[2026:RJ-JP:18037] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 119/2026 1. Mukesh S/o Babu Lal, Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.). 2. Kamlesh D/o Babulal, W/o Vinod, R/o Mehmadpura, Tehsil Rajakheda, District Dholpur. 3. Devesh D/o Babulal, W/o Ram, R/o Parwana Road, Khureji Laxminagar, Delhi 4. Seema D/o Babulal, W/o Sunil, Resident Of Near Parshuram Chatrawas, Vanki Road, Hindauncity, District Karauli (Raj.). 5. Rudra Sharma S/o Mukesh Chand Sharma, Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.). ----Petitioners/Defendants Nos. 1,5,6,7,10 Versus 1. Ghanshyam Aged About 65 years S/o Shri Latoor, R/o Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.) 2. Prem Chand, Aged About 60 Years S/o Shri Latoor, Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.). 3. Horilal, Aged About 44 Years S/o Shri Latoor, Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.). 4. Kusma, Aged About 55 Years D/o Latoor, Wife Of Shivdayal, Resident Of Village Jatmasi, Tehsil Roopwas, District Bharatpur (Raj.). 5. Darupti Aged About 57 Years D/o Shri Latoor, W/o Prabhudayal, Resident Of Village Jatmasi, Tehsil Roopwas, District Bharatpur (Raj.). 6. Pooja Aged About 52 Years D/o Lathoor, W/o Ashok Tiwari, Resident Of Mohammadi, Tehsil Tundla, District Firozabad (U.p.). ----Respondents/Plaintiffs 7. Pammi Devi W/o Hemendra, S/o Babulal 8. Payal D/o Hemendra, S/o Babulal. 9. Kaushal Aged About 14 Years, S/o Hemendra S/o Babulal,Minor Through Natural Guardian Mother Pammi Devi. All Resident Of Morda Tehsil Weir, At Present Resident Of Arjun Nagar Sonkh Road Behind Dainiki [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (2 of 11) [CR-119/2026] Bhaskar Office, Bharatpur (Raj.). 10. Mithlesh D/o Babulal, W/o Mahendra, Resident Of C/o Rajendra Prasad, Ram Nagar, Sitanagar, Rambagh, Agra, District Agra (U.p.) 11. Krishankant Sharma S/o Mukesh Chand Sharma, Resident Of Morda, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.). 12. Sub-Divisional Officer, Weir, Tehsil Weir, District Bharatpur (Raj.). ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R.K. Daga, Adv. For Respondent(s) : Mr. J.P. Goyal, Sr. Adv. assisted by Ms. Jyoti Swami, Adv. Ms. Ronak Bansal, Adv. Mr. Naman Sharma, Adv. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR Judgment Date of Arguments Concluded : 15/04 /202 6 Date of Judgment Reserved : 15/04 /202 6 Full/Operative Part Uploaded : Full Date of Judgment Pronounced : 22/05 /2026 1. By way of filing this instant petition under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short as 'CPC'), the petitioners have assailed the order dated 25.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Weir, District Bharatpur (hereinafter to be referred as learned 'trial Court'), in Civil Suit No. 1/2025 titled as "Ghanshyam Vs. Mukesh and Ors.", whereby the application preferred by the present petitioners/defendant Nos.1,5,6,7 and 10 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC came to be rejected. [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (3 of 11) [CR-119/2026] 2. Briefly stated, the respondents-plaintiffs instituted a civil suit on 27.11.2024 seeking declaration and permanent injunction to the effect that the compromise dated 17.07.1982 and the judgment and decree dated 10.09.1982 passed by Additional Collector, Bayana (hereinafter referred to as ‘Revenue Court’) in Revenue Suit No. 95/1982, be declared null and void and further declaration, that the gift deed dated 31.10.2022 be declared void. 3. The case set up in the plaint is that one Babulal had earlier instituted a revenue suit for declaration of khatedari rights and perpetual injunction against his brother Latoor (Father of the plaintiff-respondent) before the competent Revenue Court, which was decided on the basis of a compromise dated 17.07.1982, culminating into a compromise decree dated 10.09.1982. Consequently, mutation entries were effected in the revenue records in terms of compromise decree. Later on, Babulal executed a gift deed on 31.10.2022 in favour of Defendant Nos.9 and 10. It is an admitted position that during his lifetime, Latoor never challenged the compromise or the compromise decree passed by the learned Revenue Court. After a lapse of more than four decades, the present suit has been instituted by his legal representatives challenging the said compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was obtained by playing fraud on Latoor and necessary parties were not impleaded in the suit. The present petitioners moved an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC contending, inter alia, that the suit is barred by law particularly, in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, and is also barred by limitation. The respondents-plaintiffs opposed the said [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (4 of 11) [CR-119/2026] application, contending that the objections raised involve mixed questions of fact and law, which require adjudication after evidence. The learned trial Court, vide order dated 25.02.2026, dismissed the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC holding that the issues raised cannot be decided at the threshold and require trial. Aggrieved thereby, the present civil revision petition has been filed. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error inasmuch as the learned trial Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Learned counsel also submits that the respondent-plaintiffs have challenged the compromise decree/judgment dated 10.09.1982 by way of an independent civil suit, which is expressly prohibited under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to appreciate that the bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC is absolute and operates at the threshold, and therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC without embarking upon a trial. 5. Learned counsel for petitioners further contends that the original decree having been passed in the year 1982, and the suit having been instituted in the year 2024, the same is barred by limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act. The plaint does not disclose any cause of action as to how the suit is within limitation, therefore, the suit is liable to be rejected on this ground also. [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (5 of 11) [CR-119/2026] 6. Learned counsel for petitioners further argues that the predecessor of the plaintiffs/respondents, namely Latoor, never challenged the compromise decree during his lifetime, and thus, the legal representatives are bound by the said decree. The plaintiffs, lack locus standi to challenge a decree which had attained finality decades ago. Learned counsel further argues that a decree passed by a competent court, particularly on the basis of compromise, cannot be challenged by way of a separate suit, and any such challenge must be raised before the same court which passed the Judgment and compromise decree. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners prays that the order passed by the learned trial Court be quashed and set aside, while allowing the application filed by the petitioner for rejecting the plaint. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the following judgments:- • Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3720 • Sree Surya Developers and Promoters Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad and Ors. with Raja Pushpa Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. N.Sailesh Prasad and Ors. reported in (2022) 5 SCC 736 • Shri Ram & Anr. v. 1st Addl. Distt. Judge & Ors. reported in 2001 3 SCC 24 • Pushpa devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh & Ors. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 566 • T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. reported in (1977) 4 SCC 467 • Manjunath Tirakappa Malagi & Anr. v. Gurusiddappa Tirakappa Malagi (Dead Through LRs) reported in 2025 SCC online SC 835. [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (6 of 11) [CR-119/2026] • Jitendra Singh Deora v. Paras Kumar & Ors. reported in 2025 Supreme(Raj) 1881 • Anju (Smt.) & Ors. v. Vikram Kaur reported in 2013 Supreme (All) 1160 • Dunia Lal Dutta v. Nagendra Nath Datta & Anr. reported in AIR 1982 CALCUTTA 163. 9. On the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, vehemently argued that a suit to examine the validity and correctness of the compromise or the question regarding legality of the same cannot be adjudicated by Revenue Court, therefore, only a Civil Court would be able to adjudicate the issue. Hence, the learned trial Court has rightly rejected the application moved by the petitioners before it. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the following judgments:- • Horil Vs. Keshav and Ors. reported in (2012) 5 SCC 525 • Sree Surya Developers (supra) • S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. reported in 1994 1 SCC 1 • Jitendra Singh Deora (supra) • Siri Bhagwan v. VBM Estates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. reported in 2015 Supreme(Del) 4151 • Harbir & Ors. v. Bhabhuti reported in 2012 Supreme(P&H) 1486. 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 12. Before proceeding with the discussion, it is pertinent to first examine Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A of the CPC. For ease of reference, the provisions are reproduced herein below: "ORDER XXIII Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits [1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.—(1) At any time after the [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (7 of 11) [CR-119/2026] institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim: Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court. (2) An application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or such other person. (3) Where the Court is satisfied,— (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of suit or part of a claim, It may, on such terms as it thinks fit grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. (4) Where the plaintiff— (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub- rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. (5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiff.] [1A.When transposition of defendants as plaintiffs may be permitted.—Where a suit is withdrawn or abandoned by a plaintiff under rule 1, and a defendant applies to be transposed as a plaintiff under rule 10 of Order I the Court shall, in [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (8 of 11) [CR-119/2026] considering such application, have due regard to the question whether the applicant has a substantial question to be decided as against any of the other defendants.] 2. Limitation law not affected by first suit.—In any fresh suit instituted on permission granted under the last preceding rule, the plaintiff shall be bound by the law of limitation in the same manner as if the first suit had not been instituted. 3. Compromise of suit.-Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise [in writing and signed by the parties]or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:] [Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.] [Explanation.- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not he deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.]" [3A. Bar to suit.-No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. 3B. No agreement or compromise to be entered in a representative suit without leave of Court.—(1) No agreement or compromise in a representative suit shall be entered into without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings; and any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court as recorded shall be void. (2) Below granting such leave, the Court shall give notice in such manner as it may think fit to such persons is as may appear to it to be interested in the suit. Explanation.—In this rule, “representative suit” means,— [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (9 of 11) [CR-119/2026] (a) a suit under Section 91 or Section 92, (b) a suit under rule 8 of Order I, (c) a suit in which the manager of an undivided Hindu family sues or is sued as representing the other members of the family, (d) any other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of the provisions of this Code or of any other law for the time being in force, bind any person who is not named as party to the suit.] 4. Proceedings in execution of decrees not affected.—Nothing in this Order shall apply to any proceedings in execution of a decree or order." 13. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondents upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Horil (supra),wherein the case of the appellant was as hereinbelow - "3. According to the appellant, the defendants had instituted the suit before the Assistant Collector in which his father, namely, Chunkai was made as one of the opposite party. In that suit, a compromise petition was filed on 7-10-1971 with the fake signature of Chunkai and on that basis a compromise decree finally came to be passed on 25-4-1979. 4. It is the case of the appellant that no notice of the suit was ever served upon his father Chunkai. He never appeared in the proceeding and was not even aware of it. He did not sign any compromise petition and his alleged signature on the compromise petition dated 7-10-1971 was faked. He had died much earlier and was not even alive in 1979 when the decree was passed. The appellant, accordingly, sought a declaration that the decree dated 25-4-1979 passed by the Assistant Collector, Class I, Karwi, may be cancelled or it may be declared as void ab initio, inoperative and not binding upon him." [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (10 of 11) [CR-119/2026] After analyzing the provision of Order XXIII of CPC, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Horil (supra), has held as under:- "15. We are of the view that the Revenue Courts are neither equipped nor competent to effectively adjudicate on allegations of fraud that have overtones of criminality and the courts really skilled and experienced to try such issues are the courts constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure." Hence, on the facts of the case, the Hon'ble Apex Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of Order XXIII of CPC shall not act as a bar against the suit filed by the appellant. 14. On the other hand, reliance has been placed by learned counsel for petitioner on the settled proposition in the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sree Surya Developers (supra) as well as the judgment passed by the Coordinate bench of this Court at Principal seat at Jodhpur in case of Jitendra Singh Deora (supra), has held that a separate suit challenging a compromise decree is not maintainable and is barred by Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC particularly when read in conjunction with the aforesaid explanation to Rule 3. It was also observed that the Explanation underscores that the question of legality or validity of a compromise must be examined by the very Court before which such compromise is presented without a separate suit; consequently, the only recourse available to an aggrieved party is to invoke the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII CPC and required to file an application seeking recall of the compromise decree before the same Court which passed the compromise decree, which alone is competent to examine the lawfulness of the [2026:RJ-JP:18037] (11 of 11) [CR-119/2026] compromise and adjudicate the issue upon consideration of the material placed before it. 15. 15. The facts of Horil's (supra) case are clearly distinguishable with the facts of present case, because in Horil's (supra) case no notice was ever served on appellant's father and he had died much earlier then the filing of the compromise on the basis of which compromise decree was passed, whereas, in the present matter, it is not the case of petitioner that alleged compromise was not signed by father of the plaintiff-respondent. The objection of the plaintiff-respondent with regard to not including the necessary parties also can be looked into by the Revenue Court which has passed the compromise decree/judgment on the basis of compromise. 16. Hence, in light of decision in Sree Surya Developers (supra), wherein it was held that the Court passing the compromise decree retains the jurisdiction to scrutinise its lawfulness upon challenge, the present revision petition is liable to be allowed. Hence, the impugned order dated 25.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Weir, District Bharatpur, in Civil Suit No. 1/2025 is hereby quashed and set aside. The trial Court is directed to decide the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC afresh in the light of the observations made in this order. 17. The revision petition is allowed accordingly and stay petition as well as all pending applications, if any, stands disposed of. (ASHUTOSH KUMAR),J AARZOO ARORA /--