Page No.# 1/13 GAHC020002582026 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WP(C)/57/2026 MAJOR LAUV KUMAR HQ IGAR (NORTH), KOHIMA, D BLOCK, 732555, C/O 99 APO VERSUS UNION OF INDIA THROUGH THE MILITARY SECRETARY IHQ OF MOD (ARMY), DELHI THE MILITARY SECRETARYS MS BRANCH, IHQ OF MOD (ARMY), SOUTH BLOCK, NEW DELHI - 110011 Advocate for the Petitioner : IN PERSON, MEDO VERO,SIDDHART LUTHRA, SR. ADV Advocate for the Respondent : , BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA JUDGMENT Date : 25-05-2026 Date on which judgment is reserved : 05.05.2026 Date of pronouncement of judgment : 25.05.2026 Whether the pronouncement is of the operative part of the judgment? : NO Page No.# 2/13 Whether the full judgment has been Pronounced : YES JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. S. Luthra, learned senior counsel through video- conferencing mode, assisted by Mr. M. Joshi and Mr. Medo Vero, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Dr. N. Mozika, learned senior counsel through video-conferencing mode, assisted by Ms. K. Gurung, learned counsel for the Union of India, representing all the respondents. Mr. Yangerwati, learned CGC is present. 2) It may be mentioned that the petitioner has challenged his transfer and Major Payal Goyal, who is the relieving officer and has already arrived, is permitted to be present in the proceeding. 3) The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is a JAG Officer and presently functioning as Additional Law Officer at the Office of the Inspector General Assam Rifles (North), Kohima. He was deputed to the present place of posting by signal dated 05.08.2024 and he had joined the said post of 30.09.2024. However, before completion of his two year tenure, the petitioner has been transferred by virtue of posting signals dated 18.03.2026 and 01.04.2026, passed by the Military Secretary Branch, IHQ of Ministry of Defence (MS Branch). Govt. of India and posted as Additional Officer, under HQ Western Command. The petitioner claims that he has not been given a defined duty and thus, his transfer is arbitrary and in colourable exercise of power. It is also projected that the transfer of the petitioner is violative Page No.# 3/13 of the Posting Policy of Assam Rifles bearing No. 04530/MS Policy dated 19.11.2009, which prescribes tenure of (a) 21/2 years for “Officers Bns (Offrs. Posted in bulk)” and (b) 2 years for “all staff appointments”. By referring to a purported “service profile of the petitioner”, annexed to reply filed in I.A. No. 74/2026, it has been submitted that the petitioner has an illustrious career and ought not to have been transferred before his usual tenure. 4) It has been submitted that after the issuance of the transfer signals, the Offg SO-1(A), on behalf of the Inspector General Assam Rifles (N), by a communication dated 15.04.2026, addressed to the Military Secretary’s Branch (MS-20A), Integrated Military HQ to MoD (Army), recommended for deferment of posting of the petitioner and completion of tenure of two years, containing detailed justification for the deferment. It has been submitted that the respondents would project that out of 21 months of posting, the petitioner remained away from functional duties from Headquarters for 9 months and therefore, the work was suffering, and in this regard, it has been submitted that during that time, the petitioner was officially assigned duty at a different office and therefore, he was on duty during the said period and therefore, the respondents cannot accuse that the work of the petitioner had suffered. Moreover, it has been submitted that even during the said period, the petitioner had cleared several important files of IGAR(N). However, in a sudden change of stand, on behalf of the Director General of Assam Rifles, communications were made to the Military Secretary’s Branch for transfer of the petitioner. Page No.# 4/13 5) It has been submitted that no affidavit-in-opposition has been filed against the writ petition and therefore, by applying doctrine of non- traverse, the petitioner deserves to be allowed and in the said context, the case of Ganda Khunghur Basumatary v. State of Assam & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Gau 4261, decided by this Court has been cited. Moreover, it has been submitted that the respondents have also not produced any record before this Court for perusal. It has also been submitted that contradictory stand have been taken by the respondents and therefore, the entire exercise of transfer of the petitioner was not fair and equitable. In support of his submissions that as the respondents have taken contradictory stand, the principle against approbate and reprobate would apply and in the said context, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has cited the case of Union of India v. N. Murugesan & Ors., (2022) 2 SCC 23. 6) It has been submitted that aggrieved by Court of Enquiry convened in respect of the petitioner, he had approached the Armed Forces Tribunal and it is projected that the said learned Tribunal by its orders had protected the petitioner. However, the Court of Inquiry was ordered to proceed against the petitioner, but before taking any action, the authorities were directed to take leave of the learned Tribunal. Moreover, by referring to the social media posts, which have been annexed to the writ petition, it has been submitted that on the information about the purported transfer of the petitioner to Western Command being circulated, the officers of the said area have been giving posts in social media, which disclose that there were several officers waiting to “fix’ the petitioner and therefore, it has been submitted that the petitioner ought not to be transferred to the proposed place of posting. Page No.# 5/13 7) It has also been submitted that the Armed Forces Tribunal would not have jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer and posting of officers in armed forces under Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, which is excluded from the purview of the Armed Forces Tribunals under Section 3(o)(iv)(ii) thereof. 8) In support of his submissions, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner had cited the following cases, viz., (i) Somesh Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 592, (ii) Vinod Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 SCC OnLine Gau 685, (iii) N. Murugesan (supra). 9) Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondents has submitted that consequent to the transfer order, the relieving officer, Major Payal Goyal has reported for joining her duty and owing to the interim orders passed in this matter, presently, there are two officers for one post and as charge has not been handed over by the petitioner, the relieving officer has not been able to discharge her duties. It has been submitted that as the posting of the petitioner was required in other office of the respondents, the petitioner remained outside the jurisdiction of Inspector General, Assam Rifles (N) and therefore, there was no impropriety in the officers making a request to relieve the petitioner by another officer. 10) It has been submitted that the High Court of Bombay, by its order passed in the case of Lt. Col. Anjan Kumar Senha v. Union of India & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1550, had relegated the petitioner to move the Central Administrative Tribunal and therefore, alternative remedy is available to the petitioner. Page No.# 6/13 11) It has been submitted that in the case of Major General J.K. Bansal v. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 227, the Supreme Court of India had held that scope for interference of transfer of members of armed forces is very limited. 12) The Court had permitted Major Payal Goyal leave to address the Court. This leave was granted on two counts. Firstly, she is a lady officer of Armed Forces, who is on transfer to the jurisdiction of Inspector General Assam Rifles (North), has arrived at her place of posting. Secondly, she had submitted that as she has arrived and she apprehends that any delay in joining her transferred post may be read adversely in her future service career. 13) Perused (i) the writ petition; (ii) petition of I.A.(C) No. 72/2026 filed by the Union of India, through the Military Secretary, BHQ of MoD (Army), Delhi for impleading itself as respondents in the writ petition; (iii) Reply affidavit filed by the writ petitioner; (iv) petition of I.A. (C) No. 74/2026 filed by the applicant in I.A.(C) No. 72/2026 for vacating/ modification of the order of stay dated 24.04.2026; (v) Reply affidavit filed by the writ petitioner; (vi) I.A.(C) No. 76/2026 filed by the writ petitioner; and (vii) argument note by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. 14) The learned senior counsel for the petitioner had emphasized on 2 (two) major points. Firstly, it was urged that the present transfer order is punitive and mala fide with stress of the petitioner being transferred prematurely before completion of his usual tenure. Second limb of attack was that contradictory stand has been taken by the Assam Rifles and MS Branch. Page No.# 7/13 15) In respect of the transfer being mala fide, it was submitted that petitioner was transferred to the present place of posting by signal dated 05.08.2024 and he joined in the post on 30.09.2024. It was submitted that the tenure of posting for the petitioner in the said post is 2 (two) years. Both the submissions are admitted by the learned senior counsel for the respondents. In respect of the submissions that the petitioner was sought to be transferred, the learned senior counsel for the respondents had made his submissions justifying the transfer by submitting that according to a section of authorities, the work in the Office of the Inspector General Assam Rifles was suffering for reasons that are being attributed to the petitioner, which is vehemently denied by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. 16) It has been further submitted that no specific duty was assigned to the petitioner in his new place of posting. This is also not disputed or denied by the learned senior counsel for the respondents. In this regard, the Court finds it to be very premature to presume that the authorities have acted in a mala fide and arbitrary manner to post the petitioner at a place without first delineating the scope of his work or role because it has to be presumed that if the armed force of the Country has created a post, the officer posted there would have some utility. It was projected that transfer posting are done under consultative process, but merely because the authorities could not transfer the petitioner to the choice expressed by the petitioner, it cannot be said that the transfer of the petitioner is mala fide. It can also be possible that there may be certain posts/ position in the Armed Forces, and the authorities may deem it appropriate that scope of work in the said post is not to be known to Page No.# 8/13 persons outside a certain chain of command. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the Court would not like to call for details of scope of work of the post to which the petitioner is sought to be transferred. 17) In the case of Union of India Vs. S.A. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, the Supreme Court of India has held that the Administrative Tribunal is not an Appellate Authority sitting in judgment over the orders of transfer and that it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority competent to transfer. It may be stated that in the same judgment, it has been also held that the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal is akin to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in service matters, further stating that the same is evident from a perusal of Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. It was also observed that the constraints and norms which the High Court observes while exercising the said jurisdiction apply equally to the Tribunal created under Article 323-A. 18) The grievance of the petitioner is that in some social media posts, some officers in the Western Command are eagerly waiting for the petitioner to arrive there so that they can ‘fix’ him. Though the social media post has been referred to, but the petitioner has not stated that the concerned person making the post is currently serving personnel or a retired army personnel. The petitioner has not disclosed that the officer(s), who are circulating posts/ comments in the social media, which according to the petitioner, indicate that the co-officers would ‘fix’ him, are posted in the same office or command area or zone in which the petitioner is sought to be transferred and posted. In the said context, the learned senior counsel for the respondents had stated that on specific Page No.# 9/13 instructions from the Office of the Inspector General Assam Rifles (North), he is instructed to submit that the person whose social media posts has been annexed in the writ petition, is a retired army officer. 19) Therefore, as in this case in hand, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate the existence of mala fide, the case of Somesh Tiwari (supra), would go against the petitioner, because, in the said case, the Supreme Court of India had reiterated that transfer is an incidence of service and cannot be interfered with unless it is shown to have been vitiated by mala fide or because of malice. 20) The decision of Vinod Kumar Meena (supra), also does not help the petitioner because in that case, the transfer order itself contained an advisory to the officer under transfer not to indulge in groupism and therefore, this Court had held that the transfer order was stigmatic. Similar fact situation does not exist in this case. 21) The second point urged by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that contradictory stand has been taken by the Assam Rifles and MS Branch. It was submitted that the Directorate General Assam Rifles (HQ DGAR), in the I.A.(C) No. 72/2026 have projected that they had issued several communications to the MS Branch to transfer the petitioner because he was facing a Court of Inquiry due to which he was not able to attend to his work at HQ IGAR (N), but on the contrary, the proceeding of Court of Inquiry has been stayed vide order dated 29.10.2025, passed by the learned Armed Forces Tribunal in O.A. No. 434/2025 and thereafter, from 02.11.2025, the petitioner has been regularly discharging his duties. The said stand is in contrast to the documents appended to the petitioner’s reply in I.A. (C) No. 72/2026, Page No.# 10/13 where, the petitioner has annexed documents to show that HE IGAR had recommended deferment of the transfer of the petitioner, which was later on withdrawn. Again, on the contrary, the MS Branch, in I.A.(C) No. 74/2026, had taken a plea that transfer is in organizational interest and as a part of routine manpower management and was not punitive. 22) In this regard, the Court is of the view that the petitioner has shown from the impugned transfer order that the authority that had transferred the petitioner is the Military Secretary’s Branch, Army Headquarter. There may be a given case where some officers may have made contradictory remarks in respect of the petitioner, but even in such cases, the view expressed by the authority that is authorized to transfer the petitioner shall prevail. The petitioner would have a reasonable ground to question the remark expressed by any authority which is ultimately recorded in his APAR/ ACR, by whatever name called in the concerned Army Organisation, in the event it has any likelihood to adversely affect his career. 23) In this regard, the case of N. Murugesan & Ors. (supra), was relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. In that case, an advertisement was issued for appointment to the post of Director General of Power Research Institute, either by direct recruitment or on deputation. The post was a five year initial tenure post. After four years, the respondent made a representation to treat him as regular employee and therefore, he be continued till his superannuation. Under the said facts, the Supreme Court of India had held that when appointment to a tenure post was made, the Court of law cannot give the respondent a different status and accordingly, it was held that the respondent was not Page No.# 11/13 entitled to any relief. Thus, on facts, the present case is distinguishable because a departmental guideline to fix a particular tenure of posting on transfer cannot be equated with a case where appointment is made to a tenure post. 24) In the case of S.A. Abbas (supra) it was held that the Court or the Tribunal cannot quash the order of transfer, if any of the administrative instructions/ guidelines is not followed. Similarly, in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402, the Supreme Court of India had observed to the effect that this Court has often reiterated that the order of transfer made even in transgression of administrative guidelines cannot also be interfered with, as they do not confer any legally enforceable rights unless shown to be vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provision. 25) On the issue of transfer and posting, the Court is of the considered opinion that before the transfer and/or posting orders is interfered with there is a necessity for the petitioner to prove violation of his fundamental rights. In this regard, the Court finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Major Amod Kumar v. Union of India, (2018) 18 SCC 478. 26) In the case of Major General J.K. Bansal (supra), the Supreme Court of India had held that scope for interference by the Courts in regard to the armed forces is far more limited and narrow and was held that it is for the higher authorities to decide when and where a member of the armed forces should be posted. It was further observed that the Courts should be extremely slow in interfering with the order of transfer of such category of persons unless an exceptionally strong case is made out, no Page No.# 12/13 interference should be made. The Court is inclined to follow the same well settled legal principles in this case as the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference with his transfer. 27) Therefore, in light of the discussions above, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Needless to mention that the interim order passed on 24.04.2026, would stand vacated forthwith. 28) There shall be no order as to cost. 29) The Court is inclined to direct as under:- a. The authorities shall give a reasonable time for the petitioner to move to his place of posting. b. However, it would be open to the respondent authorities to allow the relieving officer to take over charge on and from such date and time as deemed fit by the authorities. c. In the event the petitioner does not hand over charge to the relieving officer, the competent authorities are permitted to allow the relieving officer to unilaterally assume charge of the post. 30) Before parting with the records, it may be reiterated that the relieving officer had expressed her apprehension before the Court that as she had come on transfer and could not take over charge, her future career may be adversely affected. In this regard, the Court cannot perceive that the career of any officer of the armed forces would be impacted in future due to interim order dated 24.04.2026, passed by this Court. If that is done, the relieving officer is at liberty to approach this Court. Page No.# 13/13 JUDGE Comparing Assistant Parimita Kalita Digitally signed by Parimita Kalita Date: 2026.05.26 00:52:08 -07'00'