Government of Mysore or from the Insurance Department to an extent of about Rs.15,000/- by mortgaging Item No.1 of the suit schedule property. 16 15. In this factual backdrop, the pivotal question that arises for consideration is whether defendant No.1, while acting as Kartha of the joint family, had utilized not merely his salary income and loan proceeds, but also the joint family nucleus by alienating ancestral properties much prior to the partition of 1984, for the purpose of purchasing the Bengaluru site and constructing the residential house thereon. In order to substantiate this plea, the plaintiff has relied upon a series of registered sale deeds marked as Exs.P-2, P-3, P-4, P-6, and P-7, which are certified copies of sale deeds dated 31.08.1963, 23.12.1974, 28.09.1974, 14.11.1984, and 14.11.1984 respectively. A meticulous examination of these documents reveals that all the said alienations were effected by defendant No.1 prior to the partition of 1984, while the joint family status admittedly subsisted. 16. What is of considerable legal significance is that the recitals contained in the aforesaid sale deeds unequivocally state that the ancestral properties were being sold with the express intention of mobilizing funds for purchase of a site at 17 Bengaluru and for construction of a residential house. Under Section 91 and Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the terms of a registered document, particularly recitals explaining the purpose of alienation, constitute the best evidence of the transaction and bind the executant thereof. Therefore, this Court deems it fit to extract the relevant recitals in the sale deeds vide Exs.P-3 and P-4. The same reads as under: Ex.P-3 " ²æà ¸À£ï ಒಂದು ಾರದ ಒಂ ೈನೂರು ಎಪತ ಾಲೇಸ ಸಂಬ ಾೆಯ ಾ!ೕಖು ಇ¥À¥ÀÛ÷Û ಮೂರರಲೂ% ಮಂಡ' ()ೆ% ಮಂ*ಯ ಾಲೂ%ಕು ಬಸ,ಾಳ ೋಬ. ಹÉèÃ0ೆ,ೆ 0ಾ1ಮದ2%ರುವ ವ'ವಾಯ4ಂದ (ೕಸುವ 5ೆಂ6ೇ 0ೌqÀßಮಗ 9ೋರ ಉ.ತ;<0ೌಡ!0ೆ ;ೕಲಂಡ ಹ)ೆ%ೕ0ೆ,ೆ 0ಾ1ಮದ2% =ಾಸ=ಾ>ರುವ ವ'ವಾಯ4ಂದ (ೕಸುವ )ೇ ತಮ?ಯ' @ೆಟ1 ಮಗ ೆB.5ಾಡ @ೆCDEಾದ ಾನು ಬ,ೆF5ೊಟD ಶುದH ಕ1ಯ ಪತ1 ಅ6ಾ> ಈ 4ವಸ ನನK ಷರತು MNತ'=ಾ> ಅಂದ,ೆ ನನ0ೆ 9ೆಂಗಳO!ನ2% ಟ1PD 9ೋjØMಂದ ಮಂಜೂ,ಾ>ರುವ ೈಟು ಬ0ೆR Sಬಲಗು ಕಟುDವ ಬ0ೆR ನನK 9ಾ§ÄÛ ತನK T ಾ1(Uತ=ಾ> ಬಂದು ನನK ಸಂಪVಣU ಹಕುಳX Yೆಡೂ'Z ೈಟು [ಾಗವನುK Mಮ0ೆ ನಗದು 0ೌನU;ಂಟು Sಬಲಗು (2000/-) ಎರಡು ಸಆವರ gÀÆ]ಾಗಳ^0ೆ ಶುದH ಕ1ಯ5ೆ 5ೊಟುD ಸದ! ಸ_ತುಗಳನುK ಈ 4ವಸ=ೇ Mಮ? ಾ_`ೕನ5ೆ aಟುD 5ೊCDರು ೇೆ Mೕವb ಇ2%ಂದ ಮುಂ6ೆ Yೆಡೂ'Z ಸ_c0ೆ ಸಂಪVಣU ಾ2ೕಕ,ಾ> ಅದರ 9ಾ§ÄÛ ಸ5ಾUರದ ಕಂ6ಾಯ 18 ವ0ೈ,ೆ ಕCD5ೊಂಡು ಅದರ2%ರುವ M` Mdೇಪ ಜಲತರು ]ಾYಾeಾ4 ಅಷD 9ೋಗವ'ವಾರ ಚತುಷ'ಯಗ.0ೆ Mೕ=ೇ ಾದ',ಾ> ಸುಖ4ಂದ Mಮ? ವಂಶ]ಾರಂಪgÀå=ಾ> ಸುಖ=ಾ> ಅನುಭF5ೊಂಡು ೋಗ ತಕದುH . . . " Ex.P-4 "ಸi ಒಂದು ಾರದ ಒಂ ೈನೂರಯಪತಾಲೇ ಇF_ ೆ]ೆDಂಬ ಾೆ ಾ!ೕಖು ಇಪ ೆಂಟರಲು% ಮಂjಾ' ಾ)ೊ%ೕಕು ಬಸ,ಾಳ^ ೋಬ. ಹÉèÃ0ೆ,ೆ 0ಾ1ಮದ2% =ಾಸ=ಾ>ರುವ ಮ!ೕ0ೌಡರ ಸ6ೆHೕ0ೌಡರ ಮಗ 6ೊಡkºÉÊ6ೇ0ೌಡ!0ೆ ಸದ! ಹÉèÃ0ೆ,ೆ 0ಾ1ಮದ2% =ಾಸ=ಾ>ರುವ ತಮ?ಯ' @ೆಟDರ ಮಕlಾದ ೆB.5ಾಡ @ೆCD ಆದ ಾನು ಬ,ೆF5ೊಟD ನನK 9ಾ§ÄÛ ಖು¶Ìà ಜNೕನು ೈಟುಗಳ ಕ1ಯ ಪತ1 ಅ6ಾ> ನನK ದರದು MN ಾ' ಅಂದ,ೆ 9ೆಂಗಳO!ನ2% ೈಟು ೆ0ೆದು5ೊಳ^Xವ ಉ6ೆHೕಶ=ಾ> ಈ 5ೆಳ0ೆ ]ೆಡೂ'Z ನ2%ನಮೂ4ರುವ ಶುದm ಕ1ಯ5ೆ 5ೊಟುD ಕ1ಯದ Sಬಲಗು ಎರಡು ಾರ ರೂ]ಾಗಳನುK ಪVgÁÛ ಸn !(ಾoರವರ ರೂಬು ರೂಬು ಪjೆಯು ೇೆ ಕ1ಯದ ಸ_ತುಗಳನುK ಈ 4ವಸ=ೇ Mಮ? ಾ_`ೕನ5ೆ ವಹFaಟುD 5ೊCDರು ೇೆ ಈ )ಾ0ಾಯು ಕ1ಯದ ಸವcನ2%ರಬಹು6ಾದ M` Mdೇಪಜಲತರು ]ಾYಾeಾ4 ಅಷD ೋಗ ೇಜಾಮ'ಕೂ ವ'ವಾ,ಾ4 ಚತುಷpಯಂಗ.0ೆ)ಾ% Mೕ=ೇ ಾಧ',ಾ> ಕಂ6ಾಯ ವ0ೈ,ೆ ]ಾವc ಾ5ೊಂಡು Mಮ? ೆಸ!0ೆ rಾ ೆ ಸಹ ಬದ)ಾF5ೊಂಡು Mಮ? ಪbತ1 ]ೌತ1ವಂ@ಾನು ]ಾರಂಪgÁå=ಾ> ಸಂ ೋಷ4ಂದ ಅನುಭF5ೊಂಡು ಬರುವbದು . . . . . . " 17. It is well-settled that such recitals, unless proved to be vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, carry 19 substantial probative value and operate as admissions against the executant. Defendant No.1, having consciously incorporated such recitals in multiple registered documents, is therefore estopped from contending that the joint family corpus was not utilized for acquisition of the Bengaluru properties. 18. Apart from the alienations made by defendant No.1, the father of the original plaintiff, as evidenced by Exs.P-2, P-3, P-4, P-6 and P-7, which have already been extracted and referred to hereinabove, this Court also finds it necessary to advert to another significant piece of evidence brought on record by the plaintiff. The said evidence assumes considerable importance in establishing that the earnings of the original plaintiff were also contributed to the common family pool and were utilized for the benefit of the joint family. The documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff clearly indicates that even the salary earned by the original plaintiff was being credited into the account maintained by defendant 20 No.1, thereby forming part of the common hotchpotch of the joint family funds. 19. These documents assume relevance in determining the true financial position of defendant No.1 during the period preceding the alleged partition of 1984. The materials on record clearly demonstrate that although defendant No.1 had alienated certain ancestral properties prior to the said partition, the proceeds derived therefrom were evidently insufficient for his financial requirements. The evidence further indicates that defendant No.1 had not only availed hand loans from relatives and friends but had also borrowed amounts from the department in which he was employed. More importantly, the evidence on record shows that he had to seek additional financial assistance from his own son, namely the original plaintiff, who had already secured employment as early as in the year 1971. 20. In this regard, Ex.P-10 series assumes considerable evidentiary value. The said documents disclose that the 21 original plaintiff was regularly crediting his entire monthly salary of Rs.250/- into the account of his father, defendant No.1. The continuous deposit of the plaintiff’s salary into the father’s account clearly demonstrates that the income earned by the plaintiff was also being utilized for the benefit of the family. The Ex.P-10 series therefore lends strong support to the plaintiff’s case that defendant No.1 was not financially independent in the manner now projected by the defendants. On the contrary, the evidence clearly reveals that apart from selling ancestral properties and raising hand loans from friends and acquaintances, coupled with borrowings from his department, defendant No.1 was also dependent upon the financial assistance extended by the original plaintiff. The consistent deposit of Rs.250/- per month by the plaintiff into the account of defendant No.1 unmistakably indicates that the earnings of the plaintiff were also merged with the joint family funds and were utilized by defendant No.1. 21. The aforesaid circumstances assume great significance while examining the nature and character of the 22 suit schedule properties. The evidence clearly establishes that defendant No.1 had drawn upon multiple sources of funds, including the alienation of ancestral properties as well as the earnings of the original plaintiff, which formed part of the family pool. 22. The defendants, however, have made a feeble attempt to dislodge the plaintiff’s case by placing reliance on Ex.D-17, which is alleged to be a reply notice issued by defendant No.1 in response to the legal notice sent by the original plaintiff, marked as Exs.D-15 and D-16. By placing reliance on Ex.D-17, the defendants have attempted to contend that defendant No.1 had disputed the plaintiff’s claim over the Bengaluru properties, including the present suit schedule properties, by asserting that they were his self- acquired properties. 23. A careful reading of Ex.D-17 reveals that defendant No.1, while issuing the said reply notice, has indeed stated that the suit schedule properties were his self-acquired 23 properties. At the same time, it is equally evident from the contents of the said notice that defendant No.1 had acknowledged the existence of ancestral properties and had also admitted that no partition had taken place in respect of those ancestral properties. Thus, the document itself reflects a position where the existence of joint family properties was not denied. 24. However, this Court finds it necessary to closely examine the manner in which Ex.D-17 has been relied upon by the defendants. A careful scrutiny of the pleadings in the written statement indicates that Ex.D-17 has not been specifically pleaded or set up as a foundational document in support of the defendants’ case. It is a settled principle of law that any document on which a party seeks to place reliance must find a place in the pleadings so that the opposite party is put on notice and afforded an opportunity to meet the same. In the present case, Ex.D-17 does not find mention in the written statement filed by the defendants. 24 25. More importantly, the said document was not confronted to the plaintiff during the course of the trial while recording his evidence. The defendants have failed to put the contents of Ex.D-17 to the plaintiff in cross-examination in order to elicit his explanation or to establish that the original plaintiff had accepted or acquiesced in the alleged assertion made by defendant No.1. In the absence of such confrontation during cross-examination, the evidentiary value of Ex.D-17 becomes significantly diluted. 26. Be that as it may, even otherwise, the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff carries far greater probative value. The plaintiff has placed on record several registered sale deeds demonstrating that defendant No.1 had alienated a number of ancestral properties prior to the partition of 1984. The recitals contained in those documents clearly indicate that the alienations were effected with the intention of mobilizing funds for the purchase of a vacant site in Bengaluru. These registered documents, coupled with the evidence showing that the salary of the original plaintiff was also being deposited into 25 the account of defendant No.1, strongly support the plaintiff’s case that the acquisition of the suit schedule property was made with the aid of joint family funds. 27. Therefore, the mere production of Ex.D-17 and the bald assertion contained therein that the suit schedule properties are self-acquired properties of defendant No.1 cannot, by itself, displace the cogent and convincing evidence adduced by the plaintiff. The documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff, when read cumulatively, clearly establishes that the funds derived from the alienation of ancestral properties, together with the financial assistance received from the original plaintiff, formed the financial basis for the acquisition of the suit schedule property. Consequently, the defendants have failed to effectively rebut the plaintiff’s case that the suit schedule property partakes the character of joint family property. 28. The principles of Hindu law, as expounded by Mulla in his Treatise on Hindu Law, further fortify this conclusion. 26 Mulla unequivocally states that where the Kartha of a joint family acquires property during the subsistence of the joint family and it is shown that the joint family possessed sufficient nucleus, the burden shifts on the Kartha to establish that the acquisition was made without any aid from joint family funds. Even where the Kartha has an independent source of income, the property would nonetheless assume the character of joint family property if it is established that the joint family nucleus was available and was in fact utilized, either wholly or partially, for such acquisition. 29. Though defendant No.1 and defendant No.3 have led evidence to show that Item No.1 was mortgaged and that loans were availed under Exs.D-4 and D-5 for amounts of Rs.9,000/- and Rs.1,500/- respectively, and though reliance was placed on Exs.D-7 and D-9 to demonstrate repayment of the loan in 64 monthly instalments and clearance of dues from pensionary benefits, the same does not negate the overwhelming documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff. On the contrary, the evidence further discloses that defendant 27 No.1 had borrowed hand loans, and the list of creditors reflected in Exs.D-18 and D-21 corroborates the financial compulsions which necessitated alienation of ancestral properties. 30. The cumulative effect of this evidence unmistakably establishes that defendant No.1, while acting as Kartha, mobilized funds from multiple sources namely, salary income, housing loans, pensionary benefits, and significantly, by selling ancestral properties much prior to the partition of 1984. The recitals in Exs.P-2 to P-7 clearly demonstrate that the sale consideration received from alienation of ancestral properties formed part of the financial corpus utilized for purchase of the Bengaluru site and for construction of the residential house. The said recitals, being clear admissions, bind defendant No.1 and decisively belie the plea of exclusive self-acquisition. 31. Viewed in the light of settled principles of Hindu law and the evidentiary mandate governing registered documents, this Court finds that there exists clear, cogent, and tangible 28 evidence to conclude that the suit schedule properties were acquired with substantial aid from joint family funds, and therefore retain the character of joint family properties, notwithstanding the individual earnings of defendant No.1. Accordingly, point nos. (i) and (ii) are answered in the 'Affirmative' and point nos. (iii) to (v) are answered in the 'Negative'. Findings on point no.(vi) and (vii): 32. Insofar as the quantification of shares is concerned, this Court finds substantial merit in the contention urged on behalf of the appellants. Though the Trial Court rendered its judgment in the year 2010, it has conspicuously failed to advert to and apply the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which had already come into force with effect from 09.09.2005. Admittedly, defendant No.1, who was the Kartha of the joint family, was survived by two sons and three daughters. The Trial Court, however, proceeded to quantify the share by granting 7/24th share to the original 29 plaintiff, without considering the statutory conferment of coparcenary rights on daughters under the amended provision. 33. The legal position with regard to the rights of daughters in coparcenary property now stands conclusively settled by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma & Ors.1, wherein it has been authoritatively held that by virtue of the amended Section 6, a daughter of a coparcener becomes a coparcener by birth, in the same manner as a son, and that such right is not dependent on the date of death of the father, so long as the coparcenary property is available for partition and the partition suit is pending. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further clarified that the conferment of coparcenary status on daughters operates by legal fiction retrospectively, thereby entitling daughters to claim equal share in pending partition proceedings. 1 (2020) 9 SCC 1 30 34. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the suit schedule properties have remained intact, that no final partition has taken place, and that the suit for partition was pending adjudication when the amended Section 6 came into force. Having already arrived at a categorical finding that the suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties, this Court is of the considered view that the benefit of amended Section 6 necessarily enures to the daughters of defendant No.1, who are parties to the suit. The failure of the Trial Court to take note of this statutory mandate and the binding law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court has resulted in an erroneous and legally unsustainable quantification of shares. 35. Applying the principles enshrined under the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, defendant No.1’s coparcenary interest is required to be notionally partitioned among his children, treating both sons and daughters on par as coparceners. Since defendant No.1 is survived by two sons and three daughters, all five children are 31 entitled to equal shares in the joint family properties. Consequently, the original plaintiff -Lakshminarayana, original defendant No.3-Narasimha Murthy, and the three daughters are each entitled to one-sixth (1/6th) share in the suit schedule properties. 36. Therefore, the quantification made by the Trial Court granting 7/24th share in favour of the original plaintiff is not only contrary to the amended provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, but also runs afoul of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. To that extent, the preliminary decree passed by the Trial Court warrants interference and modification by this Court. Accordingly, point nos. (vi) is answered in the 'Negative' and point no. (vii) is answered in the 'Affirmative'. Findings on point no.(viii): 37. It is indeed true that the plaint does not contain a separately articulated paragraph captioned as “cause of action”. Equally, it is of considerable significance that the 32 defendants, while filing the written statement, did not raise any objection whatsoever with regard to the absence of specific pleadings relating to cause of action, nor was any issue framed by the Trial Court on that score. Be that as it may, this Court is of the considered view that in a suit for partition, the absence of a distinct paragraph setting out the cause of action is not fatal, for the reason that the entire plaint, when read as a whole, constitutes the cause of action. 38. Under Order VII Rule 1(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaint is required to contain the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose. The provision does not mandate any rigid or ritualistic form. What is required is a disclosure of material facts which give rise to the plaintiff’s right to seek relief. In the present case, the plaint contains clear and unequivocal pleadings asserting that the suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties, that the plaintiff is a coparcener having a legitimate share therein, and that defendant No.1, who is the father and Kartha of the family, has denied the plaintiff’s share 33 and failed to effect partition despite demands. These pleadings, taken cumulatively, unmistakably disclose the factual foundation necessary to maintain a suit for partition. 39. It is trite law that a partition suit stands on a distinct footing when compared to other civil actions. In such suits, the Court does not create or confer new rights, but merely recognises and declares pre-existing rights of the parties in joint family property. Denial of share by one coparcener or refusal to effect partition by the Kartha itself gives rise to a continuing cause of action. Therefore, the concept of cause of action in a partition suit cannot be viewed through a narrow or hyper-technical lens. 40. Further, under Order VI Rule 2 CPC, pleadings are required to contain only a concise statement of material facts and not the evidence by which such facts are to be proved. When the plaint discloses material facts sufficient to inform the defendant of the case he has to meet, the requirement of law stands satisfied. In the present case, the defendants have 34 fully understood the case set up by the plaintiff, contested the same on merits, led evidence, and participated in the trial without demur. Having acquiesced in the proceedings and allowed the matter to go to trial, the defendants cannot be permitted to raise a technical objection relating to cause of action for the first time at the appellate stage. 41. It is also apposite to note that under Order XIV Rule 1 CPC, issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other. No issue relating to absence of cause of action was either pressed for or framed before the Trial Court, which clearly indicates that the defendants themselves did not perceive any prejudice or ambiguity in the pleadings. An objection of this nature, raised belatedly at the appellate stage, is liable to be rejected, particularly in the absence of demonstrated failure of justice, as contemplated under Section 99 CPC. 42. Viewed from any angle, this Court is of the considered opinion that the pleadings in the plaint sufficiently 35 disclose the cause of action for maintaining the suit for partition. The assertion of joint family status, the claim of ancestral character of the suit properties, and the denial of the plaintiff’s share by defendant No.1 cumulatively constitute a valid and subsisting cause of action. In a suit of this nature, the cause of action is required to be liberally construed, especially when the objection is not raised at the threshold but sought to be introduced for the first time in appeal. Consequently, the contention regarding absence of cause of action is devoid of merit and does not warrant interference. Accordingly, point No.(viii) is answered in the 'Negative'. Finding on Point No.(ix): 43. Kada shetty is survived by his widow Kamalamma (defendant No.2), two sons and three daughters. Widow kamalamma is entitled for share notionally. Since this Court has come to conclusion that suit schedule properties are joint family ancestral properties, defendant Nos.1(a), 1(b) and 1(c) who are married daughters in view of amendment to Section 6 36 to Hindu Succession Act and the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma (supra), are declared as coparceners by birth and therefore, they are entitled for equal share at par with two brothers namely Lakshminarayan and defendant No.3. To carve out and grant share to widow, if notionally 1/6th share is allotted to Kada Shetty, the original plaintiff K.Lakshminarayan, defendant No.3 and defendant Nos.1(a) to (c) independently take 1/6th share each. In 1/6th share allotted to Kada Shetty, widow will take 1/6th share i.e., 1/36th share, while the sons and daughters will also take 1/36th share each. Point No.(ix) is answered accordingly. 44. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following; ORDER (i) Appeal is allowed in part; (ii) The judgment and decree dated 30.11.2010 passed in O.S.No.2282/1996 on the file 37 of the I Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, is hereby modified; (iii) Plaintiffs together are entitled for 7/36th share; (iv) Draw preliminary decree accordingly; (v) No order as to costs. Sd/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA