HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD WRIT - C No. - 740 of 2019 Court No. - 5 HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J. HON'BLE VIVEK SARAN, J. 1. The matter is directed to be listed peremptorily today vide order dated 03.09.2026. The case is also listed peremptorily and there as as many as three counsel name are showing in the daily cause list out of which one counsel is filed his illness slip. though Sri Satvik Choudhary, learned counsel holding brief of Sri Adarsh Bhushan, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3 is present. 2. The petitioner has preferred the present petition with the following prayers:- "I- Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned recovery citation dated 28.09.2018 (Annexure No. 13 to the writ petition) issued against the Petitioner demanding market fee on turnover of finished leather, shoe upper and leather footwear.. II- Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing and commanding the Respondent no.3, 4 and 5 not to demand or recover from the Petitioner any amount towards market fee on Hides and Skins under the notifications for the period 25.11.2004 to 31.03.2006 or any other period." 3. It is argued by learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3 that the controversy involved in the present petition has already been dealt with and decided by a Division Bench of this Court vide judgement and order dated 17.04.2026 passed in Writ C No.2923 of 2019 (M/S Samsons Versus Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Bed Kant Mishra, Devendra Kumar Tiwari, Shivam Shukla Counsel for Respondent(s) : Adarsh Bhushan, Ashish Mishra, C.S.C., Rajesh Kumar Yadav M/S Arfat Tanners .....Petitioner(s) State Of U.P. And 4 Others .....Respondent(s) Exports Vs. State of U.P. and others) (Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:84994-DB). 4. It is stated in the writ petition that the hides and skins and preparation of upper part of slippers and sandles would not amount to agriculture produce. 5. Per contra learned counsel appearing for the Mandi Parishad has placed a Division Bench judgment of Supreme Court in Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors, (2001) 3 SCC 135 in which vide paras 21, 22 & 23 it has been held thus: "21. We see no reason to go into the difference between 'manufacturing' and 'processing'. In the strict sense of the terms there may be a difference. However, we are not required to go into these differences as, in our view, it is very clear, from what has been set out by the Appellants themselves in their affidavit that for hide and skin to be converted into leather or tanned leather all that is required is a process. It is a process of cleaning, curing and adding preservatives. That it is a process has been held by this Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Mahi Traders and Others, etc. (Supra). We are also of the view that the finished product i.e. 'tanned leather' even though it may have changed in physical appearance or chemical combination and even though it may commercially be a different item still remains a 'hide' or a 'skin'. 22. For this reason we are of the opinion that there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. 23. Even otherwise our above view is supported by the Hindi version of the definition. As has been set out in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (Supra), it is well known in U.P. all legislations are in Hindi. Of course an English version simultaneously published. Undoubtedly if there is conflict between the two than the English version would prevail. However, if there is no conflict then one can always have assistance of the Hindi version in order to find out whether the word used in English includes a particular item or not. In the Hindi version the word used is 'Chamra'. There can be no dispute that the term 'Chamra' would include 'leather' in all its forms." 6. Thus, according to learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 & 3, the controversy sought to be raised is no more res integra. 7. Considering to the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 & 3, however, he should be given some respite in terms WRIC No. 740 of 2019 2 of time to pay back the dues sought to be recovered by means of recovery citation. 8. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the petitioner to deposit Rupees One Lac in 15 days from today and in any case by 26.09.2026 and remaining amount in three bimonthly installments beginning from 01.11.2026. It is made clear that any default in payment of dues, as directed herein above, will cease the protection granted by this Court and the Mandi Parishad shall be at liberty to recover the amount in accordance with law. 9. It is further provided that in the event petitioner deposited the amount as directed herein above, no coercive measure shall be taken against the petitioner. 10. We make it clear that no time extension application, nor any second writ petition would be entertained in any circumstances, nor any modification application for modification of this order shall be entertained. 11. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this petition stands disposed of. September 11, 2026 saqlain WRIC No. 740 of 2019 3 (Vivek Saran,J.) (Prakash Padia,J.) Digitally signed by :- SYED MOHAMMAD SAQLAIN HAIDER High Court of Judicature at Allahabad