Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2026 DAILYLAW 7114 (GAU)

Jiten Siyum Anr 2 Ors v. The State of AP

Crl.Petn./26/2026 · 2026-05-31

Mitali Thakuria

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Page No.# 1/10 GAHC040001822026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) (ITANAGAR BENCH) Case No. : Crl.Petn./26/2026 Jiten Siyum Anr 2 Ors Son of Shri Tajit Siyum, permanent resident of Linke Village, PO Siyum, PS Taliha, Siyum Circle, Upper Subansiri District, Arunachal Pradesh. 2: Manual Enduwar Age: Occupation : F/o Shri Andrivas Enduwar resident of Laluk Dhekiajuli Vilale PO and PS Laluk North Lakhimpur District Assam. 3: Techi Tadap Age: Occupation : Son of Late Techi Tagum resident of Model Village Naharlagun PO and PS Naharlagun Papum Pare District Arunachal Pradesh VERSUS The State of AP represented by the PP of AP Advocate for the Petitioner : Duge Soki, Reri Tatin Sogum Advocate for the Respondent : P P of AP, Page No.# 2/10 BEFORE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MITALI THAKURIA ORDER 01-06-2026 Heard Mr. D. Soki, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. D. Loyi, learned Addl. PP for the State respondent. 2. This is an application filed under Section 528 BNSS, 2023 for quashing of GR Case No. 752/2025, registered under Sections 117(3)/118(2) of BNS, 2023, read with Sections 25(1B)(a)/27(1) of the Arms Act which is pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yupia and the Charge Sheet No. 185/2025 dated 07.10.2025 in connection with Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 115/2025. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the present petition for quashing has been filed jointly by the accused petitioner No.1, the informant i.e., petitioner No.3 and the father of the victim i.e., petitioner No.2. 4. It is submitted that from the statement made by the victim as well as the witnesses, it clearly reveals that it was merely an accident and there was no intention of the petitioner to cause any harm to the victim, who is only a 13 year old boy. From the statement made by the victim also it is seen that at the time of the incident he was observing the repairing work of a vehicle in the garage of his uncle when suddenly one bullet hit him in his hip and he saw that blood is coming from wound. Thereafter, the accused immediately took the victim to the hospital for treatment and the family members of the accused provided all necessary treatment to the victim and he was immediately released from the hospital without any grievous injury on his person. Page No.# 3/10 5. He further submitted that from the circumstances and situation of this case, it is also seen that there was no quarrel or there was no enmity with the informant or the victim or the garage owner, i.e., the petitioner No. 3 and it was purely an accident where one bulled was coming out from the gun which was holding by the accused at the time of the incident. 6. He further submitted that the arms belong to his brother in law and it was gifted to him and for that there was also a gift deed agreement executed by the owner of the gun, but subsequently, the process for transferring the licence in the name of the accused petition No.1 could not be done due to ill health of his mother, who was suffering from cancer at the time of the incident. 7. Soon after the incident, the family members and the father of the victim as well as garage owner had entered into an agreement and they took all responsibility for treatment of the victim, but the accused could not put his signature in the agreement, as he was inside the jail during that time. But after coming out from jail after about 4/5 months a subsequent agreement was executed wherein the accused petitioner put his signature in the subsequent mutual agreement. 8. The situation and subsequent conduct of the petitioner show that it was purely and accidental case, wherein suddenly the victim sustained bullet injury. As the matter has already been compromised between the parties, there is no chance of adducing any evidence against the accused and in the case the probability of conviction is less, even if the case is allowed to be proceeded further. 9. Mr. Soki, learned counsel further relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others Page No.# 4/10 reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 wherein in para 14 and 15 some guidelines have been issued while dealing with petition under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 corresponding to Section 528 BNSS, 2023. 10. He further relied on another decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. Bharthi Devi and another Vs. State of Telangana and another reported in (2024) 10 SCC 384 wherein the order was passed for quashing considering the judgment of the two Judges Bench of Apex Court passed in case of Narinder Singh (supra). 11. Citing the above, referred judgment it is submitted by Mr. Soki that considering the situation and entire aspect of this case, the GR Case No. 752/2025, registered under Sections 117(3)/118(2) of BNS, 2023, read with Sections 25(1B)(a)/27(1) of the Arms Act which is pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yupia and the Charge Sheet No. 185/2025 dated 07.10.2025 in connection with Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 115/2025 may be set aside and quashed. 12. He further submitted that the accused petitioner was also not carrying the gun un-authorizedly as there was a gift deed which was executed by the owner of the gun and he himself stated before the I.O., that the agreement was executed so that he can carry the gun and also to avoid from any disturbances from police. 13. Mr. Soki, learned counsel accordingly submitted that this is a fit case wherein the entire proceeding pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yupia in GR Case No. 752/2025, registered under Sections 117(3)/118(2) of BNS, 2023, read with Sections 25(1B)(a)/27(1) of the Arms Act and the Charge Sheet No. 185/2025 dated 07.10.2025 in connection with Page No.# 5/10 Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 115/2025 may be set aside and quashed. 14. Mr. Loyi, learned APP submitted in this regard that there may be compromise between the parties, but from the materials in the case record, it reveals that at the time of incident, there was no licence in the name of the petitioner No.1 and the registration of the licence was still in the name of another person and thus, he was un-authorizedly carrying the gun at the time of the incident and Mr. Loyi, learned APP raised objection and submitted that it may not be a fit case for quashing by invoking the extraordinary power under Section 528 BNSS, 2023. 15. I have heard the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the case record. 16. It is a fact that the nature of the case under which the case is registered and charge sheeted is of heinous in nature wherein not only Section 117(3)/118(2) are there but the case is also registered under Section 25(1B) (a)/27(1) of the Arms Act. But after hearing the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and also on perusal of the statement made by the witnesses including the victim and the petitioner No.3, i.e., owner of the garage and other witnesses, also it is seen that on the day of the incident, the victim was only standing along with his uncle/garage owner and they were observing repairing works of a vehicle when all of a sudden he sustain bullet which was coming out from the arms which was carried by the accused petitioner. But there is no evidence at all that the petitioner had any previous grudge or at that moment there was any quarrel between him and the garage owner. There is no evidence that the petitioner had enmity with a 13 years child who was injured by the present petitioner through his arms. Page No.# 6/10 17. Considering the over all situation and circumstances of this case, it is seen that it was admittedly an accident wherein the victim, a 13 year old boy sustained bullet injury. Further it is seen that he subsequently, released from hospital after his full recovery. Further it is also seen that immediately after the incident, accused petitioner took the victim to the hospital and he also surrendered before the police after the said incident. After his arrest, his family members along with the family members of the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 entered into a settlement agreement and wherein the family members of the accused had bared all the expenses for the treatment of the child. Further after release of the accused petitioner on bail, one subsequent settlement agreement was made wherein the petitioner put his signature. Thus, it is seen that immediately after the incident, there was a compromise between the parties and considering the over all situation it is seen that it was an accident wherein a boy/victim sustained bullet injury. 18. Coming to the issue raised by the learned PP in regards to carrying of an unauthorized arms, it is seen that there was no licence in the name of the petitioner and he was carrying the gun which was in the name of another person. But from the statement made by the owner of the gun, it is also seen that he made a gift deed but allowing the petitioner to use his gun and the deed was executed only to save the petitioner from unnecessary harassment from police. The process of registration of the licence in the name of the petitioner was also going on, but only due to ill health of this mother, the registration process could not be initiated. Thus, it is seen that though petitioner was carrying a gun without any licence in his name, but it is seen that the gift deed was executed by the owner of the gun in the month of February, 2025, but the process of registration could not be completed and the unfortunate incident had Page No.# 7/10 happened. 19. The Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan as referred above, in para 14 basing on a decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) and accordingly expressed that the power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be exercised in cases involved of heinous serious offences of mental depravity or offences like, murder, rape, dacoity etc., and offences which are not in private in nature and have a serious effect on society. Para 14 of the judgment read as under: 14. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court in the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat (supra) is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court has noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences conferred on a court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh (supra), the very Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under: “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. Page No.# 8/10 While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to Page No.# 9/10 come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 20. In the instant case, it is seen that the case was registered under the offences of heinous offences wherein the arms was also alleged to have been used by the present petitioner, but considering the over all circumstances as disused above, it is seen that the case can be considered as an accident and it also private in nature wherein the parties have arrived at a settlement immediately after the incident and that apart, family members of the accused petitioner also bear all the expenses of the treatment of the child. 21. 21. So considering this aspect of the case, even if the case is registered under Sections registered under Sections 117(3)/118(2) of BNS, 2023, read with Sections 25(1B)(a)/27(1) of the Arms Act, this Court is of the opinion that power under Section 528 BNSS can be exercised in such a situation and that apart the chance of conviction is also bleak and remote even if the case is allowed to proceed further as there is no probability of adducing evidence against the present petitioner, which have already been compromised between the parties. 22. Accordingly, the GR Case No. 752/2025, registered under Sections 117(3)/118(2) of BNS, 2023, read with Sections 25(1B)(a)/27(1) of the Arms Act which is pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yupia and the Charge Sheet No. 185/2025 dated 07.10.2025 in connection with Naharlagun P.S. Case No. 115/2025 pending against the accused petitioner is hereby set aside and quashed. Page No.# 10/10 23. This criminal petition accordingly stands disposed of. JUDGE Comparing Assistant